


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A SHORT HISTORY
OF THE
GREEKS

London: C. J. CLAY AND SONS,
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE,
AVE MARIA LANE.

Glasgow: 50, WELLINGTON STREET.



Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS.

New York: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

Bombay: E. SEYMOUR HALE.

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A SHORT
HISTORY OF THE GREEKS
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES
TO B.C. 146

BY

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CAMBRIDGE:
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1901

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Cambridge:

PRINTED BY J. AND C. F. CLAY,
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

P R E F A C E.

THE only excuse for adding another to the many histories of Greece is the hope that the writer has been able so to state the old story—modified by recent studies and discoveries—as to suit the needs or tastes of certain classes of readers and students. In a book of this size it is impossible not to curtail or omit much that is interesting and even important. The aim of the writer, in selecting the topics to be dwelt upon, has been to choose those which best illustrate the political life and intellectual activities of the Greeks wherever they lived, not only in Greece proper, but in the larger Greece of Italy, Sicily, and Asia. To do this at all adequately in so short a space it was often necessary to reduce details as to particular cities and districts to a very low standard. The writer has wished to treat Greek History in a wide Hellenic spirit, but in spite of good resolutions he has found it as impossible, as others seem to have done, to avoid giving Athens the lion's share in the story. The

Persian Wars and the Athenian Supremacy will always, it is probable, represent the real points of interest to most readers of Greek History. It is almost impossible to be very cheerful over the Spartan and Theban Supremacies: and though Demosthenes has lent a revived brilliancy to the story of the Macedonian period, and Alexander the Great has a unique place in the imagination of mankind, we feel that Greece as we knew and loved it is slipping away from us, and it requires an effort to recover our interest in the intellectual life of Alexandria or the political experiments in the Peloponnese. The new Hellenism in the post-Alexandrine kingdoms, and the gradual absorption of all in the Roman system, should furnish a story well worth our study. But Polybius—in spite of many brilliant episodes—will never rival Herodotus and Thucydides, or even Xenophon, in popular favour. People will continue to be fascinated by the older writers and to be repelled by the historian of the Achæan League. The writer has tried however to tell this part of the story as clearly as the rest, and as circumstantially as his space allowed. It has also been his aim, besides the brief sketch of Greek Literature in the last chapter, to draw attention throughout to the intellectual and artistic movements in Greece as they became prominent from time to time, for they constitute the chief service of the Greeks to the world.

Finally, he has the pleasant duty of thanking Dr Jackson of Trinity College and Mr Whibley of Pembroke College for reading some of his proofs and giving him valuable suggestions. To the readers and other officials of the Cambridge University Press he is also under deep obligations.

E. S. SHUCKBURGH.

March, 1901.



HIERO II OF SYRACUSE.

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
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A SHORT HISTORY OF THE GREEKS.



CHAPTER I.

THEHELLENES IN GREECE.

GREEK History is not the history of a united people, living in a well-defined country, with a common capital.

There were many things indeed more or less common to all Greeks—descent, language, customs, views of religion; but there were other things that kept them apart: and during all the time in which we shall here study their history we shall find them split up into many separate groups and States. Even in the divisions marked on the map with a common name, such as Thessaly, Boeotia, Phocis, Arcadia, there were often several cities with a small territory that were, or wished to be, quite independent of each other. Moreover, the Greeks sent colonies in every direction to many other countries and islands, and wherever a colony went, it became a separate and independent State. The people were still Greeks and proud of being so, but they did not own any great central authority, and they each developed in a way peculiar to themselves. A history of the Greeks, therefore, is a history not of one, but of many States, which have differences as well as similarities, both of which we ought to observe.

The words Greek and Greeks are not those used by the people themselves. They called themselves Hellenes and their land Hellas. There is nothing like the word 'Greek' in Homer except Graea (Γραία), a town in Boeotia. When the name Hellas

1. The Greeks as a Nation.

2. What the Greeks called themselves.

got thoroughly into use, which was not till comparatively late in the history of the people, it was taken to include any part of the world where Hellenes lived, at any rate where they lived in great numbers. Thus Herodotus speaks of Sicily and Asia Minor as *Hellas*: and, though it sometimes means only what we call Greece, that is, Greece on the continent of Europe and the adjacent islands, it often also means what we should rather express by the phrase 'Hellenic world.' The Romans called the people and country *Graeci* and *Graecia*, apparently from a tribe in Epirus, with which they were early acquainted, and we, with most of the rest of Europe, have taken the words from them.

I said that the names of *Hellas* and *Hellenes* were adopted comparatively late in the history of Greece. The earliest written testimony we have is the poetry of Homer. In this 'Hellas' and 'Hellenes' only occur as the names of a small territory and tribe in Thessaly, and are not general names for Greece and the Greeks. As far as there is any such general name it is Achaeans ('Αχαιοί), Argives ('Αργεῖοι), or Danaoi (Δαναοί). The last died out, except in poetry, and the two former were afterwards confined to parts of Greece. In what seems the next oldest poetry after Homer—that of Hesiod—the words *Hellas* and *Hellenes* begin to be used. We, however, cannot be certain of the dates of either Homer or Hesiod (assuming them both to be names of real persons), and we must be content to say that at any rate by 800 B.C. Greece was commonly called *Hellas*, and the Greeks *Hellenes*, and that they called all other people barbarians (βάρβαροι). It is not likely that the Achaeans, Argives and Danaoi were of a race widely different from each other, or from the people who were strong enough to give the name of *Hellenes* to all alike. They may perhaps represent earlier migrations from the same stock. But even before them we hear of other nations living in Greece,—Leleges, Minyae, Pelasgoi. We know too little of these to decide what their relation to

3. The earliest inhabitants of Greece.

the Hellenes was, or how far they remained to influence and modify the Hellenes on their arrival in Greece. The Leleges, sometimes identified with the Carians, are heard of chiefly in connexion with the Islands; but both Herodotus and Thucydides looked upon the Pelasgoi as the prevailing race in Greece before the Hellenes. Their name is found in Homer in the appellation Pelasgic Argos for Thessaly, in Pelasgic Zeus as the title of the God of the ancient oracle of Dodona, in the name of one of the rulers of Larissa in Thessaly, as forming one body of the allies of Troy, and again as inhabiting Crete. They are also connected with Athens, where the remains of an ancient fortification of the Acropolis was in historical times called the Pelasgicon. Some believed that all Ionians, as well as the original inhabitants of Athens, were Pelasgoi, and remains of them were supposed to be found in many parts of Greece, especially in the islands of Lemnos and Imbros. According to report they were a peaceful agricultural folk and skilful builders. But records of them are so vague and uncertain, that we can only here note the tradition of a time when others than the Hellenes lived in Greece.

Accepting the fact of the Hellenes inhabiting Greece, we must next notice that they are divided into three great races or families, Dorians, Aeolians, and Ionians. Greek mythology accounted for this

4. The Three Hellenic families.

by saying that the common ancestor Hellen had three sons, Dorus, Aeolus, and Xuthus, and that Xuthus had two sons, Ion and Achæus, from whom they respectively were descended—thus making the Achæioi a fourth branch of the Hellenic family. Whether these three divisions of the Hellenic people represent three waves of invasion we cannot tell. All we can do in regard to them is to point out where they were chiefly found living in historical times. The Dorians—numerically inferior to the Aeolians—occupied, besides many Islands, a district in the South of Asia Minor, and another in

central Greece, and afterwards forced their way into Peloponnese, from which they sent out numerous colonies in many directions. The Aeolians spread themselves at first more widely in Greece. Beside a considerable district in the North of Asia Minor and the large island of Lesbos, they occupied the whole of central Greece and Thessaly (though from the last they seem to have been subsequently driven), parts of Peloponnese, and many islands. Their colonies, however, were mostly confined to the shores of the Pontus and its minor seas; they took little share in the colonisation of the West. The Ionians, who for some reason were at one time regarded as inferior to the other two, seem to have settled first in the North of the Peloponnese, whence they passed to Attica, Euboea, and to many of the Cyclades. Whether the Ionians of southern Asia Minor were a migration from Attica, or an independent settlement, was always a disputed point. In the sending out of colonies they were not behind the Dorians.

The first great movement among the Hellenes in Greece proper, of which we have any tradition, was that of the Dorians. In historical times they were found living in the islands of Aegina, Crete, Melos, Thera, Rhodes and Cos, with two cities on the mainland opposite to Cos, Cnidus and Halicarnassus. But in Greece proper they occupied Megara, Corinth, and the greater part of Peloponnese—Argolis, Laconia, and Messenia. Their presence in Peloponnese was accounted for mythologically by the legend of the return of the Heracleidae, the sons of Heracles, who, having been expelled from Mycenae and Tiryns by the tyrant Eurystheus, effected their return by aid of the Dorians, and divided the country between them. This also explained the fact that the kings of Sparta and Argolis, who claimed to be descendants of the Heracleidae, were not Dorians, but Achaeans. Putting aside mythology, it is certain that at some time or other subsequent to

5. The descent
of the Dorians
(? B.C. 1000).

the Homeric poems the Dorians did occupy these parts of Peloponnese. The ancient Achæan inhabitants either retreated to the northern district of Peloponnese, which retained their name, or remained in their old homes as freemen without political rights and were called perioeci (περίοικοι), or as serfs bound to the soil and called helots (εἰλωται), according perhaps as they submitted easily or made an obstinate resistance to the invaders. The old kingdoms of which we hear in Homer disappeared, and two strong Dorian States—Laconia and Argolis—took their place; while Messenia soon had to submit to the supremacy of Laconia. The Arcadians inhabiting the mountainous district in the centre managed to maintain their freedom and nationality. The people of Elis also, connected with the Aetolians on the opposite side of the Gulf of Corinth, held their own, and presently came to occupy a privileged position as possessing Olympia, the common meeting-ground of all Hellenes at the great Olympic festival.

We know of no great movement in central Greece like that of the Dorian invasion of Peloponnese. Yet

Thucydides tells us that changes of inhabitants had been frequent, especially where there was good soil, as in Boeotia and Thessaly, to attract invaders. Thus Thessaly is not a name known in Homer, who only mentions certain towns and districts in it. Since his time the Thessaloi must have come to overpower its Aeolian inhabitants and give it a name. Phœnicians seem to have occupied Thebes in Boeotia: and Locris is a name unknown to Homer. But Phocis and Aetolia had never been invaded in sufficient force to effect a change of name; and Attica, owing to its poor soil, and to its lying off the highway from the north, was believed to have been subject to less change of inhabitants than any other part of Greece. The people boasted of being natives of the soil (αὐτόχθονες), though according to one story they were once called Kranaoi, not Atticoi; and according to another, certain Ionians—driven from the Peloponnese by the

6. Greece
north of the
Peloponnese.

Dorians—took refuge there, and so affected the people that Athens came to be regarded as the Mother City of all the Ionians. In the North and North-West the countries known afterwards as Macedonia and Epirus were mostly barbarous—though there was probably a mixture of Hellenes to be found in them—and did not till much later affect the course of Greek History : but south of Epirus the town and district of Ambracia (as well as the island of Leucadia) were colonised by Corinth in the middle of the 7th century B.C.

The Hellenic families also occupied very early the Islands and the coast of Asia Minor. In the Ionian or Western sea the islands did not generally become Hellenic till the colonising age began. Thus Corcyra was colonised by the Corinthians, Zakynthus by the Achaeans. But the largest of the group, Cephallenia, seems to have had an Hellenic people long before this age and not to have been ever colonised in the ordinary way. To the South of the Peloponnese Cythera became Dorian with Laconia. In the Aegean the Cyclades—the islands round Delos as a centre—were very early occupied mostly by Ionians, though some few were Dorian, as Melos and some small neighbouring islands. The islands near the coast of Attica, especially the greater part of the long island of Euboea, were Ionian. Of the other islands Crete and Rhodes (with some smaller neighbours) were Dorian ; but Samos and Chios, as well as the Northern group—Thasos, Samothrace, Lemnos, Melos—were Ionian ; while Lesbos and the islets round it were Aeolian. The same distribution of the three Hellenic families is found on the coast of Asia Minor, where the Aeolians settled on the North, the Ionians in the centre, the Dorians in the South. The farther extension of the Hellenes we shall have to note when we study Greek colonisation. Here it is only necessary to remark that though the Hellenes settled in these parts of the continent and islands, there were in most of them remains of a more ancient race of inhabitants,

who can never be wholly disregarded in studying the history and character of each district and its people.

We have said that Greek history is mainly a history of separate States, jealous of their autonomy, and often bitterly opposed to each other, and yet with certain ties uniting them as against the rest of the world. Let us see first what were the causes making for disunion. Among the most decisive was the nature of the country. Greece in Europe is a small country about the size of Portugal, but owing to the irregularity of its coast line it has a seaboard greater than almost any other. The country again is mountainous, and the mountains generally come close down to the sea: therefore there are no navigable rivers. The obvious results of this are, first the division of the country into districts separated by ridges which make communication difficult, and for parts of the year often almost impossible; secondly the placing of most important towns within reach of the sea, and causing the people to become a seafaring folk, whose interests are in foreign traffic rather than in commerce with other towns, as it might have been, if they had had between them the easy connexion offered by rivers. Thus the map will shew you that the central district of the Peloponnese, Arcadia, is the core of a range of mountains which spreads like a fan over the rest of the land, dividing it into its separate districts. In Greece north of the Isthmus Attica is divided from Boeotia by the range of Cithaeron and Mt. Parnes; the range of Mt. Oeta forms a barrier to the North of Boeotia; while the plains of Thessaly are enclosed, as by a wall, by the ranges of Pindus and Othrys on the West and South, and the Cambunian Mountains and Olympus on the North. Something also must be put down to the genius of the people, fostered indeed by their geographical position, but also naturally imbued with a taste and ability for politics, only to be fully gratified in small States where all could take part in directing the government.

8. Causes
which tended
to separate
Greek States.

But while these causes made for separation, there were others that tended towards union. The first of these was the communion of blood and language, of which all Greeks were proud as marking them off from all other nations. With this common nationality they connected certain principles, such as the respect for the laws of hospitality, the observance of particular customs in war, especially in regard to the burial of the slain and the respect due to sacred places. If these principles were sometimes violated, yet they were—they thought—more generally observed by Greeks than by other nations. Again, religion formed a bond of union. Each State indeed had its own special object of worship, some god or goddess whom it particularly revered as the guardian of the city (*πολιούχος*), and a hero or deified man—founder or benefactor—whose chapel or *heroum* was regarded as the special feature of the country. Still the great Gods were recognised everywhere and their shrines respected, and in the eyes of all Zeus was the supreme god, the father of men and gods. Connected with this unity of blood and religion was the institution of the four great games—Olympic, Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean—in which the first condition of admission to compete was Hellenic birth. They were the occasion also of the meeting of Greeks from all parts. Proclamations and notices affecting all Greeks alike were published at these assemblies. At the Olympic festival a truce from war was proclaimed, and all Greeks could feel for a time that they were one people. Closely connected also with religion were the local Amphictyonies,—combinations of certain States to maintain some temple and join in worship at it. The chief of these was the Amphictyonic assembly, which met once a year at Delphi, and once at Thermopylae, consisting of deputies—called Pylagorae—from States belonging to the Aeolian, Dorian, Ionian, and other tribes. Their main object was the protection of the great temple at Delphi; but the council or congress also laid

down certain principles of what we might call international law in regard to the carrying on of war, which all pledged themselves to maintain,—thus in a manner making a large part of Greece into one nation for certain purposes. Similar in their effects were other religious assemblies, such as the yearly meeting of deputies from various States at Delos, once the great meeting ground of the Ionian States. Even after the Panionia was transferred to Ephesus, the Delian festival still remained an occasion for meeting to a large number of States. Lastly we shall often have occasion to remark the influence of the Oracle of Delphi. It was open to all comers, and professed at any rate to be impartial and above all local and separate interests. For a time perhaps it really was so, and did something to promote a national or Panhellenic spirit.

As Greece consisted of many separate States, so was there a great variety in the forms of government prevailing in them. They may however be classed under four general heads,—three acknowledged

10. Forms of
government in
Greece.

as regular and constitutional, one regarded as irregular. The three first are (1) the rule of a constitutional king, or *basileus* (*βασιλεία*), with fixed prerogatives, (2) Oligarchy (*ὀλιγαρχία*), the rule of the few, in which a privileged class possessed the chief political rights, (3) Democracy (*δημοκρατία*), where all the freemen of a State had equal rights and an equal voice in passing decrees or making laws. (4) The fourth or irregular government was that of a despot or tyrant (*τύραννος*). By this word was meant any ruler who usurped or in any way placed himself above the laws in a State, which had once enjoyed a constitution. It did not make any difference whether he ruled well or ill; his possession of absolute power was in spite of the laws, and he was a 'tyrant.'

The first of these forms of government—the limited monarchy—was the oldest. None other seems recognised in Homer, where the *basileus* represents the people before gods and men; performs religious rites, holds the levy in war, and

protects private rights in time of peace, giving out rules or dooms (*θέμιστες*) on his own authority, not by fixed law or *nomos* (*νόμος*)—a word which does not occur in Homer. He is not absolute, but is assisted by a *boulè* or council of elders, and sometimes refers questions to a public assembly or *agora*. In historical times however this form of government had almost disappeared. The name remained in Sparta and Argos, and in semi-hellenic countries, but in Sparta at any rate the office, though still surviving, had lost much of its importance and a real oligarchy existed. In Argos the name disappeared before the middle of the 5th century B.C., and was replaced by a democracy. Oligarchical governments continued to exist in Corinth and to a certain extent in Athens and other places for some time, and wherever Sparta had influence she endeavoured to promote them, but the tendency in these and most other parts of Greece from the 6th century onwards was in the direction of democracy. Tyrannies were spasmodic and short-lived. A great many of the States at one time or another in their history went through a period of subjection to Tyrants, who generally gained their position by taking the side of the people against the oligarchical nobles. But they seldom managed to maintain themselves beyond the second generation. What had been gained by the energy of the father, was generally lost by the weakness or the insolence of the sons, corrupted by the temptations of absolute power.

Greek religion arose from the observation of the great forces of nature, and the awe inspired by them in the minds of men. Thus the first thing that must strike human consciousness is the bright open sky; Zeus therefore, personifying this, is the first of gods, and his brethren are the representatives of the other elements—Poseidon of water, Demeter of earth, Aïdes god of the unseen underworld. Though the names and attributes of the gods of Greece may sometimes be traced to different sources—to Egypt, Phoenicia, Thrace—yet by the time that

II. Greek Religion.

the Homeric poems were written we find already acknowledged eleven of the twelve great gods—Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, Apollo, Hermes, Ares, Pallas, Aphrodite, Artemis, Demeter, Hephaestus¹. From Zeus, father of gods and men, had come Pallas, goddess of wisdom springing ready armed from his brows; the sun god Apollo; the moon goddess Artemis; Aphrodite the goddess of love and birth; the messenger Hermes; the war god Ares. To them in course of time the fancy of poets or mythologists added many more,—Night and Day, Birth, Youth and Death, Sleep and Strife, Wine and Song, the Seasons and their alternations of growth and decay, Justice the assessor of Zeus, Prayer and Retribution for wrong-doing,—all had their special deities. Woods, fountains, seas had their nymphs, and the winds their divine directors. The simple ideas underlying all this are that the gods are very near to us all in whatever we say and do and see; that men have need of these gods; that certain actions on the part of men will rouse their jealousy or call down their vengeance—for nature destroys as well as produces; and, lastly, that the gods can be approached in some way by prayer and sacrifice. Greek religion had no authorised book of dogma or doctrine, no central church to declare what was true or false. Yet forms of worship—generally in the shape of cheerful festival and song connected with seed-time, harvest, or vintage—had been handed down from immemorial antiquity, and the gods were believed to take pleasure in what gave pleasure to man. But it was all-important to know their will: hence sprang the appeal to oracles, so common throughout Greece, and the resort to mysteries or secret rites, in which certain persons claimed an hereditary power of revealing to the initiated the truth as to the relations between gods and men.

¹ The twelfth of the orthodox list is Hestia, the goddess of the hearth. This addition to the list may mark a time when family life—as opposed to State life—became more prominent. Thus for instance Grote remarks that there is no direct reference to the custom of purifying a man for homicide in Homer. This was one of the most sacred uses to which the Hestia or domestic altar could be put.

There were many oracles in Greece (between seventy and eighty), but Dodona in Epirus, Branchidae in Asia, the cave of Trophonius in Boeotia, and Delphi in Phocis surpassed the others in credit and permanence. By the sixth century Delphi was the most important of all. The temple was regarded as inviolable and the safest repository of public and private wealth. The oracle was consulted on every kind of question, from the most important to the most trivial. And at an early date collections of oracular responses were made, often containing forgeries, which were consulted and quoted at times of difficulty or excitement. For a long time the Pythia—as the prophetic maiden was called, from Pytho, the old name of Delphi—justified her position by giving answers which were impartial and on the whole in the general interests of Greece. When that impartiality became doubtful, we shall see the credit of the oracle decline.

But besides these—on the whole cheerful and reverent—views of the gods, there was another and more human side to Greek religion. In a certain sense the gods and nature itself were the jealous enemies of men—hampering their efforts, envious of their success, and intent on keeping them weak and dependent. Hence the wrath of Zeus when Prometheus gave men fire, whereby all implements and arts became possible. Accordingly those men, who by strength of will or body could grapple with the difficulties put in the way of mankind, were revered as demigods. Heracles, the embodiment of manly strength and courage, slew monsters, cleared swamps, destroyed robbers, wrestled with death itself, and was accordingly widely worshipped both in and outside Greece. In the same way nearly every State had a ‘hero’ of its own, who like Theseus had founded towns, made dangerous ways safe, or rid the land of deadly beasts. They had each in his own way fought the irreconcilable foes of man, had made human life better and safer, and were honoured as benefactors and offered a worship second only to that of the gods themselves.

CHAPTER II.

THE HOMERIC AGE TO THE AGE OF COLONISATION.

Greek History must begin with Homer. Though Archaeology is always giving us new lights on the history of the race, the Iliad and Odyssey are the earliest written records of what the inhabitants of Greece were like, how they lived, and what they did and thought. To observe the changes in the Greek world, as it appears in these poems, and as we find it in the literature of the sixth century, is the readiest way we have of getting an idea of what the people had been doing, how they had been moving from one part to another, and how their views and habits had been developing. We cannot indeed fix the date of these poems with any certainty: all we can say is that as soon as we know anything of the Greeks they were in possession of them. The Iliad, as we have it, is an Epic poem in twenty-four books—a division probably of comparatively late date—recording certain episodes in the siege of Troy, the deeds of certain of the kings and chieftains on either side, and the councils of the gods concerning them. It is wholly a poem of the camp. The Odyssey on the other hand is a poem of travel and adventure, with pictures of domestic life. The hero Odysseus, after the fall of Troy, was kept for ten years on his return voyage by various accidents and adventures. His wife Penelope, remaining faithful to him in spite of her importunate suitors, at length sends her son Telemachus to search for his father. In this

I. The
Homeric
Poems.

poem accordingly we have descriptions not only of the Island home of Ithaca, but of similar homes and courts in other places, as well as wonderful adventures in the still mysterious West. There were doubtless many differences in habits and thought between the men of the Homeric poems and the men who lived in the century and a half between Marathon and Chaeroneia, yet there were also many—perhaps more—likenesses. The poems remained sufficiently in harmony with later Greek feeling to be regarded by all Greeks as the highest expression of their life, their ideas, and their beliefs; and to be appealed to in a hundred ways as the most trustworthy record of the past, and as the highest authority in politics, morals and religion.

We must observe however that, as stories, neither the *Iliad* nor the *Odyssey*—especially the former—is complete in itself. The *Iliad* begins in the last of the ten years' siege of Troy, and yet the fall of Troy is not narrated, nor the previous or subsequent fate of the heroes engaged in it. A knowledge of the history and cause of the expedition is assumed, and only hints are given as to its final result. We may therefore safely conclude that these poems did not stand alone, but were an embodiment—doubtless the best and most popular—of a part only of a mass of legend and song recited by rhapsodists, and referring to the history of the Trojan war. It was not long before other poets and prose writers used these ancient stores—and perhaps their own invention too—to fill up the omissions in the Homeric poems. Such writers are called 'Cyclic'—as treating of the cycle of the legend of Troy. Of these we have little more than the names: but their works were the store-house from which later painters, sculptors, tragic writers and compilers of mythology drew their material. The chief of the Cyclic poems are (1) The *Cypria* of Stasinus, (2) The *Aethiopica* (adventures of Memnon) and the *Sack of Troy*, by Archînus of Miletus, (3) The little *Iliad*, by Lesches of Mitylene, (4) The *Returns*,

2. The Cyclic writers.

by Agias of Troezen, (5) The *Telegonia*—the death of Odysseus at the hands of Telegonus, his son by Circe. There were also some Epics not connected with this Trojan cycle, such as the tale of the war between Argos and Thebes—the *Thebais*—and its sequel, the *Epigoni*; as also the tale of the capture of Oechalia by Hercules, all by unknown authors. No country perhaps had ever such a mass of heroic legend, but with the exception of the two Homeric Epics it has been lost to us, or only survives by having supplied plots for the Attic dramatists.

The questions which have been discussed from ancient times as to the origin and authorship of the Homeric poems do not much affect their value as a truthful representation of early life and manners in

3. The
Homeric
Question.

Greece before the dawn of history. Still we ought to know something of what has been written and said on the subject. The chief questions have been: Are the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by the same poet? Is the *Iliad* a single poem by a single author, or a number of separate heroic ballads combined with more or less of skill by later reciters or editors? The belief that the two poems were by different authors was first started about B.C. 146 by a grammarian named Hellanicus. The school of critics that adopted the theory were called 'the Separators' (οἱ χωρίζοντες), and in modern times the belief was resuscitated by the German F. A. Wolf, in 1795, who also started the modern criticism as to the composition of the *Iliad*. But neither ancient nor modern scholars—who profess to detect the different layers of poetry which go to make up the *Iliad*—have really arrived at any certainty. Internal evidence can always be used in more than one way. In a long poem like the *Iliad*, composed for recitation, and very likely long remaining unwritten, or preserved only in few and imperfect copies, inconsistencies and contradictions, defects in the carrying out of the plan or downright changes in it, insertion of episodes to please this or that audience, were not only probable, but all but inevitable. But they can never prove conclusively a diversity of authorship

of the bulk of the poem. There is good reason for believing that a collection or edition of the poems was made for Athenian use in the sixth century B.C. under the direction of Peisistratus: but there were other editions afterwards made for different cities, and recent discoveries of fragments of early mss. in Egypt seem to shew that there were considerable discrepancies in these editions—not yet however sufficient to disprove decisively the unity of the *Iliad*. For the poet himself, tradition, founded on a line in the ‘Hymn to Apollo,’ spoke of him when old and blind as living in the island of Chios. The word ‘Homeros’ means ‘fitted together,’ and secondly a ‘hostage.’ But such a name really teaches us nothing more than any other, such as Euripides or Shakespear. It may have originated in a hundred ways, and to say that it does not represent a man, but a literary process, is an assumption no more capable of proof than any other. On this point there is no evidence worth the name, and we shall probably decide the question in our own minds as we think it probable or not that there should have been many poets capable of composing with (on the whole) such uniform excellence and similarity of style. Another question almost equally difficult is as to the part of Greece to which the poet—if he were one man—belonged¹. The best tradition perhaps connects him with Chios and Smyrna; but other traditions connected him with both North and South Greece. Internal evidence can be quoted for each theory. He knew the geography and natural features of the Troad: but, if he were an Asiatic Greek, it is strange that no Greek cities of Asia, except Miletus—and that in connexion with the ‘barbarous-speaking’ Carians—are mentioned by him, though that very epithet seems to shew that Greeks were already in Asia. If he was a Northern Greek, it is curious that so great a preponderance is given to the Achaioi and Argeioi in the South; and if he was a Peloponnesian, that

¹ Many cities claimed the honour of his birth or being connected with him in some way, though seven—Smyrna, Chios, Colophon, Salamis, Rhodos, Argos, Athenae—were supposed to have better claims than the rest.

he should be most elaborate in his mention of Boeotian towns, and take his hero Achilles from Pelasgic Argos (Thessaly). These arguments indeed can be used in several ways and are not conclusive in any. Nor is the nature of the language of the poems any more decisive. It is neither the Ionic of Herodotus, nor the Aeolic of Alcaeus and Sappho, and yet it partakes in some degree of both. It may therefore be equally well argued that it presents an earlier dialect than either and independent of both; or that having been composed in a primitive dialect—Achaean or whatever name we may give it—it has been Aeolicised by one set of editors or reciters, Ionised by another, and Atticised by a third. Any one of the three theories accounts for some things in Homer's language: none accounts for all.

But without entering upon the Homeric question any farther, we may treat the poems as an historic document, and try to illustrate from them the direction in which changes had occurred in Greece between the epoch to which they refer and the 8th century. Let us notice first that important local names for divisions in Greece have come into existence since Homer's age—Peloponnesus, Locris, Thessaly, Doris, Acarnania, Epirus, Macedonia. All these, whatever their origin, have become definite and recognised names for certain parts of the country. Macedonia and Epirus, indeed, are hardly as yet to be accounted parts of Greece, but the former came later on to play an important part in Greek History, and the latter was extensively Hellenised before long. Again, between the time of the Homeric poems and the 8th century, Hellas and Hellenes have become the universal designation of Greece and the Greeks; and the threefold division of Aeolian, Dorian and Ionian is thoroughly recognised, and plays a considerable part in determining political divisions and combinations.

4. Development of Greece since the times of the Homeric Poems.

Island Greece again has become an established fact; the

Cyclades and the other islands of the Aegean, such as Samos, Chios, Lesbos, Lemnos and Thasos, as well as the Island Greece. great island of Crete, have been Hellenised. In the west, whereas the Homeric poems hardly recognise distinctly anything beyond the islands of Cephallenia, Ithaca and Leucas, in the 7th century the shores of Sicily are rapidly becoming studded with Greek colonies, and similar settlements are being begun upon the coast of Southern Italy—countries which to Homer are only vaguely known as distant and mysterious lands.

Again, the threefold settlement of Greece in Asia Minor has taken place in this interval. In the North
 5. Asiatic
 Greeks. are the eleven AEOLIAN towns—once reckoned
 (1) Aeolians. as twelve while Smyrna was included in the list. None of them became of much importance, or is much heard of, except for a short time Cyme, but the large island of Lesbos had contained flourishing towns in Homer's day, and its six Aeolian cities including Methymna and Mitylene, the latter of which afterwards gave its name to the whole island, had a flourishing trade from very early times and were the home of some of the earliest post-Homeric poetry in Greece. These Aeolians too, although never very powerful, had been the principal agents in Hellenising the northern shores of Asia Minor, the Troad and the Thracian Chersonese.

To the south of the Aeolians were the IONIAN Greeks, starting from the river Hermus, whose district
 Asiatic
 Greeks. was notable for its pleasant climate and good
 (2) Ionians. harbours. They too possessed twelve chief cities, which may be divided into groups distinguished by position as well as by a variety in their dialects. The southern or Carian group contained Miletus, Myus, and Pirene: the next or Lydian group was Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, Clazomenae, Phocaea: the third or island group contained the islands of Samos and Chios with the Lydian town of Erythrae. Though these towns had a strong admixture of Carian and



Lydian inhabitants, they were so predominately Ionian that they regarded themselves as purely Greek, and looked on Athens as in a way their mother-city, in some cases as having actually supplied the founders of their colony, and in all as being the head of the Ionians. They also formed an Amphictyony, or half religious half political union, which had once its central meeting-place at Delos, then at the temple of Poseidon at Mykale, and later on at Ephesus. We shall presently have to speak of the services of these Ionians to Greek culture, and the activity of the principal city Miletus in the colonisation of other lands.

The Dorians in Asia formed originally a Hexapolis or group of six States—Lindus, Ialysus, Camirus in Rhodes; Halicarnassus and Cnidus in Caria; and the island of Cos. Afterwards it is called a Pentapolis, because Halicarnassus was expelled from the league and became Ionicised. They also formed an Amphictyony, the common meeting-place of which was the Triopium, a temple of Apollo on the promontory of Cnidus, where a yearly festival and games were held.

Asiatic
Greeks.
(3) Dorians.

We cannot date the movements which produced this re-arrangement of Greece. We only note that it has taken place since the Homeric epoch. Of one part of it indeed Thucydides does put forward an account, reasonable in itself, though the exact age cannot now be ascertained. He says that the earliest Hellenic power to possess a strong navy was Crete. At some time after the Trojan war (the first combined action of Greek States, as he thinks) Minos king of Crete—whose rule was so righteous that he became after his death one of the judges in the other world—became master of the sea, cleared it of pirates, drove out the barbarous Carians from the islands of the Aegean, and opened them for Hellenic settlers. That some such change as this had taken place was proved by tradition and by the antiquarian evidence to be found in the islands themselves, where

6. Colonisa-
tion.

ancient tombs proved by the mode of burial that the inhabitants had once been Carians. But when this took place we cannot tell, probably at least as early as 800 B.C. The next great movement however admits of being dated, not indeed with certainty, but with nearer approach to it. This was the great outburst of colonisation, beginning at least as early as the 8th century B.C. and probably earlier. It took generally speaking two directions: north-east along the shores of the Black Sea, and west to Sicily and Italy. Of the very numerous cities thus established, many of which in their turn sent out colonists to settle in unoccupied or thinly peopled places, some rose to be of great importance in the history of Greece and even of the world, while many only enjoyed moderate success, or even proved entire failures. But taken as a whole this movement had, before we get any real history, already spread Hellenism—Greek ideas, speculations, habits of life, literature and the seeds of philosophy—destined to have a profound effect on the world, over a large portion of Eastern and Southern Europe. We may learn also, by observing the origin of these colonies, what parts of Greece, from the 8th century B.C., appear to have been enjoying the most vigorous life, to have possessed the most adventurous inhabitants, and the most skilful mariners.

Taking therefore first the north-eastern group that studded the shores of the Propontis and Pontus, we find
 7. Pontic Colonies. that the earliest and most fertile colonising States were Megara, just north of the Isthmus of Corinth, and Miletus in Asia. To Megara belong Byzantium and the opposite city of Chalcedon, Heracleia Pontica (with the help of Boeotian Tanagra), and partly also Chersonesus in the Crimea, all probably between B.C. 690 and B.C. 600. From Miletus went the men who settled Abydos, Lampsacus and

¹ Notice that a Greek colony consisted of men who abandoned their own country and became citizens of the new State. They were not parts of the old country or dependent on her.

Sinope, Trapezus, Panticapaeum (Kertch), Odessus (Varna), and many others of less importance between B.C. 600 and B.C. 550. Other Greek States—such as Samos, Teos—contributed in a less degree to this extension of Hellas, but it is Megara and Miletus that are most conspicuous. Megara, once probably included in Attica, had become Dorian and, after a period of subjection to Corinth, had risen to high commercial importance between 800 and 700 B.C., in great degree owing to its position as lying on the road from North Greece to Peloponnesus, and as having access both to the Saronic gulf on the east and the Corinthian gulf on the west. Its activity in colonisation both to east and west is at once a proof and a result of this success. Miletus, the ‘ornament’ of Asia, had prospered in a somewhat similar way. Its four great harbours made it the resort of ships from Phoenicia as well as the corn-growing districts bordering on the Pontus, and its prosperity continued till it fell into the hands of the Persians.

It is true that even before these adventurers went from Megara and Miletus there had been movements to the North. The story of the Argo—a story older at any rate than the Odyssey—and its band of heroes, led by Iason to fetch the golden fleece from Colchis, was no doubt founded on traditions of early voyages of the inhabitants of Greece in search of the gold and other wealth to be found on the shores of the Inhospitable Sea; while the settlement of Greeks upon the Thracian Chersonese seems of immemorial antiquity. The colonists of the seventh and sixth centuries probably often found semi-Greek communities struggling for existence in these distant regions. But it was in this age that a persistent, and on the whole successful, Hellenisation of the countries was carried out.

The movement toward the West was still earlier. Apulia and Calabria, forming the heel of Italy, and having a coast-line nearest to that of Greece, had from times far beyond historical record been

8. Italian
and Sicilian
Colonies.

visited and partly settled by wanderers from Aetolia or Epirus ; but it was in the eighth century that the colonies, which rose to be important cities and in their turn sent off fresh colonies, were established. Here the Peloponnesian States took a considerable share in the movement. The Achaeans founded Sybaris (*circ.* B.C. 720), Croton (*circ.* B.C. 710), Metapontum (*circ.* B.C. 690); while Sparta sent out colonists to Tarentum (*circ.* B.C. 700) and Callipolis (*circ.* B.C. 690). An important part was also played by the great commercial city of Chalcis in Euboea. Its commercial importance is shewn by the fact that its coinage was long the prevailing standard in Greece, by its so completely occupying the Chalcidic peninsula as to give it its name, and lastly by its colonies in Macedonia as well as in Italy and Sicily. In Italy it founded probably the oldest of all Greek colonies, Cumae¹, as also Naples and Rhegium. The Cretans are also credited with some settlements : and Epizephyrian Locri was founded by the Locrians of Greece soon after B.C. 700 : while the Phocaeans in about B.C. 544 settled at Velia, and even made their way to Corsica and Massilia.

In Sicily again the eighth and seventh centuries witnessed a similar and even more successful movement. Here too we find Chalcis and Megara playing a great part, this time along with Corinth and Rhodes. Megara was the mother of Naxos and Zancle (afterwards Messene), and from these went Catana, Leontini, Himera and Mylae, all apparently before B.C. 700. About the same time the Megarians founded Thapsus and thence removed to Megara Hyblaea, from which colonists went to Selinus before B.C. 600, and before B.C. 500 to Heraclea Minoa. Corinth was the founder of the great city of Syracuse (*circ.* B.C. 734), from which before B.C. 600 went Acrae, Casmenae and Camarina. And from Rhodes (in conjunction with Crete) was founded Gela (*circ.* B.C. 690) and from Gela, Agrigentum (*circ.* B.C. 582).

¹ The date of the founding of Cumae generally fixed at B.C. 1050 is probably much too early.

There is another change that has apparently come over Greece since the time of the Homeric poems. She has become conscious of great kingdoms, and civilisations older than her own, in Asia and in Africa. In Homer there is no hint of any knowledge of the great monarchies on the Euphrates and the Tigris; and though in the *Odyssey* the coasts of Phoenicia and Libya are known, and the Ethiopians are mentioned as the most remote of men, the geography of Egypt could be little understood, and the Nile had no name beyond that of the river of Aegyptus; while the Phoenicians are only once referred to in the *Iliad*, though in a way that seems to imply that the fame of their skill in certain arts had reached the poet's ears. Still on the whole it cannot be said that any intercourse with either Egypt or Phoenicia is implied in the poems. But in the seventh century (or perhaps earlier) the inscriptions at Abu Simbel shew that Greeks had crossed to Egypt to serve the Egyptian monarchs, and the nature of the letters there used proves that from Phoenicia the Ionians had learnt an alphabet and even improved upon it¹. There is good reason also to believe that before the same epoch Phoenician settlers had found their way to the island of Thera, and even to Thebes, where the citadel (Kadmeia) commemorated the fact by its name derived from the word Kadmos 'eastern,' supposed to represent the name of the leader of this Phoenician colony. Lastly the Greek town of Naucratis in the Delta of the Nile, which seems to have been in existence at least as early as the sixth century, attests the growing importance of Greek trade with Egypt. As for the kingdoms on the Euphrates, they were still mysterious to the Greeks. About B.C. 600 a brother of the Lesbian poet Alcaeus is said to have visited Babylon, but that is the first indication that we

¹ Herodotus (5. 58) tells us that *Φοινικηία* was the earliest name for letters in Greece, and this word is found in an early inscription in Teos, an Ionian city in Asia (C. I. G. 3044).

have of the Greeks being conscious of the monarchies of upper Asia before the conquest of Cyrus. Other rumours as to far distant countries had indeed very early reached the Greeks. Thus the Pygmies or race of dwarfish men in Africa are mentioned even by Homer; and the early myth of the sisters of Phaethon, turned into poplars at the mouth of the Po, whose tears shed for Phaethon were converted into amber, seems to point to a knowledge of the trade route from the northern shores of Europe. In the *Odyssey* also we hear of the *Laestrygon*es in whose country the ways of day and night are close together—"there herdsman hails herdsman as he drives in his flock, and the other who drives forth answers the call. There might a sleepless man have earned a double wage, the one as neatherd, the other shepherding white flocks: so near are the outgoings of the night and the day." And this can hardly be derived from anything but a rumour of the short Arctic nights in summer, as the darkness of the 'Cimmerians' represents the long nights of the Arctic winter.

In these last respects the knowledge of the Greeks had not become much more definite since the time of
 10. Summary. Homer. But in some other ways Greece has grown to be much as we know it in historical times: the names and divisions of Greece proper have become fixed; the people have spread to the west as far as Sicily and Italy, to the east as far as Asia Minor and the shores of the Pontus; they have occupied the islands of the Aegean and have opened up trade with Phoenicia and Egypt, and are thus beginning to know of civilisations much older than their own both in these countries and far away also in Central Asia.

Life, as depicted in the Homeric Epics, has many features in common with what we know of the Greeks of a later day, but there are some notable omissions.
 11. Early Hellenic Life after Homer. Thus, though the general plan of the Homeric house is not widely different from that of later days, and the

use of worked stone is implied in that and other ways, yet there is no trace of its employment for ornament or statuary, though such works as the carved lions at Mycenae shew that this use of it was known then or not long after. Again, though the use of gold and silver for ornamental work is well known, there is no mention of coined money, and only one doubtful allusion to the use of letters. Domestic slavery exists, but almost entirely as resulting from capture in war, while kidnappers of children are barbarians. Morals are mostly founded on family ties and duties. The handicrafts are hardly recognised in the *Iliad*, and not spoken of with much respect in the *Odyssey*: but the cultivation of corn and the vine, and the care of herds and flocks, are the regular employments of peace and the legitimate sources of wealth.

The next glimpse of Greek life supplied us by early literature indicates a certain development, though no great break or contrast. The *Works and Days* of Hesiod in some respects, especially as to Ancestor worship and the sacredness of the Hearth, represent an even more primitive state of things than do the Homeric poems, and more closely in harmony with what is known of kindred Aryan races. This is not surprising, for they refer to country life, in which custom and tradition are always most conservative. In other points however there seems to be a change, if not progress. They recognise, to begin with, a Hellas and Hellenic nation. Again, in matters of right and wrong, justice is no longer so closely confined to family duties and connexions, it has become more national. The reward of justice is peace, national prosperity, increase of flocks and herds. From the injustice of one man sometimes a whole city will suffer, population will decay, the enemy will destroy host and citadel alike. Justice therefore must be the chief care of kings. Virtue and wisdom are one: and virtue includes respect for suppliants and guests, for the sanctity of marriage, with honesty and liberality in dealing. The only proper source of wealth

is ceaseless industry. These moral reflexions indeed are only the prelude to maxims and instructions suitable to the Boeotian peasant farmer. What he cares for most is the plough and the cart; the knowledge requisite for the cultivation of his land, and the thrift which will secure him from want; the good neighbours who will not rob him, but will lend him a helping hand in trouble; and the sons (not too many) to support his old age and perform his funeral rites. Still besides the farmer's business we find traces of sea-traffic, not for war, but gain, and of the games and contests in music and poetry, which hereafter were to play so great a part in Greek life and to produce such noble literature. There is also a closer observation and knowledge of nature. The seasons are marked by the variations of the sun's course and the rise and setting of the constellations; various timber trees are distinguished and noted, and the habits of birds watched. We may add to these indications of the life and habits of Greek rural life in Boeotia, the picture given us in the Hymn to Apollo of the Ionians *en fête*, to complete the picture of what we can directly know of the Greeks of the earliest post-Homeric times. To Delos at the annual festival come the Ionians in their long trailing robes, with children and virtuous wives; "and there they watch the combats of boxing, dancing, and song, and share in such joy and cheerfulness as to forget death and age. A fair sight are their swift ships, their goodly men, and fair-zoned women, and all the wealth they bring. Fair too are the Delian maidens, devotees of the god, that welcome them, singing in chorus to lyre and harp hymns in praise of Apollo, Latona and Artemis, telling of ancient heroes and heroines, charming the hearts of all that hear." The Delian festival was a fair as well as a religious gathering. The commercial part of it survived the religious, but in the 4th century B.C. it was still attended by sacred embassies from Ionian towns. There must also by this time have been a great outburst of temple building, for a large number of places, where temples to Apollo were

known to exist in after times, are already mentioned as connected with his worship.

Civil quarrels, and fighting of city with city, there were no doubt now as before and after, but here we have two pictures of country life and of a cheerful festival, shewing us something of what was always behind politics and war which occupy so much space in history.

We have seen that at least by B.C. 800 the three divisions of the Hellenes had settled nearly in the same parts of Greece in which we find them later on: and that from the 8th century began the great movement of expansion which sent their colonies in nearly every direction. But another great movement began also in the 8th century.

12. Age of political movement and of the Lyric and Elegiac Poets from about B.C. 690.

Government up to about that time had generally been that of constitutional kings, *basileis* with fixed prerogatives. But between B.C. 750 and 500, there was in many parts of Greece a series of revolutions. Oligarchy—the rule of a few—often superseded that of the constitutional kings, and was often itself superseded by the tyranny of some popular leader against the nobles, and this again in many places by democracy. These changes roused to life the political instinct: men took sides with eagerness, and began to speculate on social and political theories and ideas. It was a time of new birth and excitement, and this excitement eventually found a voice in a great outburst of poetry meant to be sung to music (Lyric), or to express personal opinion or feeling in a manner most likely to attract attention (Elegiac), or to give utterance to satire or pointed sayings (Iambic). A common note of all these is that poetry became personal. The poets composed hymns for public festivals or other purposes; but they also wrote in their several styles what was meant to express their personal feeling, either in regard to passion or the circumstances of their time. Of the Lyric poets the most famous, and among the earliest, were the Lesbian Alcaeus and Sappho.

Of the poetry of Alcaeus but little remains, but the general circumstances of his life will shew us what was happening in this age of restlessness. He was one of the aristocrats of Mitylene, and was engaged in a war with the Athenians for the possession of Sigeum. In this war he suffered the disgrace of throwing away his shield, which his enemies hung up as a trophy. Then came constant struggles with the democratic party, and with more than one of their leaders, who established themselves as tyrants, ending with his own banishment. After wandering as far as Egypt, he and his party returned to Lesbos and tried to expel the reigning tyrant Pittacus (B.C. 589—579). He was taken prisoner, but spared and released by Pittacus, against whom he wrote his bitterest poems. In contrast with this brilliant genius and restless man, may be placed one who was nearly his contemporary—Solon the Athenian (594), who used his gift of elegiac poetry to impress upon his countrymen civic virtues, and the blessings of ordered freedom. We shall have to study him more fully by-and-bye when we follow the history of Athens. The two men form two sides of a picture—both representing features of Greek life of the age: both engaged—though with widely different purpose and principles—in the political excitement which was seething in many parts of Greece. We find the same in other places: Alcman, born at Sardis, and Tyrtaeus at Aphidnae in Attica (B.C. 675—660), were both employed at Sparta to stimulate the patriotic and warlike feelings of the Spartan youth: while the earlier Archilochus (circ. B.C. 700), born at Paros and removing with a colony to Thasos, had in both islands lived in the midst of constant political or personal quarrels, being specially credited with having driven the daughters of his enemy Lycambes to suicide by his bitter satire. Simonides of Samos (circ. B.C. 660) also took part in a colony to Amorgos, and in one of the two important Iambic fragments which we possess, reflects the restlessness and troubles of his age. It is to be noted also that of the ‘Seven Wise Men,’ who flourished in the

7th century into the 6th, five at least—Cleobulus of Lindus in Rhodes, Periander of Corinth, Cheilon of Sparta, Pittacus of Mitylene and Solon of Athens¹, were all actively engaged in the politics of their States, either as actual governors or as reformers. It was an age of movement and transition. Those who came to the front were not merely men of most military ability or of most persistent purpose. The same exciting causes seem to have stirred men to political and to literary activity. The men of liveliest imagination and most endowed with the poetic temperament were just those most keenly touched by the new political ideas. The simplicity of the Homeric or immediately succeeding ages—partly perhaps in consequence of the movements which brought in the Hellenes and sent the Dorians southward—had been replaced in most parts of Greece by social and political unrest. The old prae-Hellenic ideas and practices, religious and social, were not wholly swamped or forgotten, but there were added to them new ideas and new aspirations. The unprivileged were striking for equality with the privileged: and the struggle was in many places bringing sudden and signal changes—from oligarchy to tyranny, from tyranny to democracy. We shall have to trace this general movement, as it affected particular parts of Greece, when we proceed to study the history of the several States, and to see how they all shared in it, though to a varying extent and with different results.


¹ The other two were Bias of Priene, and Thales of Miletus. Whether Thales engaged in the politics of his town is a disputed question. He at any rate led the way to physical philosophy by speculating on the origin of matter, which he decided to be water.

CHAPTER III.

THE PELOPONNESE BEFORE B.C. 500.

The Dorians were only known to Homer as a people of
 1. The Dorians in the Peloponnese. Crete, they are not mentioned by Hesiod at all. Their descent upon Southern Greece may have taken place about B.C. 1000 or a hundred years later. But the result of their occupation of the Peloponnese is manifest, whenever it took place. The districts commanding the entrance to the Peloponnese—those of Megara, Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius and Cleonae—were all occupied by them. The whole of what is called the Argolic peninsula—with the exception of some cities on the coast—shared the same fate; and, lastly, the southern districts of Laconia and Messenia, with the islands of Aegina and Cythera—which may be regarded as appendages to the Peloponnese. This distribution of territory was accounted for in the legend of the return of the Heracleidae by saying that the princes drew lots for their shares of the conquered territory. To Temenos fell Argolis (including Corinth and Sicyon), to the sons of Aristodemus Laconia, while Cresphontes the youngest obtained by a trick the most fertile district of all—Messenia. We have thus about two-thirds of the Peloponnese in the hands of the Dorians. The ancient inhabitants, the Achaioi and Argeioi, either took refuge in Elis and Achaia, or remained on their native soil in an inferior position. The remaining parts of the Peloponnese continued to be inhabited by various combina-





tions of its ancient peoples, with migrations from the opposite shores of Aetolia. This distinction of races in the Peloponnese must be kept in mind to help us to understand much of its subsequent history.

The Dorians, wherever settled, present certain peculiarities, variously modified afterwards in different localities. In all alike the government was more or less aristocratic, that is to say it was practically in the hands of an upper class, whose position and privileges were hereditary; and in most there were generally two magistrates, either succeeding by hereditary right, or elected from certain families. These magistrates at Sparta and Argos were called kings (*βασιλεῖς*), at Crete *cosmi*: at Corinth all offices including the kingship were engrossed by a family or class called the Bacchiadae; at Megara and Aegina, as soon as we know anything of their history, we find a ruling aristocracy; and in cities elsewhere colonised by the Dorians the same peculiarity occurs. For instance, in Corcyra there was a privileged aristocracy consisting of the original Corinthian settlers; in Leucadia the nobles alone owned the land; in Syracuse for a long time the *gamoroi*, 'landowners,' alone formed the government; both Gela and Agrigentum were for a long time powerful oligarchies. At Byzantium there were first kings, and then a close oligarchy; at Cnidus a council of 60 with a president, all from certain noble families; at Cyrene the constitution of Sparta was at first exactly copied. We must notice this peculiarity of the Dorians, because Greek history in the 6th and 5th centuries is much affected by the fact that wherever Sparta, which soon became the leading Dorian State, had influence, that influence was exerted in favour of oligarchical government, hostile alike to tyranny and democracy. Other common peculiarities (besides the dual kingship or magistracy) were a division of citizens into three tribes; a *gerousia*, that is, a council of elders; an assembly of all citizens of a certain age from a limited number

2. Dorian
form of
government.

of families, called variously at different places *ἀλία*, *ἀπέλλα* or *ἀγορά*. The chief Dorian towns in the Peloponnese underwent various modifications of polity, but they all started with a constitution in which these features more or less occur. Sparta has the most important and interesting history, but it will be well to say a few words first on the others.

At Corinth the conquering Dorians formed a small ruling class, the native Aeolians far outstripping them in numbers. Before long an equality of civil rights appears to have been established between the two classes, but the kingship for twelve generations was in the hands of a family claiming descent from Aletes the original Heracleid monarch. The Bacchiadae were a clan, rather than a family, to which the royal family belonged. About B.C. 747 this clan resolved to abolish the kingship and elect a yearly president or Prytanis from among themselves. The oligarchy lasted till B.C. 657, when it was overthrown by Cypselus, acting as usual as a champion of the lower classes. He presently made himself a tyrannus and drove most of the Bacchiadae into exile. These men had become unpopular from the vices so often generated by a close possession of power, and Cypselus during his reign of 30 years (B.C. 655—625) by the moderation of his government and the purity of his conduct reconciled the people to tyranny. But his son Periander (B.C. 625—585) was less popular. He was not only so wise a man as to be classed among the ‘Seven Sages,’ but he was also active and warlike. He kept control over Corcyra and seized on Epidaurus, and appears to have maintained the prosperity of his country. But not only was he guilty of many severities—his very virtues made him disliked. The Corinthians were rich and luxurious: they liked to buy slaves to do their work for them, and to live in idleness. Periander on the other hand thought that idleness led to political disaffection. Under his rule the citizens were constantly employed on public works, and open idleness was liable to fine. The growing

dissatisfaction broke out in the third year of the reign of his nephew and successor Psammetichus, and with the help of Sparta the tyrant was dethroned in B.C. 580, and a new oligarchy established on a rather wider basis than that of the Bacchiadae, which kept Corinth henceforth in close alliance with Sparta. The institutions of Corinth shew a variation from the usual Dorian type in the fact of the natives having been comparatively early put on a civil equality with the Dorian conquerors. The people were accordingly divided into eight tribes, instead of the three usual among the Dorians. The reason is to be found in the early commercial success of the city. The Dorian nobility was closely connected with the ownership of land, but in Corinth wealth from commerce quickly surpassed that from land, and with wealth came claims to civil rights which could not be resisted. Still though Corinth thus early became wealthy, and was the first State in Greece to build war-vessels or triremes, during the great period of Greek history it does not play a very conspicuous or dignified part, and never had any claim to that supremacy among other Greek States, which was successively acknowledged to belong to Sparta, Athens and Thebes. Those who wished to praise it attributed this to moderation and the love of freedom, and asserted that Corinth engaged in no wars for its own aggrandisement, but only in those which were fought for liberty.

Sicyon was a very ancient city and had been known by many names in the Heroic age. When the Dorian conquest came, it was at first held in dependence on Argos, but about B.C. 676 it was separated from Argos and fell under the tyranny of Orthagoras, whose descendants governed it for 100 years. The Orthagoridae were not Dorians, and their rule appears to represent a rising of the natives against the Dorians. The last of the dynasty was Cleisthenes, who died about B.C. 560. By his daughter Agariste, who married the Athenian Megacles, he was

4. Sicyon.

grandfather of the great Athenian reformer Cleisthenes. With the fall of the Orthagoridae the power of the Dorians in Sicyon revived, and throughout the period of the Spartan, Athenian, and Theban supremacies it is always found in close alliance with Sparta, except for a brief period when Epaminondas forced it to ally itself with Thebes. After undergoing various fortunes during the Macedonian period and being ruled by a succession of tyrants it finally joined the Achaean league, and in the Roman period was again for a long time a flourishing town, raised to greater importance by the destruction of Corinth.

In Argolis were contained in the most ancient times the chief cities of Southern Greece. Argos probably

5. Argos.

supplied the only general name for the whole Peloponnese known to Homer, and even after the Dorian invasion it controlled the entire eastern coast including the island of Cythera. Before the Dorian conquest Mycenae was the chief town in Argolis, but after that event Argos supplanted all others and became the capital city. It was also head of an Amphictyony, primarily religious but exercising also political influence, consisting of seven other Dorian States—Cleonae, Phlius, Sicyon, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, the island Aegina—whose central meeting-place was the temple of Apollo Pythaeus on the acropolis of Argos, though each of the cities had also a shrine of the god. The city of Argos itself became entirely Dorian, but in the district of Argolis the ancient Achaean inhabitants seem to have to a great extent remained, though in an inferior position, the *orneatae* and *penestae* answering to the Spartan perioeci and helots. Yet several cities in Argolis were not under the control of Argos, and as late as the time of the Persian wars we find Mycenae and Tiryns acting as independent cities, till they were destroyed by Argos because in that war they took an opposite course to herself. For some time after the Dorian conquest the Argives claimed to be, and apparently were, the chief State in the Peloponnese; but the gradual rise of Spartan power deprived them of that

position. They lost control of Cythera and the southern coast; the disputed district of Cynuria was gradually secured by Sparta, till only the northern part of it—the Thyreatis—remained to be fought for by the famous three hundred champions on either side in B.C. 547¹. The attacks of the Spartan Cleomenes between B.C. 510 and 500 finally established the Spartan superiority, but left a bitterness in the hearts of the Argives which survived in the constant opposition between the two States almost throughout their history. The highest point in the prosperity of Argos seems to have been reached under king PHEIDON—to whom widely different dates have been assigned, ranging from about B.C. 950 to B.C. 668. The greatest weight of evidence seems in favour of placing his reign in the eighth century. At any rate it is clear that he did great things for Argos. He established himself indeed as a sole tyrant instead of a constitutional king—as one of the Temenidae, or descendants of Temenus, the Heraclid founder of the dynasty—but he greatly increased the importance of his country. He recovered the influence which had become weakened over the cities of the Amphictyony, and forced Corinth also to submit to him. It was in an attempt to exercise authority in other parts of the Peloponnese that he seems to have eventually lost most of what he had gained. There is a curious analogy between the quarrel in the Peloponnese and that which afterwards more than once distracted Northern Greece with ‘sacred wars.’ As the people of Delphi claimed the exclusive management of the oracle and temple against the demand of the whole of Phocis to share in that honour, so the people of Pisa claimed to manage and control the Olympic festival, while the people of the whole of Elis demanded to share in it. And as in North Greece both sides sought help from others, so here the Pisates called in Pheidon, while the

¹ Only one Spartan survived, but he remained in the field and stripped the bodies of the slain. Two Argives survived but left the field, therefore after all the question was not settled without another battle.

Eleans got help from Sparta. The details of the struggle are not known to us: but we are told that Pheidon at first succeeded in maintaining the cause of the Pisates and presided with them at the ninth celebration of the festival, but that afterwards he was defeated by the Spartans and the Eleans were restored to their privileges. But another of his measures intended to extend the influence and wealth of Argos had more lasting effects. He is universally credited with having introduced from Aegina—over which he held dominion—a standard of weights, measures, and coinage, for which last he opened a mint in Aegina, probably the first established in Greece. Aegina had long been in communication with Egypt and Phoenicia, and had carried on a brisk trade with the East. For that purpose there must have been some standard of weights, measures and coinage recognised by the Egyptian and Phoenician traders as well as by themselves. Till Pheidon's time, however, the Aeginetans seem to have used foreign coins. Pheidon first established a mint there, and introduced the coinage into Argos, doubtless with the view of enabling it to share in this foreign trade. It eventually prevailed all over



COIN OF ARGOS (TORTOISE).

the Peloponnese, the weight of the coins being in the proportion of 6 : 5 as compared with the Euboic. The earliest specimens preserved are of the middle of the 7th century B.C. They all have the figure of a tortoise on them, whence the Peloponnesian money was called *Chelone*, 'tortoise.' The political effect of this was to detach Argos still more from the home-staying military Spartans, and to direct her sympathies rather to the East.

We have thus glanced at the early history of three of the

chief Dorian settlements in the Peloponnese. We must follow at somewhat greater length the history of the power which was the greatest rival of Argos, and eventually established itself as the leading State in the Peloponnese, with such a reputation for skill and courage in war that it came to be acknowledged as the natural leader in any military expedition undertaken by the Hellenes of all continental Greece. According to the legend as to the division of territory among the Heraclid leaders of the Dorians the worst lot fell to the sons of Aristodemus, Eurysthenes and Prokles—the progenitors of the two royal families at Sparta, the Agidae and Eurypontidae. The part of the country thus described as the ‘worst lot’ was the valley of the Eurotas. When the Dorians descended into this valley they seem to have avoided attacking Amyclae, an ancient city which had long been the point of communication with Gythium and the island of Cythera—the staple towns for the trade, especially in purple dye, with Phoenicia—but to have fixed on the range of low hills, upon which stood the open town, or the collection of hamlets making up the town, of Sparta. From this elevated situation, so well protected by nature that for many centuries no fortifications were considered necessary, they gradually extended their hold upon the valley and the surrounding district. They first took possession of the best land immediately near the town, but did not disturb the farmers—Achaean, or of the various races brought there by commerce—but allowed them to remain in occupation, paying a rent in kind or in personal service. They were called *perioeci* ‘neighbours,’ and they had no citizenship in the Spartan State, though in certain towns, such as Amyclae, there remained for a long time a separate State in which the *perioeci* had a kind of citizenship. But these towns were always subordinate to Sparta, and in course of time were entirely absorbed, the *perioeci* thus surviving as free farmers but without any civil status. Some of the lands however—perhaps those where

6. Laconia
and Messenia.

the Dorians had experienced most resistance—were taken over wholly by the conquerors, and their cultivators were reduced to the position of serfs or unfree labourers, called helots, attached to the soil, bound to pay half the produce of it to their lords, and to do him personal service in arms. The conquering Dorians were the only full citizens, Spartiatae, and were as regards each other ‘peers’ (ὅμοιοι). This appellation however was not applied to them till it was necessary to distinguish the original families from certain others that had obtained citizenship later, and were, like the Roman *minores gentes*, looked upon as in some way inferior (μείiores). These Spartiatae alone possessed citizenship, and being relieved from labour and care for wealth by the produce from their estates, they devoted themselves wholly to military training, and remained a separate ruling class among a dependent and inferior population. The government was conducted by two kings (βασιλεῖς) of equal dignity and rank, whose duty or privilege it was to lead the army on active service; in time of peace to act as judges, as guardians of heiresses, as witnesses of adoptions, and as representatives of the people at public sacrifices and other acts of worship. They also presided at the *gerusia* or Council of 28—making the total 30—and received on all public occasions the greatest marks of respect. Besides the kings and *gerusia* there was an assembly (or *apella*) of all citizens of a certain age, which elected magistrates, but neither debated nor decided anything except by answering ‘aye’ and ‘no’ to questions put before it. The elections were said to be decided by the comparative loudness of the shouts greeting each name. The chief power however presently fell into the hands of five magistrates, elected annually, called Ephors. They seem at first to have been elected to oversee (ἐφορᾶν) the markets and the general administration of the laws; but they gradually obtained almost absolute powers. One or more of them was even sent out on military expeditions to control the action of the kings, whom they summoned once a month

to take an oath to respect the constitution, and whom they could in certain circumstances fine and imprison. One of the three *rhetrai*¹ or maxims attributed to Lycurgus was that the Spartans should have no written laws. This in itself tended to throw great power into the hands of magistrates; and if the theory of some can be maintained, that the Ephors were elected by the peers and inferiors alike, while the kings and *gerusia* were elected only by the peers, this would give an additional weight to their authority, which Cicero compares to that of the tribunes at Rome, for though they could interfere with every other officer, they were themselves irresponsible.

Now, these features of the Spartan government are not peculiar to Sparta, but appear, as has been shewn, in all or most of the Dorian States. The

7. Lycurgus.

Ephoralty is the one institution which seems most distinctively Spartan, and even that reappears in Cyrene. It is therefore impossible to attribute the entire settlement of the constitution to one lawgiver named Lycurgus. The age and identity of Lycurgus were early matters of dispute. In the time of Plutarch there existed a quoit in the Heraeon of Olympia, on which were inscribed the names of Iphitus and Lycurgus as having first proclaimed the sacred truce and having thus founded the Olympic festival (B.C. 776). This is the earliest record of his name, and it would seem to shew that besides his schemes for training the Spartans at home he aimed at exercising a Panhellenic influence. Herodotus, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, all recognise him as the author of the most characteristic institutions in Sparta; and though Plutarch confessed that it was impossible to make any statement concerning him that was not open to controversy, yet he found enough traditions current about him to construct a sort of biography; and if the institutions he attributes to him were not his, or were, as some

¹ The three *rhetrai* were (1) not to have written laws, (2) not to use anything except axe and saw in house-building, (3) not to go on military expeditions often against the same enemies.

thought, partly his and partly belonging to others (one historian believing that there were two Lycurguses at a considerable interval of time), yet they at any rate existed at Sparta, and form an example of a social and political experiment perhaps the most curious and interesting that is known to us. We have seen that the main features of the political constitution of Sparta (with the exception of the Ephoralty) were common to other Dorian States. There were, however, other institutions there which were not thus shared by others, but were strictly peculiar to herself. These were also ascribed in a mass to Lycurgus, but it is perhaps more likely that they had been gradually developed and were not owing to any one statesman. Their object was to maintain the Spartans in their original position, something like that of a garrison in a conquered country, admitting none of the inhabitants to share their privileges. To effect this, every Spartan must be trained as a soldier: must from his earliest youth look upon the duty of serving and defending his country as the one object of his life, and a failure to do so, or an act of cowardice in fighting for her, as the supreme disgrace for which nothing could compensate. Farther, to effect this object, the legislator or legislators had aimed at calling off the Spartan from all thoughts of traffic and from the corrupting influence of other nations.

The institutions designed to attain these results were mainly these:

8. Social
institutions
attributed to
Lycurgus.

(1) Land was to be divided in equal lots or *cleroi* among the Spartans, and to obviate accumulation of lots, an owner was prevented from leaving his lot (out of his family) except to someone who had none of his own, while an heiress could only marry a landless man.

(2) Rents were to be paid in kind, and private persons were not to possess gold or silver money, only the iron tokens or 'cakes.'

(3) All men and boys after a certain age were to live

alike at the common mess or *sussitia*, at which there was enough for the support of the body, but only of a coarse and homely sort. Even the kings had to attend. The only excuses admitted were having had a sacrifice on the day at a man's own house, or having returned late from hunting.

(4) Marriage was considered a duty, and a refusal to marry was punished by certain disabilities. But the selection of the wife was not left to the husband or influenced by his feelings. Women were chosen who seemed likely to make the best mothers, and even after the marriage the pair were subject to strict rules and regulations in the enjoyment of each other's society.

(5) Women were freer in Sparta than in other towns. Girls joined in the games with young men and were trained like them. 'The Spartan women,' said someone to the wife of Leonidas, 'are the only ones in Greece that rule the men.' 'Yes,' she replied, 'for we are the only women who bear men.'

(6) The foundation of all was the treatment and training of children. At birth a child was inspected by competent persons, and if weakly or deformed was exposed on Mount Taygetus—a cruel custom common throughout Greece—not necessarily to perish, but more likely to be taken up by some family of perioeci and brought up in the lower non-citizen class. If however the boy was to be reared, he was left in charge of his mother till the age of seven, but was then entirely separated from her, and brought up in a public institution with other boys, where he was trained in every kind of manly and warlike exercise, and with a severity of discipline calculated to fit him to bear the duties and hardships of Spartan manhood. The boys were instructed in reading and music, but in no other of the fine arts. As they grew older their training became more and more strict. Their hair was cut as short as possible, they were forced to walk bare-footed and to dress in only one garment winter and summer alike, to abstain from the bath and ointments

except on rare festivals, to sleep on mats of rushes, to reverence their elders, to bear punishment without shewing pain, and even to support themselves by clever thefts from gardens and the *sussitia*, with the penalty of the most terrible flogging if they were awkward enough to be detected. At twenty they were called *eirenes* and began military service under the command of the best and bravest of their own number. But they were still subject to the strictest discipline for another ten years, and were not allowed to shew themselves in the agora or to engage in any public business till they were thirty years of age, nor were they eligible for the *gerusia* till sixty.

Besides the purely military training there were other qualities which it was the object of Spartan education to develop in the direction of stern simplicity. The youths were taught to give short and pithy answers to questions on practical subjects put to them by their elders at the *sussitia*; and this brevity of speech became so rooted a habit, that to 'laconise' was the common word to express a short epigrammatic form of speech. The youths were taught indeed to sing to the pipe or flute, but the subjects of their songs were all heroic and warlike, the praise of those who had died for their country, the glory of the brave soldier and the shame of the coward. After they ceased to be boys a certain taste for personal decoration was encouraged, especially in the care and adornment of the hair, which they allowed to grow long. But even this was chiefly with a view to war. The personal adornment was mostly in the direction of splendid armour, and a saying was attributed to Lycurgus that 'Long hair made the handsome still handsomer and the ugly more terrifying.' When Xerxes wondered at the Spartans being seen combing and oiling their hair before the final struggle at Thermopylae, he was told by Demaratus that it was a sign that they would fight to the death. Lastly, the perpetuity of these institutions and habits was much promoted

g. Brevity
of speech.

Music.

Personal
ornaments.

Dislike of
strangers.

by the rarity of visits from outside. The presence of strangers in Sparta was disliked and discouraged, and very few instances are quoted of the admission of a foreigner to Spartan citizenship. They wished to be a people apart, having as little dealing as possible with those outside except on the field of battle.

The Spartan system and policy, by whomsoever begun, was in a sense eminently successful. For several centuries they were what they wished to be: a nation of soldiers, whose training and discipline gave them the superiority over their neighbours, and whose peculiarities marked them out as holding a unique position among all other Greek States. The perioeci, and still more the helots, were kept in due submission, and the narrow oligarchy of the peers made any attempt at establishing a despotism impossible. They were never popular in Greece, but they were feared, and in a manner admired and respected. Lastly, the system lasted without material change a far longer time than any other polity and system in Greece, with less variation perhaps than almost any with which we are acquainted in Europe.

10. The success of the Spartan system.

Still it not only contained the seeds of decay, but never perhaps, or but for a short time, was entirely what it professed to be. Among its disadvantages were these. First, the position of the helots was so intolerable that they were constantly tempted to revolt, keeping the Spartans still more in the position of a garrison in an enemy's country; and as they were surrounded by neighbours—Argives, Arcadians, Messenians—ready to take any advantage against them, the discontent of the helots was always there to give a handle to enemies. So dangerous did they regard the disaffection of the helots, that we hear of committees of safety, called *crypteia*, secret associations of young Spartan men, who made it their business to visit suspected helots and, if they saw reason, to despatch them at once.


11. Its drawbacks. Disaffection of helots.

The next, and perhaps the most fatal drawback, was the fact that the Spartans, as close corporations inevitably do, soon shewed a tendency to diminishing numbers. Families died out and were not replaced by others from outside. Occasional attempts were made to remedy this by admission of new families (*νεοδαμῶδεις*); but they seem not to have occupied a high position, and at any rate were not in sufficient numbers to stop the wasting of the population. The result of this was that the land—which could not be sold but could be left by will—got into the hands of heiresses. In Aristotle's time (B.C. 384–322) two-thirds of the land was said to be owned by women, while the number of the true Spartan men had sunk to between 700 and 1000, and most of these possessed no land, but lived in the city 'in poverty and contempt,' whereas at Plataea (B.C. 479) there had been 5000 Spartans serving in that one army, while there was at the same time a fleet and another army at Mycale.

Thirdly, the discipline was too severe and produced an inevitable reaction in many, as soon as the public service took them abroad. The prohibition as to the possession of gold and silver coins was evaded in various ways, as by storing deposits of money beyond the frontiers, especially in Arcadia. We find the kings frequently possessed of considerable sums of money; but when it was required for State purposes, such as for ambassadors going to foreign towns, or for hiring mercenary soldiers, or for making offerings at Delphi—though there was no regular public treasury—contributions seem to have been levied on the perioeci, to whom the prohibition did not apply, the Spartans themselves not being called on for taxes. The Spartan peers indeed, not being engaged in commerce, and being supplied with necessaries from their lands and with journey money by the State when they went abroad on service, could subsist without gold and silver coins, and perhaps felt a pride in abstaining from what was the mark of an inferior

12. Dimin-
ishing num-
bers and in-
equality of
wealth.

13. Severity
of discipline
and prohibi-
tion of the
possession of
money.



class. Yet directly they mixed with other people they must have felt tempted to break the law, and in fact we find the Spartans not at all behind other Greeks in amenability to bribes.

Lastly the rigidity of their training made them harsh and unsympathetic. They were never popular, and, when they undertook to govern others, failed to propitiate their subjects or to retain their power for any length of time.

Such, then, was the training of a nation of soldiers—accustomed from youth to the absence of all luxuries, to plain food, a hard couch, scanty clothing; schooled in the gymnasium and palaestra, and unused to any excitement beyond that of marching to war to the sound of martial music and song, and with no personal vanity to gratify except that of dressing their persons so as to astonish or terrify their enemy. But the supremacy which this training secured them was only gradually obtained. Beginning with the upper part of the valley of the Eurotas, they had by a series of struggles with Argos—of which we do not know the details or the times—extended their dominion over most of Cynuria on the east coast down to Cape Malea, and had overcome the old Achæan inhabitants between themselves and the harbour of Gythium, till Laconia included all that lay between Mount Taygetus and the sea. But to the west of Taygetus lay the district of Messenia watered by the river Pamisus (as Laconia is by the Eurotas) and, though in part mountainous, yet containing larger and more fruitful plains than those of Laconia, and enjoying a milder and more temperate climate. Its earliest known inhabitants were Leleges, and its chief city in Homeric times was Pylos, in which reigned a dynasty of Aeolian kings called Neleides. On the invasion of the Dorians, Messenia fell to the lot of the Heraclid Cresphontes, who is credited with having made a five-fold division of the country, each with a principal city—Stenyclerus, Pylus, Rhium, Hyameis and Mesola—and legends as usual follow as to the various fates of his descendants. As in Laconia, the Dorian

14. The
Messenian
Wars.
1st War,
B.C. 745—24(?).

conquest was gradual, beginning with Stenyclerus on the borders of Arcadia and going on to include other parts of the country. The ancient inhabitants do not seem to have been expelled, though reduced to the status of perioeci whenever the Dorian conquerors got sufficient hold upon them. But it is clear that this Dorian conquest was never complete, and that Messenia remained to a great extent what it was before the invasion. At any rate, no great Dorian city in it rose to the commanding position occupied by Sparta in Laconia. The enmity between the Messenians and the Spartans was of very old standing, and seems to have begun as usual in quarrels as to frontiers, and border raids. The western slopes of Taygetus were easier and better for vines than the eastern, and when we first know anything about the two countries the Spartans had possessions on this western slope. There appear indeed to have been ancient claims on the part of Sparta, making the Pam̄sus instead of Mount Taygetus the limit of their dominion. But whether these claims were ever seriously made or not, in the seventh century the two peoples seem to have agreed to a frontier following the river Medon, which flows in a deep valley through the centre of the range of Taygetus. At Limnae—the site of which has been proved by discoveries of remains and inscriptions—was a temple of Artemis Limnatis, at which both Messenians and Spartans worshipped as standing on the borders of their respective dominions. But such an agreement was certain to be subject to disputes and reprisals. The history of the English and Scottish border in the early centuries of our history would doubtless find many parallels in that of Messenia and Laconia. The Spartans always had their eyes fixed upon the better and more fruitful ‘lots’ of land in the plain of the Pam̄sus, and according to tradition it was the murder of the Spartan king Talecles (8th of the Agidae) near the shrine of Artemis Limnatis that brought the quarrel to a crisis. Talecles is credited with a great extension of Spartan power in Laconia, and he may have also turned

his arms to the valley of the Pam̃sus. However that may be, soon after his death began a more determined attempt on the part of the Spartans to settle the Messenian question. They descended from the frontier mountains and seized Thuria (once called Anthea) in the basin of the lower Pam̃sus, a fertile and well-watered district, and from this town as their basis wasted the country round, until the Messenians fortifying themselves on Mount Ithome made a long and desperate resistance. There are traditions of more than one Spartan defeat in the long war for freedom: but it was at length decided by the dogged persistence of the Spartans under the vigorous leadership of the kings Theopompus (B.C. 772—713) and Polydorus (B.C. 750—709). From that time the old royal cities of Messenia became desolate, fortified villages or strongholds were dismantled, and the remains of the national Aeolic king Aphareus were removed to the market-place of Sparta, to mark it as the capital of the two districts. The conquering Spartans treated the lands as they had done those in Laconia. They took a thousand new lots for their own citizens, which they worked by natives in the position of helots, who paid half the produce to their masters. Some whole communities were expelled, and others more favourable to themselves put in their place. The Messenian owners either emigrated to Sicily and Magna Graecia, or stayed on in their holdings in the inferior position of perioeci, paying a fixed proportion of the produce to the Spartan State. The Spartan territory was more than doubled, and the very name of Messenia, as a separate State, was abolished¹.

But though conquered Messenia was not thoroughly

¹ The reader must be warned that the dates of these wars are very uncertain, as also how far the effects here mentioned may be regarded as following the first or second war. Our authority for them is mainly Pausanias (2nd century A.D.) who seems to have relied mostly on the *Messenica* of Myron of Priene (3rd century B.C.) and an Epic poem of Rhianus of Crete (3rd century B.C.).

subdued, and continued indeed to be a constant source of trouble till its final separation from Sparta by Epaminondas (about B.C. 369). But no other great movement took place for at least a generation after the war of conquest. It was in the northern part of the country now that the spirit of liberty was most powerful, and the Spartan hold least firm : and it was round Eira on the northern frontier, part of the mountain range separating Messenia from Arcadia, that the next struggle was to be concentrated. About B.C. 685 the natural discontent arising from the degraded state of the populace, and the severity of Spartan rule, began to find expression among the highlanders of this northern district. Like every national movement that has been of any account, it owed such success as it attained, and at any rate its prolongation, to the fact that a leader was found of the right sort. What the Bruce was to Scotland, Llewellyn to Wales, and the legendary Tell to the Swiss Cantons, that ARISTOMENES was to the Messenians in the 7th century B.C. Legend and myth clustered round his name, as it has round that of most national heroes, and as late as B.C. 372, when at the battle of Leuctra the great blow was struck which was soon to shake off the yoke of Sparta and enable the Messenians once more to become a people, the spirit of Aristomenes was reported to have appeared aiding the Thebans and spreading terror among the Spartan host.

We must not expect to be able to follow this war as we can one related by contemporary authorities. But the broad outlines are probably not open to doubt. In the first place we must observe that what is called the Second Messenian War represents not only a Messenian movement, but a feeling of dislike and dread of the rising Spartan power throughout the Peloponnese. The Argives, Arcadians, Sicyonians, and Eleans all seem to have fostered the rising or given secret promises of help. Sparta was never a popular power. None of these States however gave Aristomenes effective aid. The Arcadians

15. The 2nd
Messenian
War, B.C. 685
—660 (?).

indeed made some show of doing so, but their king or duke Aristocrates seems twice to have played the traitor. In the first three years of the war legends tell of three great battles, at Derae near the Spartan frontier, at the Boar's Tomb near Stenyclerus, and at the Great Trench (ἡ μεγάλη Τάφρος). In the first two success more or less decisive is claimed for Cleomenes, who after the first is even said to have made his way into Sparta and nailed up a Spartan shield, which had been left on the ground, in the temple of Athena Chalcioecus. The Spartans however were encouraged to go on, it is said, by the spirited songs and exhortations of Tyrtæus, the lame poet from Aphidna in Attica, who had been sent to Sparta, half in scorn, by the Athenians when asked for help. In the third battle—at the Great Trench—Aristomenes betrayed by the Arcadian king was utterly beaten, and escaping with some of his followers fortified himself on Mount Eira. This post—like that of Ithome in the other war—was maintained for eleven years, during which a never-ending though desultory warfare went on, accompanied by the usual romantic incidents and hair-breadth escapes. It is, we should observe, a North Messenian war; the southern parts of the country seem to have been held securely by the Spartans; only they had always to be on their guard against sudden raids from Mount Eira, and were often put into considerable danger. They had to be always under arms, or ready to be so at short notice, as it was never certain in what direction the daring rebels would descend. Aristomenes himself is credited with a variety of adventures, many of which are no doubt founded on fact and are the inevitable consequences of this sort of war, in which there is constant occasion for some bold dash, some sudden attack, or some hasty retreat. The stories of Bruce in Scotland will almost exactly represent to us what the life of Aristomenes must have been. The best known story is of his leading a bolder raid than usual as far as Amyclæ, within a few miles of Sparta itself. There he was captured and thrown into a deep pit, called *Keadae*, into which

the bodies of executed criminals were wont to be flung. After two days and nights in this dark and noisome den, when he had now given up all hope, he was dimly aware of some fox or other wild beast gnawing the corpses. Where it got in, he thought, he could get out. He seized its tail and followed it till a faint stream of light shewed where the animal had burrowed an entrance, and by that path he too now managed to make his way into the upper air. So the old predatory war went on, with other adventures and other escapes. The Spartans are now assisted by the Corinthians, and at length surprise Eira by a night attack and shut up Aristomenes in the fortification on its summit. The Spartans, all through their history, shewed to the least advantage when attacking such places. Their training and arms were meant for fighting in the open, where they were most successful; but to take a fortress was always a task they were ready to leave to allies. Thus they were now glad to compound matters with Aristomenes after three days' blockade. He and his men were allowed to march out in safety with their women and children. But with the loss of Eira all effective operations were at an end for him; and after some futile attempts to renew the war, his sons and his followers mostly crossed the sea to Rhegium, and he himself shortly afterwards went to the court of his son-in-law Damagetes, king of Ialysus in Rhodes, and there ended his days.

The result of this long struggle was the complete annexation of Messenia, and its absorption in Laconia for about 300 years. Its inhabitants were mostly henceforth in the position of helots, working the lands for the benefit of the Spartan owners or the Spartan government. Spartan territory was doubled, and Spartan influence became paramount throughout the Peloponnese.

Of the non-Dorian inhabitants of the Peloponnese those most affected by the fall of the Messenians were the Eleans. The inhabitants of the three districts—(1) Elis proper, (2) Pisatis, (3) Tri-

16. The
Eleans after
the Messenian
wars.

phylia—were originally called Epeians ; but after the admixture of a number of Aeolian immigrants the name of Elis¹ and Eleans gradually prevailed over the whole district. During the second struggle between Sparta and the Messenians the Pisatae and Triphylians, who favoured the Messenians, took the opportunity of securing possession of Olympia, and excluded the other Eleans—who favoured Sparta—from the festival. The end of the Messenian resistance and the triumph of Sparta brought with it therefore the fall of the Pisatae and the restoration of the Eleans to the presidency of the Olympic festival. About B.C. 588—572 the Pisatae endeavoured to recover this privilege, but were defeated, and their town so completely destroyed, that its very existence became afterwards a matter of dispute. Hence till about the time of the Peloponnesian war the Eleans were faithful allies of Sparta.

But though from this time the influence of Sparta was paramount in the Peloponnese, there was never wanting some determined opposition to it. This came chiefly from Argos and Arcadia. We have seen that the Argives had originally occupied the leading position in the Peloponnese which the Spartans had been gradually acquiring for themselves. Since the time of Pheidon (circ. 730 B.C.) the Argive influence had been on the decline. It was less closely united in itself than Sparta; Epidaurus, Troezen, Mycenae and Tiryns long maintained a kind of independence, and a loose confederacy is always at a disadvantage in a contest with a better organised State. When the contest for the disputed territory of Cynuria was finally decided in favour of Sparta, the Argives were no longer able to dispute the supremacy; but they remained in opposition, in a somewhat sullen reserve: and in after times we find the enemies of Sparta always counting upon this traditional enmity in any plan for raising an opposition to Sparta in the Peloponnese.

17. Opposition
to the Spartan
influence
in Argos,

¹ The form of this word on the column at Delphi is *FAAIΣ*, which is probably connected with *vallis*.

But the difference between Argive and Spartan policy was not only connected with Peloponnesian politics. Argos was regarded as the mother State of Crete, Rhodes, Cos, Cnidus and Halicarnassus. Its interests therefore were with the East rather than the West, and this was made clearer when the Persians began interfering in Greece.

Other opposition to Spartan supremacy came from Arcadia, and especially from Tegea. The Arcadians were
 18. and in
 Arcadia. looked upon as the most ancient people in Greece, that is to say, they were the people, more than any other, as to whom no record existed either of their original immigration or of any substantial change since. The mountainous nature of the country—for though the mountains of the east are much lower than those in the west, it is throughout a highland region—no doubt contributed greatly to this permanence. A nation of shepherds and huntsmen, they were the Swiss of Greece, and had been able to resist even the Dorian conquerors. Their reputation was high for kindness and hospitality, for a primitive simplicity of life, and for their cultivation and love of music. They had sided with the Messenians both from their innate passion for freedom, and because the encroachment of the Spartans was a frequent source of danger to themselves. Thus they put to death Aristocrates, king of Orchomenus, when he a second time betrayed Aristomenes. But the country as a whole was not united. There were at least three principal divisions, and there were other towns which maintained a virtual isolation. The State which most felt the danger of Spartan encroachment was Tegea, a very ancient city whose importance was at least as early as the Homeric poems. Its territory embraced nine townships (*δημοι*) and its inhabitants were divided into nine tribes. Its importance arose from the fact that it barred the road into Arcadia and the north, and the Spartans therefore made constant efforts to reduce it to obedience. Legends of contests begin with the very beginning of Doric Sparta, and

continue at intervals for a long time afterwards. It was not till B.C. 560 that the Tegeans were compelled to acknowledge Spartan supremacy and to furnish a contingent to the army when Sparta demanded it. Yet Tegea remained independent even after that, and was reckoned by Herodotus as the second military power in the Peloponnese. Wars between it and Sparta are twice recorded after B.C. 480; and its great temple of Athena Alea remained a place of refuge for men flying from Spartan law.

The remaining district of the Peloponnese which, for a time at least, held aloof from the Spartan alliance

was Achaia. As Wales became the refuge of the Celtic natives of Britain before the conquering Saxon, so Achaia received the remains of the old Achaeans who fled before the Dorian conquerors, and preserved their name; while many of its Ionian inhabitants migrated to Attica. It included from very ancient times a league of twelve cities, and its inhabitants enjoyed a high reputation for probity and honour, and though they did not in early times come forward much in the internal politics of Greece, they were very active and successful as colonisers in Italy and Sicily. Some time before the Peloponnesian war they had submitted to acknowledge the supremacy of Sparta in some shape, we do not know how far, but it did not extend to anything like complete loss of independence.

19. Achaia.

Such in general outline was the political state of the Peloponnesus when we take up Greek history in the 6th century. Sparta has made itself the leading State, has absorbed the Cynurian district

20. Summary of Peloponnesian affairs.

and Messenia, has gained the alliance, on more or less compulsory terms, of Corinth, Sicyon, Tegea, the Eleans, Achaia. The one part in which she can exercise no influence is Argolis. But the Argives are weak, and while holding sullenly aloof, cannot hope to offer any effective resistance to Spartan power. The Spartans themselves have in virtue of their ancient consti-

tution and discipline become what we know them afterwards, a nation apart and peculiar, a nation of soldiers holding down an enslaved and hostile population, and not only devoted to their own oligarchical form of government, but ready to promote it everywhere else as against tyranny or democracy.



COIN OF CORINTH.

CHAPTER IV.

ATHENS AND ATTICA.

Of the vast influence exercised by Greek art and philosophy upon the thoughts, and therefore upon the history, of mankind, Athens must be looked upon as the main source. Many of the great writers who have so profoundly influenced all succeeding literature were Athenians; many were attracted to Athens as the seat of learning and the centre of all culture; and she became in time, as Pericles wished, the 'School of Greece.' It is natural therefore that the history of Athens should occupy a very large place in that of the Greeks. Still the rise of Athens, both in material and intellectual influence, was comparatively late in Greek history. The place occupied by Athens in the Iliad is a very subordinate one, if indeed the mention of it at all is not a later insertion. Her part in the Ionian settlements in Asia is not very distinct or well defined; and though her successful attempt to establish her possession of Sigeum against the Mitylenians in the 7th century shews that the Athenians were already vigorous and looking out for external dominion, yet as late as the beginning of the 5th century B.C. she was still so far from having developed a naval power that she had to hire or borrow triremes for the war with Aegina. So also on the intellectual side: a considerable literature had grown up among the Greeks before Athens began to make any important contributions to

i. The comparative lateness of the rise of Athens.

it. The Homeric epics and hymns, Hesiod, and the writings of the Cyclic poets, are all unconnected with Athens. There are no Athenian lyrics, and no elegiac poets before Solon; the earliest history was not Athenian. Herodotus and his contemporary Hellanicus, and his predecessor Hecataeus, were Asiatic or Island Greeks; Pindar was a Boeotian; Bacchylides and Simonides were islanders. The rise of Athens begins with the rule of Peisistratus (B.C. 560), although, as we shall see, even before that she had begun to occupy a peculiar and interesting place in Greece. When she did acquire a commanding position among other Greek States, she did not maintain the material supremacy very long, but the intellectual supremacy was won for ever and still survives.

The primary facts in regard to a country—affecting its whole history—are its geographical position and the nature of its surface. Attica is a triangular country, two sides of which are washed by the sea, while its base is formed by Mount Cithæron and its southern or Eleusinian spur, separating it from Boeotia and Megara, and its eastern extension called Parnes. These mountains have at least three passes, but of sufficient difficulty to admit of defence. The easiest and most natural road from Thebes to the south passed by Eleusis to Megara, thus only skirting Attica proper. Its area is about 700 square miles—rather more than half the size of Cornwall—or 740, if the island of Salamis be counted in. It is divided into five natural divisions by the formation of its mountains—the Paralia or district along the south-western coasts; the Mesogaia or inland district bounded by the mountains Pentelicus and Hymettus; the eastern coast; two plains, those of Athens and Eleusis; and a highland district (Diacria) north-east of Athens, with no other plain except that of Marathon. The soil is light and dry, well suited for certain fruits such as olives and figs, and in many parts for vines, but not for corn. A considerable amount of corn indeed was grown in Attica, but

2. Geographical position and natural features of Attica.

it was the result of hard toil and careful cultivation, and probably never sufficed for the inhabitants, certainly it never caused Attica to be an object of envy as an agricultural district. Wild flowers were abundant, especially in the district of Hymettus, leading to the cultivation of bees and the production of good honey. Its nearness to the sea helps to give Attica a healthy and comparatively temperate climate, and it is particularly noted for its bright and pure atmosphere. The greatest source of wealth to Attica however was the silver from the mines near Sunium, the southern apex of the triangle. Xenophon asserts that these mines had been worked from remote antiquity; but the earliest known Attic silver coin does not appear to date before about B.C. 590, and, though they no doubt were worked with increased energy after that time, the earliest mention of these mines in literature is in the *Persae* of Aeschylus, first exhibited in B.C. 472.

Let us see what effect these natural features of the country had upon its history. In the first place, lying out of the direct highway from north to south, and having nothing in the nature of its soil to attract invaders, it suffered much less than other districts from displacements of population. This fact was symbolised in the myths that affirmed the people of Attica to have been born from the soil, autochthonous, and represented the earliest king Cecrops, acknowledged as in some way combining the rule of all Attica, as being half man and half snake; while the earliest eponymous or name-hero of the Athenians was Erechtheus or Erechthonius, a child born of Mother Earth, delivered to Athena, and in her turn committed to the care of the daughters of Cecrops. These myths represent a fact—that the inhabitants of Attica had been in the country beyond the memory of man. And consequently we find that they were regarded as connected with what Thucydides says was the largest of the prae-Hellenic peoples, the Pelasgi. The position of the country also caused it to be sought as

3. Early
mythology
and history
of Attica.

a place of refuge by people expelled from other countries. Thus in mythology it is Athens that offers hospitality to the Heracleidae, or sons of Heracles, when expelled from Argolis ; and, coming nearer to historical times, it is at Athens that the Ionians, driven from Achaia by Achaeans who were retiring before the Dorian invaders, first find a refuge before passing on to Asia. There is hardly any characteristic of Attic habits more frequently mentioned with approbation than that of the welcome always extended to strangers—so sharply in contrast with the *xenelasia* of the Spartans. If we may trust the analogy of other countries, this must have affected the character of the people by bringing men of energy and skill into the land, introducing new thoughts, aims, and industries, and forming that activity and alertness of genius which distinguished the Athenians among the other Greeks. Again the poorness of the soil, combined with the extent of sea-line and the existence of convenient landing-places, must have from early times induced many of the inhabitants to seek by labour in the sea or commerce what the soil hardly supplied in sufficient abundance for all. It was a question that had early to be determined—should they remain at home and cultivate the unkindly soil, or seek their fortunes on the sea? This debate is partly represented under the myth of the contest between Athena and Poseidon for the possession of the land. Poseidon struck the earth and up sprang a horse, the emblem of war : Athena touched the soil and there sprang up an olive, the emblem of peace. The judges assigned the land to her as having produced what was best for man. Attica was then to shine in the arts of peace, and all those accomplishments of wisdom and learning of which Athena—who sprang ready armed from the brain of Zeus—was patron goddess. And such indeed was to be her fate. It was only as a comparatively brief episode—a short period in the life of a nation—that Athens played the part of a naval and military power, of an imperial State forcing its authority on unwilling subjects. The real empire of Athens,

viewed in the light of world-history, has been a spiritual empire. One great material service indeed she rendered to Europe in heading and inspiring the resistance to invasion from the East; but her other generals and admirals fought and died in local contests of little significance in general history. Her real heroes were her poets and philosophers.

Again, the variety in its natural formation produced a difference also in the nature and employments of the inhabitants of Attica. The *pedieis* or men of the plain possessed the best lands for cultivation and grew to be wealthy and inclined to regular civil life. The *epacrii*, or highlanders, lived a harder life, depending on the game to be found in the mountains, or wringing a sustenance with greater difficulty from an unwilling soil, and wandering with their sheep and goats through wilder scenes. These were less inclined—as highlanders always are—to submit to the restraints of social life. The *parali*, men of the coast, made their living by fishing; and the hardness of their life and its dangers, and the scantiness of their earnings, caused them rather to sympathise with the men of the heights than with the well-to-do farmers of the plains.

From its position, within easy distance of two good harbours, and its possession of that chief desideratum of a Greek town, a strong acropolis, capable of being fortified and defended, as well

4. Early political division of Attica.

as from its situation in the best plain of Attica, Athens was plainly destined to be the ruling power in the whole district. But there was a time when it was not so. The inhabitants divided into clans (*γένη*) lived as did other Aryan peoples in separate towns and villages (*πόλεις, κῶμαι*), each with its own chief's house (*prytaneium*) and council chamber (*bouleuterium*) and place of assembly or discussion (*lesche*). The prytanis or chief, originally perhaps called *pater*, was afterwards called *basileus*. Some of the villages were larger than others and made up of subordinate villages or *demes*. But all were separate and independent, and admission to the full privileges of a

citizen in them depended on belonging by pure blood to certain families—of which the number in each clan was traditionally thirty. These privileges included a share in a common burial place, certain rights of succession and of property, rights of marriage, and a share in the use of common land; while in return each owed obedience to certain principles of right and wrong, were obliged to render certain acts of mutual help, and worshipped common gods, Apollo Patrous and Zeus Herceius (Zeus of the homestead). A certain number of these clans, again traditionally thirty, combined to form a *polis*. There were said to be twelve *poleis* in Attica: and the clans thus forming the *polis*, though separate in some respects, were all *phratores* to each other and formed a *phratría*, also with a common object of worship and common duties of mutual protection.

The work of combining these twelve *poleis* or States into one (*συνοικισμός*) was always attributed to Theseus, who thus became the hero of the whole Athenian State. It is very likely, as often happens, that a single person is credited with what was a gradual process; and many maintain that what was really to be attributed to Theseus was the combination of some villages¹ into the single city of Athens round the Acropolis, and not the combination of the twelve Attic cities into one State with Athens as the capital city. As such a theory rests entirely on conjectural explanations of myths and words, it cannot be really proved or disproved. What we have to note is that some time before the eighth century the separate communities in Attica had ceased to be autonomous; instead of the *leschai* in the separate towns there was an assembly at Athens, and a *bouleuterium* and *prytaneium* at Athens instead of the local ones: and above all a *basileus* or king at Athens, instead of the separate village chiefs. The local organisations

¹ Cecropia, Helicon, Eleusium, Melite are the four *comae*, named by some as thus combined in one city.

probably remained for certain purposes, as that of the *phratría* for the recognition of children. And another division of the people, perhaps as old as any, into the four Ionic tribes—Hoplites (military), Aegicoreis (goatherds and shepherds), Argadeis (labourers), and Geleontes—remained, and was used by the kings for political purposes, such as the levying of contributions. It is uncertain whether these tribes were local and corresponded roughly to the division mentioned before of the men of the plain, the mountains, and the sea-coast, or whether they were entirely *castes*, divided according to the prevailing occupations of their members. As to the meaning of the fourth, the Geleontes, there is much dispute, but it seems likely that in some way it indicates a priestly, or priestly and martial, class.

Of the hero Theseus, to whom this combination of the separate Attic cities was attributed, there are many other traditions. He was said to have practically established many democratical institutions, equality of rights in all citizens, the proclamation invoking the general assembly, the use of coined money, and certain religious rites. He was also a kind of rival Heracles, subduing monsters, and sailing to the Pontus to attack the Amazons. After the Persian war, when the Athenians, proud of their sacrifices and success, were looking out for means to give dignity to their restored city, a commission was sent, in obedience to an oracle, to the island of Scyros, where Theseus was believed to have died, and the bones of a man of heroic size found there were solemnly brought to Athens, and a temple was built over them in the Ceramicus, with special rights of sanctuary¹.

According to the common story the institution of a life king (*basileus*) came to an end with the death of Codrus, who, when the Dorians from Peloponnesus invaded Attica, devoted himself for his country. An oracle had said that the side would win whose

6. The life
archon.

¹ The temple now called the Theseium is probably not this building.

king perished. Thereupon Codrus disguised himself, and going among the Dorian soldiers provoked them to kill him. The Athenians in honour of his heroism determined that no one should be a *basileus* after him. This was one way of accounting for a great change that before the time of regular history had taken place at Athens. It is probable however that the change was gradual. The title of *basileus* in fact was never abolished, though the office gradually lost many of its prerogatives and its monarchical position. For a new classification of the people now appears—the Eupatridae (nobles), the Geomori (landowners), and the Demiurgi (handicraftsmen). The Eupatrids, as oligarchical nobles always were, would be enemies of monarchy. We find therefore that the power of the *basileus* is weakened by the appointment of a polemarch, to lead the army in war, at first owing to the incompetence of some *basileus*. Yet the *basileus* still remains for certain religious and State functions: but he is now styled king archon (ἄρχων βασιλεύς) to distinguish him from the war archon (ἄρχων πολέμαρχος). The office was confined to one clan called the Medontidae, and the king archon was elected for life.

But in B.C. 753 the life tenure was abolished, and a period of ten years substituted, though the office was still confined to the Medontidae. In B.C. 713 the Medontidae were deprived of this privilege and the ten years' archonship was thrown open to all Eupatrids. This then represents a change in the direction of oligarchy, in which the highest office is retained by one class. In B.C. 684 a farther step was taken against personal rule. The decennial archonship was abolished, and the office put as it were into commission, nine archons being elected every year.

The first three of these archons performed the chief functions once performed by one. But in them the *basileus* takes the second place, and the *polemarchus* the third. The chief of the nine is called *the* Archon, and gives his name to the year (Eponymous).

7. Ten years' archon, and yearly archons.

8. The nine archons.

The remaining six were called *Thesmothetae* (makers of dooms), their function being from the first judicial. They had to decide cases according to custom and traditional rules; and, when there are no written laws, this practically amounts to legislation. But the inevitable result of this subdivision of functions was the weakening of the archonship as representing the government. One by one these functions were curtailed or more closely defined, and they gradually became mere administrative magistrates. One of the chief functions of government—that of dealing with foreign nations—was eventually delegated to a specially elected board of generals or *strategi*. This was much later: but as the ancient *boulè* (afterwards called the *Boulè* of the Areopagus to distinguish it from the *boulè* of 401) was replenished from ex-archons, who were members for life, the hold of the Eupatrids upon the government was still maintained, and for a time Athens was a close oligarchy. For this *boulè* conducted the whole internal administration, inflicted summary punishments on offenders against order, and saw that the customs and traditional rules were obeyed.

The first inroad upon this oligarchy of the Eupatrids was the beginning of a written code of laws. Like the decemviral legislation at Rome, the laws ^{9. Draco.}_{B.C. 621.} attributed to Draco were neither mild nor democratic. But it is a step towards liberty that punishments should no longer depend on the will of a magistrate or a council, but on a written enactment known to all and applicable to all. The laws of Draco, we are told, were merciless in their severity. Murder, adultery, sacrilege, theft, were all alike punished by death. “Draco’s laws,” it was said, “were written in blood”! “They were not laws of a human being,” says Aristotle, “but of a dragon.” Still they were laws; the penalties attaching to their breach were known, and did not depend upon the decisions of magistrates or *boulè*. The court of Ephetae (51), also attributed to Draco, was perhaps intended as a farther

restraint upon magisterial caprice. The Ephetae were elected on the score of merit (*i.e.* not by lot) and acted as a court of appeal from the decision of the archon. Their functions were afterwards limited, but they in a way anticipated the courts of a later time. Draco's legislation does not appear to have been shocking to the men of his day, and indeed the extraordinary number of offences to which the death penalty was attached continued to mark Athenian law unfavourably to a very late time. And though Solon is said to have repealed all except those referring to murder, yet a number of laws of unknown antiquity engraved on tablets or cylinders (p. 75) were preserved in the Acropolis and were referred almost indiscriminately to Draco and Solon. As late as B.C. 404—3, having never been repealed, though fallen into disuse, they were ordered by a popular vote to be in force until a commission appointed to revise them should have finished its labours.

This was nearly all that was known of Draco till lately.

10. The
'Constitution
of Athens,'
and its view
of Draco.

He was regarded as the author of certain laws dealing with particular crimes, but not as a reformer of the constitution. But the discovery a few years ago of the *Constitution of Athens*, attributed to Aristotle, put the character of Draco in a new light. In this work (c. 4) he is represented as having wholly remodelled the constitution; and institutions once believed to have belonged to the age of Solon are attributed to him.

Briefly the constitution thus assigned to him is as follows. He found the existing definition of citizens, *i.e.* men possessed with full civil rights, to be 'those who could provide their own arms.' From this body of men were to be selected (1) archons and stewards of the temples, (2) lower magistrates, (3) strategi and hipparchs, (4) a boulè of 401. All were to be over thirty years of age, and all, except the strategi and hipparchs, were to be selected by lot. But the archons and stewards of the temples could only be selected from those who had a property qualification valued at ten minae (1000 drachmae, about £40),

and the strategi and hipparchs from those having land valued at 100 minae (10,000 drachmae, about £400), in both cases free from mortgage. The other minor offices required no property qualification beyond that of the men being able to supply their own arms. The strategi and hipparchs were also to be married and have legitimate children over ten years of age. Till all who were qualified had held office once, no one was to hold office twice. Non-attendance at the boulè of 401 was to be punishable by fine. The boulè of the Areopagus was to have general superintendence of the laws, and before it any citizen might impeach another by whom he conceived himself to be treated illegally. There is no mention of a general assembly, but perhaps that is implied in the citizens 'able to supply their own arms,' though nothing is said of what they are to do or how they are to meet. This 'timocracy' or 'civil rights according to property' is the basis of the Solonian constitution also, and the provisions attributed to Draco are in some respects more liberal, particularly in the amount of property qualifications for the archonship. The use of the lot also had generally been assigned to a still later age. Accordingly many critics refuse to accept this account, and believe it to have been falsely alleged by later reformers, who wished to shew that the changes introduced by themselves were in harmony with the most ancient constitution of Athens. It is however more natural that such a constitution as Solon's should be founded on and developed from what had gone before, rather than spring ready made from his own brain. Election by lot—connected with the religious idea of leaving the choice of apparently equal claims to the gods—was probably of great antiquity. But the strategi mentioned cannot be the board of ten instituted after B.C. 510 by Cleisthenes. They were probably military commanders elected when required. Lastly the remark of Aristotle in another book that Draco 'made no change in the constitution' may be explained by the fact that he found and left the full franchise confined to

the citizens able to supply their own arms; that he left the boulè of the Areopagus in the same position as he found it, without transferring any of its functions to any other body; and, finally, that he left the magistrates also as he found them. His only change was to limit the citizens eligible to office by a property qualification, which very likely did not much alter what was practically, if not legally, the case before; for the Eupatrids, who had alone had the right, would even now form the great majority of the class possessed of the necessary property. The magistrates, and especially the military strategus and hipparchs, would still be generally Eupatrids, though in theory they need not be.

Such a close constitution always offered inducements to an ambitious man, acting as champion of the excluded or practically excluded classes, to attempt a revolution. There were enough grievances among the people to make it easy for a reformer to get a party—such as the tyranny of the rich over the poor, the absolute mastery given to creditors by law or custom over the persons of their debtors, to say nothing of the exclusion of the great mass of people from political privileges. Accordingly soon after the time of Draco such a leader was found in Cylon¹. We know little of the man and his objects; but his movement is represented by all authorities as an attempt to establish a tyrannis. It was at any rate one that the oligarchical Eupatrids disliked. If however he, as usual with such conspirators, professed to be acting in the interests of the lower orders, he soon forfeited their confidence. He was of high birth and had won

11. Cylon,
B.C. 612 (?).

¹ The treatise on the 'Athenian Constitution' has introduced another difficulty into the received account of Cylon by putting his conspiracy before the legislation of Draco. This had been conjectured previously by some scholars, as best explaining the course of events and the reforms of Draco. There are however many difficulties in accepting this view, though there is nothing in the notices of Herodotus or Thucydides which makes it impossible.

the much valued distinction of an Olympic victory in the long foot-race. He had married the daughter of Theagenes, tyrant of Megara. His sympathies were therefore probably against oligarchy, though in favour of Dorian influence at Athens, and the attempt he now made was in consequence of an answer of the oracle at Delphi, which was always inclined to favour Dorian States. At any rate when the oracle told him to seize the Acropolis at 'the chief feast of Zeus,' he took advantage of the next Olympic festival to appear at the head of a band of armed men borrowed from his father-in-law Theagenes, and, with other friends, seized on the Acropolis. If he ever had the sympathy of the citizens at large he lost it now. The people gathered from all sides and laid siege to him. But as he held out a long time, the first enthusiasm died out, and the siege was left in the hands of the archons, chief of whom was Megacles of the great Alcmaeonid clan. When the conspirators were almost reduced to starvation, Cylon and his brother contrived to escape: the rest took up the position of suppliants at the altar of Athena on the Acropolis. After a time they were promised their lives, lest they should defile the temple by their death, and were thus induced to come down. They fastened a cord to the image of the goddess to which they held as they descended, more effectually to preserve their claim to the protection of her sanctuary. But—so it is said—the cord broke and the archons at once put them all to death, including some who fled for refuge to the altar of the Eumenides. This act was held to put the whole Alcmaeonid clan under a curse (*āγος*), in consequence of which we shall presently hear of their banishment. They were indeed afterwards restored, but were always looked on with suspicion, and in more than one instance the Spartans used this suspicion to discredit the leading statesmen in Athens—as in the case of Cleisthenes and Pericles. Whether, then, the attempt of Cylon ever had popular sympathy or not, it is evident that the oligarchic Eupatrids had the greatest interest in suppressing it. The

people were indifferent, or soon became so, and all the discredit of the measures taken against the conspirators fell upon the Eupatrids. The seizure of the Acropolis by the aid of Megarians was enough perhaps to alienate any popular sympathy Cylon may ever have had. The credit of the oracle was as usual saved by the explanation that by 'the chief feast of Zeus' was meant not the Olympic festival, but the *Diasia*, a festival of Zeus celebrated by the Athenian people outside the city.

The glimpses which we get of Athenian history after the unsuccessful attempt of Cylon are not very satisfying. The acquisition of Sigeum (about B.C. 606) shews that the Athenians were beginning to look abroad for possessions to secure their trade and commerce; but their weakness at home is shewn by it still being a disputed point whether the island of Salamis, naturally almost a part of Attica, should belong to them or the Megarians: while among their own people nothing had been effected by the reforms of Draco towards improving the relations between rich and poor. Indigent farmers, whether small landowners, or tenants paying a sixth of the produce to their lords (*hectemoroi*), still groaned under a load of debt, which meant not only ruin, but often slavery also to themselves or their children. The next attempt to remedy this state of things was made by Solon. Like most reformers in Greece he was not one of the oppressed class. The son of Exekestides was an Eupatrid, said even to belong to the Medontidae who traced their descent from Medon son of king Codrus. His father had diminished the family property, and Solon had as a young man betaken himself to foreign commerce. But he had availed himself also of the opportunities of travel thus given him to widen his knowledge of other peoples, their institutions, and their learning. He was not a philosopher in the sense afterwards attaching to that word. We know of no speculations of his on nature, or the operations of the

12. Solon,
born about
B.C. 635.

mind, or the theory of ethics. He studied what we should call social science and politics, the application of virtue and sagacity to the framing of a constitution, and the drawing up in a State of laws best calculated to secure the well-being of its citizens. His own ideal for himself he declared to be "to grow old ever learning"; and while acknowledging the practical value of wealth, he declares, like Hesiod, that "if unjustly gained it buys loss." "Many base men," he says, "are rich; many good are poor. I would not change virtue for wealth: for virtue abideth ever: wealth is now one man's now another's." "Our State," he says again, "will not perish of itself, or by the action of the gods: it is our own citizens corrupted by bribes, it is the injustice and arrogance of our leaders, it is our neglect of justice, that will breed civil war and all its ruin and destruction." The art or practice of oratory was not yet born, and his maxims were delivered in the shape of elegiac verses, as most likely to stick in the mind. In this form he put forth his social and political doctrines, winning the sort of reputation which in after times men gained by speeches, or in our own by writing in the Press.

Three questions which greatly affected the well-being of Athens came to the front early in his career, and gave him opportunities of gaining the confidence of his countrymen. One was the possession of the island of Salamis. The island was of great importance in regard to the freedom of navigation in the Saronic gulf, and became still more important in after years when the harbour of Athens was removed to the Peiræus from the bay of Phalerum. Intermittent war with Megara had long been going on for its possession, and Athens had suffered many disasters, so that, it is said, the Eupatrids had passed a law inflicting death on anyone who proposed to renew the Athenian claim. Solon, who believed that one of the best chances of reforming the evils at home was that Athens should become a stronger State, was filled with

13. The
public services
of Solon.
Salamis.

indignation and shame at such a public confession of failure. Assuming the appearance of supernatural excitement he hurried into the agora. A crowd gathered round him and he addressed them as usual in verses, of which a few have been preserved. "A herald I am come myself from lovely Salamis, with a stave of ordered verse in lieu of a speech.....Would I could change countries and were a citizen of Pholegandros or Sicinos and not of Athens! For all the world will soon be saying, 'Lo, an Athenian! one of those who gave up Salamis!'. Nay, to Salamis we will go, to fight for the lovely isle, and to rid us of the burden of our shame!" The effect of this poem in securing the repeal of the law seems to imply the existence of a popular assembly, but it is the first we hear of its positive action. Of the way in which the Athenians did eventually secure Salamis two stories are related. First that Solon sent a pretended deserter to the Megarian garrison in the island to persuade them to seize the opportunity of the festival of Aphroditè Kolias, near Sunium, to carry off the Attic women engaged in it and hold them as hostages. The women were meanwhile withdrawn, and when the Megarians rowed across to take them, they were rewarded by deadly thrusts from the daggers of the youths who had been dressed up to represent the women. While they were thus engaged, Solon crossed to Salamis with Athenian troops and captured the island. Another story represents the dispute as referred to Spartan arbitration. Solon pleaded the Athenian cause and argued, (*a*) that in the catalogue of the ships in the second book of the Iliad, Ajax is represented as having his ships next to those of Athens; (*b*) that the sons of Ajax—Philæus and Eurysakes—gave up the island to Athens and settled in Attica, one of the Attic demes being called after the former *Philaidēs*; (*c*) that an examination of the tombs shewed that in old times the Salaminians were buried in the Attic manner, one in each grave, and facing the west, whereas the Megarians buried

their dead facing the east and several in one grave; (*d*) that there existed oracles in which Salamis was called Ionian. These arguments would have greater weight than we should perhaps expect. The reference to the graves, like that of Thucydides to the Carians buried in the islands, was in its way a good piece of historical evidence. And whether Solon, as has been supposed, foisted into the *Iliad* the verse as to the Athenian ships or not, the decision of the Spartan arbitrators in favour of Athens was regarded as chiefly owing to his wisdom, and helped to make him the leading statesman and referee in all difficulties.

In another matter Solon came forward not only as an Athenian statesman, but as promoting the interests of Greece generally. The temple of Delphi with its oracle was by this time becoming the centre of Greek life, appealed to in all difficulties private or public, and resorted to from all parts. It was therefore of great importance that access to it should be easy and safe. But the people of Cirrha, the port of Delphi, not only levied a heavy toll on worshippers arriving in their harbour, but had also committed many acts of aggression on the sacred territory. The Amphictyonic league at length—under pressure, it is said, from Solon—proclaimed a kind of holy war against the Cirrhaeans, something like the crusade undertaken to free Christian pilgrims from the tax levied by the Saracens at the gates of Jerusalem. Though Solon did not command in the war, its success, after ten years of struggle, was believed to have owed much to his wise advice. The city and its territory were taken and made wholly the property of the god, the Cirrhaean plain being for ever withdrawn from cultivation.

Yet another service was done by Solon to his country. The 'curse' (*ἄγος*), brought upon the people by the violation of the sanctuary by the archon in suppressing the Cylonian conspiracy, was believed to have been the cause of great miseries

14. Solon
and the sacred
war, B.C. 595.

15. The
Alcmaeonidae
and the
'curse.'

to the country. The popular party—remnants perhaps of the Cylonians—were ready to attribute to it the losses in the Megarian wars, bad seasons, and epidemics which seem to have occurred at this time, bringing with them increased poverty and debt among the farmers, and a general feeling of uneasiness to all. Again it was Solon who suggested and secured that the Alcmaeonidae—the family to which the offending archon Megacles belonged—should submit to the decision of a court of 300 chosen judges. A certain Myro of the deme Phlya acted as accuser. They were condemned and the whole family exiled, even their dead being taken from their graves and cast over the frontier. The court was probably composed of Eupatrids, it was not elected by lot but on merit (*ἀριστίᾳ*), which includes the idea of high birth: but it seems to have commanded universal acceptance. Such a method of settling an important public question was a great advance in the direction of law and order.

How serious the alarm had been is shewn by what followed.

16. Epi-
menides of
Crete.

Even after the expulsion of the Alcmaeonidae the people felt uneasy as to the curse which had been incurred by the city, a feeling heightened, it is said, by the lingering of the epidemic. It was necessary to purify the city more completely. Accordingly a renowned sage, Epimenides of Crete, was invited to visit Athens. All sorts of wonderful stories were told of him. He was the son of a nymph; he had once slept in a cave for 57 years; he was more than 150 years old; he was the special favourite of Zeus, and the like. A ship was sent for him, and, when he came, he taught the people how to purify the city and appease the gods. The existence of altars at Athens without the name of any particular deity was accounted for afterwards by the story that he bade altars to be built on the Acropolis wherever a black or a white sheep, allowed to stray at will, chanced to lie down—perhaps accounting for the altars to ‘unknown gods’ seen by St Paul, and later still by the traveller Pausanias.

Epimenides refused all reward, and seems not only to have calmed the excitement of the people, but to have suggested some permanent changes in religious worship and in certain social customs, especially those of marriage, and to have been the first to point out to the Athenians the importance of the Peiraeus.

The story of Epimenides, told so vividly, though only by late authorities, may be taken at any rate as giving us a picture of an age of simple faith. But though he allayed a temporary alarm, the causes of discontent lay deeper. These causes were partly political and partly social. As Athens became more prosperous, there were more people who desired an equal voice in public affairs and to be eligible for public office. But such an increase of wealth in the city came from commerce, and especially from the corn trade, and what enriched the seafaring class tended for a time at any rate to impoverish the farmers, who could not compete with the merchants. Their debts increased, and the result was of course discontent. If this did not at once lead men to seek for political power, it would be sure to do so in the future, and might even give some popular champion the opportunity of establishing a tyranny. Solon states the problem thus: "by great nobles a State is ruined; yet the people from its unwisdom falls under the slavish yoke of a despot." Freedom was to be secured, but not by an unlimited democracy. In his view this inevitably led to tyranny. Some limit there must be; but that of property he thought to be better than that of birth. And this principle—already it seems existing in the Draconian system—he now developed. As Solon left the Athenian constitution it was still an aristocracy, but one in which the measure of privilege and merit was property and not birth. Such a method of measuring merit must be a rough and uncertain one; for property may be acquired dishonestly, or may be inherited without desert on the part of the owner. But it

17. Solon's
legislation,
B.C. 594—3.

has the advantage over an aristocracy of birth that it lays open to all the possibility of attaining the coveted position—Napoleon's *la carrière ouverte aux talents*. It distributes privilege to larger numbers, and it sets up a standard which on the whole men are more inclined to acknowledge. It is however far from a perfect arrangement, nor did it, as we shall see, answer Solon's hopes by averting a tyranny. But before embarking on the settlement of the constitution or on legislation, he felt that something must be done to alleviate the poverty, which was foreboding the very revolution which he meant by his political measures to avert.

Solon's first reform therefore aimed at relieving the impoverished farmer. From various causes, perhaps chiefly from the competition of commerce, the cultivators of the soil in Attica had become deeply involved in debt. The boundary stones (*ὄροι*) of their allotments were inscribed with the amount of the mortgages upon the land, and were everywhere witnesses of their embarrassments. But debts were secured not only on land, but also on the persons of the debtors and their children. If the debt could not be satisfied by the value of the land, the debtor might be forced to sell his children into slavery, and finally become enslaved himself. The exact nature of the measure of relief brought in by Solon has been a subject of much dispute. Some hold that he abolished all debts; others that he relieved the debtors by diminishing the interest and lowering the money standard; others again that the only debts abolished were those secured on land and on the person of the debtor. The last seems to be implied by the report that certain persons having got private information as to Solon's intentions, borrowed money and with it purchased land, so that, when the measure passed, they had their land for nothing. It is almost incredible that business debts of every sort should at once be abolished. Such a dislocation of all trade and commerce would have caused a wide ruin and distress of which we hear

18. The
Seisachtheia.

nothing. The wiping out of the land mortgages, on the other hand, might as a temporary measure be both justifiable and successful. For (1) they were usurious transactions forced on the borrower by his necessities; (2) the high rate of interest had probably already recouped the lenders, who were besides rich in other ways; (3) the unnatural security of the person of the debtor and of his children so enlisted sympathy with the debtors—the sentiment being always against the enslavement of Greeks—that a revolution was with reason regarded as likely, in which the rich might lose far more than the sums invested on land.

This abolition of mortgage debts was followed by a law forbidding the persons of a borrower or of his children to be pledged as a security for a debt. These two measures are what are called Solon's *seisachtheia*, 'shaking off of a burden.' They seem to have been at once successful, and we do not hear again in Attic history of this particular grievance, though of course the contrast of poverty and wealth, success and failure, is eternal. Solon set the example of obedience to his law by at once surrendering money of his own invested on land, and thus refuted the calumnies of his enemies, who asserted that he had shared in the fraudulent proceedings of those who used their knowledge of the coming law to borrow.

Of actual laws passed to regulate the life and conduct of the citizens we have a considerable number mentioned by various authorities, though there may be a doubt whether some are not attributed to him merely on the ground of being ancient. They were inscribed on wooden tablets (*κύρβεις*) arranged in sets of four—making thus a hollow pillar which revolved round an axis (*ἄξονες*). Many such were preserved on the Acropolis, and their date must often have been doubtful. Of those usually ascribed to Solon the two which perhaps may be regarded as best expressing his ideal are, first, the regulation which allowed any citizen who chose (*ὁ βουλόμενος*) to set the law in motion

19. Solon's
Laws.

against an offender although the alleged crime did not personally affect himself. This is not in itself political equality: there may still be disqualifications for office or other rights: but it puts all on a level in one most important point, it establishes an equality before the law which is of more practical importance than most political privileges. The second is the law which made a man disfranchised (*ἄτιμος*) who took no side in political parties or factions. Before all things a man was to be a *citizen*, a member of a society or *polis*. If he took no interest in its concerns, and avoided the duties of a member of this society, he was to cease to be a sharer in its privileges.

Draco is said to have punished 'idleness' (*ἀργία*), the absence of all visible employment, with death. Solon, we are told, repealed or allowed to fall into desuetude all Draco's laws except those of murder. But he appears to have followed their spirit, though attaching milder penalties to them. Thus while punishing with disfranchisement the man who took no part in politics, he also ordained that if a man brought up his son to no profession, the son was absolved from the duty of supporting him in his old age¹. Other laws regarded matters of detail, such as the freedom of bequest, the regulation of the expenses of sacrifices, the reward for the killing of wolves, the regulation of the water supply, and the prohibition against exporting anything from Attica except olive oil—the usual mistake among the ancients as to the nature of trade, just as in England there have been at times laws against exporting iron, and gold and silver money. Lastly an 'alien' law is attributed to him, forbidding the admission of a foreigner to citizenship, unless he had forfeited the citizenship of his own State, and removed with all his family to Athens. This was not intended to discourage the immigration of desirable families, but to make it more permanent.

¹ All these regulations as to *ἀργία* are said by Herodotus (ii. 117) and Diodorus (i. 77) to have been of great antiquity and to have been borrowed from Egypt.

On the purely constitutional side Solon's changes were not as great perhaps as was once supposed. They were in some respects in the direction of a more complete democracy, in others of an opposite tendency. The *boulè* of 401 was left as it was, with the duty of preparing measures for the *ecclesia*, of controlling the treasury and certain other departments. The rights of the *ecclesia* were not materially altered, but he seems to have done something towards making its meeting more constant, and its convocation more regular. As to the election of magistrates and officers he removed the restriction on the franchise which in Draco's scheme confined it to men capable of supplying their own arms. All who were of full age could now vote, but, on the other hand, the persons capable of being elected were even more closely defined than before. Solon retained the existing four Ionic tribes, with their subdivisions of *phratries* and clans, for the registration of the birth of full citizens and for elections; but the whole people were also divided into assessments (*τιμήματα*) according to their property. The first consisted of those whose land produced 500 medimni—dry or liquid measure—yearly; the second 300; the third 200. They were called respectively *Pentacosio-medimni*, *Hippeis*, *Zeugitae*. The fourth class consisted of all who could not shew property of the last-named value: they were called *Thetes*. The first class was eligible to the archonship, the second and third to various inferior offices; the *Thetes* to none at all. The mode of election to the archonship was a mixture of two systems. Each of the four tribes elected as they chose ten men, and from the forty thus named the archons were chosen by lot (*κληρωταὶ ἐκ προκρίτων*).

Solon regarded the ancient *Boulè* of the *Areopagus* as one of the sheet anchors of the State. This council, so called from the hill on which it met in the open air¹, was of unknown antiquity, and was

20. Solon's
constitutional
measures.

21. The
Areopagus.

¹ The meeting in the open air was to avoid pollution from the presence

originally the only council. Its functions were a general superintendence of the laws and conduct of the citizens: it received appeals from men who alleged that they had been wronged by magistrates, and tried certain crimes, punishing them at its own discretion. As early as we know anything of it, it was filled up yearly by the ex-archons, who remained members for life, and perhaps the 51 Ephetae, who heard appeals in certain cases of homicide. Solon seems rather to have defined its powers than increased them, and to have separated its jurisdiction from that of the Ephetae. It always retained its jurisdiction in cases of murder, poisoning, deliberate wounding, arson and some forms of sacrilege. The age and experience of its members gave it a great moral weight, and we shall see it playing an important part hereafter in more than one crisis in the history of Athens.


But what proved to be the most democratic part of Solon's constitution was the establishment of a law court or *dicasterion*, called the Heliaea (from a word meaning 'assembly'). The dicasts or jurymen consisted of a certain number of citizens over thirty years of age, selected by lot. For this court the Thetes were eligible, and it presently superseded in practice the jurisdiction of the archons, because the final decision as to the laws lay with it, and the archon in time became merely a magistrate of first instance, who decided whether there was a case to go before the jury, and saw that the legal formalities had been satisfied. The power and importance of the dicasts rapidly grew, and we shall have to note presently a great development of the system.

of persons stained with bloodshed. It probably only came to be called distinctively the council of the Areopagus when there was another council from which to distinguish it. The name of the hill was supposed to be connected with Ares, hence in the Acts the A.V. translates it 'Mars' Hill,' but others connect it with *ἀπαί* 'curses,' for the crimes tried there. The Greeks themselves regarded it as the *hill of Ares*, see Soph. *Oed. Col.*

Solon hoped—no doubt wrongly—that the constitution as he had arranged it would require no change for a long time. He wished moreover that the people should learn to work it themselves without the appeals to himself with which he was being constantly troubled. Accordingly, having caused all magistrates and dicasts to take an oath not to propose any alteration for ten years, he went on his travels. He visited Egypt, Cyprus and Asia. In Cyprus he was welcomed by the king Philocyprus, and is said to have given him advice as to the government of his kingdom, and even to have assisted in the foundation of a Greek colony in the island, called in his honour Soli. But the different stories told of his travels are difficult to reconcile. The most famous of all was that of his visit to king Croesus of Lydia, whom he found flourishing in great wealth and power. Croesus asked him whom he thought to be the happiest of men. Solon answered first by mentioning an obscure Athenian, Tellus, who had led a prosperous life, had excellent children, and died on the field of battle at the moment of victory. Next to him he told of the two Argive youths, Cleobis and Biton. They drew their mother in her car—for which the oxen came too late—to the festival of Hera. After they had received the applause of the concourse at the festival, their mother prayed the gods to give them the greatest blessing possible to man. They fell asleep in the temple, after the sacrifice and banquet, and died without waking. When Croesus was angry at the preference given to these humble folk over himself, Solon warned him that till the end came no one could be called happy. This story, told with the inimitable charm of Herodotus, is rejected by many on chronological grounds. Croesus did not begin to reign till B.C. 560; and therefore it cannot have happened in the first ten years' travel, if that began immediately after Solon's archonship of B.C. 594, or even twenty years later in B.C. 574. But Solon is represented by some authors as going abroad again when Peisistratus seized

23. Solon
goes abroad.

the tyranny (B.C. 560), when, as far as dates are concerned, it might have happened. But he must then have been a very old man, unlikely to have travelled so far. The date of his death is not known, nor even the place. According to some he died in Athens, according to others in Cyprus.



ATHENS AFTER THE PERSIAN WARS.

CHAPTER V.

ATHENS (*continued*). THE TYRANNY OF PEISISTRATUS
AND HIS SONS, AND ITS DOWNFALL.

Though the legislation of Solon had done a great deal to secure peace in Attica, it was by no means permanently successful. Four years after the date of his archonship we are told that there was so much disturbance that no archon could be elected at all (B.C. 590—589), and eight years later still (580—581) a certain Amasius being archon managed to grasp unconstitutional power and get elected for a second year. To prevent the recurrence of this a reform was introduced, whereby the archons were to be ten in number and elected in unequal proportions, five from the Eupatrids, three from the Geomori, and two from the Demiurgi. But this only lasted a year. It is evident however that the feud between these classes was continually breaking out. They answer roughly to another division of parties which represented various interests; the men of the coast (*parali*), the men of the plain (*pedieis*), and the men of the highlands (*epacrii*). The distinctions of birth had no doubt been the cause of many disagreements; but those of wealth and adverse interest seem to have caused no less bitterness of feeling. Towards the end of this period (about B.C. 562—1) we are told that the head of the party of the Coast

I. Athens
between the
archonship
of Solon
(B.C. 594) and
the usurpa-
tion of
Peisistratus
(B.C. 560).

was an Eupatrid named Lycurgus, that of the Plain was another Eupatrid—Megacles son of Alcmaeon. For the Alcmaeonidae who had been living in banishment in Phocis had by this time effected their return, partly no doubt owing to the divisions in the State, but partly also because they had become too rich and powerful to be denied. The head of the clan, Alcmaeon, had received great wealth from Croesus, and his son Megacles had married a daughter of Cleisthenes the tyrant of Sicyon. The party of the Coast was probably the extreme oligarchical party—for they were not now only poor fishermen, but included many rich merchants—that of the Plain the moderate party. Both were opposed to the democrats of the Mountain, but were also constantly at variance with each other.

This was just the state of things to give an ambitious man the chance of using a pretended zeal for the popular party to exalt himself. Peisistratus, son of Hippocrates, a relation of Solon, had in his youth distinguished himself in the war against Megara, and was said to have headed a storming party that seized Nisaea, the harbour town of Megara. We know nothing of what he had been doing since, but he now appears as a popular champion and head of the party of the Mountain. His first step was the usual one. He demanded from the people a body-guard on the ground that, as their champion, his life was in danger. Driving one day into the city covered with blood on a mule-car, he explained to the crowd which formed round him that he had been attacked on his way to his farm and all but killed by his enemies and theirs. In spite of Solon's protest the people voted him a guard, with which he soon afterwards seized on the Acropolis and made himself tyrant. Our authorities agree in acknowledging the moderation with which Peisistratus used the power thus irregularly obtained. The laws were not repealed, and the yearly magistrates were appointed as usual with the same functions. He himself professed to be subject to the law, even

2. First
tyranny of
Peisistratus,
B.C. 560—554.

condescending to appear before the council of the Areopagus to answer a charge of murder, though the case dropped from the absence of the accuser. The plan seems to have been that the ordinary forms of law and administration should go on, but that he should be the final authority. The archons were content to carry out his orders, while he no doubt kept the management of foreign and military affairs in his own hands; and one of the laws attributed to him contained a provision for pensioning men maimed in war. But on the whole the period of his tyranny—lasting for 19 years between B.C. 560 and B.C. 527 with two intervals of banishment—was a time of peace and growth in many ways for Athens. In the course of it he undertook the purification of the sacred island of Delos, the traditional centre of Ionian federation; he intervened in the political contests in Naxos, and secured the rule of Lygdamis; and owning property on the mouth of the Strymon, he used the gold mines near Mount Pangaeus to enrich the Athenian treasury as well as his own purse. The town of Sigeium in the Troad, which had been in possession of the Athenians since B.C. 606, was carefully looked after, and one of his sons, Hegesistratos, was made ruler of it. The silver mines of Laurium began to be worked with more energy, and the city was enriched by the royalty of five per cent. paid by the miners. He also did much to beautify Athens itself, employing a large number of men in the construction of temples and other public buildings, such as the temples of Pythian Apollo, and Zeus Olympius¹, the Lyceum with its gardens, and the fountain of the nine springs (Callirrhoe). He established the greater Panathenaea, or much improved it, as a festival celebrating Attic unity, and adorned the city with many Hermae inscribed with pithy sayings or texts. Lastly he not only caused the Homeric poems to be collected and revised, but he also made a collection or edition of the works of other poets for the use of the

¹ This was begun on so large a scale that it was never finished till the time of the Emperor Hadrian.

citizens, and encouraged men of genius and learning to settle in Athens.

These achievements were spread over the three periods of the rule of Peisistratus. Taken together however they shew the general nature of his administration. Yet in spite of it, and in spite of his popularity and gracious manners, he was twice driven into exile for about 6 and 10 years respectively. His rule, it was said afterwards, was a real Saturnian age of happiness, but at the time no doubt there were grievances, especially a tax of ten per cent. on property in Attica. At any rate the oligarchical Eupatrids were bitterly opposed to it. The party of the Coast and the party of the Plain forgot their differences and united against him. He does not appear however to have left Attica, or at any rate to have been prevented from being there when he chose: but as soon as his restraining hand in the government was away, the old quarrels between the parties of the Coast and the Plain recommenced.

3. First exile
of Peisistratus,
B.C. 553 to
B.C. 549.

After some years of this disorder Megacles came to terms with Peisistratus, agreeing to assist his restoration to power and to give him his daughter in marriage. Accordingly a plan was adopted which Herodotus calls 'the silliest in history.' A tall handsome woman was dressed in armour to represent Athena, and standing by the side of Peisistratus was driven in a chariot into the city, and proclaimed that she was 'bringing him back to the Acropolis, honouring him above all men.' Perhaps the desire for peace was as strong a motive as any belief in the genuineness of the divine apparition in inducing the people to receive him. In any case his restored power did not last long.

4. First
restoration,
B.C. 549-7.

5. Second
exile of
Peisistratus,
B.C. 547-537.

He offended Megacles by refusing to live with his new wife (Coesura), and after little more than a year's rule, finding that a strong coalition of the parties was forming against him, he retired to Eretria in Euboea. There he was joined by his two

sons Hippias and Hipparchus, and they seem soon to have resolved upon attempting a return. But for this purpose he spent many years of preparation, visiting his estates on the Strymon, collecting money from the mines of Pangaeus, and negotiating for support from outside. The knightly class at Eretria, who were in the ascendancy there, the Thebans, and his friend Lygdamis of Naxos, were specially forward in giving aid.

Having thus collected much wealth and a goodly band of supporters, he crossed from Eretria to the Attic coast, landing on the famous plain of Marathon. There seems to have been little notice taken of his proceedings at Athens until he was actually in the country and was being joined by numerous adherents. Then some effort was made to resist him, and a force met him at Pallènè on the road from Marathon to Athens, not far from the modern village of Garito. The arms of Peisistratus, however, were so quickly successful, that some historians have suspected treachery on the side of the Athenian force. At any rate he seems to have had no difficulty in persuading many of the army opposing him—by promising them security—to quit the ranks and return to Athens. The people generally were soon won over by the charm and eloquence of their old favourite; and Peisistratus, having by a trick deprived the greater number of them of arms, seems to have peacefully kept possession of power for the remaining ten or eleven years of his life. It was in these years probably that most of the improvements referred to above (pp. 82—83) were carried out, and in these that Athens began to make decisive advance in wealth and importance among Greek cities.

He was succeeded at his death by his eldest son Hippias, with whom his brother Hipparchus was associated in some way not very clearly defined. It seems to be acknowledged that for the first thirteen years of his administration Hippias not

6. The second restoration of Peisistratus and his death, B.C. 537—527.

7. The fall of the dynasty of the Peisistratids, B.C. 527—510.

only followed his father's example in adorning and strengthening Athens, and encouraging art and literature, but also governed mildly and well. Taxation was not increased, and the laws were maintained in full vigour, though Hippias retained the same ultimate jurisdiction as had been exercised by his father. But it appears that Hipparchus and a younger brother Thettalus had made themselves notorious by frivolity or vice, and in the case of the latter by that still more offensive kind of ostentation and disregard of the rights of others, which the Greeks called *hubris* (ὕβρις). They therefore had no doubt predisposed the public mind to some change. This was brought to a point by the assassination of Hipparchus in what was little more than a private quarrel. Harmodius having been insulted by Hipparchus, his friend and relation Aristogeiton supported him and brought the enmity of Hipparchus upon himself, who retaliated by fixing a public insult upon their family. The sister of Harmodius was ordered by him to retire from the procession of virgins carrying the sacred baskets (κανηφόροι) on the ground of not being a true-born Athenian¹. The two friends therefore determined to avenge their private wrongs and free Athens at one blow, by assassinating both Hippias and Hipparchus at the Panathenaea, at which time alone a citizen could carry a weapon in the city without exciting suspicion. The conspiracy was shared by many, and, as usually happens in such matters, a small circumstance threw it out. One of their number was called to speak to Hippias, which made the rest fear that they had been betrayed. Harmodius and Aristogeiton hurried to the Ceramicus, where Hipparchus was marshalling a procession, and there attacked and slew him. Harmodius was killed on the spot by the guards, and though Aristogeiton escaped for the moment, he was pursued and captured. The story goes that being put to the torture to make him confess the names of

¹ Herodotus (v. 57) says that this family migrated from Eretria or even from Phoenicia.

his confederates, he purposely mentioned a large number of leading men who were ostensibly friends of Hippias, and when Hippias had put them to death, boasted of the deception. Another account says that after naming one batch, he promised to reveal another, requiring Hippias to grasp his hand as a pledge of security. When Hippias did so, he taunted him with having taken the hand of his brother's murderer, which so enraged Hippias that he drew his sword and slew him.

It was the four years of rule which followed that gave the tyranny its bad name with the people. But it must have been specially galling to the Eupatrids. Hippias tried to strengthen his position at Athens by keeping mercenaries and attracting the support of the rulers of other Greek States, not for the interests of the city, but for his own. Being naturally rendered suspicious of treason on every side, the executions already mentioned seem to have been followed by others, as well as by banishments equally arbitrary. The Athenians forgot the services of Peisistratus and the good days of the rule of Hippias, but always remembered these four years of tyranny. Harmodius and Aristogeiton occupied a special place in the roll of national heroes and liberators. Their posterity were freed from taxation for ever, and had the perpetual right of feeding at the public mess in the Prytaneium: and a song or *scolion* composed by Callistratus in their honour was sung at festivals and banquets almost as a national anthem. Finally, when Hippias began erecting a fort on Munychia, the highest point in the peninsula of the Peiraeus, commanding the two harbours of Munychia and Zea, the popular alarm gave the nobles whom he had banished an opportunity of striking a successful blow. Among these exiles were many of the Alcmaeonids, and this family had the warm support of the oracle at Delphi, where they had acted with splendid liberality in the restoration of the temple, which had been burnt

8. The severe rule of Hippias, B.C. 514—B.C. 510.

down in B.C. 548. Instead of using only the common stone of the country, with which they had contracted to build it, they had faced the greater part of it with costly Parian marble. In return the Pythian priestess is said to have frequently impressed on Spartan inquirers that 'Athens must be freed' and the exiles restored. After several failures to effect their own restoration—especially by seizing and fortifying Leipsydrium on Mount Parnes—the exiles obtained help from Sparta, in a great measure owing to the money which they were able to offer, partly borrowed, it is said, from the treasury of the temple. The first attempt of the Spartans to effect a landing at Phalerum failed, but an expedition under the eccentric king Cleomenes by land was more successful. The Spartans with the exiles defeated the tyrant's Thessalian horse, and invested Hippias and his partisans, who had taken refuge on the west end of the Acropolis, the only fortification then existing in Athens, called the 'Pelasgic wall.' After the siege had lasted some time the Spartans chanced to capture some of the children of Hippias. This brought him to terms; he agreed to surrender the Acropolis and remove from Athens, taking his property with him, in five days.

The tyranny was at an end, but for that very reason the old contests between the two parties revived—one led by Isagoras, the other by the Alcmaeonid Cleisthenes. The chief supporters of Isagoras were the friends of the banished Hippias, and, if they did not wish to recall him, they at least wished to keep all political power within the narrowest limits. Cleisthenes therefore decided to throw in his lot with the advanced democratic party. The ups and downs of this struggle lasted for four years. Isagoras had the better organised party, and was supported by political clubs; and when he found that he had numbers against him, he was able to induce the mad Spartan king Cleomenes once more to interpose. The old plea of the 'curse' on the Alcmaeonids was revived.

9. Political
contests
between
Isagoras and
Cleisthenes,
B.C. 510—507.

Cleisthenes was banished with five hundred other families; and Isagoras reduced the roll of citizens capable of taking part in the government to three hundred of his own partisans. He tried to abolish the *boulè*, but that body was able to raise the people, who besieged Isagoras and Cleomenes on the Acropolis. On the third day of being thus invested, they consented to quit the city with their followers, and Cleisthenes with the other exiles was recalled.

Cleisthenes was now able to carry out the reforms which he seems to have in part at least proposed before. Their object was on the whole to establish complete equality between all citizens, to remove all limitation as to voting in the *ecclesia*, serving in offices, or acting as *dicasts*, except as to the age of thirty years. The archonship indeed was still confined to the first three assessments of Solon (see p. 77), but it became in itself steadily less important, and even this restriction was removed about 26 years afterwards. Now in order to secure this equality an elaborate new arrangement of the citizens was made, including a large number who from having recently settled in the country, or for some other reason, had not been included in the four Ionic tribes. These tribes were abolished, though the old *phratries* and clans (*γένη*) were retained for family registration and religious worship. The basis of the new arrangement was the *deme*. Attica was divided into a certain number of *demes* or townships with a fixed extent of land; the number seems at first to have been 100, but was increased to 182. To each *deme* there was a *demarch*, and the *demesmen* (*δημοταί*) like a parish council met for transacting their local business, but especially for revising their register of citizens (*τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον*). Everyone whose name was duly entered on that register was *ipso facto* a full citizen when at the proper age, and his name could not be erased from it without a 'suit of alienation' (*δίκη ξείας*), though the *demesmen* might be punished by the *boulè* for

10. The reforms of Cleisthenes, B.C. 507—506.

making improper entries. This then secured the citizenship of all persons properly qualified by birth.

The next thing was to arrange for a fair rotation by which all might in turn serve in offices or elect officers. This was done by the division of the whole people into ten tribes (*φυλαί*), each named after an eponymous hero¹. Each tribe embraced a certain number of demes. These demes were not necessarily contiguous, in fact the aim was that they should not be so, and they were allotted generally in groups (*trittyes*) selected respectively from the sea-coast, plain, and hills. These tribes were used as the unit in most political matters. The nine archons and their secretary were supplied by each tribe electing one, as also the ten generals. The boulè of 500 (taking the place of the 401) were elected each year, 50 from each tribe. When an army was required each tribe supplied a certain number of infantry under its taxiarch, and a certain number of cavalry under its phylarch. The Heliastic courts were also served by 5000 dicasts, with 1000 in reserve, each tribe electing 600 men over thirty years of age, without any distinction as to property.

The mode of election was made more democratic. With the exception of the purely military officers, taxiarch, hipparch, and strategus, who were elected by show of hands, all were elected by lot from those who had not yet served. The only modification on this completely open system of election or the pure chance of the lot was the *docimasia*, that is the 'test examination,' which each elected magistrate, and even each man assigned to serve in the cavalry, had to undergo as to his eligibility by birth or character. At this it was open to anyone who chose to lodge objections, which had to be considered at a regular trial. The *strategi* indeed were

11. Election
by the ten
tribes.

12. The
mode of elec-
tion, (1) lot,
(2) show of
hands. The
Docimasia.

¹ The names of the ten tribes were Erechtheis, Aegeis, Pandionis, Leontis, Acamantis, Oeneis, Cecropis, Hippocritis, Acantis, Antiochis.

liable to the *docimasia* every month, and if rejected could be deposed.

The function of the *boulè*, besides a general superintendence, particularly as to the supply of ships and finance, was to prepare measures for the ecclesia, the proposal thus prepared being called a *pro-bouleuma*; and to introduce to it any impeachment (*εἰσαγγελία*) for public crime, brought by anyone who chose, which they decided to be legal in form. They also presided at all meetings of the ecclesia, whether for ordinary deliberative business, or for the trial of such impeachments. As five hundred was too great a number for that purpose, the fifties from the several tribes took their turn in doing this, each for a tenth part of a year, and were then called *prytaneis* or presidents, and their tribe was called the presiding tribe (*ἡ πρυτανεύουσα φυλή*).

13. The
Boulè, and the
Ecclesia.

The Ecclesia was the ultimate authority on every possible matter. It made general laws (*νόμοι*), or decrees on particular points of administration as they occurred (*ψηφίσματα*). Anyone of proper age could bring forward proposals or speak when the herald after the proper prayers had been offered said 'Who wishes to address the meeting?' (*τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται*;) But no law could be proposed without the previous sanction of the *boulè*: and the *prytanies* could refuse to put a motion which was contrary to existing laws.

We have seen that the appointment of *strategi* had taken place in earlier times, but Cleisthenes first arranged for the regular yearly election of a board of ten *strategi*. They were often abroad in command of army or fleet, but at home also they did much of the sort of work done by a foreign office. This contributed greatly to reduce the archons still more completely to the administration of justice, and even in this their functions were closely defined and limited.

14. The ten
strategi.

It has often been asked, 'Who then really governed Athens?'

The answer is—no one magistrate or board of magistrates.

15. The real
power at
Athens.

The Ecclesia was supreme, and settled details of administration, often the most minute. Yet a popular assembly is generally helpless without guidance. The result was that some one leading man, who from eloquence or impressive character won the confidence of the Ecclesia, became practically the ruler of Athens. But it was only while he could maintain that confidence. The Demos was suspicious and fickle, and such a man had to humour his masters. His position was not official or provided for in the constitution, though while it lasted it was perfectly well understood. The Demos also tried to protect itself by appointing certain official orators, whose duty it was to speak on proposals brought before it with an unbiassed view as to their advantages or dangers, without regard to party ties or personal connexions. They were to explain matters, and act for the Demos as a legal adviser for his client.

16. Ostra-
cism.

Thus, though the laws of Solon remained, the working of the constitution was much nearer a pure and undiluted democracy than he had ever contemplated, and the danger of which in his eyes was that it inevitably led to a tyranny. This danger Cleisthenes tried to obviate by the institution of OSTRACISM. This meant the compulsory residence outside Attica, without loss of property or citizenship, of any citizen, whose power or rivalry with another seemed dangerous to the constitution. It was not peculiar to Athens, and is mentioned as prevailing under different names at Argos, Miletus, Megara and Syracuse. But Cleisthenes, when establishing it at Athens, made elaborate arrangements to prevent its abuse. The first step was to ask the Ecclesia, without mentioning names, whether there was occasion for such proceeding. If the Ecclesia voted in the affirmative, the agora was arranged with large voting urns to receive the votes of the tribes, each man writing on a bit of earthenware or shell (*ὄστρακον*) the name of the man whom he

thought ought to leave the country. There had to be 6000 votes delivered in all, and the man mentioned by more than half that number was obliged to retire from Attica. We only know of ten cases of ostracism; and the system, which served its purpose for a time, gradually fell into disrepute. The last occasion of its employment known to us was about B.C. 420, when Hyperbolus—a man of no distinction or influence, against whom the ordinary process of the law might equally well have been used—was banished by it.

Thus organised Athens entered on the great period of its political history, which was to last for about a hundred years. She was to shew, perhaps more completely than has been shewn elsewhere, the strength and weakness of a government ‘of the people by the people for the people.’ It was no doubt a period of vigorous life and expansion. The introduction by Solon of the Euboean standard for money, weights, and measures, instead of the Aeginetan, had opened up to Athens a larger field of commerce. The silver mines at Laurium were being worked with greater activity, and helped to relieve the people from taxation. Ship-building was going on vigorously, and although the State as yet possessed few if any war triremes, they were able to send a fleet to Ionia in B.C. 499 carrying a considerable number of troops. A fresh attempt of Cleomenes to restore Hippias had been repelled, and a punitive expedition had been sent against Chalcis in Euboea for having helped Cleomenes, by which an army of Boeotians coming to the aid of Chalcis had been decisively defeated. A proud answer had been returned to the Persian Artaphernes, who demanded submission to Persia, as the price of his support against Sparta; and when the troubles of the Ionian revolt and Persian wars came upon Greece, we find Athens reckoned as decidedly the strongest State in Greece next to Sparta. Herodotus attributes this manifold display of vigour to the ‘freedom’ gained by the expulsion of the Peisistratids and the

17. The energy of the Athenians and the rise of Athens.

democratic reforms which followed. But there seems no doubt that under Peisistratus and his son Athens had already made great progress both material and intellectual. The revolution seems to have been as much the result as the cause of that progress.



FOUR MAGISTRATES, from the Eastern Frieze of the Parthenon.
(*Waldstein's Pheidias*.)

CHAPTER VI.

THE ASIATIC GREEKS AND THE PERSIANS.

While the Peloponnesian States and Attica had been developing in the way described in the last three chapters, the more northerly countries in Greece had not made similar progress. Boeotia, containing a league of twelve towns, was weakened by continual quarrels between certain of these towns. The main cause of disunion was the claim of Thebes to supremacy, in which she was specially opposed by Orchomenos, claiming the supremacy for herself which had apparently really existed in Homeric times ; while Plataea from very early times shewed a disposition to join the Athenian alliance against Thebes. Thessaly again was not under a central government, but contained leagues with capitals at Larissa, Pherae, Crannon, Pharsalus and other places. And though in times of danger there was some arrangement for electing a general or *tagus* to command a united army, this was always difficult to collect. The part hitherto played by the Thessalians in the drama of Greek history consisted of constant border warfare with the Phocians. Farther north, Macedonia was only semi-Hellenic, and, though ruled by a Greek dynasty, was too much engaged in struggles with barbarian neighbours to count for much as yet in Greek history. It is necessary to note this state of things, for it was an important point in the coming struggle with the Persian Empire, that the barrier on the north against

I. Weakness
of Northern
Greece.

the invader should be as weak as that on the east was now to be proved to be.

Some account has already been given of the Ionian and other great colonies in Asia (pp. 18—19). For a time the interest of Greek history shifts to them.

2. The Asiatic Greeks.

Herodotus¹ remarks that though the Ionians in Asia inhabited the most beautiful country in the world, and enjoyed the finest climate, yet Ionia was always in a dangerous state, and property was always changing hands. The reason for this was twofold: the frequent encroachment of powerful neighbours, and the mutual suspicion and enmity between the cities themselves and their inability to combine for common defence. The twelve Ionian States did in a way form a community (τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰώνων), meeting once a year at the Panionium, a temple of Poseidon on the promontory of Mycale. This combination, like others similar to it, was primarily religious, but had the elements in it of a political league also. Occasionally we find the members acting in concert for a national or political purpose. But such concert was short-lived and precarious, and liable to dissolve at the first difficulty. We have seen how active these towns, especially Ephesus and Miletus, had been in colonisation, and in two other respects they seemed at one time to be taking the lead in Greek life: in the outburst of literary activity, and (after about B.C. 750) in the constitutional movements from monarchy to oligarchy, and from oligarchy to democracy. It seemed at one time that the centre of Greek life was to be Asiatic and insular rather than European. But this prospect was overclouded, and this active life deadened, by their successive subjection to the Lydian and Persian monarchies.

The earliest inhabitants of Lydia, of which we hear, were called Maeonians. They had been displaced or absorbed by a mixed inroad of Carians and Pelasgians; and, when we first hear of it as a

3. The Lydian kingdom.

¹ i. 142; vi. 86.

united kingdom, a dynasty which lasted about 160 years had just been established by GYGES. He seems to have aimed at posing as an Hellenic sovereign, endeavouring by rich offerings to propitiate the Delphic oracle. It was perhaps the desire to possess good outlets to the sea, as much as enmity to Greeks, that made him attack Miletus, Smyrna and Colophon. In the case of the first two he failed, but seems to have occupied Colophon. His son and successor ARDYS continued or renewed the war with Miletus and took Priene, but for a long time was prevented from farther inroads on the Greek towns by the necessity of driving out the Scythian marauders (the Cimmerians), who had been many years in Asia, and now actually occupied his capital Sardis, though failing to take its acropolis. His son and successor SADYATES had at first to contend with the Medes and the Cimmerians. When that was over, he took Smyrna, but was repulsed in an attack upon Clazomenae. He then renewed the attack upon Miletus, in which he had been engaged six years when he died. His son ALYATTES continued the war with Miletus for five years, but at the end of that time made terms with its tyrant Thrasybulus, and seems not to have molested the Greeks farther. In this long struggle with the Lydian monarchy the divided state of the Greek cities was shewn by the fact that Miletus received help from none of them, except from Chios, which had been formerly assisted in like manner by the Milesians. The fruit of this selfish policy was the complete subjugation of all the Greek cities in Asia by the next Lydian sovereign CROESUS—though Miletus while paying tribute had specially favourable terms—who again extended his dominions so as to embrace all Asia Minor west of the Halys, except Lycia and Cilicia. He contemplated, moreover, adding the islands of the Aegean to his dominions, and actually began

Gyges,
B.C. 716—678.

Ardys,
B.C. 678—629.

Sadyates,
B.C. 629—617.

Alyattes,
B.C. 617—560.

Croesus,
B.C. 560—546.

constructing a fleet suitable for that design, which however he was induced to abandon. The greatness of the Lydian kingdom was thus of short growth. Its fall was sudden and complete. Cyrus who conquered it took over the Greek cities as part of the spoil, though they offered some resistance. It was this that brought the Persians into collision with the Greeks. And as the struggle that followed is the most striking episode in Greek history, it will be necessary to learn who and what these people were, who now appear for the first time on the shores of the Mediterranean.

Assyria, properly a narrow district on the left bank of the Tigris, gives its name to a great empire of unknown antiquity, varying in extent according to the character and ability of its sovereign, but, at its greatest, extending from the Caspian to Palestine. In the 8th century B.C. this great empire seems to have been in a state of disruption, crumbling back again into its elements. Babylonia had long been separate from it: and about B.C. 711 the Medes, a pastoral people living south of the Caspian, with a capital called Ecbatana—once free but then included in Assyria—broke away from it. Media seems to have remained a separate kingdom for about 150 years, and its last king but one, after successfully struggling to expel the Scythian invaders from Asia, finally took and destroyed Nineveh about B.C. 625. The kingdom of Assyria thus ceased to exist, and part of its territory was absorbed by the Babylonians. The last of the kings of this increased Media was Astyages (B.C. 594—559). In B.C. 560 Cyrus led down a mountain people upon the Medes, seized Ecbatana, and became lord of all upper Asia except Babylonia. Herodotus tells us a romantic story of the birth of Cyrus.

4. The Persian kingdom.

5. Story of the birth of Cyrus.

Astyages, the last king of the Medes, had an only daughter Mandane. Frightened by dreams that seemed to foretell that her offspring would deprive him of his kingdom, he resolved that she should not

marry a Mede. Therefore he gave her to a noble Persian named Cambyses: and when she was about to produce a child, terrified by a second dream he sent for her to his palace, and taking the son who was there born, gave it to his faithful minister Harpagus, with orders to put the boy to death. Harpagus promised, but reflecting that, on the death of Astyages, Mandane would be queen and would revenge her child's death, he refrained from killing it, but gave the babe to a shepherd with directions to expose it in the wildest part of the mountains. When the shepherd returned to his home, he found that his wife had just been delivered of a dead child. The two agreed to expose the body of the dead baby, but to bring up the royal child as their own. This was done, and the dead body after three days' exposure was duly shewn to Harpagus and buried as a royal infant. But as he grew up the young Cyrus made himself conspicuous among the shepherd lads. In their games and sports he was chosen to be their king, and ruled them with royal dignity. An accident brought out the truth. He had chastised the son of a courtier for disobedience to his authority in the course of the games, and on a complaint made to the king, the shepherd and the boy were summoned to his presence. Struck by his appearance, the king questioned the shepherd and learnt the truth. Harpagus was punished by the horrible device of having his own son's flesh served to him at a royal feast, but the young Cyrus was sent away safe to his real parents: the magi having persuaded Astyages that in having been king among the boys he had fulfilled the dream and would do no more hurt. But Harpagus nourished thoughts of revenge, and when the young Cyrus had grown up he sent him a letter, concealed in the body of a hare, advising him to raise an army of Persians and invade Media. He had no difficulty in doing this, for the warlike Persians were restless under the rule of the Medes. The army of Astyages was shamefully defeated by the invaders, the young Cyrus was crowned king of the

'Medes and Persians' and kept Astyages at his court in honourable captivity for the remainder of his life.

There is nothing in this story out of harmony with the manners of the East. Yet we cannot tell how far particular incidents in it are due to skilful romancers. Other authorities indeed say that Cyrus was not in any way connected with Astyages, but was a pure Persian by birth, and a leader of his countrymen in their revolt. The important fact—of which there is no doubt—is that about this time he dethroned Astyages, and united the greater part of the old Assyrian Empire under his crown. He did not become master of Babylon till twenty-one years afterwards (B.C. 538). But, soon after having possessed himself of the crown, he shewed that he meant to extend his power to the West. The Lydian kingdom was the great obstacle in his way to the sea, and must be conquered if he wished for a free access to it. Croesus shewed his consciousness of the danger threatening him by forming alliances with Labynetos of Babylon, Amasis of Egypt, and Sparta; besides sending round to all the leading oracles in Greece to learn, if possible, his chances in the coming struggle. Believing that he had ascertained by a curious test¹ that the oracle of Delphi was the most trustworthy, he sent it magnificent presents, and asked to be advised as to whether he should take active measures against

¹ The story in Herodotus (i. 46—7) is that wishing to test the oracles in Greece and discover which was the most trustworthy, he ordered his envoys on a particular day and hour to ask the several oracles what he was doing. At the appointed hour he took a tortoise and a lamb, and cutting them up boiled them in a brazen covered cauldron. He thought no one could possibly guess what he was doing. But the Pythia, by luck or from having got some hint, handed in an answer, reduced as usual to verse, in which were the lines

Lo! on my sense there striketh the smell of a shell-covered tortoise,
Boiling now on a fire, with the flesh of a lamb, in a cauldron,—
Brass is the vessel below, and brass the cover above it.

Cyrus. The oracle told him that 'if he attacked the Persians he would destroy a great empire¹.' Interpreting this in his own favour, he advanced into Cappadocia and met Cyrus near Sinope. A fierce battle ended indecisively: and next day, as Cyrus did not renew the attack, Croesus resolved to retire to Sardis and to spend the winter in collecting a larger army and obtaining help from his allies. But he had not calculated on the rapidity of Cyrus's movements, who determined to strike home at once. Croesus had scarcely reached Sardis, after dismissing his main army to their winter quarters, when Cyrus appeared before its walls. Croesus attempted a sortie with what troops could be collected in the town, but was decisively defeated, partly, it is said, because his cavalry horses were frightened by a troop of camels brought by Cyrus. The citadel, on a high and precipitous hill, held out for a few weeks, but the Persians found the way to scale it by observing a Sardian soldier descend it to pick up a helmet that had rolled down, and before long Croesus was a prisoner and his whole kingdom in possession of Cyrus.

The Ionian and Aeolian Greeks, seeing the disaster that had befallen Lydia, sent envoys to Cyrus desiring to be under his protection on the same footing as they had been under that of Croesus. But in the previous year they had refused his request to revolt from Croesus, and he now answered them by the fable of the fisherman, who having failed to induce the fish to come to him by playing on his pipe, caught them in a net, and when he saw them leaping and struggling, said, 'None of your leaping and dancing now, since you would not dance when I piped.' He was resolved in fact that they should submit without conditions. And they in their turn began fortifying their towns, determined to resist. For a while the meetings at the Panionium rose to the dignity of a national

7. The effect
of the fall of
Croesus on
the Greeks.

¹ Or, as given by some, 'if he crossed the Halys he would destroy a great empire.'

assembly. Messages were sent to Sparta asking for assistance, and for about a year the Greeks seem to have been very little molested. When departing for Ecbatana, carrying Croesus with him in honourable captivity, Cyrus had indeed left a general and an army with orders to conquer the Greek towns: but a serious rising of the Lydians under Pactyas, whom Cyrus had left in command at Sardis, must have much retarded the operations. When this had been suppressed, and Pactyas, who had fled for refuge to Cyme, Mitylene and Chios, had at last been captured, Mazares, who had been sent to crush him, overran the basin of the Maeander, took Priene and sold its inhabitants into slavery. Upon his death Harpagus was sent to take command, and proceeded systematically to attack one Greek town after another, beginning with Phocaea. The only one left undisturbed was Miletus, which had early made terms with Cyrus, retaining the position of free alliance won after so many years of warfare from the Lydian kings. But the others fell one after the other, and their submission was followed by that of the islands close to the coast, and by the conquest of all Caria and the Dorian Hexapolis, the Aeolians and Ionians being forced to serve in the armies which enslaved their fellow Hellenes. In some cases indeed—as at Phocaea and Teos—a large part of the inhabitants, rather than submit, embarked on board their ships and sought a home elsewhere. The Phocaeans touched at Chios, and thence made their way far off to Corsica, from which in after years they made settlements at Massilia in Gaul, and Rhegium and Velia in Italy: while the Teians made their way to Thrace, where they founded the town of Abdera.

The change in the position of the Greek towns does not appear to have been very great. Acknowledgment of the supremacy of the king, payment of tribute, supply of men and ships when required—these were the main points, and these conditions had probably existed under Croesus. The Ionian towns still had a separate

8. The Greek towns under the Persians.

political existence, and their deputies met as before at the Panionium. But two things were a fruitful source of trouble. First, the conditions under which they lived depended a great deal on the personal character of the Persian governor living at Sardis, who was left with almost autocratic authority, and had little reason to fear interference from the Court, so long as he prevented violent outbreaks and transmitted the tribute regularly to the royal treasury. Secondly, the Persians insisted on the abolition of democratic governments, and the substitution of tyrants, who were dependent upon them and would rule in their interests. This does not seem to have been done quite at once throughout the district, but in a few years we find most of the Asiatic Greek towns so governed. The yoke was no doubt much lighter at first on the islands than on the towns of the coast, for the Persian king had not yet the assistance of the Phoenician fleets to enable him to control them. And we find that one of the islands towards the end of the reign of Cyrus (who fell in war with Queen Tomyris, B.C. 528) had risen in wealth and power to an extent which threatened to defy the Persian supremacy.

This was Samos, off the coast of Caria, a member of the Ionian league, and possessing some territory, or *peraea*, on the mainland. About B.C. 535 Polycrates and his brothers got possession of the government of the island. But presently one of the brothers (Pantagnotus) was put to death on some pretext, and the other (Syloson) banished. Polycrates then set himself to acquire power and wealth. He collected a large fleet, containing a hundred penteconters; occupied several neighbouring islands and towns on the mainland; waged war against Miletus, and, making alliance with Amasis of Egypt, for a time rendered Samos one of the most powerful States in Hellas. His object perhaps was not entirely selfish. He conceived the idea of renewing a Panionian League, strong enough to maintain its independence, in which of course he

9. History
of Polycrates
of Samos,
B.C. 535—522.

was to be the chief director, but which would serve as a breakwater against Persian expansion. So great was his prosperity, that his friend Amasis thought it well to warn him against the perils of too high a fortune, begging him, as the story in Herodotus goes, to cast away his most cherished possession and so pacify the jealousy of fortune. After much debate in his mind as to what he should throw away, he resolved to cast into the sea a valuable ring, as the most precious of his possessions. But soon afterwards the ring was restored to him, having been found in the belly of a fish which his cook was dressing. He was however still safe and powerful when in B.C. 525 king Cambyses, the successor of Cyrus, invaded Egypt. Like the other Ionian States, Samos furnished its contingent to the Persian army, thereby acknowledging the over-lordship of the Great King. But Polycrates took care that the men sent should be mostly of the party opposed to him at home, of whom he would be not sorry to be rid. Most of them however returned, and getting help from Sparta and Corinth laid siege to his capital city. From this danger he freed himself triumphantly and seemed stronger than ever. But his downfall was approaching. In B.C. 522 Oroetes was satrap or governor at Sardis, and determined to get rid of Polycrates, who was much too strong and independent not to rouse the jealousy of a satrap, whose first duty was to see that every subject of the king was sufficiently subordinate. He knew too how the Ionian cities chafed under the yoke of Persian supremacy. If they found a champion strong enough to give them hope, a revolt might be expected at any time. He had no ships however capable of coping with the navy of Polycrates. He resolved therefore to tempt him over to the mainland. He sent him a message pretending that he was in terror of king Cambyses, and begging Polycrates to come to Sardis and help him to remove the treasures there, by the aid of which he might make himself master of all Greece. Polycrates, in spite of warning, fell into the trap. He set out

for Sardis, and on the way was arrested and put to death. For a time the island was in the hands of the late king's secretary Macandrius; but a Persian force entered it under Otanes, and on the pretext of the murder of some Persian officers, overran the island, killing a large proportion of its male population. The government of the island, thus weakened, was handed over to Syloson the brother of Polycrates, who had won the favour of Darius (who became king in B.C. 521) during the Egyptian campaign. This was a specimen of the way in which the Persian satraps took every opportunity that occurred to crush anything that seemed capable of resisting them in a Greek town. The Medising of Samos marks the final subjection of Ionia. It was not for nearly twenty years after this that any movement of consequence took place among the Ionians, though the Persian satraps were always suspicious and uneasy about their loyalty.

Reduction
of Samos,
B.C. 521—520.

The subjection of the Hellenic towns of Asia was not the only thing which was making the Persian kingdom a menace to Greece. Either towards the end of the reign of Cyrus or the beginning of that of his successor Cambyses (B.C. 528—521) a close alliance, hardly distinguishable from an acknowledgment of suzerainty, had been made with the Phoenicians of Tyre, giving the Great King the advantage, whenever he called for it, of the largest and best fleet in the Mediterranean and the most experienced seamen. In B.C. 525 Cambyses completed the conquest of Egypt, thus obtaining what seemed another point from which to attack Europe from the south, though in the end the difficulty of holding Egypt proved a hindrance rather than a help to an invasion of Europe. It was reserved for Darius (B.C. 521—485) to extend the Persian supremacy towards the north, thus encompassing Greece on three sides and making the great struggle between East and West inevitable.

10. The
alarming
growth of
Persian
power.

CHAPTER VII.

DARIUS AND THE IONIAN REVOLT.

1. Darius
(B.C. 521—485)
the organiser
of the Persian
Empire.

On the death of Cambyses, the crown—after a few months' reign of Smerdis, a pretended son of Cyrus—was secured for Darius, who was to marry Atossa, daughter of Cyrus, and so continue the line of the great founder of the Medo-Persian monarchy.

His chief work was to organise the government of his vast and varied empire. He divided it into twenty provinces or satrapies, each governed by a satrap, and each paying a fixed sum to the royal exchequer. In case of a general war each satrapy had also to furnish a certain number of troops to muster at a spot fixed by the king. The internal government of the satrapies was left very much to the discretion of the satraps, who even waged war with the surrounding peoples, or sometimes with each other, without necessarily incurring interference from the central government. But failure to secure and forward the tribute, and frequent and dangerous outbreaks of rebellion, or a suspicion of attempting independence, were pretty sure to cause the offending satrap to be superseded. The satrapy with which we are chiefly concerned is the first—embracing the Ionians, both Magnesias, the Aeolians, Carians, Lycians, Pamphylians. It paid 400 talents to the king, and the seat of the satrap's government was Sardis.

ÆGEAN SEA & ITS COASTS



Scale of Miles.

0 20 40 60 80 100

But the accession of Darius to the throne had been secured by the belief in his character as a great warrior. He had none of the sentiment attaching to hereditary right on his side. It was perhaps therefore necessary for him to undertake some enterprise to strike the imagination of his subjects. His wife Atossa is said to have inherited the warlike disposition of her father, and to have urged him to do so. But it was for some time doubtful to him whether he should direct his attempt westward to Greece, or to the European countries north of Greece. In the end he allowed a Greek physician, Democedes of Crotona, to conduct a commission of inquiry as to the state of things in Greece and the Greek cities of Italy, while he himself resolved upon the northern expedition. The Scythian Cimmerians who invaded Media about B.C. 625 had come round the Black Sea by way of the Caucasus. But Darius meant to end there. His plan was to go over the Bosphorus near Byzantium into Thrace, cross the Danube, and march through the little known region, which the Greeks vaguely called Scythia, and make his way round the Euxine. For the convenience of transport bridges of boats were constructed across the Bosphorus and the Danube: and, according to the story in Herodotus, he really did advance beyond the Don, taking and burning the semi-Greek timber-built city of Gelonus, which had been established—some think—as a staple town for Hellenic traffic in the north, perhaps for the trade in furs with the cities on the Euxine. As far as the Danube all seems to have gone well with the expedition; but after that Darius found his line of march harassed by wild tribes, acquainted with the country, and determined to resist an invader. Herodotus tells us how one of the chiefs sent him a present of a bird, a mouse, a frog, and arrows, and when Darius wondered what the meaning of such a present could be, one of the magi interpreted it to signify ‘Unless you can fly into the air like birds, or burrow into the earth like mice, or

2. The
Scythian
expedition
of Darius
between
B.C. 515 and
508.

swim in the marshes like frogs, you will be destroyed by these arrows.' Symbolical letters are known of elsewhere among wild tribes, and ought hardly to have puzzled one acquainted with the writing on Assyrian monuments. Other details, if not true, are *ben trovati*; and there is little more reason for doubting Herodotus' narrative—with the inevitable deductions to be made for the inaccuracy of human testimony—in this than in other matters, in which modern investigations have tended rather to confirm than refute him.

But the interesting part of the story, as far as Greek history is concerned, is that which relates to what occurred on the banks of the Danube. In the army of invasion were contingents from the subject Greek cities, led by their respective tyrants, who owed their position to Persian support. By the advice of Coes, the commander of the contingent from Lesbos, Darius resolved to leave the bridge of boats over the Danube in charge of the Greeks, with orders to wait sixty days—which they were to count by daily untying one of sixty knots in a rope—and, if he had not returned by that time, to break up the bridge and return home. The sixty days passed and no news of the king had reached the Greeks; when suddenly a band of Scythian horse appeared and, addressing the men on board the boats forming the bridge, told them that Darius was in full retreat and that they could easily intercept him, if the Greeks would but break the bridge. The Greek leaders held a council, and Miltiades—an Athenian who had been for some years ruler of the Thracian Chersonese, though holding it in some way for the Athenians—proposed that they should break up the bridge and leave Darius to his fate. If the king and his great army perished, the Greek States would be able to throw off the Persian supremacy, or, as in his own case, avoid falling under it. But Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus, opposed the suggestion on the ground that the destruction of the Persian power would be the signal for their own deposition: for the Greek cities

3. The
Greek tyrants
at the bridge
over the
Danube.

still desired free government. This argument settled the question: a few ships were removed from the northern end of the bridge, to impress the Scythians with the idea of its being broken, who thereupon went away to intercept Darius; but when, after some days, Darius and his wearied army appeared on the bank, the vessels were swung round again, and the king and his host passed in safety. But we may be sure that there were not wanting some to inform Darius of the debate that had divided the Greek tyrants, and which of them had advised that he should be left to perish. From this, as we shall see, two things which were to have important consequences to the Greeks at large were indirectly brought about—the Ionian revolt, and the fact that Miltiades was in command at Marathon.

But though the Scythian expedition had been unfruitful, the plan of subjecting the Greek cities in Thrace and lower Macedonia to the Persian obedience was not given up. Megabazus was left behind, when the king returned to Asia, expressly for this purpose. He seems to have performed his task without much difficulty. Hardly any city offered a strenuous resistance except Perinthus, on the north coast of the Propontis. When this city had at length given in, Megabazus proceeded westward to cross the Strymon into Macedonia. The Paeonians, living between the Axios and the Haliacmon, were by the express orders of Darius transported to Phrygia, with a view apparently of introducing an industrial population¹. Envoys were also sent to Amyntas, king of Macedonia, to demand earth and water, the symbols of submission to the Great King. Macedonia, which was at present little more than the strip of country forming the basin of the Axios—though it was being

¹ The reason given by Herodotus is that Darius had been much struck by seeing a tall Paeonian woman at Sardis who led a horse by a bridle over her arm, at the same time carrying a water-pitcher on her head, and using both her hands in spinning. Herod. v. 12.

pushed eastward to the Strymon—was too weak to refuse. The seven envoys were entertained by the king with all honour, but an insult offered to the ladies of the court so enraged the king's son Alexander, that he contrived their assassination. The matter however was hushed up, and the signs of submission on the part of the king accepted at Sardis. The work of Megabazus was completed by his successor, who beginning by taking possession of Byzantium and Chalcedon, proceeded through the Hellespont, taking some towns in the Troad, as well as the islands of Lemnos and Imbros. Thus the Persian supremacy was well established on the northern coast of the Aegean by about B.C. 507; and though the European Greeks had good reason to regard what had been done as a menace to their safety and freedom, yet for a few years there was a period of unusual peace in the islands, and in the Greek cities of Asia.

This period of comparative repose however did not last long. But it was not in the newly acquired Thracian towns that the next rising took place. They were perhaps sufficiently far from the central government of the satrap to feel the yoke somewhat less keenly. It was among the Ionian Greeks that the new movement began, which had very far-reaching effects. Though it was hastened by a curious train of circumstances connected with Darius's northern expedition, it began naturally in Miletus, the town which had always been most forward in resisting the Lydian and Persian oppression.

5. Causes
of the Ionian
revolt after
the period
of quiet,
B.C. 506—501.

When Darius left his army to continue the conquest of Thrace and Macedonia, he himself returned to Sardis, where he stayed a considerable time. One of his first measures was to send for Coes of Mitylene and Histiaeus of Miletus, to offer them rewards for their service in preventing the breaking down of the bridge over the Danube. Coes asked for the tyranny of Mitylene, Histiaeus for a tract of country on the Strymon.

Both were granted. Histiaeus proceeded to found a settlement at Myrkinus, on or near the site of what was afterwards Amphipolis. It was an admirable position, in the neighbourhood of the gold mines, and commanding the coast road from the Thracian Chersonese towards Greece. Its importance is shewn by the efforts made in after times by Athens to retain it, and the determination of Philip of Macedonia to do the same. Near it Octavian and Antony were encamped when they came to meet Brutus and Cassius in the last decisive struggle of the civil war at Philippi. The new settlement prospered at once sufficiently to rouse the suspicion of the Persian general Megabazus, who on returning to Sardis warned Darius that Histiaeus intended to set up a power independent of the king. Thereupon Darius—following the example often set by Eastern sovereigns—summoned Histiaeus to his court on the honourable pretext of requiring his advice, and on the same pretext carried him off with him when he returned to Susa on the Choaspes, the royal residence for part of the year, leaving his half-brother Artaphernes as satrap in Sardis. After a few years Histiaeus wearied of this gilded captivity and longed to be back in the familiar movement and interest of Greek life. But to leave the court was impossible without the king's consent, and that consent was not likely to be given unless Histiaeus could shew that some benefit to the king was likely to arise from his absence. At length he concluded that, if an insurrection could be stirred up in Ionia, he might persuade the king to send him down to the coast to stop it. The difficulty was to communicate with his son-in-law Aristagoras whom he had left in charge of Miletus. At length he hit upon a strange device. He caused the head of a slave to be shaven and on the scalp to be tattooed the two words 'rouse Ionia' (*ἀναστῆσον Ἰωνίαν*). Having given time for the hair to grow sufficiently to conceal the marks, he sent him to Miletus with directions to Aristagoras to have the slave's head shaved and to look at it. To 'rouse Ionia' was never a very difficult task,

and just then Aristagoras was in a position which made him ready to take the hint.

The island of Naxos was the largest and most powerful of the Cyclades. It had not long before been governed by the tyrant Lygdamis, the friend of Peisistratus. About B.C. 525 Lygdamis was deposed

6. The affair
of Naxos,
B.C. 502-1.

by the aid of the Spartans and an oligarchical government set up or restored. In B.C. 503 there was a popular rising and some of the oligarchical party were forced to leave the island. They had that connexion with Histiaeus which the Greeks called *proxenia*, 'guest friendship,' in virtue of which they might claim his hospitality and protection. Coming to Miletus, they asked this protection from Aristagoras, as being regent in the place of Histiaeus. He declared himself unable to give them efficient support himself, but offered to plead their cause with the Persian satrap Artaphernes. The chance of asserting his authority in one of the Cyclades, which had as yet remained free from the Persian yoke, was welcome to the satrap. He promised a fleet of 200 ships, but not till the following spring, on the ground that he must have time to consult the king. The ships however seem to have been collected at once and sent to Miletus, where they took on board Aristagoras, his Milesian troops, and the Naxian exiles. But when the expedition had started under the joint command of the king's nephew Megabates and Aristagoras, the difficulties soon appeared which usually attend joint commands. Megabates punished a Carian captain for not keeping proper watch on board his ship, by tying him with his head projecting from a port-hole, and Aristagoras, who was his friend, released him, declaring himself to be the commander-in-chief by the order of Artaphernes. Megabates in revenge sent a secret message to warn the Naxians. Accordingly, when the fleet arrived at the island, Aristagoras found that the chief town—also called Naxos—had been carefully prepared to stand a siege: and though he kept up the blockade for four months he failed to make

any impression on the town. His own stores were now exhausted and his money spent, so that he could not pay the king's soldiers. All he could do was to build some forts on the island, in which the banished oligarchs might secure themselves and annoy their enemies; and having done this he had to withdraw to the mainland. He expected nothing but vengeance from Artaphernes for having induced him to venture troops and vessels of the king on what had proved a failure. He looked for deposition at least, and probably death. The message of his father-in-law Histiaeus came opportunely, as suggesting a means of distracting the attention of Artaphernes from his own misadventure, and his failure to fulfil his promise of paying the expenses of the expedition.

To carry out the plan it was necessary to secure the co-operation of friends in the different Ionian states.

7. The
Ionian Revolt,
B.C. 501-495.

A conference was held at Miletus, in which it was resolved, as a first step, to put down the medising tyrants in the several cities. Aristagoras himself made a show of laying down his power at Miletus, though he seems to have retained it under another name. Several of the other tyrants were seized on board the fleet which had been used against Naxos and was now stationed at Myus, near the mouth of the Maeander. They were handed over to their subjects, but were allowed to quit their cities in safety, though obliged to abdicate their royal powers. An exception to this was Coes of Mytilene, who had made himself so disliked by his people that they led him out of the city and stoned him to death. Though this revolution involving the overthrow of the tyrants was certain to be offensive to the Persian court, it was not exactly an act of rebellion. It was as possible for a democracy to own the over-lordship of the Great King as for a monarchy. But its tendency was anti-Persian; and the States should not have ventured upon it unless prepared sooner or later to resist the king. At the council at Miletus the one voice raised in favour of prudence had been that of

the historian Hecataeus. He argued against provoking the hostility of Persia; or, if they were resolved upon doing so, he advised that they should seize the wealth stored in the temple of Apollo at Branchidae, about twenty miles south of Miletus. This was one of the greatest and most wealthy temples in Hellas, containing an oracle used by all Ionians as well as others, and filled with lavish offerings from kings, peoples, and private persons; and moreover, like other great temples, containing much wealth deposited within its precincts for safe custody. These treasures would have enabled the Ionians to furnish out a great fleet. But because they either shrank from committing sacrilege, or feared the effect it would have on others, they refused to violate the shrine. Its riches fell into the hands of the Persians, who had no such scruples, and at the end of the revolt plundered and burnt the temple. Aristagoras however took other means to secure aid for the movement which he was preparing. Having arranged that 'generals' should be appointed in the various towns instead of tyrants, he took ship and sailed to Greece in the latter half of B.C. 500, to secure help in his struggle for freedom.

He first went to Sparta, as the acknowledged head of Greece, and endeavoured to persuade the Spartan government to join in raising war against the Great King, by describing the enormous wealth to be found at Susa, and affirming that the Spartans had only to come over to Asia to make certain of possessing themselves of it. He brought with him a 'bronze tablet, whereon the whole circuit of the earth was engraved with all its seas and rivers.' This was probably the production of Hecataeus of Miletus, and is the earliest mention of a map which we possess. He pointed out that the greater part was occupied by the king's dominions, and that besides freeing brother Hellenes by taking part in this expedition, they would gain possession of wealth beyond the dreams of avarice. He perhaps trusted to the violent and headstrong

8. Arista-
goras at
Sparta.

character of the Spartan king Cleomenes to persuade the Ephors to embark on this enterprise. But Cleomenes proved unexpectedly cautious. He promised to give an answer in three days and, when that time had passed, he summoned Aristagoras to his presence and asked only one question—‘How many days’ journey is it from the coast to the king’s residence?’ Taken by surprise, Aristagoras answered the truth—‘Three months.’ To which the king at once replied: ‘Stranger, quit Sparta before sunset. It is no good proposal to Spartans, to lead them three months’ journey from the sea!’ Aristagoras however made one other attempt. He seems to have supposed that Cleomenes was acting only under orders from the Ephors. Hence he sought him out in his own house, carrying the branch which indicated a suppliant, and offered him a large bribe, beginning at 10 and rising to 50 talents, if he would induce the Spartans to undertake the enterprise. By the side of the king was standing his daughter, a girl of eight or nine years of age, and as the cunning Milesian went on raising his offers, she suddenly exclaimed: ‘Father, the stranger will corrupt you unless you depart.’ The king thereupon rose and left the chamber, and Aristagoras had to quit Sparta without having accomplished his object.

He next tried Athens. There he found a readier acceptance, for the Athenians were in the first vigour and exuberant hopes caused by their recently established freedom. They had triumphed over the attempts of the Spartans to expel Cleisthenes and set up an oligarchy; they had triumphed over a combination of Boeotians, Chalcidians of Euboea, and Aegina—a confederacy promoted by Cleomenes—and had not only defeated the Boeotians and Chalcidians in the field, but had occupied part of Euboea, in which they had settled Athenian land-owners or *cleruchs*. They were besides especially irritated with the Persians. When appealed to for help during the first attack of Cleomenes, the

9. Arista-
goras at
Athens,
B.C. 500.

Athens,
B.C. 510–500.

satrap Artaphernes had demanded the signs of submission 'earth and water,' as a condition of giving aid, which the Athenians had indignantly declined. Later on Hippias had gained the ear of Artaphernes, and had induced him to send messages to them that 'if they wished to be safe they must restore Hippias.' The Athenians had thereupon resolved that in any case hostility to Persia was to be their policy. Aristagoras therefore could hardly have come at a better time. He addressed the assembly, assuring the people that the Persians were bad soldiers and ill equipped, carrying neither shield nor spear; he reminded them that Miletus was an Athenian colony; and in his eagerness poured forth the most extravagant promises. This speech had the desired effect. The Athenians voted a fleet of twenty ships—a large number for them at that time—and elected Melanthius to command them and take them to the help of the Ionians. 'These ships,' says Herodotus, 'were a beginning of mischief to Greeks and barbarians.' At the same time the Eretrians of Euboea—in gratitude for help once given them from Miletus in some of their many quarrels with Chalcis—also promised ships: and Aristagoras hurried back to Miletus with the assurance of having obtained the aid which he desired.

Active measures were begun as soon as Aristagoras returned to Miletus; and a direct defiance given to the king by inducing the Paeonians (p. 109) to quit the villages in Phrygia in which they had been settled and return to their native land. This they succeeded in doing, though pursued by Persian cavalry. This movement seems first to have awakened Artaphernes to the serious nature of what was going on. Though he remained at Sardis, he sent for reinforcements from the head-quarters of the Persian army west of the Halys, and ordered out a Phoenician fleet, which appears to have been in time to harass the Eretrian ships on their voyage.

When the twenty Athenian and five Eretrian ships arrived

10. The
beginning of
the revolt and
burning of
Sardis;
B.C. 500—499.

at Miletus, they joined the Ionian fleets already there, and at once proceeded to Ephesus. They left their ships at a small town in the Ephesian territory, and started up country, following the line of the Cayster, under the command of a brother of Aristagoras, till they reached the southern slope of Mount Tmolus. Crossing the high ground there they came down upon the town of Sardis. They occupied the city without much difficulty: but Artaphernes held the almost impregnable citadel, and with that in the hands of the enemy the Greeks could feel no security. Nor did they hold the town many hours. A carelessly thrown firebrand set fire to the thatched roofs of some houses. In great alarm the inhabitants rushed down into the market-place by the river in such numbers, that the Greeks found it necessary to evacuate the town and march back to the high ground of Mount Tmolus, where they bivouacked for the night. Thence next morning they resumed their march in hopes of gaining the ships left in Ephesian territory. But the reinforcements sent for by Artaphernes had meanwhile arrived at Sardis, and the cavalry had been sent in pursuit. It overtook the Greeks just before they reached Ephesian territory and inflicted a severe defeat and slaughter upon them. The survivors apparently reached their ships, but the Athenians sailed away and gave no farther help to the revolt.

The expedition had accomplished nothing, but had deeply irritated the king. When Darius heard of the burning of Sardis, he called for his bow and shooting an arrow into the air prayed to Ormuzd, the supreme God, to grant him vengeance on the Athenians; and a slave was specially ordered to say aloud to him thrice daily 'Sire, remember the Athenians!' From this time it became a settled plan with him to reduce the Greeks to obedience.

This failure however had not much influence on the course of the revolt. Aristagoras indeed could take little part in it, as he had taken no part in the expedition to Sardis, because an investment of

II. The
voyages of the
Ionian fleet,
B.C. 500-498.

Miletus by the Persians seems to have been begun at once, and to have been continued, though for a long time with little energy, for five years. But the Ionian fleet was free, and now having no hope of safety except in victory, it sailed from city to city trying to gain fresh adherents. It went as far as Byzantium, which was induced, as were the cities on the Hellespont, to join the movement. Then returning southwards it did the same with the cities of Caria.

But though the revolt thus spread far and wide, the Persians were gradually forming a force sufficient to check it. A fleet had been collected from Egypt, Phoenicia, and Cilicia, and after some intermittent skirmishing, its whole efforts were directed to the recovery of the island of Cyprus, which had joined the rebels at the time of the expedition against Sardis. Persian troops were landed from the coast of Cilicia and though the Phoenician ships, which sailed round the eastern extremity of the island, encountered the Ionian fleet and were beaten by it, on land the Persians were successful. They reduced the whole island to submission in little more than a year from the time of its joining the revolt.

12. The
reduction of
Cyprus,
B.C. 498.

The Ionian ships now scattered, each squadron to its own city. The Persian generals seem to have left the cities of the Ionian League alone, and to have devoted their efforts entirely to the detailed reduction of all the other towns which had joined in the revolt. In Caria indeed, though they twice defeated the natives, they finally fell into an ambush and lost three generals and a large number of men. Yet elsewhere they were almost uniformly successful. Thus the towns on the Hellespont as well as on the Asiatic side of the Propontis fell one after the other. Presently the same process began to be applied to Aeolian and Ionian cities, and Clazomenae and Cyme were taken. Everywhere the rebels were losing. The heart of Aristagoras failed him.

13. Rapid
reduction of
revolted
towns,
B.C. 498—7,
and flight of
Aristagoras.

He determined on flight, and after some hesitation as to where he should go, he sailed to his father-in-law's town of Myrcinus in Thrace, and there shortly afterwards perished in battle with the natives.

Such was the state of things which Histiaeus found when he arrived in Sardis, having persuaded the king to send him down to put an end to the disturbance. To a great degree the revolt had been stamped out. The only cities which were still in arms were those of the Ionian League. Even of these Clazomenae had been already occupied by the Persians, while Ephesus and two towns closely connected with it—Colophon and Lebedus—held aloof, probably because they were closely watched by the Persians, as the great road up the country began at Ephesus. The remaining nine¹, still holding out, made some attempt at combination. Their deputies met at the Panionium—the temple of Poseidon on Mycale—and resolved on concentrating all resistance on their ships. To the number of 353 vessels they were mustered off the island of Lade, opposite Miletus. Histiaeus took no share in the struggle. When he arrived at Sardis he had been alarmed to find that Artaphernes was fully aware of the part he had played. ‘You made the shoe’—said the satrap to him—‘and Aristagoras put it on.’ He tried to find safety in Chios, and thence essayed to enter Miletus. But the Milesians had no mind to admit their old tyrant, and drove him wounded from the walls. Thence he passed to Mitylene and Byzantium. At the latter with eight triremes, which he had obtained from Mitylene, he supported himself by levying blackmail on the corn-ships. His only contribution to the persistence of the Ionians in the revolt was the report spread by him that the king meant to remove all Ionians from their homes and put Phoenicians in their places.

The success of the revolt was now narrowed down to two

¹ Miletus, Priene, Myus, Teos, Chios, Erythrae, Phocaea, Lesbos, Samos.

14. Histiaeus comes to Sardis.

points,—the Ionian fleet, and the town of Miletus. The fleet had elected Dionysius of Phocaea to the supreme command, and for a time the men submitted to the discipline and laborious training necessary for success. But they had been too long used to sailing where they liked, and passing most of their time on land. They soon revolted against the sterner duties of their profession, and returned to their old habits of going where they pleased and landing where they chose. Meanwhile the Persian fleet of Phoenician and Cyprian vessels had mustered for the attack on Miletus, supported by a strong army, which was now to invest Miletus by land in a more serious way than had been the case for some time past. An attempt was made to obtain the submission of the Ionians through their banished tyrants on a promise of indemnity for the past: but all refused except the Samians; and a battle was fought off LADE in which the allies were entirely defeated. The battle seems to have been bravely contested by most. The Samians—except eleven vessels whose captains refused to do so—deserted their friends at the beginning of the fight, in accordance with the terms which they had made with the Persians, and were followed by the Lesbians. But the rest fought well and suffered severely, especially the Chians. Dionysius of Phocaea, when he saw that all hope was over, escaped to Phoenicia and thence to Sicily, where he lived by plundering the ships of Carthaginian and Etruscan merchants.

15. End of the revolt, brought about by the battle of Lade and fall of Miletus.

Battle of Lade, B.C. 494.

The battle of Lade broke the resistance of the Ionians at sea, and was quickly followed by the fall of Miletus. The town was immediately invested by sea and land: mines were driven under its walls, and all implements then known for attacking fortifications were used, and before the end of the sixth year of the revolt it was in the hands of the Persians. With the fall of this fairest city of Ionia, which had maintained so proud an independence

Fall of Miletus, B.C. 494.

against both Croesus and Cyrus, the revolt came completely to an end. The inhabitants were to a great extent removed to Susa, where however they were kindly treated, and given certain villages in which to settle.

The Persians, now masters of Caria as well as the rest of the coast of Asia Minor, put their fleet in harbour for the winter at Miletus. But in the spring of the next year it was sent to continue the work of subjugation in the north. Chios, Lesbos and Tenedos were taken and treated with great severity. Byzantium and Chalcedon followed and other cities on the Hellespont, as well as the whole of the Thracian Chersonese, from which Miltiades had retreated to Athens, knowing what his fate would be if he fell into Persian hands. Histiaeus, the instigator of this movement, quitted Byzantium when the fall of Miletus convinced him that the Persian fleet would before long appear in the Bosphorus. He sought safety in one place after another in Asia, but was at length captured by the Persian Harpagus in the territory of Atarneus and put to death.

Artaphernes now attempted to heal the maladies of Ionia by more peaceful means. He summoned deputies from each of the Ionian towns, and compelled them to come to terms with each other and swear to abstain from mutual raids and pillage; while he adjusted the taxation by dividing the lands into districts of uniform size, paying a fixed sum to the Persian government, thus avoiding possible disputes as to the amount payable by one state or another, and as to the mode of collecting it. But he appears to have restored the banished tyrants, and in that respect maintained the old policy of the Persian government, which had been so fruitful a cause of discontent. This policy was reversed by Mardonius, his successor in the satrapy, who arrived in the spring of the following year (B.C. 492); for he deposed the tyrants and re-established free

16. Subjection of the islands and Thracian towns, B.C. 493.

17. Re-organisation of Ionia, B.C. 493.

governments in the Ionian cities. He had come with orders to subdue Athens and other parts of European Greece: and perhaps this new policy arose from a wish to have a peaceful and contented Ionia in his rear. But such a concession to the feelings of a subject-people shews a more enlightened and liberal view than is generally attributed to the Persian court. The pretensions of the Great King were so high, that these petty princes must have seemed entirely insignificant to him: and the difference between putting them up to rule and allowing the people to rule themselves must have appeared a matter of small importance, to be entirely decided by what was shewn to be practically the most convenient.

Though peace was thus secured for a time in the Ionian cities, the result of the war must have seemed grievous to Greece generally. One of the fairest districts occupied by Greeks in Asia had permanently, as it appeared, lost its independence; and with it a long list of other Hellenic cities along the coasts, from Byzantium downwards, had again been reduced to be subjects of the Great King. To the Athenians it was the fall of Miletus which appeared the most afflicting of all the misfortunes—Miletus a colony from their own city, and so long the glory of Asia and a bulwark of freedom. This feeling shewed itself by their fining the tragic poet Phrynichus a thousand drachmae for reminding the people of their misfortunes by his play called the ‘Capture of Miletus.’ A decree ordered that no one should ever exhibit the play again.

18. The
fining of
Phrynichus.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PERSIAN WARS (FIRST PERIOD, B.C. 492—490).

Herodotus thought that his statement as to the policy of Mardonius in putting down the tyrants in the Greek cities of Asia would appear incredible to the men of his own generation. It was therefore probably not maintained long. Nor was it the main object of sending Mardonius, a young man and the king's son-in-law, to take the place of Artaphernes, who seems to have died about this time. He came down to the coast of Cilicia with a large army, and there met a fleet of ships already prepared for him. He embarked at once, and proceeded to coast along Asia Minor, stopping only to make the political changes as to the government of the Ionian towns, and then going on to the Hellespont. There the land army met him, and was transported across the strait in a numerous fleet of vessels which had purposely assembled there. This route for an invasion of Greece had been chosen because there were still many Greek States in Thrace and the northern islands which had not submitted to the Persians, and it was resolved that, though Athens and Eretria were the final objects of the expedition, the whole of the northern part of the peninsula should be rendered safe, and the coast road from the Thracian Chersonese thoroughly secured. After the passage of the Hellespont, Mardonius left the fleet with orders to coast down Greece, while he himself joined the land army, with which he subdued all the Greek cities in his way which still held out, and reduced the Macedonians to

1. The first
invasion of
Greece by
Mardonius,
B.C. 492.

a more complete submission. Such opposition as he met with was from the native Thracians, especially the tribe of the Brygi, living just north of the Chalcidic peninsula, who inflicted considerable loss upon him, even wounding Mardonius himself, though they had eventually to submit. But the intended co-operation of the fleet was soon after this rendered impossible by a great disaster which befel it when attempting to round the promontory of Athos. It had at first met with success in subduing the island of Thasos; thence it made for Acanthus at the head of Acte, but as it was rounding the promontory it was caught by a storm which drove great numbers of the ships upon the rocky shore of Athos. As many as three hundred of them are said to have been wrecked, and twenty thousand men to have perished, some by sharks infesting the sea and more by being dashed against the rocks. The loss of the fleet, and perhaps his own wound, discouraged Mardonius from continuing the expedition, and with the remains of his army and fleet he returned to Asia.

The scheme for invading Greece however was by no means abandoned by the Persian government.

But the ease with which a movement in the island of Thasos was suppressed, the people consenting without resistance to dismantle their fortifications and send their fleet to Abdera,

2. Preparations for another Persian invasion, B.C. 492-490.

seems to have encouraged the king to try first to obtain a peaceable submission from Greece at large. Heralds were sent round to the Greek cities demanding 'earth and water' as symbols of submission, while at the same time orders were sent throughout the empire for a supply of troops, and to the towns on the seaboard to furnish ships. Many of the towns on the continent and all the islands gave the symbols of submission. Sparta and Athens were conspicuous by their refusal, and even violated the persons of the heralds. At Athens they were thrown into the *barathrum*, or pit; at Sparta into a well, and bidden to

The Persian heralds.

take earth and water from it. The mission however served its purpose of emphasizing the divisions in Greece, and shewing the Persians where to expect acquiescence, if not cordial adherence, and where to look for determined resistance.

One immediate effect was to bring on a renewal of hostilities between Athens and Aegina. The Aeginetans had yielded to the demand of the Persian heralds, and when this was known at Athens, the Athenian government resolved to punish them. A regard for their own safety no doubt chiefly influenced them in this; for if Aegina offered safe harbourage for an enemy's fleet, the danger to Athens would be greatly increased. A message was sent to Sparta, denouncing the action of the Aeginetans, and appealing to the Spartans as the acknowledged head of the Greek States to punish them. It is an interesting incident as shewing an attempt at recognising Panhellenic obligations, and the duty of the leading State to enforce them. Yet after all it was a very imperfect conception of such an union. If the Spartans were to punish Aegina for yielding to the king's demand, why not the northern towns and the islands? The fact is that the only part of Greece where even an informal league of the sort existed was the Peloponnese, with Sparta at its head. In applying to Sparta to act, Athens for the time put herself into communication with this southern league, though afterwards she took her more natural position among the powers outside the Peloponnese.

In answer to the application of Athens, the Spartan king Cleomenes went to Aegina to seize the leaders in Aegina who had counselled the treasonable submission to the Persian king. The Aeginetans refused to give them up on the ground that, as he was not accompanied by the other king Demaratus, his demand was not authoritative. He returned to Sparta resolved to get rid of Demaratus, whom he believed to have purposely

3. Punish-
ment of the
Aeginetans.

4. Madness
and death of
king Cleo-
menes.

thwarted him. By means of a bribe he got an oracle from Delphi declaring Demaratus not to have been the real son of the late king. He was accordingly deposed and succeeded by Leotychides. The two kings then went together to Aegina, and the Aeginetans consented to give up some of their richest men as hostages for their loyalty. These men were deposited at Athens. But before many weeks the fact of Cleomenes having bribed the oracle was discovered. Fearing the consequences of this discovery, he retired to Arcadia, and stirred up the Arcadians against Sparta. The Spartans had always had reason to fear hostile movements from Arcadia, and in their alarm they recalled Cleomenes and reinstated him in his kingship. But he had always been half mad, and he now became entirely insane. He made this conspicuous by his conduct in the streets, where he struck all kinds of unknown persons with his sceptre, until his relations were obliged to arrest and confine him. But having persuaded the helot who was watching him to give him a knife, he killed himself with horrible mutilations. One action of his troubled reign may be mentioned here, because it still further alienated Argos and determined its medising policy in the coming struggle. About B.C. 510 he had invaded Argolis—on what quarrel we do not know—had beaten the army raised at Argos to resist him, had occupied Argos itself and desecrated its temples, had massacred a considerable number of his prisoners, and had left the country so depopulated that the serfs and perioeci seized the government, and were not displaced till a new generation had grown up and a fierce servile war had been fought out.

The death of Cleomenes seems to have changed the Spartan policy in regard to Aegina. King Leotychides was sent against his will to Athens, to demand that the Aeginetan hostages should be sent home. The Athenians refused to restore them, and the Aeginetans thereupon seized the

5. The war
between
Athens and
Aegina,
B.C. 497.

sacred vessel of the Athenians, full of men of high position, who were attending the naval festival off Sunium. The Athenians obtained twenty triremes at a nominal price¹ from Corinth and retaliated by a descent upon Aegina. We cannot suppose that Athens had no triremes of her own; but that at a sudden emergency she should be obliged thus to recruit her own forces, shews how ill she was prepared to resist the coming storm, and what sublime rashness on her part it was to have provoked it. The Athenian expedition to Aegina was by no means successful. It failed to come in time to take advantage of a revolution that was occurring in the island, and, although the Athenians won one battle at sea, the Aeginetans—in spite of being refused help from Argos—defeated them in a second battle and destroyed four of their ships.

While these indecisive and wasteful struggles were going on in the only part of Greece where the Persians had reason to expect resistance, Darius was pushing on his preparation for a renewed invasion. A great fleet of six hundred vessels was collected and mustered in the spring of the next year (B.C. 490) on the coast of Cilicia, near which a great army also was encamped on the Alesian plains, between Tarsus and the river Pyramus. To command this great force two men were specially selected and sent down to Cilicia—Datis a Mede, and Artaphernes, nephew of the king and a son of the Artaphernes who was satrap at Sardis during the Ionian revolt. Mardonius, owing to his failure in B.C. 492, was relieved of all command. On this occasion the plan of proceedings was to be different from that of Mardonius. There was to be no parallel movement of fleet and army, and the long coasting voyage and march round the head of the Aegean were to be avoided. The point of departure was to be Samos, and the great fleet was to steer across the Aegean, touching at certain of the islands, and so descending upon Euboea and Attica.

6. The
second Persian
invasion,
B.C. 490.

¹ Five drachmae apiece, the law of Corinth forbidding a loan of ships.



The Second Persian Invasion.

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For, as before, the orders given to the generals were to take Eretria and Athens, and bring their inhabitants back with them to Susa. The fleet first touched at Naxos, which the Persian generals resolved to punish for its action at the beginning of the Ionian troubles. The inhabitants fled to the hills in the centre of the island; but the town was burnt, and all those who had failed to escape to the hills, were captured and treated as slaves. The next place was Delos. The Delians expected to be treated in the same way and fled to Tenos. But it did not suit the Persian policy needlessly to shock Greek feeling. Delos was left alone, and the ships were anchored at the neighbouring Rheneia. So far from violating the temple, Datis, after sending an urgent message to Tenos begging the Delians to return, offered a large present of incense to Apollo, in whose worship, as the Sun-god, the fire-worshipping Persian might claim a share.

The fleet then made for Carystus at the south of Euboea, touching at various islands on their way, and levying troops or taking hostages from them. The Carystians refused to give hostages or to promise assistance against Eretria and Athens; but after a few days, during which the Persians devastated their territory, they were compelled to surrender. The next point was Eretria. The Eretrians were in the divided state so common in Greek cities. One party, determined not to yield, resolved on abandoning the town and taking refuge in the mountains in the centre of the island; the other was secretly calculating the advantages to be gained by making terms with the Persians. At first however a decent show of resistance was made, and when the Persians were known to have arrived at Carystus, messages were sent to Athens asking for help. The Athenian government sent orders to the 4000 *cleruchs* who had been settled in Chalcidian territory, to give their aid. But Aeschines of Eretria, knowing the secret designs of his countrymen, warned them to return to their homes. They

7. The
capture of
Eretria.

accordingly crossed the Euripus and took refuge in Oropus. Presently the Persian fleet arrived and anchored off Eretrian territory. The horses were immediately landed and preparations made for a battle. But the Eretrians would not come out. For six days the Persians vainly assaulted the walls of the town, but on the seventh they were admitted by two traitors. The temples were burnt in revenge for those that had been destroyed in Sardis, and the inhabitants were removed bodily to the small island of Styra, to await transport to Asia.

The Persians remained some days in Eretria, perhaps while Hippias, the former tyrant of Athens, who accompanied the expedition, was arranging the transfer of the inhabitants to the island. Then the horses were re-shipped and the fleet crossed to the Attic coast. The Persians did not however land at Oropus, the nearest point, but under the advice of Hippias went a few miles farther south to the bay of Marathon. Hippias knew the place well, for he had landed there with his father Peisistratus on the last occasion of his recovery of the government of Athens. Along the coast was a level plain, six miles in length with never less than about a mile and a half, and sometimes double that distance, between the hills and the sea. At each end there were salt marshes, at the southern end small and at this season probably dry, on the northern extending to about a square mile, and at all times impassable. There is, however, a broad sandy beach all along it, and the plain itself is nearly treeless and unbroken except by a small stream which waters it. There are three roads from Athens to this plain, by Pallènè, Cephisia, and Aphidna. That by Cephisia, leading to the village of Marathon and the precinct of Heracles, was the shortest, the distance to the village from Athens being about 25 miles. The plain afforded good ground for a cavalry engagement, and it was for that reason that Hippias recommended it.

But after having been on the plain for a few days the

8. The Battle
of Marathon,
18 September,
B.C. 490.

Persian commanders seem to have changed their minds as to marching upon Athens, and resolved to sail round Sunium and attack it from the sea. Their reason for doing so was apparently that they had information of the army of the Athenians having left the city, which it would therefore be easy to attack. There was a party of treason within the walls which was in communication with the enemy, and at least one signal was given by a flashing shield from the heights above Marathon, which was meant to invite the Persians to sail to Athens.

The Persians land at Marathon but do not march into the country.

On the news of the landing of the Persians at Marathon the Athenians at once despatched nine thousand men to intercept them. There had been a difference of opinion as to whether it would be better to stay in Athens and act on the defensive, or to do as these men were doing and advance to meet the enemy. The latter course had been adopted principally on the advice of Miltiades, one of the ten generals, who had been living in Athens since fear of Persian vengeance had forced him to fly from the Chersonese, where he had been despot, though still an Athenian citizen holding the country in some sense for Athens. The 9000 Athenians arrived at the enclosure of Heracles just below the modern village of Vrana. As they marched along the road from Cephisia to this spot they would have a full view of the plain of Marathon, the sea, and the mountains of Euboea beyond. The long line of the Persian ships would seem immediately below them, and no doubt the tents and the horsemen on the plain would be in sight to impress them with the greatness of the struggle that was before them. They were quite isolated. Pheidippides, the swiftest runner of the day, had been despatched to Sparta in all haste to ask for help; but the day of his arrival was the ninth of the Spartan month Karneios (September), in which the festival called Karneia was still in progress, and

Despatch of Athenian troops.

The Spartan delay.

their law forbade them to start on an expedition till the moon was full (12th of September). But before the Athenians had been long in position at the enclosure of Heracles they were

Arrival of
Plataeans.

cheered by the arrival of 1000 Plataeans, who had hastened to shew their gratitude to Athens for help given them in the past. This voluntary service at a moment of such extraordinary importance was never forgotten by the Athenians, and the Plataeans were ever held in special regard by them.


Their numbers were now 10,000, but they did not venture to leave their position of safety and to descend into the plain in face of the Persian cavalry. The ten strategi and the archon polemarchus (Callimachus), according to the custom then prevailing, were entitled to the chief command for a day each in turn. They were divided in their opinions as to the right course to pursue. Five of the generals were for engaging the enemy, five for holding back, or even returning to Athens with a view of awaiting the attack there. The

The com-
mand in the
hands of
Miltiades.

casting vote was with Callimachus, and Miltiades appealed to his patriotism to decide upon fighting where they were. It does not appear that Miltiades wished to fight at once. He had communicated probably with some of the Ionians who were unwillingly serving in the Persian host, and he wished to be able to attack when the proper time came. Each of the four generals who had voted for fighting gave up his day of command to him. Yet he did not engage until his own day came round, perhaps because of the additional danger to himself, if he fought and failed on a day when the command was not legally his, but more likely because he knew that the time had not come. When his own day came round, probably about the 10th since their arrival at the temple of Heracles, some Ionians were descried making signals from the pines near the great marsh, which Miltiades rightly interpreted to mean that the Persian cavalry had re-embarked. Urged by his friends within

the city—whoever they were—Datis seems to have abandoned the idea of advancing by land from the plain of Marathon upon Athens, and to have decided to round Sunium and effect a landing near the city. For this purpose the cavalry had been embarked and the other transports were being got ready. Miltiades saw that the

The Charge.



MAP OF MARATHON.

moment had come. His soldiers had been straining at the leash, eager to attack. He now let them go. It was a distance of about two miles to that part of the plain where

the memorial mound or *soros* still remains, but the Persian line which was drawn up to meet them seems to have been about a mile nearer. The charge of the Greeks was thus made down hill. But the superior numbers of the Persians made it necessary for the Athenians to spread themselves out to prevent their being outflanked. They advanced in three columns, the Plataeans on the extreme left, and Callimachus commanding on the right. The centre, however, owing to this wide extension, was weak. Consequently when they came into contact with the enemy, though the right and left wings were immediately successful in driving in the enemy's line, the centre was broken and turned to flight. The Persians pushed on in pursuit, but the two victorious wings of the Athenian army, instead of pursuing those whom they had beaten, faced round and attacked both flanks of the victorious Persian centre, and after a long and obstinate engagement drove them in disorder to their ships. The fighting was renewed as the Persians struggled to get on board and push off the transports. It was here that the greatest slaughter seems to have taken place. Some of the Persians were prevented from getting at their ships and were driven into the marsh and cut to pieces, some were killed as they were getting on board, and seven of the ships were captured and prevented from putting to sea at all. Of the Persian army 6400 are said to have been killed, while the Athenians had lost only 192 men, though among them were the polemarch Callimachus and one of the ten generals.

The triumphant Athenians watched the Persian fleet sailing southward, and knew that they were making for Sunium. The victory had been complete, but the vast Persian host was after all but slightly diminished and might still fulfil the king's order to take Athens and remove its inhabitants. They must therefore hasten back to defend the city, left almost without a garrison. Early next morning therefore, leaving Aristides with the contingent

9. After the battle.


from his tribe to bury the dead and collect the spoil, Miltiades marched back to Athens, arriving in time to see the king's ships steering along the Attic coast. The invaders had thus come too late; they had hoped for an unopposed landing. They were not inclined to attempt one in the face of an enemy that had so lately shewn how he could fight. If we could believe, with one of our authorities¹, that Datis had fallen in the fight, we should be better able to understand this hesitation. Whatever its cause, however, the Persians attempted no landing, and presently returned to Asia.

Though the famous Battle of Marathon is not one of the great battles of the world, in regard to the numbers engaged, or the destruction inflicted upon the enemy, it yet was of very great importance in its effects upon Greece. To the Athenians of course it was a source of the greatest and most natural pride. They had stood forward almost unaided as champions of the liberty of Hellas, for the Spartans did not arrive till the day after the battle, only in time to view the *débris* of the fight and to acknowledge frankly the great achievement of the Athenians. A festival was held in yearly commemoration of it, and its glories were kept before the eyes of the people by a great picture or fresco in the Painted Colonnade (*Stoa Poekile*) which represented in three compartments the advance to the charge, the victorious *mêlée* at the marsh, and the fight at the ships. The 'warriors of Marathon' (*Μαραθωνομάχαι*) were long the ideals of the almost heroic period of Athenian glory. But it not merely raised Athens to the front rank among Greek States. It taught the Greeks that the dreaded Persian troops were not invincible: that a huge nondescript army, made up of tribes differing in habits and language, and often most unwilling combatants, could be beaten by a smaller army united and inspired with a common

10. Effects
of the Battle
of Marathon.

¹ Ctesias (about B.C. 400). Herodotus, however, says that Datis returned to Asia.

feeling of patriotism. It was not the first time that Greeks had faced Persians, but it was the first time that European Greeks at any rate had met them with resolution and success. Nevertheless its effect upon the Persian resources and policy was small. The king had lost nothing that he much valued. A few thousand lives more or less mattered little in his eyes. His pride was wounded, but his resolution was not shaken: and almost immediately orders were issued for the formation of a new and overwhelming force to operate against Greece. It was a general opinion however in Greece itself that the defeat at Marathon put an end to all danger of attack from Persia. But one of the generals engaged, Themistocles—of whom we are now to hear much—was of a contrary opinion. He declared Marathon not to be the end but the beginning of the struggle with Persia—as indeed it proved to be.



HARBOUR OF ATHENS.

CHAPTER IX.

THE THIRD PERSIAN INVASION.

The battle of Marathon had foiled the king in half of his purpose, Athens was still untaken and free. All the Eretrians, however, who had failed to escape to the mountains, were taken bodily and removed to Susa. They were kindly treated by the king and settled in a district called Cissia, where they continued to live for many generations, maintaining their Greek language and customs. But this did not make up to the king for the disgrace of having been successfully defied by the Athenians. He determined to repeat the invasion with still greater forces, and all Asia was kept in a state of commotion for three years of preparation for war. But these preparations were diverted into another channel by a revolt in Egypt (B.C. 486). Darius himself died before he could start for that province (B.C. 485), and his successor Xerxes was for the next two years too busily employed with it (B.C. 485-4) to think of an expedition against Greece, to which, it is said, he was at first disinclined. These ten years of respite from attack proved of great advantage to the Greeks in view of the coming struggle. A common enemy tended to produce union, the one great want of Greece: so that, in spite of many still existing quarrels, when the great danger was known to be approaching it was found possible to collect a Congress of

1. Ten years' freedom from Persian attack B.C. 490-480.

allies at Corinth, representing in some degree Greece as a whole, and claiming to act in her name.

But the first results of the success at Marathon did not promise well for the peace of Hellas. Miltiades, whose victory gave him immense prestige at Athens, was for a forward policy, securing a hold on the islands, as a barrier against Persian invasion. In this policy he is said by Plutarch to have been opposed by Themistocles, who now begins to become prominent in Athenian politics. The contest between them was a matter of personal rivalry rather than any radical difference of policy. But Themistocles seems to have wished rather to develop for a time the internal wealth and power of the State among other Greek States before anything was undertaken outside; while Miltiades wished at once to take measures against Persian influence in the Aegean. For this purpose he was placed in command of the Athenian fleet, now consisting of 70 ships, with apparently an unlimited commission to operate among the Cyclades. He no doubt had made exaggerated promises in his speeches in the assembly to induce the people to trust him thus completely. But his known hostility to Persia, and his brilliant success at Marathon, silenced all objectors; and his expedition was looked upon as likely to bring both wealth and security to the State. He sailed from island to island, claiming contributions of money, partly, no doubt, on the ground that the islanders had joined (however unwillingly) in the Persian expedition to Marathon, but partly also on the plea that Athens would now undertake to protect them, and that therefore it was only fair that they should contribute to support the fleet. He seems not to have been opposed until he came to Paros. There the people refused all payment and closed their gates. He besieged the town for twenty-six days. At the end of that time a priestess offered to admit him to a temple of Demeter on a hill near the town, apparently as commanding some entrance to it. Miltiades,

2. Condemnation and death of Miltiades.

however, in leaping over the wall of the enclosure, dislocated his thigh and otherwise injured himself, and being completely disabled resolved on returning home. The natural result was that he was impeached for 'deceiving the people' (*ἀπάτη τοῦ δήμου*), the penalty of which was death. He was impeached by Xanthippus, father of Pericles, an Alcmaeonid; and no doubt it was one of the same party that had previously impeached him for 'tyranny' on his return from the Chersonese. Still disabled by his wound he was carried into the assembly on a couch, and did not address the people. But the earnest pleadings of his friends, his own great services, and perhaps the consciousness of the people that they would have done nothing against him, if he had succeeded in taking Paros and brought home the sums of money which they expected, caused them to vote against the death penalty. He was fined 50 talents, probably as covering the cost of the expedition. A fine to the people was due within three months of its infliction, and the person so fined had to give securities for the payment or be imprisoned till it was paid. But before that time had elapsed the wound in his thigh had gangrened and Miltiades was dead. The fine was still due from his heirs, and was eventually paid by his son Cimon. Miltiades paid the penalty of failure like other commanders: but such grants of roving commissions to generals who had won the ear of the people were among the disadvantages of an administration conducted by a popular assembly, and more than once afterwards led to difficulties.

We have few details as to what was going on in Greece during the next five or six years. But the general and important fact comes out that in two parts of Hellas there were powers growing to sufficient strength to resist the attack from the East, which was hanging like a cloud over it. In the West Gelo, king of Syracuse (B.C. 485-478), had by his ability raised the power of that city to an unexampled

3. The policy of Themistocles and Aristides, B.C. 488-481.

height, enabling him presently to beat back the wave of Carthaginian invasion, which whether by chance or design synchronized with that of the Persians in the East. With this rise of a strong power in the West coincides the development of Athens as a sea power. This was greatly owing to the policy of Themistocles, which, as opposed to that of Aristides, aimed at raising the power of Athens in every direction, and by every artifice of diplomacy or force, to a position of authority in Greece. He was a man of extraordinary energy, ambition, and acuteness. Quick to foresee, and ready to provide for all emergencies, he for some years gained the complete confidence of the assembly. His opponent Aristides, though he doubtless was equally anxious for the prosperity of Athens, was colder and more cautious. He disliked enterprises accompanied by risk, and in general a policy of finesse and intrigue. His character for disinterestedness and honesty stood high; and though the people as a rule preferred others to command their army and navy, they were inclined to trust Aristides with the management of their diplomatic and domestic affairs. The two men therefore were constantly opposed to each other in regard to various proposals that came before the assembly; and so hot was the contention that Aristides himself remarked, after a more than usually stormy meeting, that the Athenians would never have peace till they had cast both of them into the *barathrum*.

Among the many disagreements which continued to distract

4. The increase in the Athenian fleet owing to the war with Aegina.

Greece was the renewed hostility between Athens and Aegina. We have no particulars either of the cause or of the course of this war. But the same provocations were still in existence. The

Aeginetan hostages had not been restored; and Nicostratus, whose attempted revolution in Aegina had given the Athenians a chance of invading the island, had been settled by them in Sunium and continued to attack the

merchant vessels of his old home. Finally Aegina was mistress of the sea in her neighbourhood, and her ships could not be prevented from making descents upon the Attic coast and stopping vessels bringing corn to Athens. It was this which caused Themistocles to be ever urging on the Athenians to build ships and make themselves powerful at sea. In this no doubt he had the support of the enterprising part of the people, who were engaged more or less in commerce and maritime affairs; while his opponent Aristides would have the sympathy of the farmers and artisans. But the need of more ships, caused by the Aeginetan quarrel, eventually gave Themistocles the upper hand, and the new navy was greatly his creation. No doubt it had been gradually increasing. We saw that the year before the battle of Marathon the Athenians had been obliged to go to Corinth to obtain enough ships for their purposes; yet soon afterwards they were able to put 70 under the command of Miltiades. The fact seems to be that the revenues from the mines at Laurium enabled the State to build every year a certain number of ships. But in B.C. 484 it appears that a fresh extension of the mines took place by the discovery of silver in a district of Laurium called Maroneia, and consequently the amount of the royalties paid to the Exchequer was considerably increased. Whether it had been the custom to use part of these royalties for making a distribution among the citizens is uncertain, but at least it was now proposed to do so. Themistocles, however, carried a resolution that this distribution should be suspended and the whole sum devoted to the building of a fleet¹. The number of ships at the command of Athens was thus raised to two hundred, and, as about this time peace was patched up—we know not how—with Aegina, they were never used in war with her.

¹ The account in the *Constitution of Athens* is that a talent was to be given to 100 of the richest men on the understanding that, if they did not expend it in a way approved by the people, they were to refund it. Each built a ship.

There is some vague hint of some of them having been employed against pirates, but for the most part they were fresh and intact for the coming struggle with Persia. 'Thus,' says Herodotus, 'this war saved Hellas, by having forced the Athenians to become a sea power.' This triumph of Themistocles was consummated by the ostracism of Aristides (B.C. 483), whose constant opposition to a forward policy had wearied the citizens, so that one of them is reported to have said that he voted for his ostracism because he was tired of hearing him called 'the Just.'

The revolt in Egypt was completely suppressed by the end of B.C. 484, and Xerxes, leaving his brother Achaemenes in charge of the country, returned to Asia to resume his preparations against Greece. He seems to have been far from eager to undertake the invasion, and expressed his doubts to a council of the notables that was now summoned to consider it. The influence of Mardonius, however, prevailed, backed by the importunity of various Greeks. Thus messages were sent him from the Aleuadae, a powerful Thessalian family reigning at Larissa, promising him their support if he would invade Greece. The banished members of the family of Peisistratus were also urgent, working on his superstition through the dishonest *mantis* Onomacritus, who had once been banished from Athens for forging prophecies under the name of Musaeus. Other Greek exiles, such as Demaratus of Sparta, were with him, and if they did not advise the expedition, helped him with counsel and information. The preparations were pushed forward on a vast scale. A land army, amounting, according to Herodotus, to more than half a million of fighting men, besides a still larger number of servants and camp followers, was ordered to muster in Cappadocia early in B.C. 481; and a fleet of 1207 war vessels, besides innumerable transports, was to be ready at the Hellespont. In the autumn Xerxes came in person to join the army and marched to Sardis,

5. The
Persian
preparations,
B.C. 483—480.

where he wintered. To secure the prompt passage of this vast host a bridge of vessels lashed together was made across the Hellespont, and a swarm of workmen, including skilled Phœnician engineers, was employed to make a canal across the neck of the peninsula of Athos, to avoid the disaster which befel the fleet of Mardonius twelve years before. The first bridge of boats across the Hellespont was destroyed by a storm, and Herodotus delights to tell us how Xerxes, in his Eastern pride, ordered the sea to be scourged and fetters to be thrown into it, to punish it for its insolence. Apart from such stories, both works proved of great use, and were prudently conceived. Thus everything was prepared for the accomplishment of the old plan of Mardonius of a march down the country parallel to a coasting voyage of a great fleet, each mutually supporting the other. Nor had money been spared in making the attempt, generally too successful in Greece, to introduce division by gifts of gold to certain persons in the cities. We hear of Arthmios of Zeleia in the Troad, a *proxenus* and temporary resident in Athens, being detected in thus secretly conveying Persian gold, and on the motion of Themistocles being outlawed with all his family.

These vast preparations could not of course be unknown in Greece. The first news of them was sent to Sparta by the exiled Demaratus, and a congress of deputies from States well affected to the Hellenic cause met at Corinth. They seem chiefly to have been from towns in Southern Greece. The Spartans naturally united most of Peloponnese, and Athens would bring the Plataeans and the Chalcidians of Eubœa and the islanders of Ceos; but Thebes and most of the Thessalian towns stood aloof, as did the majority of the islanders—some from disaffection, and more perhaps from terror. The first act of the Congress, the object of which was to unite all Hellas, was to obtain a suspension of existing quarrels, and especially of that between Athens and Aegina. The next thing was to send

6. The Congress of Corinth, B.C. 481-480.

spies to Sardis to ascertain the truth as to the preparations of Xerxes. These spies were caught, but by the order of the king were allowed to see everything and depart unharmed. He believed that their report would terrify the Greeks into submission, in spite of the warnings of Demaratus, who told him that Sparta at any rate would never endure slavery. The Congress also sent messengers to other Greek States inviting co-operation, especially to Argos, Crete, Corcyra, and Syracuse. The Argives however were still smarting from the sufferings which Cleomenes had inflicted upon them, and had never been reconciled to Spartan supremacy. They even preferred that of Persia, and had, as it seems, already been in communication with the Persian Court. They answered therefore that they would join on condition of receiving the joint command of the whole force. This they knew that the Spartans would refuse; and accordingly they stood out of the defence of Greece throughout the war. The mission to Corcyra was sent in the hope of inducing the co-operation of Western Greeks. Corcyra was strong as a naval power, but had always held aloof from Hellenic politics, as it continued to do afterwards. It would be a novelty as well as a great advantage to have the support of this fleet. The Corcyreans, however, only made fair promises. They sent indeed 70 ships, but ordered them to loiter about Pylos in the south of the Peloponnese watching for the result of the war, and never gave any real help. Gelo of Syracuse demanded as a condition that he should command at sea or on land. But the Athenians refused the former, and the Lacedaemonians the latter. He did, however, send some vessels of observation which, like those of the Corcyreans, did nothing. His real reason probably was not the punctilio as to the command, but a knowledge of the danger threatening him from the Carthaginians, with whom it appears that Xerxes had made an agreement to invade the Sicilian Greeks at the same time as he was invading Attica and the Peloponnese. Thus Western Greece stood aloof like the





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VALE OF TEMPE

north, and like Argos in the south. The refusal of the Cretans was based on the advice of the oracle of Delphi, which throughout this period of preparation seems consistently to have advised submission. Some suspect that its motive in thus acting was the selfish one of desiring to secure its own privileges, whatever power might be uppermost in Greece. A less unpatriotic explanation may be, that acting always under Spartan influence, it believed that the only hope was to defend the Isthmus of Corinth and the shores of the Peloponnese, giving up all north of the Isthmus as for the present untenable. It was a miserably craven policy, but we must remember that as yet the naval strength of Athens was not understood.

The Congress met again at Corinth in the spring of B.C. 480 with the reports of their various emissaries before them. The advance of the great army had already begun, and the king was said to have reached Abydos. The first thing to be considered was a message from the Thessalians.

7. The first measure of defence. To occupy Tempe. Spring of B.C. 480.

Many of the Thessalian towns were averse from the medising policy of the Aleuadae of Larissa, but felt themselves helpless without stronger forces than they could themselves command. They offered however to co-operate with any force which the allies would send in guarding the pass of Mount Olympus and the Vale of Tempe. Accordingly a body of 10,000 hoplites was shipped to Halus on the Pagasaeon Gulf, and thence marched up to Tempe, under the Spartan polemarch—the next military rank to that of the king—while the Athenian contingent was commanded by Themistocles. They were presently joined by some Thessalian cavalry; but it was soon found that the defile could not be defended by so small a force. Alexander, son of King Amyntas of Macedonia, warned them of the overwhelming nature of the king's forces, which could be resisted only at a much narrower pass, and the expedition was quickly withdrawn.

8. Second
plan of cam-
paign. The
stand to be
made at Arte-
misium and
Thermopylae.

This withdrawal involved the loss of Thessaly, and the Congress had now to consider at what points resistance should be offered to the invaders. Probably Themistocles had not been unwilling to return from Thessaly. He had formed a design of great boldness and originality. The Athenians, he thought, could never want a home in which to settle so long as they had their ships; while a successful resistance to the Persian army would be of little use to Southern Greece, so long as the king's vast fleet dominated the sea and could make descents upon the coasts at its pleasure. The oracle at Delphi had been consulted and had returned a terrifying answer, warning the Athenians to fly from the certain destruction impending over them. A second oracle, however, had admitted that, when everything else was lost, 'a wooden wall' would protect the Athenians, and ended with the lines

'Thou shalt destroy, O divine Salamis, the offspring of women
Or when the seed is scattered, or when the harvest is gathered.'

This last oracle, whether secretly secured by his own intrigues or not, Themistocles now used to support his own policy. He explained that the 'wooden wall' did not mean the palisade of the Acropolis but the ships: and that by calling Salamis 'divine' not 'unfortunate,' or some epithet of that description, the oracle meant that something favourable was to happen there. Whatever may have been the truth about the oracle, Themistocles managed to bring the Athenians over to his view. They would trust to their ships, even, if necessary, abandoning the town itself. They were ready, therefore, when the Congress selected Artemisium, on the north of Euboea, as the point at which to oppose the enemy at sea, to contribute ships more than equal in number to those of the allies which had mustered at Pogon (the harbour of Troezen), in accordance with the directions of the

Congress. The combined fleet under the Spartan Eurybiades proceeded to take up its station at Artemisium to guard the entrance to the narrow sea between Euboea and the mainland. It consisted of 271 war vessels, of which the Athenians supplied (counting 20 lent to Chalcis) 147, under the command of Themistocles.

The point selected for defence by land was the pass of Thermopylae, a mile of narrow road between Mount Oeta and the sea, part of which would not admit of two carts abreast, and across which a wall had been built by the Phocians to protect them against the Thessalians. A small force might hold it for a long time against vastly superior numbers. Accordingly an advanced guard of 300 Spartans under king Leonidas, each accompanied by 7 helots, was sent at once to occupy this place. Leonidas was joined by contingents from various towns in the Peloponnese, from Corinth, from Thespieae and Thebes in Boeotia, and from the Opuntian Locrians and Phocians, making up about 9000 men. But though the Spartans professed that this was a mere advanced guard, which was to be reinforced when their festival of the Karneia was over, yet they were also busying themselves in building a wall across the passes of the Isthmus of Corinth, with the secret idea of thus securing the Peloponnese, without regard to the fate of Northern Greece. We shall find therefore that the chief difficulty experienced by Themistocles was to induce the allies to stay at their post at Artemisium: while at Thermopylae none of the southern allies remained with Leonidas to the end.

The two points to be defended—Thermopylae and Artemisium—were not occupied until it was known that Xerxes was already in the southern district of Macedonia. He had started from Sardis in the early spring of B.C. 480, and had met with no opposition and no disasters. The skilfully constructed bridge with its cables of flax and byblus had given the land

9. Thermopylae occupied.

10. Advance of the Persians to Thermopylae.

army a safe passage over the Hellespont, and the canal across the neck of Acte—about 2500 yards in length—had served its purpose in enabling the fleet to avoid the dangerous headland of Athos. Xerxes accompanied the land forces, sometimes in a chariot and sometimes in a litter; had reviewed both army and fleet as they crossed to Europe; and had felt his heart swell sometimes with pride, and sometimes with sadness, to think of the brief space of life given by fate to so many thousands. The stories in Herodotus represent him with the faults and virtues of an Eastern monarch—now magnanimous and open-handed, now cruel and pitiless; but, as affecting the result of the expedition, the historian means us to see that under his showy qualities was the heart of a coward. Both army and fleet were made up of a motley assemblage from an endless variety of tribes. The best part of the fleet however was supplied by Phoenicians; and in the army the Persians themselves and the Sacae (or Scythians) were the most warlike, especially the guard of 10,000 picked Persians who were called the Immortals. In both forces the contingents from the Greek towns and islands were the least dependable, for they were serving against their will and with bitter indignation in their hearts. There was every variety of equipment, armour, and weapon to be seen; and the 80,000 cavalry included horsemen, chariots and camels. The numbers employed both on land and sea are probably greatly overstated. Still they were no doubt huge, and an adequate supply of food and water must have been a matter of extraordinary difficulty in a march through a country, in much of which rivers in the summer often run dry, and corn is seldom grown in sufficient quantities even for home consumption.

II. The three
days' fighting
at Artemisium
(July).

The formation of the coast line often necessitated the fleet and army being somewhat widely separated. But they came in contact at Therma (Thessalonica), where there was a halt for rest of several days. The fleet stayed a fortnight longer than the army;

and from this place a squadron of 10 vessels was sent out to reconnoitre. It got as far as the island of Sciathus, where it fell in with three look-out ships of the Greeks, two of which were captured. The third—an Athenian vessel—fled to the mouth of the Peneus, where its crew ran it on shore and escaped on foot homewards through Thessaly. News of this seems to have so much terrified the men of the Greek fleet, that they withdrew from their station at Artemisium to Chalcis intending to block the Euripus. Some few days afterwards the main body of the Persian fleet arrived off the southern extremity of Magnesia opposite Artemisium, and anchored on an open beach near the modern Cape St George. But a violent storm in the night did great damage to the crowded ships; and news of this reaching the Greeks at Chalcis, they returned to their old station at Artemisium. Then followed three days' fighting of no very decisive character. On the first of these the clever seamanship of the Greeks, and perhaps the more manageable size and freightage of their ships, gave them the advantage. They succeeded in capturing or sinking thirty of the enemy's ships, but when night fell neither fleet had gained a decisive victory. On the following night there was another violent storm, which again did great damage to the enemy in their exposed position, while 200 ships which had been sent to circumnavigate Euboea, and so enclose the Greek fleet, were all wrecked on the rocky shores of the island.

The second day the Greeks were reinforced by the arrival of 53 Attic ships, and again advanced to the attack; but the Persian fleet had suffered so much that it would not venture to put out to sea; and nothing was done beyond charging and disabling certain Cilician vessels.

On the third day, dreading the wrath of the king if he did nothing, the Persian admiral ordered a general attack—forming his ships in a huge crescent in order to enclose the Greek fleet. The Greeks at first refused to move, but fearing to be

surrounded at length put out and engaged the enemy. Again night prevented the victory of either fleet.

But the Greeks had suffered severely. Nearly half the Athenian ships were more or less damaged; and in a council held after the fighting was over the captains decided to withdraw. Themistocles had all along found it exceedingly difficult to persuade them to stay, and he now gave in and consented to retire to the south. This resolution was confirmed next day when a scout, who had been stationed on the coast, came with the news that the pass of Thermopylae had been forced, and that the Persian army was in full march for Athens.

For while the two fleets had thus been facing each other without decisive result at Artemisium, Xerxes
 12. The battle of Thermo-
 pylae. with his army had been engaged with the defenders of the pass at Thermopylae. As the Grand Army marched southward, not a hand had been raised to oppose it in Thessaly or Achaia Phthiotis as it proceeded along the coast road, to avoid having to cross the range of Mount Orthys, and descended into Malis. There the range of Oeta running down to the coast left, for nearly two miles, only the narrow causeway or road which then constituted the pass of Thermopylae or 'hot gates,' so called from some hot springs at the southern end of the plain into which the pass led¹.

Xerxes could not believe that such a puny force would venture to withstand his great army. But finding that there were no signs of their giving in, he sent some Medes and Cissians forward to clear the way. They were beaten back with loss, and the picked Persian guards or 'Immortals' fared no better. The next day the attempt was renewed with no more success. Their longer spears and more serviceable shields gave the Greeks the advantage at close quarters, and the

¹ The sea has now receded, and the alluvial deposits of the river Spercheius have created a broad piece of marshy land covered by rice fields. There is no longer a narrow pass.

narrowness of the ground with the protection of the Phocian wall baffled the great numbers of the enemy. But on the evening of that day a Malian named Ephialtes obtained an audience of the king, and offered to

*The treason
of Ephialtes.*

guide a body of troops to the rear of the Greeks by a path over the mountain Callidromus. The king, who had been much agitated by the misfortunes of the two previous days, gladly accepted the proposal, and at nightfall the ten thousand 'Immortals' set out. The hill was thickly overgrown with an oak forest, under cover of which their advance was concealed from the 1000 Phocians who had been stationed just below the crest of the hill to guard against this very movement. By daybreak the Persians were approaching the summit, and through the clear morning air the sound of their trampling through the brushwood was carried to the ears of the Phocians. Yet they had little warning : the Persians seemed to start suddenly into view, surprised no less than themselves to see a body of men hastily getting under arms, where they had expected a lonely mountain path. When assured however by Ephialtes that they were not the Spartans, who had given them so much trouble the day before, they marched steadily on. The Phocians attempted no resistance but retired to the crest of the hill ; and the Persians, without stopping to attack them, followed the winding path which avoided the hill-top, and began the descent with all speed.

The Greeks below had early warning from deserters that they were betrayed. The sacrifices were unfavourable, and their own scouts soon came running in with the news. The allies immediately decided to depart before they were surrounded, or, as some said, were dismissed by Leonidas, that no Greek lives might be uselessly sacrificed. Only the Thebans and Thespians remained of all that did not come from the Peloponnese : the Thespians, because they preferred death to desertion ; the Thebans, detained by Leonidas as hostages for their medising state, intending to desert at the earliest opportunity in the battle. To Leonidas and his

three hundred the idea of retreat was intolerable. It was the duty of a Spartan—inculcated from childhood—to die at his post. With them, it seems, there remained the helots and 1000 perioeci from Lacedaemonia.

At sunrise Xerxes poured libations to Mithras, and about ten in the morning started once more for the pass. The Spartans knowing themselves to be cut off from retreat determined to risk all. They quitted the shelter of the Phocian wall and advanced into more open ground. There there was a fierce struggle: two of the Persian king's half-brothers were slain, many of his men were driven into the sea, or trampled to death by their own comrades. Presently Leonidas himself fell, and a desperate fight raged for a time round his corpse. But at this time the Spartans found the Immortals on their rear. They made one more desperate charge: fought their way back to the wall, and thence to a piece of elevated ground, where after a gallant defence they were at length completely surrounded and fell to a man. The only survivor was Aristomenes, who by an accident was not actually engaged. But his life was made such a burden to him, that he courted and found death in the following year at Plataea.

As the retirement of the Greek ships after the three days' fighting at Artemisium left the Persian fleet a free passage to the south; so the victory of the king at Thermopylae removed the sole obstacle to the march of his army. The Thebans and Boeotians generally were his friends, nor were there any land forces guarding the roads and passes into Attica. At Panopeis, on the frontier of Boeotia, a column was detached to attack Delphi and plunder its temple, while the main army, with Xerxes himself, continued its march to Athens—the professed object of the expedition. Artemisium and Thermopylae were only preliminary skirmishes. The first had not been a failure, and the latter was a decided success, for the invaders. But the real struggle was yet to come.

13. The
Persian ad-
vance
resumed.





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THEMISTOCLES

CHAPTER X.

SALAMIS AND PLATAEA.

The column of the Persian army sent to Delphi advanced as through an hostile country, burning and destroying as it went. But though it reached Delphi, it neither plundered nor destroyed the temple; but hastily withdrew or was recalled. It may have been the news of the defeat at Salamis that caused its recall; for as Xerxes marched through a friendly country, it may well be that the column, often detained by its marauding operations, did not reach its destination till some time after the king had taken Athens. But the guardians of the temple had also been successful in creating a feeling of awe and terror in the minds of the enemy. The ordinary inhabitants of Delphi had sent their wives and children away to Achaia or Amphissa (in Locris), and had retired themselves to the mountains. Only about 60 were left, who seem to have been in various ways connected with the care of the temple. But these men in conjunction with the official guardian of the temple, instead of burying its valuable treasures, resolved to try what could be done by playing upon the superstitious fears of the enemy. A report was spread that the god had spoken from his shrine and declared that he could protect his own. The arms, which many generations of men had dedicated, were found to have been removed without human agency to the outside of the building, as well as many other sacred

1. The attack
on Delphi.

objects, and two gigantic hoplites of superhuman size seemed to chase the enemy from the temple. The panic was completed by a violent thunderstorm, and the descent of two vast boulders from Parnassus near the temple of Athena Pronaia, while a sound of fighting men was heard proceeding from the sacred buildings. That such rocks frequently fall from the mountains upon Delphi and the neighbouring villages is testified by their being still to be seen in considerable numbers. How far the men who remained in the temple contrived in other ways to rouse the fears of the invaders we cannot tell. It is enough that in some way the attack failed.

Meanwhile the main army was advancing on Athens. The city was not walled, and though the Acropolis
 2. Capture of Athens. was fortified in a way, the inhabitants could not all crowd upon it, nor hope to defend it long if they did. There was no army between them and Xerxes, for the Peloponnesians were busy fortifying the Isthmus. In this desperate danger the plan of Themistocles seemed the only hope. Some of the ships, which had now reached the bay of Salamis, were employed to convey women, children, and old men to Salamis, Troezen, and Aegina; while the men of military age were almost all employed on board the triremes. To persuade the people thus to abandon their homes and property had naturally been difficult, and Themistocles had used every resource of superstition to reconcile them to it. Oracles were quoted and spread among the people advising the evacuation of the city; various prodigies were reported; and finally the sacred serpent on the Acropolis, symbol of the origin of the people from the sacred soil, was reported to have disappeared. The gods were abandoning the city: it was time the people did the same. Amidst tears and lamentations the children, women, and old men, collecting what they could of their goods, departed. Not the least moving part of the spectacle, says Plutarch, was the distress of the domestic animals, which followed their masters to the beach. One dog

at least attempted to swim across to Salamis, where he dropped dead from exhaustion. When Xerxes arrived therefore before Athens, in the fourth month from the time he had crossed the Hellespont, he found an empty town. As he had done at Thespiæ and Plataea, the two Boeotian cities which had resisted, he proceeded to burn the town. Only some few houses were left standing for the use of the king and his chief officers. A scanty remnant of the people, along with the treasurers of the temples, had remained on the Acropolis, where they barricaded themselves and held out for a time. The Persians occupied the neighbouring Areiopagus and shot arrows carrying burning tow into the Acropolis, and the defenders retaliated by rolling rocks down upon them. But the resistance was not long maintained. The northern part of the Acropolis was so precipitous that no fortification had been considered necessary. Some of the Persians however contrived to climb up, and soon the main body was admitted. The defenders threw themselves from the rock or were slaughtered by the enemy, who then proceeded to dismantle and burn every building on the Acropolis. It was remarked, however, that the sacred olive, believed to be that which Athena had produced in her contest with Poseidon, though cut down and burnt, had by the next day, when the Peisistratidae by the king's orders went up the Acropolis to offer sacrifice, thrown out a long green shoot.

The object of Xerxes was thus in part accomplished, and a triumphant message was sent to Susa announcing the capture of Athens. The inhabitants indeed were not taken and could not therefore be removed *en masse* like the Eretrians. The completion of this part of his design must depend upon the fleet, which arrived at Phalerum soon after the capture of Athens. There Xerxes again reviewed it. It had made up the losses caused by storms and battle by levying contributions of ships from the islands; and it lay stretched along the Attic coast from beyond Sunium up to Phalerum.

3. The Persian fleet.

4. The Greek
fleet in the bay
of Salamis.
Shall it go
farther south ?

The Greek fleet had meantime been gradually reinforced by squadrons from other towns, which mustered at Pogon and thence joined the main body off Salamis. It now numbered 378 vessels, instead of 271 as at Artemisium. The additional ships came chiefly from the towns of the Peloponnese, which now sent 99 instead of 35, while the number from Aegina was raised from 18 to 30 ; and several of the Cyclades now ventured to send ships. From the western parts of Greece only Leucas and Ambracia contributed any ; while from the Greek towns of Italy there was only one, sent by Croton. The commander-in-chief was the Spartan Eurybiades ; but the Athenians had still a large numerical superiority (180 ships) and Themistocles was the moving spirit. But as so large a part of the fleet came from towns in the Peloponnese, it was natural that there should be a strong inclination to remove from the bay of Salamis to some place farther south, from which they would be able freely to sail to the defence of their several towns. The debate in the council of the captains on this subject was hot. Eurybiades was strongly for the retirement and was so irritated by the persistence of Themistocles, that at one point he even raised his staff as if to strike him. 'Strike by all means,' said Themistocles, 'if you will only hear me.' While to another captain who said that a cityless man ought to have no voice in the discussion, he replied that 'the fleet was now the city of the Athenians, and if they were abandoned, they could easily by its help win for themselves a good home and city.'


It was this implied threat on the part of the Athenians that they would act independently, and the fear in that case that the Persian ships would be able to operate as they pleased on the coasts of the Peloponnese, that kept the combined fleet together for the time. But while the council was still sitting the news came of the Persian army having entered Attica and reached Athens. This was too much for most of the captains

to bear. Some at once went to their ships and ordered preparations for sailing to be made; and of those who remained the great majority voted for retiring.

Themistocles left the council woefully depressed: but acting on the advice of a friend, to whom he communicated the decision, he went to visit Eurybiades on board his ship and urged him once more to remain, pointing out that the inevitable effect of removing would be the entire dispersion of the ships to their several homes; and urging that a fight in narrow waters with so vast a fleet as that of the Persians would be all in their favour. Finally he declared that, if the fleet did remove, the Athenians would sail away and seek a home in Italy. Eurybiades was at last convinced and consented to stay. But when a few days later it was known that Athens had fallen, that the king contemplated leading his army towards the Isthmus of Corinth, and that the Peloponnesian land forces, who had been occupied with feverish haste in completing the wall across the Isthmus and blocking the roads, had completed their task, the feeling in the fleet in favour of going south grew so strong, that the move would certainly have been made, if it had not been for a device of Themistocles which made it impossible. He sent a slave on board a merchant-vessel with a message to the Persian admirals, telling them what the Greek captains intended doing, and advising them to send ships round Salamis to take them in the rear and prevent their escape.

5. The device of Themistocles to force the fleet to fight in the bay of Salamis.

There had been much debate among the Persian officers also, whether to attack the Greek fleet in the bay of Salamis or not. The Phoenician commanders (whose ships formed the most important part of the fleet) were for doing so, and the others acquiesced. The only opposition came from Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus, who urged that the advance by land into the Peloponnese was now easy, and that to risk the fleet, on which the king could not safely depend, was unwise.



SALAMIS AND COAST OF ATTICA.

Though the king listened to this without anger, he yet decided in favour of attacking by sea. This resolution was no doubt strengthened by the message of Themistocles. At midnight ships were sent to sail round to the west of Salamis, and a small island called Psyttaleia, between Salamis and the mainland, was occupied by Persian troops to save wrecks that would probably be drifted upon it in the course of the battle, while the ships of the left wing were brought up so as to fill the narrow sea between Salamis and the Attic coast.

These movements of the Persian ships had not it seems been noticed by the captains, still engaged in disputing as to the withdrawal. But it had been seen by Aristides, as he was sailing homewards from Aegina, on being recalled from exile with all others who had been ostracised. He at once made his way to the ship of Themistocles to tell him what he had observed. Struck by his magnanimity in thus treating his bitter opponent, Themistocles told him the whole truth and took him with him to the council of officers, that they might learn from his lips that they were surrounded. The news was presently confirmed by a Tenian trireme which had escaped from the Persian fleet, and it became evident to all that a battle in the bay of Salamis was now inevitable.

Preparations therefore were at once begun. Perhaps all were relieved by having the question settled for them, without the necessity of coming to a decision themselves. By dawn all was ready. The sacred trireme arrived from Aegina with the figures of the Aeacidae—the local heroes of Salamis—and with a cheer the Greek ships began putting out to sea. The Persian fleet was doing the same and at first its large numbers alarmed the Greeks, who began to back water towards the shore of Eleusis, when suddenly Ameinias, an Athenian captain, darting forward with his ship, charged and engaged a ship of the enemy. The two became entangled, and as both sides then

6. The battle
of Salamis,
September,
B.C. 480.

came to the rescue the fighting soon became general. A naval battle in these conditions became a series of combats between two or a small number of vessels, the object of each captain being to bring the sharp prow of his ship full into the broadside of the enemy, and make a breach that would sink or water-log the hostile vessel. To do this well was the test of the skill of the steersmen and the vigour of the rowers—especially in practising the manœuvre of the *dickplus*, that is, rowing through the enemy's line, and then turning rapidly to charge the stern of one or other of his ships. The Athenian ships had been specially engaged against those of the Phoenicians, which were the best in the Persian fleet, and according to Aeschylus (who was in the fight) it was a successful charge upon one of these that began the battle. For a time the Persian line held together, but after some hours of such fighting it became entirely broken up; the ships tried to escape, but they were so numerous that collisions were frequent; and their confusion was completed by a charge of the Aeginetan squadron. It is to be observed that we hear nothing in the battle of the Egyptian ships that had been sent round Salamis. They must either have arrived too late to be of any service, or contented themselves with simply blocking up the channel between Salamis and Megara without attempting to charge the Greek fleet. Xerxes, seated on a silver-footed throne on a high elevation overlooking the narrowest part of the strait, watched with the greatest anxiety the course of the fight, leaping from his seat in his agony as he saw ship after ship disabled or sunk. After the end of the battle he put to death some of the Phoenician captains, whom he charged with beginning the flight.

But though the defeat had been decisive and the loss of life great, the Persian fleet was by no means destroyed. The Greeks fully expected that it would return to renew the combat the next morning. At daybreak therefore they began to prepare for

7. After the battle.

another struggle. To their surprise no ship of the enemy hove in sight, and they presently learnt that the whole Persian fleet had spread all sail, or was using all its oars, in as rapid a flight as possible for the Hellespont. The Greek fleet started in pursuit, and went as far as the island of Andros without catching up the enemy. Themistocles wished to continue the pursuit to the Hellespont and there break up the bridge, but Eurybiades insisted on returning, declaring that rather than stop the Persians from going away, they ought to build a bridge for them, by which to depart. He no doubt felt that, with the great Persian army still in the country, it would not be safe to go so far from home.

The Greeks had therefore won a greater victory than they had dared to think. For Xerxes was thoroughly frightened, being, as Herodotus says, the greatest coward in his army; and though in the council held immediately after the battle he affected to continue the contest by ordering the construction of a mole to Salamis, and projecting a march into the Peloponnese, he had in truth resolved to return home. He therefore accepted the suggestion of Mardonius that he should himself be left behind to winter in Greece and to renew the war in the spring, but that the king should go back to Sardis. The members of the royal family were entrusted to Artemisia to convey to Ephesus and so to Sardis; while the main body of the fleet was to go to the Hellespont to keep the bridge safe for the king, who was to be escorted back as far as Thessaly by the whole army, and thence to Sestos by a guard of sixty thousand men. Thus it had come about that the Greeks found that the hostile fleet had disappeared. It had in fact to a great extent dispersed, the Phoenician ships having deserted the rest and made the best of their way home. The retreat of Xerxes was accompanied by much suffering to the army. The country had been too recently plundered to supply sufficient food: want of water and nourishment brought disease, and a large number were reported to

8. Departure
of Xerxes.

have perished in attempting to cross the frozen Strymon ; but in the end the king got safe back to Sardis.

Finding that Eurybiades would not proceed to the Hellespont, Themistocles next urged that the fleet should separate to its several States and employ the winter in repairing losses, and making up for work which had been interrupted by the war. This advice he contrived should be related to Xerxes, as though it had been given in order to prevent the Greeks from breaking down the Hellespontine bridge, and so making the king's return to Asia more difficult. He already foresaw that he might one day need the king's protection. For the present he did not take the Athenian squadron home with the rest. He stayed among the islands, following the policy of Miltiades, in exacting from them payments of money, partly as fines for aid given to the Persians, partly as contributions towards the maintenance of a fleet to keep the Aegean clear of them. The Andrians replied to his demand, which he backed by declaring that he brought two mighty gods with him 'Persuasion' and 'Force,' that they had two gods even stronger, who never would leave them, 'Poverty' and 'Want.' Themistocles blockaded the town, and sent ships to Carystus, as well as to Paros and other islands, which had more success in raising money. But these proceedings roused bitter feelings against him among the islanders, and caused him to be regarded with suspicion at Athens. This jealousy was increased by the extraordinarily high honours paid to him at Sparta, which he visited shortly afterwards, and as a result he was not elected one of the Strategi for the next year, though he continued for some time to have great influence in home affairs.

Mardonius meanwhile had accompanied the king as far as Thessaly, where he remained for the winter with 300,000 men selected from the Grand Army, consisting of Persians (with the 10,000 Immortals), Medes, Sacae, Bactrians and Indians. The Greeks from Asia

9. Themistocles and the Islands.

10. Return of the Athenians to their city.

were not included, for he, had good reason for mistrusting them ; but he was to be assisted in the spring by the Thebans and other continental Greeks who were prepared to serve loyally. Artabazus, who had been general of the Parthian contingent, employed himself with 60,000 men in reducing Olynthus and Potidaea and the rest of the Chalcidic peninsula. The former town was taken and sacked, but he suffered severe loss in attempting to enter the latter by getting round the mole of the harbour at low tide. Otherwise the invading army remained quietly in winter quarters in Thessaly and Macedonia. Meantime the Greeks of the fleet were engaged in dividing their spoils, selecting a tenth for the god at Delphi, and deciding, as usual, on the prize of valour. Each captain voted for himself first, but put Themistocles second ; who was also treated with unusual marks of honour by the Spartans later on. The bulk of the Athenians returned to their homes, and began as far as they could the work of restoration.

With the return of spring the Greeks were aware that a new attack was to be expected. A Persian fleet of 300 triremes had mustered at Cyme and proceeded to Samos. They feared to come farther west because of the danger of a rising of Ionians, who had been in communication with Sparta, asking for the protection of Greek ships. Early in the spring therefore a fleet had been collected under the command of the Spartan Leotychides and had proceeded as far as Delos, in answer to this request, which had reached them at Aegina. But beyond that they had not ventured—‘all beyond seemed to the Greeks full of danger ; the places were quite unknown to them, and in their fancy swarmed with Persian troops¹.’ Thus in the early part of the year both fleets were kept back by mutual fears.

II. New
preparations
in the spring
of B.C. 479.

Meanwhile Mardonius had been trying to gain his end without more fighting in northern Greece. Athens was still at

¹ Herod. VIII. 132.

his mercy : but he wished to penetrate into the Peloponnese ; and that could only be done with safety if all the country in his rear was thoroughly secured. He had now learnt something of Greek feeling, and imagined that to get the oracles on his side would be greatly to his advantage. He therefore abstained from attacking Delphi, and tried by presents to win the support of the oracle of Trophonius at Lebadeia. He also employed Alexander of Macedonia to negotiate with the Athenians, promising them immunity from farther attack, and aid in restoring the buildings which had been destroyed, on condition of their support being given to the Persians. Great alarm was caused at Sparta on hearing of the visit of Alexander. Ambassadors were hurriedly sent to Athens, offering money towards the restoration, and compensation for the loss of the harvest of the previous autumn. The Athenians were thus encouraged to answer as they wished. They told Alexander—‘So long as the Sun keeps its course we will never ally ourselves with Xerxes.’ Having learned the result of this embassy, Mardonius called out his men from their winter quarters and mustered them in Boeotia, where the Thebans urged him to remain and to corrupt the statesmen in the various cities by bribes. No doubt the Thebans knew best the character of their fellow Greeks ; but Mardonius was bent on military success. He made one more attempt to win over the Athenians by sending an ambassador to Salamis, whither they had again retired ; but the Athenians stoutly refused, and even stoned to death a certain Lycidas who proposed to accept the terms.

The Athenians might well have been tempted to listen to the proposal ; for their retreat to Salamis had been rendered necessary by the failure of the Spartans and other Peloponnesian States to send a force to keep Mardonius in Boeotia. They were still engaged in the ostrich-like policy of strengthening the fortifications of the Isthmus, and the Spartans were celebrating the

12. The attempts of Mardonius to pacify the Athenians.

13. Second invasion of Attica.

Hyacinthia at Amyclae, a festival which scarcely anything could make them forego. Messengers sent to Sparta with remonstrances were answered only after ten days' delay: when at last troops under Pausanias—cousin and guardian of Pleistarchus the young son of Leonidas—were despatched.

On hearing that the Peloponnesian army was really on the move Mardonius, who had come as far south as to re-occupy Athens, determined to return to Boeotia. Attica was not suitable for cavalry, on which he greatly depended, and was difficult to get away from if he were defeated. He therefore started for Boeotia, but returned on hearing that a small advanced guard of the Peloponnesian army had arrived at Megara. He hoped to produce an impression by crushing this force. But again learning that the main army was not far off, he resumed his march towards Boeotia, having done as much damage to Athens as he had time for.

He marched by Deceleia on the road to Oropus; but at Deceleia was met by guides sent by the Boeotarchs who conducted him by a shorter route to Tanagra—apparently the line of the modern road branching off to the left past Kako Galesi—on the left bank of the Asopus. He marched up the stream to within a short distance of Thebes, and then cutting down trees in the neighbourhood he fortified a large camp of refuge for his men, in case of defeat, and for his stores. The men meanwhile pitched their tents along the south bank of the Asopus, stretching out in front of Erythrae and Hysiae into the territory of Plataea. There Mardonius was joined by a thousand Phocians, and contingents from many other neighbouring states, who for fear or favour were prepared to help him.

Meanwhile the Greek army from the Peloponnese arrived at the plain of Eleusis, where it was joined by 8000 Athenians under Aristides. The whole force was commanded by the Spartan Pausanias. The number of the Greek army, counting the light armed helots, amounted to over a hundred


14. Mar-
donius in
Boeotia.

15. The
Greek army on
the slopes of
Cithaeron in
Boeotia.

thousand. It was more than half composed of men from Peloponnesian States, but there were also contingents from the west—Ambracia, Leucadia and Cephallenia—from the islands of Aegina and Euboea, Ceos, Tenos, Cythnos, and Siphnos, and of states north of the Isthmus from Malis, Megara, Plataea, Thespieae and Athens. The large numbers of the force, and the wide area from which it was drawn, shew how much the victory at Salamis had done to raise the courage and determination of the Greeks. Still it was a South Greek army. From Boeotia northward all states willingly or unwillingly were supporting, or at least submitting to, the Persians. Having mustered therefore at Eleusis, the Greek army advanced into Boeotia over Mount Cithaeron by the pass of Dryoscephalae (the ‘Oak Heads’), which comes out between Erythrae and Hysiae on the way to Thebes. They did not venture to descend into the valley for fear of the Persian cavalry, which continually skirmished up to them and provoked them to come down. They had however some success in these encounters with the enemy’s horse, especially in killing Masistius, the tallest and finest cavalry officer in the Persian army. But as they needed at the same time a better supply of water, Pausanias decided to edge along the hills to the west and descend to lower ground, to a plateau near a fountain called Gargaphia, nearly opposite the main line of the Persians, with the Asopus between them. For eight days the two armies remained in position, neither crossing the river to attack the other, except for the daily skirmishing of the Persian cavalry. On the whole the Greeks suffered considerably, especially when during the next two days the Persians took advantage of their change of position to cut off a convoy of provisions coming over Dryoscephalae, and to block the pass against reinforcements. On the eleventh day Mardonius, wearied with such desultory work, resolved on a general attack on the Greek position. Warning was given to the Athenian generals by Alexander of Macedon who rode up to the Athenian lines after dark to give the information.

But the twelfth day did not witness the expected battle. It was wasted by changes and counter changes on both sides: the Spartans wishing the Athenians on the left to change with them, in order to face the Persians, of whom they had had experience, and Mardonius executing a similar movement to

16. The Battle of Plataea, summer of B.C. 479.



prevent it: and then both changing back to their original position. Whether this is false—as some think—or not, as well as a challenge on the part of Mardonius that the result

should be left to a single engagement between Persians and Spartans—at any rate the final battle was postponed. Pausanias now executed a backward movement to a place called the island, about a mile from Plataea, so named from the fact that it lay between two mountain streams running down into the Oeroe. The object was partly water, for the Persians had choked Gargaphia, partly to guard against failure of provisions, and partly to cover the other pass over Cithaeron from Plataea to Megara, which had become important since the blocking of Dryoscephalae. The movement was to be made at night, and was to be executed in three divisions—by the Athenians on the left, by the centre made up of the Corinthians and other allies, and by the Spartans and Tegeans on the right. It was begun by the centre. But the men went farther than they were expected to go and drew up in or near the Heraeum, which appears to have been close to the walls of Plataea. Herodotus attributes this to their terror of the cavalry, but it may after all have been the point they were intended to occupy. The Spartans on the right and the Athenians on the left were to have started simultaneously. But the Spartans were kept back by the obstinacy of a captain of the Pitanetan *lochos* or company, who not having been at the council did not know the object of the movement, and looking upon it as a base flight refused to stir. The Athenians had also delayed starting, not being sure of the Spartan intentions; and when these difficulties were got over, there was not enough of the night left to execute the movement in darkness.

The Athenians kept along the plain, and seem to have been out of sight of the Persians, but the Spartans and Tegeans were on higher ground and were visible to the enemy. **The fight.** They soon therefore began to find their rear harassed by Persian cavalry: while Mardonius and his whole army got under arms and pushed forward to attack them. Pausanias halted and drew up his men for battle, sending off a horseman in hot haste to beg the Athenians to join him.

But they were engaged by the Greek allies to the Persians and were shut off from the battle, the whole credit of which therefore fell to the Spartans and Tegeans. They had halted near a temple of Demeter—which as usual was in a lonely spot about a mile away from the town—and were able to sacrifice and take the omens. The Persian archers, making a temporary rampart of their wicker shields, poured in a flight of arrows upon them. But the victims continued to be unfavourable, till Pausanias raising his eyes to the Heraeum shining in the distance besought Herè ‘not to thwart the Greeks.’ At that moment, the Tegeans by a sudden impulse charged the enemy opposite them. The spell was broken: the victims became suddenly favourable, and Pausanias gave the word for a general charge. The Spartans dashed down the wicker shields and came to close quarters with the enemy. The length of their spears again gave them the advantage, as no doubt did their superior strength and discipline. In the midst of the *mêlée* Mardonius was conspicuous on his white charger, and surrounded by 1000 picked men. But a javelin or stone brought him down; the bodyguard was cut to pieces; and soon the whole motley throng was in full flight for the camp on the north bank of the Asopus. By this time the Athenians had driven back the Boeotians with considerable slaughter and were ready to join the Spartans in the attack upon the camp. But the allies of the centre, who had halted at the Heraeum, though in answer to a message from Pausanias they had started for the field of battle, did not arrive in time either for the battle or the attack on the camp; while the Phliasians and Megarians, who took the low road, were caught by some Theban cavalry and driven back with great loss. The storming of the camp was begun by the Spartans and Tegeans. It was obstinately defended for a time. But when the storming party was reinforced by the arrival of the Athenians, the works were carried, and a hideous slaughter was inflicted on the terrified mass of men within it. The only remnant of the

Grand Army was a body of 40,000 men under Artabazus, who, disapproving of the attack ordered by Mardonius, had lingered in the rear. When he saw how things were going, he bade his men stay neither at the camp nor at Thebes, but gallop to the north. He managed to get through Phocis and Thessaly by giving out that he was a mere advanced guard, and that Mardonius was close behind him, and at last reached Byzantium, but after having lost a large number of his men.


The Greek army had nothing left to do but to divide the spoil. As usual a tenth was set apart to be dedicated in various temples. From the part assigned to Delphi a large bronze stand was set up of three twisted snakes, on the heads of which stood a golden tripod, while on the coils were cut the names—still legible—of those states which had taken part in the battle or the war generally. No individual name was allowed to be placed on it, and a couplet containing that of Pausanias was ordered to be erased. Similar inscriptions were cut upon a bronze statue of Zeus at Olympia, and of Poseidon at Corinth. Lastly, before breaking up, the Congress at Corinth made a practical use of its claim to exercise national authority by putting to death the Theban oligarchs who had promoted the alliance with Persia. They had been surrendered to Pausanias after he had invested Thebes for 20 days, almost immediately after the battle of Plataea.

This was the end of the invasion. For the next 100 years Greece was to have freedom to develop in her own way. A new spirit of confidence seemed to be infused into the nation, and as in England after the defeat of the Armada this buoyancy of national life was manifested by an outburst of energy in literature and intellectual activity of all kinds, like that which marked the 'spacious days of Great Elizabeth.' About the same time a similar freedom was secured for the islands and Greek towns in Asia and Thrace, as well as for the

17. The spoil
divided and
the Medisers
punished.

18. The Hun-
dred Years'
freedom in
Hellas,
B.C. 478—378.

Hellenes of Sicily and Italy. We saw how Gelo of Syracuse beat back the Carthaginian host at Himera in B.C. 480, while the Greeks of the central peninsula were repulsing the Persians. Six years later his successor Hiero in a great battle at Cumae 'humbled the Etruscans,' the other great sea power in the Western Mediterranean. The poet Pindar connects these two events as 'rescuing Hellas from a heavy doom of slavery.' Everywhere the Hellenic genius seemed inspired with the energy of renewed youth.



ΙΟ [τοιδε τὸν ?]
 πόλεμον
 ἐπολέμεον
 Λακεδαιμόνιοι
 Ἀθηναῖοι
 Κορίνθιοι
 Τεγεᾶται
 Σικυνώνιοι
 Αἰγινᾶται
 Μεγαρῆς
 Ἐπιδαύριοι
 Ἐρχομένοι
 Φλειάσιοι
 Τροζάνιοι
 Ἑρμιονῆς
 Τιρύνθιοι
 Πλαταιῆς
 Θεσπιῆς
 Μυκανῆς
 Κεῖοι
 Μάλιοι
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 Νάξιοι
 Ἐρετριῆς
 Χαλκιδῆς
 Στυρῆς
 φαλείοι [Ἡλείοι]
 Ποτειδαῖαται
 Λευκάδιοι
 φανακτοριῆς [Ἀνακτοριῆς]
 Κύθνιοι
 Σίφνιοι
 Ἀμπρακιῶται
 Λεπρεᾶται

THE BRONZE STAND DEDICATED AT DELPHI AFTER PLATAEA. NOW IN THE STADIUM AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

CHAPTER XI.

THE CONFEDERACY OF DELOS.

1. The battle
of Mycale and
the freedom of
the islands
and Hellenic
towns in Asia
and Thrace,
B.C. 479—476.

While the Greeks were still remaining inactive at Delos (p. 163), under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides, an urgent message came from Samos begging for help against the Persian fleet and promising co-operation. It was a secret message sent without the knowledge of the medising tyrant of Samos ; but Leotychides was prepared to go, and seized on the name of the messenger Hegesistratos (Army-leader) as of good omen. The fleet arrived off Calami in Samos and tried in vain to tempt the Persians out to fight. They resolved not to risk it; but sent away their Phoenician ships for safety, and landed themselves near the promontory of Mycale, in order to be under the protection of their land army, beached their ships, and fortified a kind of naval camp. The Greeks, though they would have preferred fighting at sea, and for a time thought of leaving the enemy alone and returning to Greece, finally resolved to attack them on land. Leotychides first attempted to introduce divisions in the enemy's army by an appeal to the Samians and other Ionians not to fight against their brethren. This was so far successful that it aroused the suspicion of the Persian commander Tigranes, who disarmed the Samians, and sent the Milesians to the high ground of Mycale. As at Plataea, the battle was fought almost within sight of a temple of Herè in Samos and near a temple of Demeter. When the

Greeks landed without opposition, as the story goes, on the very day of the battle of Plataea, they were encouraged by a strange event. A herald's staff was found on the beach and a rumour ran through the host, no man knew how, that the Persians had been beaten at Plataea. Whether the rumour was designedly spread by the officers, or whether the battles were really sufficiently divided in time to allow of some news reaching Mycale, at any rate the Greeks were in high spirits and gained a brilliant victory. The wicker shields of the Persians were dashed down, and though they made a gallant resistance—Tigranes and Mardontes dying sword in hand—yet the entrenchment was carried, and the Ionian troops turned upon their oppressors and aided the slaughter. Even those who escaped from the field to the high ground of Mycale fell in with the Milesians, who treacherously guided them into the very arms of the victorious Greeks, by whom they were cut to pieces.

This practically began a second Ionian revolt. It could not be universal at first. The Persian land force was still too powerful for that; and in the council held after the battle the Spartan proposal was to transfer the Ionians bodily to the various towns in Greece which had medised. But a more reasonable policy was initiated by the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians making a sworn alliance with the continental Greeks present, undertaking to furnish ships and men for resistance to Persia. Their example was followed by some other islands, but they in no sense put themselves in the power of Athens or any other State. They joined as free and independent allies, and in the extended league formed two years later they always occupied a position of special privilege.

The first step taken by the allies after the victory of Mycale (September) was to set free the Thracian Chersonese, where a Persian governor named Artayctes, residing at Sestos, exercised supreme authority in so harsh a manner as to have

2. Beginning
of organised
attack on
Persian rule
over Greek
States.

incurred the special hatred of the Hellenic states. The control of the Chersonese was always of great importance to the Athenians, on account of the corn trade through the Hellespont, and the Athenian general Xanthippus resolved to take Sestos, even if he had to trench upon the winter season. The Spartans however had not an equal interest in it, and Leotychides went home with the other Peloponnesian allies, leaving the Athenians to carry on the siege of the town. It lasted long, but Xanthippus persisted, and at last when the garrison was reduced almost to starvation, Artayctes escaped and the town fell.

The Congress at Corinth, though nominally continuing to exist, did nothing effective after the Persian invasion. The town of Thebes (besides the execution of the leaders) was fined for medising, and Leotychides was despatched on a punitive expedition to Thessaly, from which however he returned without striking a blow—having, as it was said, been bribed by the Aleuadae. Lastly, Pausanias seems to have caused some of the central Greek States to form a sworn alliance for mutual protection¹. But the most important league resulting from the Persian invasion was that of the maritime States, island or continental, made in the course of the next few years with the object of keeping the Aegean clear of the Persians, and freeing all Hellenic cities from them, as well as retaliating on the king's dominions. Of this league Athens, by the force of events, became the head.

While the work of restoration and fortification at Athens was going on under the influence of Themistocles, the Greek fleet was not idle. In accordance with the understanding arrived at with Samos, Chios and Lesbos in the previous year, it was duly sent out to the Asiatic coast to continue the work of liberation. It was under the general command of Pausanias, while the Athenian contingent was commanded by Aristides and Cimon,

¹ Thucyd. II. 72; cp. I. 18.

3. Origin of
the Confede-
racy of Delos,
B.C. 478—476.

son of Miltiades. They first sailed to Cyprus, as being a source of naval strength to the king, and freed the greater part of it from Persian control. They then sailed northward to Byzantium, where there was still a Persian garrison, and laid siege to it. It was during this siege that a great change came over the feelings of the allies. Pausanias was making himself universally unpopular. He gave himself all the airs of a tyrant, affected exclusiveness, and after the capture of Byzantium entered into correspondence with the king. The pretext was the restoration of some captives taken in the siege. He sent them back without consulting the allies, and even wrote proposing to marry a daughter of Xerxes. The Spartans recalled him and sent Dorcis in his place with a small additional number of ships (B.C. 477). But when Dorcis arrived he found that the captains of the ships had invited Aristides to take the command of the allied fleet—partly from anger with Pausanias, partly from confidence inspired by the character of Aristides; but also on the ground of the superiority of the Athenian ships in number and quality. Dorcis thereupon withdrew the Spartan ships and returned home. Thus Sparta once more contented herself with being head of the Peloponnese and a generally acknowledged primacy on land; while the first place in the Aegean, in Island Greece, and on the shores of Asia, with all which that entailed, fell naturally to the Athenians.

The first measure of Aristides was to arrange for a more permanent league among the allies. The principles upon which it was founded were, first, that though adherence to it was voluntary, withdrawal from it was a breach of a solemn oath and could be prevented by the whole body: and, secondly, that each State was to supply a fixed number of ships and a contribution in money (*φóρος*), or an additional sum of money in lieu of ships, for the protection of the islands of the Aegean and other Greek colonies against Persia. The assessment of the contributions was left to Aristides. The treasury was to be at Delos, and certain officers called *Hellenotamiae*

4. Aristides organises the Confederacy of Delos, B.C. 477-6.

were appointed to collect and take charge of it. For this purpose there was a triple classification of States (1) Thracian, (2) Ionian, (3) Islands. In the first two adjacent islands were reckoned. Though a kind of primacy among the allies was, on the proposal of the Chians, assigned to Athens, she was originally only an ally like the rest, with no defined power over the others. Yet in regard to each State, except Chios, Samos, and Lesbos, it seems from the first to have been understood that it was to have a constitution somewhat after the Athenian model, and to admit—if necessary—an Athenian resident and guard (ἐπίσκοπος and φύλακες): and when Athens began to assert these rights, and to exercise the powers naturally arising from them, a new aspect was given to the whole constitution of the league. But for many years it effected its purpose without seriously wounding the sense of independence of the allies, and was continually receiving new adhesions. The work of reducing towns occupied by Persians went on steadily, beginning with Eion on the Strymon and the island of Scyros. These were taken by Cimon, their inhabitants removed, and colonists found to take their place.

Athens meanwhile was becoming strong enough to take the head of such a league. Immediately after the final failure of the Persian invasion, Themistocles began to urge that the citizens should not only restore the buildings of the city, but should prevent a recurrence of such a misfortune by protecting it with a wall. The work was set on foot at once, and so eagerly was it pushed on that every kind of loose material was used, houses being pulled down, and even tombstones being built into it—an assertion of Thucydides which has been amply confirmed by modern discoveries. The Spartans felt that a strong Athens was a threat to their military supremacy, and they sent ambassadors to represent that walled towns would be a danger rather than a security in case of another Persian invasion, as was shewn by the Persians having been forced to evacuate Athens on the approach of the

5. The fortification of Athens and the Peiræus, B.C. 477—471.

Peloponnesian army. But Themistocles persuaded the people to retain the Spartan ambassadors, to send him to Sparta, and meanwhile to go on building. At Sparta he put off an interview with the Ephors day after day on the plea that he was waiting for his colleagues. Presently, on receiving secret assurance that the work was sufficiently advanced, he boldly announced that the walls were built, and justified it on the ground both of the necessity of Athens being fortified, if she was to take the lead in national defence, and of the natural right of every town to protect itself. The Spartans did not think it necessary or possible to make any further remonstrance. Themistocles then suggested fortifying Peiræus also. The work was at once begun. A double wall equal in circuit to that of the city (60 stades or about 7 miles) was laid out to include the two townships of Munychia and Peiræus. The two walls were sufficiently wide apart to allow of two waggons passing each other. This space was afterwards filled up by solid masonry, and the work does not appear to have been finished till about B.C. 471, the year in which Themistocles was ostracised. From henceforth the Peiræus began to be the principal harbour of Athens, gradually superseding the old harbour at Phalerum.

Athens therefore between B.C. 477 and 471 was fitting herself for the high place she aspired to hold in Greece. The doings of the confederate fleet in these years are not known to us in detail. But it seems to have successfully kept the Aegean clear of the royal fleets, and to have gradually expelled Persian garrisons from the towns. As Aristides had been the chief framer of the Confederacy, and by his equitable assessment had made its continuance possible, so its soldier was Cimon, son of Miltiades. He completed the work for which it was primarily formed by his victories at the mouth of the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, over a Phoenician fleet, destroying 200 vessels,

6. First period in the history of the Confederacy of Delos, B.C. 476—466, to the Battles of the Eurymedon.

and the same day over a land force that was protecting the fleet near Aspendus. Though there is no evidence that a formal treaty was now made with Persia, yet the state of things after it was that which Plutarch attributes to this so-called 'peace of Cimon.' That is to say, the king no more sent his Phoenician ships north of the Lycian promontory Chelidonium into the Aegean, and no longer interfered with the Greek towns on the coast. It is probable that no definite terms to this effect were made till the peace of Callias (B.C. 450), but that this latter treaty only recognised the actual state of things.

But in the course of these eleven years there had been a gradual change in the feelings of the confederate States, and this was shewn decisively, in the very year of its success on the Eurymedon, by the determination of Naxos to quit the Confederacy, and the authoritative reduction of that island to obedience by the Athenians. 'This was the first allied State'—says Thucydides—'which was reduced to subjection contrary to the league constitution.' We do not know what the special grievances of the Naxians were, probably some severities on the part of Athens in exacting tributes or ships, or insisting on military service; but their revolt begins a new phase in the history of the Confederacy. Meanwhile the state of semi-war with Persia which it kept up involved indirectly the fall of the two men who had led Greece to victory during the invasion—Pausanias and Themistocles. We have seen how the conduct of Pausanias in the year after Mycale (B.C. 478) had not only caused his own recall, but had cost Sparta the leadership in the Aegean. But he had, it seems, resolved not to lose the chance of personal aggrandisement. He presently got possession of a single ship and joined the confederate fleet in the Hellespont. There he resumed his extraordinary behaviour, adopted Persian dress and ornaments, surrounded himself with a body-guard of Persians and Egyptians, and finally entered into a treasonable correspondence with the Persian court. He was

7. Death of
Pausanias,
B.C. 471.

summoned home by the Ephors, and, not venturing to disobey, was imprisoned at Sparta. Managing by some means to regain his liberty he again began writing to the Persian court. What was still worse in Spartan eyes, he tampered with the Helots, with a view to a revolution which should make him despot. The Ephors waited patiently for evidence, which they eventually obtained by accident. Pausanias communicated with the king by letters carried by slaves. In each of these letters he directed that the slave should be put to death to prevent his betraying his master on his return. At last a slave so sent, being struck by the non-return of former messengers, opened the letter, and, finding the same direction as to his own murder contained in it, communicated its contents to the Ephors. By arrangement with them he took refuge at the altar of Poseidon, near which the Ephors concealed themselves. Pausanias, hearing that the slave had taken sanctuary, hurried in alarm to the spot. The conversation that ensued gave the Ephors the evidence they wanted. They determined to arrest him; but he divined their intention and fled for safety to the temple of Athena. The Ephors would not violate the sanctuary, but they built up the doors and allowed him to starve, only removing him when on the point of death, to avoid polluting the temple.

The investigation of his papers involved Themistocles also in a charge of treasonable dealings with Persia. It is very likely that he was guilty of nothing more than concealing his knowledge of the plans of Pausanias. He was too acute a man to have committed his safety to one who shewed such poor qualities as a statesman. But Themistocles, at the time of this accusation, had already fallen from his high popularity at Athens. He had just been ostracised (B.C. 471) and had retired to Argos. The ostracism had resulted from many causes. Themistocles had no doubt enriched himself in various unlawful ways, especially in dealing with the islanders.

8. The ostracism (B.C. 471) and flight of Themistocles (B.C. 466).

His measures for fortifying and improving Athens and the Peiraeus had been far-seeing and brilliant, but they also entailed much labour, expense, and self-sacrifice on the people. He had incurred jealousy at home at one time by enjoying the excessive favour of Sparta; and had then lost the favour of Sparta by opposing the policy of excluding medising States from the Amphictyonic League; and so turned against himself the party at Athens which was always open to Spartan influence. In minor matters he had made enemies, as administrators are sure to do: as for instance, when at the head of the water supply at Athens, he had caused a number of people to be fined for surreptitious use of the public springs. He was also prone to talk in high terms of his own statesmanship, which offended the taste of a people who disliked any show of superiority. They contrasted him with Aristides who by his honesty and moderation had placed the city at the head of the Aegean Confederacy. This was better than the proposal that Themistocles was said to have made to burn the fleet of the allies, in order to secure the naval supremacy of Athens. Moreover Aristides had shewn himself a better democrat, for he had proposed and carried a decree abolishing the money qualification for the archonship. It was while Themistocles was living at Argos after his ostracism, and visiting other places in the Peloponnese, that the Spartans—who were uneasy at his being at Argos—laid an information against him at Athens as being involved in the treason of Pausanias, though the latter had now been nearly four years dead, a sufficient proof that the accusation of Medism was only a means of getting rid of him. Being warned of this in time, however, Themistocles escaped from the Peloponnese to Corcyra, and thence to the court of Admetus, king of the Molossi, whom he persuaded to aid him in crossing Macedonia. At Pydna he obtained a ship, and though he came in sight of the Athenian fleet then besieging Naxos (B.C. 466), he reached Ephesus safely, and after many adventures arrived at the Persian court, where he

was cordially received by King Artaxerxes, who had just succeeded Xerxes (B.C. 465), and was granted a residence at Magnesia and the revenues of Lampsacus and Myus for his sustenance; though his friends in Greece had managed to send him both his family and his money. At Magnesia he lived some years, dying, according to Plutarch, about the year B.C. 460, some said by poison—taken in despair of fulfilling his promises of Greek assistance to the king—others by a natural death. About the time of his flight to Persia his great rival died. Though Aristides had had the management of much public money, his purity was proved by his dying so poor that the State had to portion his daughters. With his death, and the disappearance of Themistocles, ends the first period of the rise of Athens. We shall have to notice now how she develops and uses the power gained by this generation of her statesmen.

The foreign policy of Athens continued for about five years more to be directed by Cimon, but at home he found himself opposed by the rising influence of Pericles, who after the death of Aristides began to take the lead of the more democratic party. The difficulties with which Cimon had to deal in the league were generally caused—as in the case of Naxos—by the necessity of enforcing the quota of ships or the payment of money in their place. As time went on and the danger from Persia seemed less and less imminent, the general disposition of the smaller States was to pay money rather than send out ships. The result was that the Athenians supplied the ships to make up the number (70), and consequently regarded it as their right to enforce payment. Moreover the magistrates and councillors in the allied States—except in the three free allies, Samos, Chios and Lesbos—in their oath of office practically promised fidelity to Athens as a suzerain power. It was inevitable that the passion for local autonomy inherent in the Greek character should lead to difficulties in such circumstances. The revolt of Naxos had been the first

9. The Athenian supremacy after the Battles of the Eury-medon, B.C. 466—449.

sign of this discontent. Everything the Athenian government found or thought it necessary to do in virtue of this supremacy would create it enemies; and even when such measures were not directly connected with the Confederacy, they often affected it in some way or another. This was the case with the next

Revolt of
Thasos,
B.C. 465.

trouble, that with Thasos in B.C. 465. One of the first of Cimon's achievements had been to expel the Persians from Eion on the mouth of the

Strymon. A colony of 10,000 Athenians had been sent to the neighbourhood and had settled at the Nine Ways, to the west of the future site of Amphipolis. The place was important as commanding the roads through Thrace into Greece, as well as the use of the Pangaeian gold mines. Now these gold mines had been worked by the people of the opposite island of Thasos, and the Thasians regarded the presence of the Athenian colonists with jealousy, and so harassed them that military support had to be sent and a fresh batch of settlers. The colony proved a failure, and was finally destroyed by the neighbouring barbarians, the Edonians, who conquered the Greeks in a great battle at Drabescus. The Thasians, however, not content with this failure of the colony, determined to shew their anger with Athens by quitting the Confederacy, though the quarrel was wholly commercial in origin and had nothing to do with the objects of the Confederacy. The Athenians promptly sent an expedition to Thasos, which, after a blockade lasting more than two years (B.C. 466-463), reduced the Thasians to submission and compelled them to pull down their walls and surrender their fleet, and thus descend to the position of a conquered dependency, as Naxos had done before, and as Aegina was to do afterwards. This success had a strong effect upon the imagination of the Athenians; they saw themselves becoming the head of an empire, and they already began to look for expansion on the continent as well as among the islands. Thus they expected that Cimon would follow up his success at Thasos by subjecting a considerable portion of

lower Macedonia, and when he returned home without having done so, he was prosecuted by Pericles for accepting a bribe from King Alexander to abstain. He had not yet, however, lost all his influence at Athens. He was acquitted, and for a time was able to thwart the democratic measures of Pericles. But events in another part of Greece presently removed him from power.


When the Thasians had, by their determination to quit the Confederacy of Delos, brought the Athenian fleet upon them, they naturally looked for help from the power which they felt sure would not regard the rising supremacy of Athens with favour. They appealed to Sparta. The Spartans would have been glad of such an opportunity of asserting their old supremacy, and indeed promised to effect a diversion by invading Attica. But just then they met with a misfortune which tied their hands for ten years. A severe earthquake ruined the town and caused the death of a large number of Spartans¹. Immediately the Helots, especially those of Messenia, seized the opportunity to revenge long years of oppression. They gathered for an attack upon Sparta itself, but being repelled by the energy of King Archidamus, they retired to Mount Ithome, where they were blockaded by the Spartans who had been hastily summoned to arms. They held out for nearly ten years, and the whole energies of the Spartans were devoted to the blockade. It was a matter of life and death to them. It was in fact a labour war, aggravated by a system of relentless oppression. The Helots were the tillers of the soil, bound to it as serfs, hopeless of release or relief, designedly corrupted that they might not have the energy to rise, brutalised by ignorance and cruelty. They naturally and laudably seized any opportunity to strike a blow at their oppressors. Their great want was a leader, a want which

10. The
revolt of the
Helots, and the
league against
Sparta,
B.C. 464-455.

¹ The loss of life was put at 20,000—probably a great exaggeration.

generally keeps an enslaved populace quiet. But on this occasion their movement was rendered the more formidable by the sympathy of the farmer class, the perioeci, many of whom joined them in hope of asserting their own political rights against the Spartan oligarchy. In their struggle with the rebels the Spartans were forced to enlist the help of various allies, and among others they even descended to ask aid of Athens. At Athens the oligarchical party—headed by Cimon—was always in favour of close alliance with Sparta. And though the measure was as unpalatable to many at Athens, as the application had been revolting to the pride of Sparta, Cimon contrived to have a vote passed in favour of sending the aid, and to be nominated to lead it himself. But very soon after the expedition arrived at the seat of war, the jealousy of the Spartans became uncontrollable, and the commanders curtly dismissed the Athenians, though retaining the other allies, with no farther explanation than that they no longer required their services. The indignation roused at Athens by this slight caused the fall of the laconising party and the ostracism of Cimon. The democratic party, with Pericles at its head, gained the ascendant, and a new combination was begun. The alliance made with Sparta at the time of the Persian war was renounced, and an agreement formed with Argos—Sparta's rival in the Peloponnese—which had now much recovered from the effects of the Spartan invasion of B.C. 494. Before long the Thessalians gave in their adherence and eventually the Megarians also. Thus a new combination of Greek States was made on the continent to dispute with Sparta the supremacy in Greece. In this, as in the Delian Confederacy, Athens occupied a leading position, and having the unfriendly Boeotians between two fires—Attica in the south and Thessaly in the north—she seemed in a fair way to consolidate her power. The success and failure of this policy, for which Pericles is mainly responsible, will be considered in the next chapter.





CHAPTER XII.

THE CONTINENTAL AND HOME POLICY OF PERICLES
TO THE THIRTY YEARS' PEACE (B.C. 460—445).

Pericles was the first and perhaps the greatest of the Athenian statesmen who won their position by eloquence, and by studying the art of managing a popular assembly. Unlike some of the later demagogues he did not do this by ostentatiously courting popularity or by perpetual speaking. He kept himself for great occasions, it was said, like the sacred Salaminian galley. He was seldom seen in the streets, avoided large social gatherings, and was reserved and quiet in demeanour. But when he did rise to speak the poet Eupolis declares that 'like a great runner he easily distanced other orators. His words flowed rapidly, and persuasion seemed to sit upon his lips. Of all the orators he alone left a sting behind him in his hearers.' By these means he obtained so firm a hold upon the assembly that it was not shaken even by the failure of the Athenians under his guidance to found an empire on the continent, a failure consummated by the peace of B.C. 445. We do not know exactly when Pericles began to exercise this commanding influence, but the ostracism of his rival Cimon in B.C. 461 seems first to have left the field clear for his policy.

**1. Pericles
rises to com-
manding
influence.**

The ideal of Pericles was a united Greece, with Athens the leading State, not only politically but as being the home of art and culture—the ‘School of Greece.’ For that purpose Athens must be strong both in herself and in her alliances. The discredit brought upon the laconising policy of Cimon had resulted in the beginning of an anti-Spartan league with Argos, which was also joined for a time by the Thessalians. But for ready communication with Argos it was of great importance to have the friendship of Megara, as commanding the road to the Isthmus, and as giving an outlet to the Corinthian gulf at its western harbour Pagae. The accession of Megara therefore to the league was gladly accepted. The Athenians assisted the Megarians in building their long walls to their southern harbour Nisaea, and placed a permanent Athenian garrison in Megara itself. But these measures alarmed those maritime States to whom the free navigation of the Saronic gulf was all important. A league was formed between Corinth, Epidaurus and Aegina to oppose this new confederation.

The Athenians, who had lately (B.C. 460) had considerable naval success in sending assistance to Inaros of Egypt in his revolt against the Persians, did not wait to be attacked. Determined to strike the first blow, they landed a force at Halieis, near Hermione, and engaged a joint army of Corinthians and Epidaurians. They were worsted in this battle; but their fleet meanwhile had defeated the Corinthian and Epidaurian ships off Cecryphaleia; and had afterwards proceeded to Aegina. There the Athenians totally defeated the Aeginetan fleet, taking seventy ships and practically putting an end to the naval power of Aegina. Nor was this all. The Corinthians and Epidaurians followed up their success at Halieis by invading the Megarid, hoping to create a diversion

2. The Continental policy of Athens.

First period (B.C. 461—452). Union with Megara, and the counter-league of Corinth, Epidaurus and Aegina.

3. War with Corinth, Epidaurus and Aegina, B.C. 458.

for the Aeginetans. But they were twice decisively defeated by a hastily levied army of Athenians led by Myronides. Athens therefore had triumphed and her league was intact.

About the same time Athens was secured from the danger of being cut off from the sea by the erection of two 'long walls'—one connecting the city with the northern corner of the Peiræus, and the other with Phalerum. They were not completed till the year B.C. 456; and meanwhile it became apparent that the recent successes of the Athenian arms had roused the jealousy of Sparta. The Spartans had been too closely engaged in their struggle with the revolted Helots and Messenians to aid the Corinthians and Epidaurians. But they could not have viewed the consolidation of Athenian power without alarm, and they presently had an opportunity of promoting an opposition to it in Boeotia.

4. Long walls
to Peiræus
and Phalerum,
B.C. 457—6.

The little district of Doris was being invaded by the Phocians on account of some quarrel as to frontiers. In response to an appeal for help from a State which they regarded as the 'mother-state' of the Dorians, the Spartans collected allies and sent an army into Doris, which drove out the Phocians and restored the Dorian towns to liberty. Perhaps the opportunity of sending a force into Central Greece had influenced the Spartan government as much as the sentiment of filial piety. At any rate, instead of returning through Phocis to their ships, which were waiting to take them across the Crissæan gulf, the Peloponnesian army moved into Boeotia and advanced as far as Tanagra, from which they might threaten the frontiers of Attica. The Athenians were convinced that the object of this entrance into Boeotia was to unite the Boeotian cities against their league with Argos, Megara, and Thessaly. They at once sent forty ships into the Crissæan gulf to prevent the return of the Peloponnesians by sea. Three difficult roads

5. Spartans
defeat the
Athenians at
Tanagra in
Boeotia,
B.C. 457.

over Mount Gereneia—between the Megarid and Corinth—were occupied by Athenian troops; and help was summoned from Argos and Thessaly. The army thus collected found the Peloponnesians encamped near Tanagra and immediately offered battle. The Thessalian horse deserted to the enemy during the fight, and though considerable loss was sustained on both sides, the Athenians were finally defeated and were forced to make a truce, allowing the Peloponnesians to return home through the Megarid.

Nevertheless, having got rid of the enemy, the Athenians were now able to deal with the oligarchical party of Thebes, which had taken advantage of the presence of the Peloponnesian army to strengthen the fortifications of the city, and to enforce the alliance of other Boeotian towns. Not content with this the Thebans went on to shew their zeal for Sparta by collecting another army at Tanagra, with a view of raiding the Attic frontiers, invited—as was afterwards discovered—by the oligarchical party in Athens itself. But the strategus Myronides—who had two years ago retrieved the Corinthian disaster—again quickly enrolled an army and marched into the territory of Tanagra. There at a village called Oenophyta he engaged and defeated the Boeotians, compelled the Tanagrians to pull down their walls, and made himself master of the country. Thereupon the oligarchical party was expelled from Thebes, and the whole of Boeotia joined the league of Athens and Argos. From fear, or because of a similar revolution, the Phocians and Opuntian Locrians followed the example of the Boeotians, the Locrians even giving hostages for their fidelity. Thessaly seems to have held aloof; but about this time Aegina, which had been for some months invested by the Athenian fleet, also submitted. The Aeginetans surrendered their remaining war ships, consented to dismantle their town, and entered the Confederacy of Delos.

6. Boeotia,
Phocis, and
Opuntian
Locris join the
Athenian
alliance,
B.C. 456.

Battle of
Oenophyta,
B.C. 456.

Aegina accordingly appears in the earliest quota list preserved (B.C. 454) as paying 3000 drachmae. Thus the idea of Pericles of a united Greece, with Athens at its head, seemed about to be realised. The one enemy was Sparta, with her Peloponnesian allies. Pericles seems to have thought that even Sparta might be compelled to join, or at least to abstain from opposition.

Accordingly the strategus Tolmides was sent with a fleet to harass the coast of the Peloponnese. He seized Methone in Messenia and burnt the Spartan dockyard at Gytheium. Thence he sailed to Zacynthus and Cephallenia, which he compelled to join the Athenian Confederacy. Steering for the Corinthian gulf he took possession of Naupactus, in the territory of the Ozolian Locrians, which with an excellent harbour commanded the entrance to the gulf, as well as a small town near it called Chalcis which belonged to Corinth. The hostility to Sparta prompting these operations was emphasised in the following year (B.C. 455), when the Messenians on Ithome surrendered on promise of their lives, but on condition of leaving the Peloponnese. The Athenians gave them a home at Naupactus, thus placing a population hostile to Sparta at a post of great naval importance.

7. Tolmides
harasses the
shores of the
Peloponnese
and takes
Naupactus,
B.C. 456-5.

This may be regarded as the culminating point of the Athenian success in creating a continental empire. From this time it steadily declined. As if to warn the people, at the very moment when their power seemed to be at its greatest, a serious disaster befell an Athenian fleet and army in Egypt. Ever since B.C. 460, when they were first invited to aid the revolt of Inaros, the fleet had been in the Nile. At first wholly successful, the Greeks had occupied part of Memphis and were blockading the remainder. After vainly attempting to bribe the Spartans to invade Attica and thus draw away the fleet, the Persian generals collected an army, with which they

8. Athenian
disaster in
Egypt,
B.C. 455.

drove the Athenians and their allies out of Memphis, and blockaded them on an island in the river for eighteen months. Eventually by diverting the water they left the Greek ships high and dry, and then stormed the Greek camp. To crown the disaster a reinforcement of fifty ships was intercepted and almost entirely destroyed by the king's Phoenician fleet.

This was followed in the next year (B.C. 454) by an unsuccessful expedition into Thessaly. A force sent to restore a king of Pharsalus failed to take the town, and with difficulty made its way back dogged by the Thessalian cavalry. It was evident that the desertion of the Thessalian horsemen at Tanagra (p. 188) was an indication that Athenian influence in Thessaly was at an end. Nevertheless Pericles did not give up the hope of coercing Sparta by harassing her allies. In the same year (B.C. 454) he led an expedition in person along the coast of the Crissaeen gulf, and forced or induced the Achaeans to join the league. After making descents upon the territory of Sicyon, he even endeavoured to force the Acarnanians to join, but returned without having succeeded.

For about three years the same general situation was maintained, but it seems to have begun to weary all sides alike. After the battle of Tanagra (B.C. 457) the ostracism of Cimon had been revoked in acknowledgment of his patriotic offer to serve in that engagement, and of the actual services rendered by his friends in it. His opponent Pericles is said to have proposed his recall, but with the private understanding between himself and Cimon, that the latter was to serve abroad and not to interfere with affairs in Athens. However that may be, about B.C. 451-50 Cimon's old policy of keeping on good terms with Sparta, and devoting the energies of Athens to resisting the Persian king, again began to find favour. It was principally by his influence that in B.C. 450 a truce was agreed to between Sparta and Athens. This truce left Athens where

9. Failure in
Thessaly,
B.C. 454.

10. Five
years' truce
with Sparta,
B.C. 450.

she was as to the league of States north of the Peloponnese, but it involved the loss of advantages which she had gained in the Peloponnese itself. The Achaeans indeed still nominally belonged to the league; but the partial occupation of the territory of Sicyon had to be withdrawn, and Argos about the same time made a thirty years' peace with Sparta, and thus removed the hope of an effective anti-Spartan league in the Peloponnese.

Cimon, having thus succeeded in effecting a pause in the hostilities between Athens and Sparta, was once more put at the head of a fleet of Athenian and allied ships to continue the war with the Persians, who seemed likely, after their successes in Egypt, again to threaten the independence of the coast towns in Asia. With a fleet of 200 sail Cimon started for Cyprus. There he was induced to detach 60 vessels to Egypt in aid of Amyrtaeus, 'king of the Marshes,' who was still holding out against the Persians. With the rest he began the blockade of Citium, a Phoenician city on the south coast of the island. In the course of the siege however he died: and, as there was a dearth of food in the island, the fleet started homeward, but falling in with the enemy's fleet—consisting of Cilician and Phoenician ships—off Salamis, it engaged and conquered it. The soldiers on board also landed and defeated the Persian land forces stationed in the same neighbourhood. Being then rejoined by the sixty ships from Egypt the fleet returned home¹.

The king, while the fleet was still at Cyprus, had sent word

II. Renewed
war against
the Persian
king in Cyprus.
Death of
Cimon. Peace
of Callias.
B.C. 449—448.

¹ This is all that can be inferred from Thucydides (I. 112). Diodorus (xii. 3—5) tells a different tale. According to him Cimon took Citium and Malum, lived to win the victories over the Persians, whom he chased to the shore of Phoenicia, and then returned to besiege Salamis. In the course of this siege he died, his colleague Anaxicrates having previously fallen in battle. The king then sent word to Megabyzus and Artabazus to make peace, which was negotiated for Athens by Callias.

to the Persian commanders that they might make peace ; and a convention was it seems at once made, the king consenting to acknowledge the independence of the Greek cities of Asia, not to send an army within three days' journey of the coast, and not to send ships of war between the Chelidonian promontory and the Bosphorus : while the Athenians undertook to abandon Cyprus and not to support any rebels in Egypt. This is called the peace of Callias, from the name of the envoy who negotiated the formal treaty based on this convention¹.

This settlement remained in force for nearly fifty years. It was not until the disastrous disruption of Greece brought about by the Peloponnesian war (B.C. 431—404) that the Persian satraps again saw their opportunity of reasserting an authority over Greek towns, and again ventured to treat the Aegean as open to their ships of war.

Our attention is therefore once more recalled to continental

12. B.C. 449—
445. From the
peace of Callias
to the 30 years'
peace with
Sparta.

(a) The Holy
War, B.C. 448.

Greece, where the five years' truce secured by Cimon between Athens and Sparta was still in force. But how precarious its existence was, and how weak the hold of Athens on her continental allies, was made manifest by the events of the next three years. The people of Delphi claimed the entire charge of the temple and oracle in their town. They were Dorians, and the Spartans, who always maintained a close connexion with the temple, thought it important that it should be in their hands. But the cities of

¹ The existence of this treaty, the terms of which are given by Diodorus (XII. 4), has been doubted ; principally because it is often quoted by Athenian orators of the next century by way of glorifying Athens, and with some varieties of detail. There does not seem however sufficient reason for disbelieving in its existence. It was mentioned by Theopompus (about B.C. 350) and Craterus (about B.C. 300), the latter of whom made a special study of engraved treaties at Athens. We learn quite casually in Herodotus (VII. 151) that Callias was at one time at the Persian court ; and whether a regular treaty was made or not, there seems no doubt that the terms here indicated represent the actual state of things for the next 40 or 50 years.

the Phocian league—containing a mixed race of Aeolians and Achaeans—always claimed a share in the management of the temple, and about B.C. 449–448 forcibly took possession of it. The Spartans determined to support their friends the Delphians and an expedition was sent into Phocis, which restored the control of the temple to them. But as soon as the Spartan army had returned home, the Athenians—who were in alliance with the Phocians—sent another expedition which seized the temple and handed it over to the officers of the Phocian league. Nothing came of this directly. The truce had not been technically broken, because the Spartans and Athenians had not come into collision. But it was a sign that Sparta still claimed some authority outside the Peloponnese, and that Athens was prepared to dispute it.

Next year the dissolution of the Athenian league was actually begun by the defection of Boeotia. Its union with Attica had involved the banishment of the oligarchical party from many of the Boeotian towns. Such exiles were always on the lookout for an opportunity to return. In B.C. 448–7 the exiles of Chaeroneia and Orchomenus—about 8 miles apart—had found means to effect their restoration, and to take possession of these two towns as well as other neighbouring places. Knowing that, if this movement spread, Boeotia would soon be lost, the Athenians at once collected an army under Tolmides, which marched into Boeotia, recaptured Chaeroneia, and placed a garrison in it. They seem to have meant to do no more, at any rate during that season, and were marching home. But at Coroneia, where the roads from Chaeroneia and Orchomenus join, they were overtaken by a Boeotian force collected by the exiles from Orchomenus—joined by others whom the Athenian alliance had caused to be expelled from Locris and Euboea—and were decisively defeated, with the loss of many killed and taken prisoners. In order to recover these prisoners the Athenians renounced authority in

13. (b) B.C.
447. The
Boeotians quit
the Athenian
league. Battle
of Coroneia.

the other States of Boeotia. Consequently the oligarchical faction returned to power in these cities, and Boeotia formally abandoned the Athenian alliance.

This successful revolt of Boeotia seems to have suggested a similar movement in Euboea: and while Pericles was conducting an expedition into that island, news came that a Spartan force under King Pleistoanax was in the Megarid; that the anti-Attic party in Megara had returned to power, and, renouncing the alliance with Athens, had attacked the Athenian garrison, killed all that had not taken refuge in the harbour town of Nisaea, and summoned help from Corinth, Sicyon, and Epidaurus. Pericles could not save Megara, but he was in time to prevent an attack upon Athens. The Spartan army had entered Attica, plundering and destroying, and was in the Thriasian plain near Eleusis. But on the return of Pericles the advance was suddenly stopped, and the invading army returned home. The reason may have been, that, having secured the separation of Megara from Athens, and the Athenian acknowledgment of it, there was no reason to incur farther risk, nor to attempt to enter a strongly fortified city. The general belief, however, was that Pericles had bribed the Spartan king: and we hear of an item in the state accounts afterwards of which he refused to give any explanation, except that it had been spent 'for a necessary purpose' (*εἰς τὸ δέον*). Euboea was reconquered in the course of the year: and to secure its future loyalty the aristocratic party¹ of Chalcis was expelled, as well as all the inhabitants of Histiaea, the lands being divided

14. B.C. 446
—5. Euboea
and Megara
revolt.

15. End of
the Conti-
nental League
of Athens.
The 30 years'
Peace,
B.C. 445.

among 1000 cleruchs—that is, Athenian citizens holding an allotment (*κλήρος*) of land. But though Euboea—which was practically a part of Attica—was thus retained, the loss of Megara was the last blow to the continental league so elaborately planned by Pericles. One after

¹ The *Hippobotai*, 'men keeping horses.'

another the members had fallen off: Thessaly, Argos, Boeotia, Megara had all repudiated her alliance, and Athens was glad to conclude a peace with Sparta for thirty years, restoring to freedom Nisaea and Pegae, the harbours of Megara on the Saronic and Corinthian gulfs, and surrendering her hold upon Achaia and Troezen. The continental supremacy, which Pericles had done his best to secure, was at an end: and from this time his policy seems to have changed. Henceforth he advised the Athenians to avoid complications on the continent and to concentrate their energies on their naval power in the Aegean.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE NEW ATHENS.

Through all changes of foreign and domestic policy Pericles kept steadily in view his purpose of making Athens beautiful and attractive to men of taste and genius. The destruction wrought by the Persians had given an unrivalled opportunity, of which he availed himself to the utmost ; using without scruple the money which came into the Athenian exchequer from the subject allies for his purpose. Architecture was an art already brought to high perfection by Greeks in many parts of the world. It had risen from two sources—defence and religion. Thus the oldest remains of building in Greece consist of what is known as Cyclopean walls, built of selected stones of various sizes, without mortar, and with little or no traces of having been worked in any way. Such are found at Tiryns, Mycenae, Larissa and other places. A natural development of this was the attempt to work stone for the purposes of ornament, as in the lion gate of Mycenae. More than a century at least before the Persian wars this rude style of building had given place to the art of the mason, who had learnt to deal with his material, whether it were soft stone or hard marble. The need—created by the neighbourhood of hostile states—for strong fortifications, early taught builders to use whatever material was at hand : while the wealth of kings produced buildings of a less warlike character, such as the dome-shaped treasure-house at Mycenae.

1. Greek
architecture
and building.

(a) Buildings
for defence.




LION GATEWAY AT MYCENAE


To face p. 196

But it was the religious sentiment that produced the greatest and most beautiful buildings in Greece. There were temples to the gods as early as we know anything of the Greeks. But it was after the immigration of the Dorians into the Peloponnese that we begin to recognize distinct styles in temple-building. The note of the DORIC order of architecture is the fluted column without base,

(b) Religious buildings.



IONIC CAPITAL AND ENTABLATURE.
FROM THE ERECHTHEION.




CORINTHIAN COLUMNS.

standing clean upon its stylobate, and with a square abacus supporting a plain architrave.

This style was developed into a more ornate structure in Corinth. The CORINTHIAN order is marked by a slenderer fluted column, standing on a round base in two or more divisions above the stylobate, and with a decorated capital between it and the architrave. The ornamentation of the

capital is said to have been suggested by the curling leaves of the acanthus.



DORIC COLUMN.



IONIC COLUMN.

About the same time a style, lighter and more ornate than the Doric, had developed in Ionia, of which the great temple of Artemis at Ephesus was the chief glory. The fluted column of the IONIAN order is slimmer than the Doric. The

flutings are separated by fillets. The base, between the end of the pillar and the stylobate, has a double *torus* or *trochilos*, and the capital is adorned with *volute*s something like curling rams' horns.

Though the principle of the arch had long been known in Egypt and Assyria, it does not appear to have been applied by Greek architects of this age, though the Hellenic tombs in Etruria shew that it must have been very early understood by the Greeks.

The most widely used of these three orders was the Doric. Splendid specimens of it still remain in nearly all parts of Hellas. Thus of the temples of Paestum in Italy, of Syracuse and Agrigentum in Sicily, of Corinth and Phigalia in the Peloponnese, of Aegina in Island Greece, there still remain sufficient fragments to remind us of the beauty of their prime. Specimens of the Ionic order best preserved are those at Miletus and Priene. Of the Corinthian order nearly all existing specimens are of a later date. But at Athens after the Persian war and in the age of Pericles, not only were the walls of Themistocles, the fortifications of the Acropolis, of the Peiraeus, and the long walls fine specimens of defensive buildings, while the long walls at Megara also attested the activity of Athenian builders, but numerous temples and cognate buildings came into existence or were restored, presenting some of the finest examples of the Doric and Ionic orders of architecture. Here and there some temple greater than any one in Athens might exist, but no city appears to have had so many notable buildings so well grouped, or streets so profusely decorated with colonnades and statues.

2. Existing specimens of the three orders.

The first great work of the restoration period was the Theseum, planned for the reception of the bones of Theseus brought to Athens from the island of Scyros B.C. 469 by Cimon, and finished about B.C. 465. The building—the most perfect in preservation of

3. The Theseum.


any at Athens—overlooking the Ceramicus, which has always gone by this name, is believed now to have been a temple of Hephaestus and to be slightly later in date than the Parthenon. But to whatever god or hero it was dedicated, there is no doubt



THE CORNER OF A DORIC TEMPLE. (*From Waldstein's Pheidias.*)

of its being of about this age, and of its marking a very advanced stage in the art of architecture. It is built entirely of Pentelic marble (104 ft. by 44 ft.), standing upon a platform of limestone





in three steps, and is what is called *peripteral*, that is, it has an open space round the actual temple, covered by the roof which is supported by thirty-four Doric columns standing free. In the *metopes* were sculptured the labours of Heracles and the exploits of Theseus, on the eastern end and two sides; on the western end are representations of the battles of the Centaurs, which still bear traces of colour. Inside the temple also were frescoes of the exploits of Theseus, the Centaurs, and the Amazons. These figures—the artists of which are not known—in the free pose of limb, the skilful representation of drapery, the natural appearance of hair and beard, and the knowledge shewn of the anatomy of the human figure, present all the characteristics of the best period of Greek art.

But it was the Acropolis that under the hands of Pericles became the glory of Athens. The buildings—on which great sums of money were expended and the greatest artists employed—were by different architects¹, but the works as a whole were superintended by the famous Pheidias.

4. Pheidias
and the
adornment of
the Acropolis,
B.C. 445—436.

The son of Charmides was an Athenian born about B.C. 500. By profession a sculptor he had been, like two other great sculptors Myron and Polycletus, a pupil of Ageladas of Argos. He first came into notice immediately after the Persian wars, having been employed to construct various monuments from the Persian spoils, as the colossal figure of Athena Promachos for the Acropolis, and other statues for Plataea and Delphi. Pericles seems to have selected him about B.C. 445 to superintend his great buildings. How much of the decorations was the actual work of his own hands we cannot tell. The ivory and gold statue of Athena Polias was his, and the figures of the frieze were either his or inspired and directed by him. A number of artists are named as his fellow-workers or pupils, and he is rightly regarded as a founder of a school of art, of

¹ The names of architects mentioned are—Ictinus, Callicrates, Corobus and Mnesicles.

which the distinguishing features were a perfect mastery over the material used, naturalness in pose, suggested motion, and attitude. The figures are no longer stiff and conventional: they seem to live and move. Flowing drapery, hair matted or flying loose, human limbs in rest or activity, horses galloping or falling, have all been studied and imitated from nature. At the same time there is an absence of all extravagance even in following nature. There is nothing unnecessary either in pose or action, no exaggerated contortion or effort. In them, as in all supreme Greek art, the key-note is moderation. Though the chief work of Pheidias at this period of his career was at Athens, it was not confined to that city. The great ivory and gold statue of Zeus at Olympia, and other decorations of the sacred town, were his work executed on the order of the Eleans. But like so many men who served Athens, he ended his life under the displeasure of the Demos. After the dedication of the Parthenon (B.C. 435) he was accused of embezzling some of the gold assigned to the robes of the great statue of Athena. When this was disproved by removing the gold and weighing it, he was next accused of impiety for introducing his own likeness and that of Pericles upon the shield of the goddess fighting the Amazons on the frieze. On this charge he appears to have been condemned and to have died in prison.

The buildings on the Acropolis, completed or begun under the general supervision of Pheidias, were, first, the ERECHTHEIUM, a double temple of which the front or eastern division—entered by a portico of six Ionic columns—contained the statue of Athena Polias; while the back or western chamber—entered also on the north-west angle by an Ionic portico of six columns—was sacred to Pandrosus and used as a treasury. The building as a whole was called the Erechtheum as embracing the tomb of the mythical king Erechtheus. It stood on the site of a more ancient temple, burnt by the Persians, and contained the most sacred objects connected with

5. The
buildings on
the Acropolis.
(1) The
Erechtheum.





the legends or history of the city,—the olive wood statue of Athena Polias, for which the sacred *peplos* was woven every year; the ever-burning golden lamp, from which colonists took the fire to light the altar or *hestia* of their new home; the sacred serpent, emblem of the earthborn ancestor of the autochthonous people; the salt spring that rose at the blow of Poseidon's trident, and the sacred olive that sprang up at the bidding of Athena; and lastly the silver-footed throne on which Xerxes sat to view the battle of Salamis, and the sword of Mardonius taken at Plataea. As indicating the connexion of this temple with the Panathenaic festival, a third portico at the south-west angle was supported by six caryatides—figures of virgins in their Panathenaic robes—instead of columns. The building of this temple, though begun under Pericles, seems not to have been finished till after the Peloponnesian war.

The temple of Athena Polias, commonly called the Parthenon or Hecatompedon, was the crowning glory of Athens, and indeed of Greek art. The ^{(2) The} Parthenon. general plan was by the architect Ictinus. It also stood on the site of an ancient temple wrecked by the Persians, the columns of which are still seen embedded in the north wall of the Acropolis. The outer framework, standing on a raised platform and supported by 46 Doric columns of Pentelic marble, measured 228 by 101 feet: the *cella* or temple proper contained within this measuring 194 by 69½ feet. It contained the famous statue by Pheidias already mentioned, made of an inner model of wood, 39 feet high, and overlaid with ivory to represent the nude parts of the body and solid gold for the robes. But the chief feature of the Parthenon was its frieze, the sculptures on the east and west pediments, and on the metopes. It was on these, too numerous to be mentioned here¹,

¹ As a large number of them are in the British Museum, the English student has every opportunity of studying these greatest products of Greek genius.

that Pheidias lavished all his skill and power of imagination. This great building after being used as a Catholic church, and then as a Turkish mosque, was finally reduced to its present ruinous condition by an explosion of powder stored there by the Turks when besieged by the Venetians in 1687.

The latest adornment of the Acropolis in the Periclean period was the Propylaea or Entrance, begun
 6. The Propylaea. in B.C. 437 by the architect Mnesicles. It consisted of a great central gateway with two smaller ones on each side, occupying the west side of the Acropolis, and approached by a flight of broad steps from the *agora*. In front was a portico supported by six Doric columns, while the columns in the interior were Ionic. Inside there was another Doric portico. On the right and left, when this inner portico was passed, were to be two vast porticoed halls, but only that on the right was ever erected. The building of this imposing structure—made, like the temples, of Pentelic marble—was a sign that the Acropolis was no longer a mere fortress. By his new walls Themistocles had made the city the great fortress. The Acropolis was now to be rather the ornament than the protection of Athens.

Finally, towering above the roof of the Parthenon, and standing between the inner porticoes of the
 7. Athena Promachus. Propylaea and the Erechtheion, was the colossal bronze statue of Athena Promachos, standing with its pedestal 70 feet high, and visible it is said at sea to men sailing round Sunium. The goddess was fully armed, holding the gorgon shield in one hand, and the spear raised to cast in the other, as if ever defending the city. This was the work of Pheidias himself.

The Odeum or Music Room was close to the Dionysiac Theatre. It had a conical roof, and many ranges
 8. The Odeum. of columns. Musical contests took place in it, and it sometimes served as a kind of overflow theatre, or a place for musical exhibitions in time of rain. It

is said to have been built on the model of the king of Persia's tent.

By these and other buildings over the construction of which Pericles presided, with Pheidias as his agent, Athens became the envy and admiration of all Greece. Few could resist the charm which they exercised over men's minds; and in the midst of the political ruin of after times they remained a unique fact in Greek life, and never failed to attract lovers of the beautiful. 'There is a sort of bloom of newness'—says Plutarch—'on these works of Pheidias, preserving them from the touch of time, as if they had some perennial spirit and undecaying vitality inseparable from them.'

In the earliest days of the drama only wooden platforms were provided for the spectators of the actor and chorus. But about B.C. 500 during a dramatic contest, in which Aeschylus was one of the competitors, the platform gave way, and it was resolved to construct an auditorium by taking advantage of the slope of a hill to cut out ranges of seats. At the beginning of the great period of the Attic drama these seats were probably only wooden or even grass banks, while the stage was merely a wooden platform with some erection at the back representing a house or palace, the semicircle between it and the auditorium being reserved as an *orchestra*. The seats were begun to be made permanent in stone probably soon after the Persian destruction of Athens, but the whole structure was not completed, or at any rate not in the state indicated by the present remains, till about B.C. 340—323 under the presidency of the orator Lycurgus. Theatres on the same model were constructed in many other Hellenic towns.

9. The
Theatre.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT BEFORE THE
MIDDLE OF THE FIFTH CENTURY B.C.

We have already seen (p. 27) that in the seventh century B.C. there was an intellectual movement in Greece, which found expression in poetry—lyrical, elegiac, and iambic. It had prevailed chiefly in Island and Asiatic Hellas and had taken two forms, the personal and the political, or a combination of the two. Towards the end of the 6th century a change which had been gradually coming upon the spirit of Greek poetry became more distinctly manifest. The chief vehicle of the poet was still lyric and elegiac verse, but the point of view became more general, and less confined to individual feeling or local interests. Poets wrote on subjects that were everywhere occupying men's minds, and in a dialect that was widely used and familiar. They were professional artists and not local politicians. Much of such poetry was composed to be sung to the accompaniment of music and dancing by choruses at the great festivals, or in the celebration of victories at the games. Much again was written at the behest of sovereigns who desired their dynasty or their family to be glorified, or at that of States who wished their prosperity or victories, or the famous deeds and glorious deaths of their citizens, commemorated. Of the writers who made it their business to supply these demands we must first note that they come from various parts of Greece. There

1. Poetry
of the 6th and
5th centuries.

is as yet no centralizing influence such as that afterwards exercised by Athens. The men are Hellenic in the widest sense of the term, and are ready to put their art at the service of any State east or west, or any person from the sovereign downwards. The two names which stand out above the rest in this profession are those of Simonides and Pindar.

Simonides was a native of the island of Ceos, though he was early in life banished—we do not know on what account—and spent most of his time in Peloponnesus, with occasional visits to the court of Hiero of Syracuse and the Scopadae of Thessaly. He wrote choric songs for the festivals, as well as elegies, *epinikia* (poems celebrating victory in the games), hymns, lamentations (*threnoi*) and much else. But what made him most famous, and as it were the spokesman of Greece, was his epigrams and funeral inscriptions, celebrating the victories in the Persian wars and the glorious deaths of those who fell. These have been preserved more fully than the rest of his work—of which only a few fine fragments remain—and cover all the chief events in the wars. Some of them are in honour of the Athenians, but nearly all the States that took prominent part in the struggle are commemorated. The devotion of Leonidas and his 300 at Thermopylae seems especially to have moved his fancy and roused his enthusiasm. His ‘encomium’—song for feast or revel—is dignified and simple, yet touched with the fire of patriotism :

2. Simonides
of Ceos, about
B.C. 556—469.

“Of those who perished at Thermopylae
Glorious the lot and bright the destiny.
Altar for tomb : for tears and funeral lays
Eternal memory and eternal praise.
Their winding-sheet is fame, which no decay
Nor all-subduing time shall fret away.
It is a holy place. Where brave men lie,
Their Country’s honour waits attendant by :
Thus passed Leonidas, and left a name
To live in bright eternity of fame.”

Thus did the genius of Simonides respond to the movement around him. But the greatest name of this period is that of Pindar the Theban. Like Simonides of Ceos he placed his talents at the service of all who desired them—whether prince, free State or private person. Like him he composed in various styles, encomia, cyclic choruses, hymns, and odes in honour of victories in the games. It is these last alone—the *epinikia*—that we possess in any completeness. The general plan of these odes is to say comparatively little about the victory or the victor, but to praise his country or his family, and to use all the resources of learning in preserving legends more or less connected with either. Splendour of language and wealth of imagination raise the poems above the level of their subject and give them a truly national rank, still farther enhanced by a tone of lofty patriotism, remote from the pettiness of local politics. They also shew the influence of another intellectual movement going on in Greece—the philosophic. Legends which attributed immoral or mean acts to the gods are refuted or explained; and in the *threnoi* or dirges the belief in a future state of existence after death is founded on the theological doctrines of the mysteries. The victors celebrated by Pindar come from various parts of Greece: only two from Athens; but as many as fifteen from Sicily, including the tyrants of Syracuse and Agrigentum. For in Western Greece at this time Hellenic life was rich and vigorous. In the east a considerable number come from the mercantile state of Aegina.

3. Pindar,
about
B.C. 521—442.

4. Bacchy-
lides, Myrtis,
Corinna, Tele-
silla, Praxilla.

Nearly contemporary with Pindar was Bacchylides of Ceos, some of whose epinikian odes have been recently recovered in Egypt. These are somewhat simpler in language than those of Pindar, less imaginative, and less varied in metre and rhythm. But they proceed on much the same lines, and Pindar is said to have regarded him with some jealousy as a rival. That he did not enjoy as great a reputation among contemporaries is shewn

by the fact that the Ceans employed Pindar rather than either of their two native poets to write for them. Four poetesses of about the same age gained a certain reputation in a like style of literature—Myrtis and Corinna of Boeotia, Telesilla of Argos, and Praxilla of Sicyon. But we have not sufficient remains of their poetry to enable us to judge of their success: while Timocrates of Ialysus in Rhodes, though using the lyric form, seems from the extract given in Plutarch's life of Themistocles sometimes at least to have devoted his talents to political satire.

This age also saw the beginning of historical writing, and again it is not Athens, or even European Greece, but Ionia which is the place of origin. The names of several writers, generally connected with Miletus, have been preserved; but their works have so entirely perished that we cannot speak with any confidence of the manner in which they treated their subjects, which were in general historical genealogies or accounts of neighbouring nations. The greatest name however of all such writers is that of HECATÆUS of Miletus, who, like Herodotus and Hellanicus after him, was a traveller as well as an historian. He visited such countries as were open to him with the express purpose of describing them from personal observation and of writing from information gained on the spot. He is therefore the father of critical history: history, that is, founded on inquiry and not on mere legend. The destruction of Miletus by the Persians at the close of the Ionian revolt put an end to the rising schools of historians and philosophers in that city, and caused the centre of intellectual activity to shift westward, to Italy, and thence back to Central Greece. But it was in Asiatic Hellas that it began, and seemed at one time most likely to flourish.

Still older than the movement in the direction of scientific history was the attempt made by various thinkers to account for the facts of the physical universe. The speculations which these men elaborated

5. History.

6. Early
Philosophy
to about
B.C. 450.

are not to be despised because later and wider knowledge has shewn them to be mistaken. They were the products of a scientific imagination, preparing the way to knowledge: the stepping-stones which others have used to arrive at truth. The earliest philosophers had no previous discoveries to guide them: they were conscious only of their own senses and of the apparent facts of the physical universe around them. Most people take these facts for granted and trouble themselves no more about them. But these men, looking with inquiring eyes upon the world, tried to discover, first, of what it was made, next, what was the creative power which produced it. To idle people, content with the legends of contemporary polytheism, they often seemed impious atheists, throwing doubt on the easy-going explanations of the popular theology. They were really, as we see now, taking the first steps towards a more reverential, because a more reasonable, view of God and nature.

This philosophic movement was widely spread throughout Hellas: Central Greece had hardly anything to do with it. Once more Ionia, and especially Miletus, is the home of perhaps the first of these thinkers. **THALES** (fl. B.C. 600), to whom the term 'philosopher' is said to have been first applied, searching for the element common to all existing things, decided that it was water. **ANAXIMANDER** of Miletus (fl. B.C. 575) took for what he called his 'principle' something between air and water, perhaps cloud or mist. **ANAXIMENES** of Miletus (fl. B.C. 538) thought that he found the principle or primary element in air. **HERACLEITUS** of Ephesus (fl. B.C. 500) declared it to be fire, and taught that all things were in a continual flux or motion. These are the greatest names in what is called the Ionic School, who, it will be seen, all busied themselves with speculations as to the physical universe.

Meanwhile a similar intellectual movement had been going on in the Greek cities of Italy and Sicily. But here it took

two distinct lines, first, that of social and religious teaching, and secondly, speculations as to the possibility and means of acquiring knowledge.

In the former class are Pythagoras and Xenophanes. PYTHAGORAS of Samos, who removed to Croton in Italy about B.C. 530, left no writings and cannot be shewn to have instituted or taught the speculations, whether physical or intellectual, for which his followers were afterwards known. But he founded a School or College, the members of which were bound to each other by certain ties of conduct and belief. The theory of music and the science of numbers played a conspicuous part in their training. They believed also in the transmigration of souls, in the duty of abstaining from food that had life, and of practising certain ascetic rules. Various doctrines, social and political as well as speculative and theological, gradually developed among these men: and long after the death of Pythagoras himself we find clubs or colleges of Pythagoreans existing in Croton, Tarentum, Sybaris and other towns in Magna Graecia, and regarded as a danger to civil and religious liberty. XENOPHANES of Colophon, afterwards removed to Sicily or Elea in Italy (fl. B.C. 530), was a younger contemporary of Pythagoras. In a long epic poem he attacked the current belief in the human shape of the gods, and defined God as the One or the Whole. He held that philosophy had failed to arrive at truth, and that we had only opinions and not knowledge.

8. Italian
philosophers.
(1) Pythagoras,
(2) Xenophanes.

But the Western School of philosophy properly begins with Parmenides. It is commonly called the Eleatic School, because its chief thinkers lived at the Greek Colony of Elea, or Velia, in Italy. PARMENIDES (fl. B.C. 495) also wrote in verse and dwelt among other things upon the distinction between opinion and knowledge. ZENO of Elea (fl. 460) first pointed out the need of logic. EMPEDOCLES of Agrigentum (fl. B.C. 455) held the uncertainty of human knowledge; and in physics taught that

9. The
Eleatic School.

all things arose from a combination of the four elements—fire, air, water, earth; of which the combining power was Love, the separating power Hate.

Nearly contemporary with these later Eleatics were LEUCIPPUS of Abdera (fl. B.C. 445), ANAXAGORAS of Clazomenae (fl. B.C. 450) and DEMOCRITUS of Abdera (fl. B.C. 420). These philosophers tried to account for the origin of the universe by the combination of seeds or atoms. They differed as to the manner in which these atoms combined, and as to whether the combination was accidental or directed by an external intelligence. But the upshot of their teaching as to Truth was that perfect and complete knowledge was impossible. This conclusion was accepted by the thinkers of the next generation—the Sophists, who therefore abandoned such speculative philosophy and taught the science of conduct, or culture, lecturing on literature, rhetoric, and ethics.

In this brief notice only the greatest names and the most obvious speculations have been mentioned.

10. Physical philosophy in Eastern Hellas.

11. Effect of philosophy on the Greeks.

We must imagine that, though the earliest philosophers probably had no school of disciples, their speculations yet influenced the thoughts of intelligent men in many parts of Greece. Lesser thinkers, or mere amateur listeners, carried away to their several cities more or less accurate impressions of what they had read or heard. These speculations generally failed to touch the multitude, or rather roused its resentment and distrust, especially in Central Greece. Thus Anaxagoras was fined and banished from Athens for impiety, but was entertained and greatly honoured at Lampsacus. Still a sufficient number of minds were impressed by them to form a kind of national character. Hellenism came to mean a way of thinking as well as of acting and living. The movement started by these men has never been arrested, and has been at least no less influential in the world than the wars and political changes of which we cannot help hearing so much in history.

CHAPTER XV.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE DISRUPTION OF THE
CONFEDERACY OF DELOS AND TO THE LEAGUE
OF STATES AGAINST ATHENS, ISSUING IN THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR, B.C. 445—432.

In spite of losses and defeats Athens was still the strongest State in Greece after the 'Thirty Years' Peace of B.C. 445. Her fleet was superior to that of any other State: for her presidency of the Confederacy of Delos gave her a good excuse for maintaining it and supplied her with the means of doing so. There was a period of quiet from B.C. 445 to B.C. 440 which Pericles utilised for carrying on his policy of adorning and strengthening the city, and increasing the number of places outside the Confederacy, in which Athens could exercise influence. It was in B.C. 444 that a second 'long wall' was built to the Piraeus, between the one already existing and that to Phalerum: and in the same year Pericles induced a number of Athenians, with many settlers from other States to form a new colony at Thurii in Italy, in the territory of the ruined Sybaris. The other colonies in Magna Graecia were mostly Dorian, and it must have seemed to him important for Athens that there should be a town in that district in which Ionians would be the stronger element, especially in view of the considerable trade in pottery which she carried on with Magna Graecia and Etruria.

I. Position
of Athens after
B.C. 445.

2. Causes of
discontent
among the
members of the
Confederacy
of Delos.

Though the actual outbreak of the Peloponnesian war was not directly connected with the Confederacy of Delos, and indeed was brought about by a quarrel in quite another part of Greece, yet it was the grievances of many of the members of the Confederacy, and the use made by Athens of the resources put into her hands as president of it, that enabled the Spartans to rouse so large a proportion of the Greek States against her. Let us see what these grievances were. The primary object of the Confederacy was the safety of the Aegean against the fleets of the king of Persia. To secure this each confederate State was to supply ships or money. Almost from the first most of the States preferred to pay money. Consequently the Athenians supplied the ships, and came to regard the money arising from the contribution (*φόρος*) as her own revenue, the surplus of which she might use for her own purposes; and the contributing States as her subjects, on whom she could enforce not only the payment of the sum assessed, but also other conditions, especially in the case of those which joined or were forced to join the Confederacy in later years. These States were often compelled to adopt a constitution similar to that of Athens itself. Lawsuits arising in them were frequently transferred to Athenian courts; and the Athenian government maintained a resident (*ἐπίσκοπος*) to watch the course of affairs, and to interfere if they seemed to be going in a way inconvenient to Athens. In some there was also a garrison of Athenians under a captain (*φρούραρχος*). The original assessment of money made by Aristides was revised every five years and at any rate was not lightened¹; while about

¹ Plutarch says that Pericles raised the assessment by nearly a third; but this may be accounted for by the addition of new members, not by raising the assessment on the original members of the Confederacy. About 290 names of contributory States are known, and the difference between the total amount as first assessed by Aristides and as it was at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war is 140 talents (460 to 600).

B.C. 454 the treasury of the Confederacy was removed from the neutral Delos to Athens, on the pretext of greater security. This was another step in the direction of absolute control on the part of Athens: and in fact the money was used for domestic purposes as well as for maintaining the fleet. These measures probably pressed hardest on those States which had been forced to join the Confederacy, such as Naxos, Thasos and Aegina; but the general result was that, instead of being one of a body of allies, Athens exercised the rights of an imperial State¹.

Another point in Athenian policy under the influence of Pericles, which gave great offence, was the system of *Cleruchies*. According to Greek 3. *Cleruchies*. notions colonists (ἀποικοί) invariably founded a new State independent of the mother city, though retaining certain ties of affection and religious union. But *cleruchs* (κληροῦχοι) were holders of allotments of land in a foreign country, who did not forfeit their Athenian citizenship or even necessarily remove to the property thus assigned to them, though, of course, they usually did so. The system was adopted by Pericles, with the view of providing for poorer Athenians, but also to establish a body of citizens among allies of doubtful loyalty. We hear of *cleruchies* at Histiaea and Chalcis in Euboea, in the islands of Andros and Naxos, in the Thracian Chersonese, and among the Thracian Bisaltae near the Strymon; while different bodies of Athenian colonists were provided for at Naples in Italy and Sinope on the Euxine, and (after a disaster to the original settlers in B.C. 466) at the new colony of Amphipolis on the Strymon in B.C. 437, while four years afterwards treaties formed with Leontini in Sicily and Rhegium in Italy shewed that Pericles aimed at establishing Athenian influence in the west as well as the east. If we add to these the employment of at least six thousand men on the sixty vessels sent out each season into the Aegean, we may easily see how

¹ It was, as Thucydides expresses it, an ἀρχή instead of a συμμαχία.

valuable to the citizens was the extent of their empire, how much inclined they must have been to extend and consolidate it, and how likely it was to rouse the jealousy, and to conflict with the interests, of other States.

For some time longer, however, Athens successfully maintained her authority, and the one serious opposition offered to it was promptly suppressed.

4. The
Samian war,
B.C. 440—439.

The island of Samos was one of the States (the others being Chios and Lesbos) which had originated the idea of a confederacy, had suggested the leadership of Athens, and had always had a special position of independence. The Samians never seem to have been jealous of the growing power of Athens, and are even said to have advised the removal of the treasury to Athens. But, on the other hand, they expected to have a free hand in what concerned their own interests. In B.C. 440 they went to war with Miletus in consequence of a dispute as to the possession of Priene on the opposite coast. The Milesians getting the worst of the encounter, appealed to Athens. Like most Greek quarrels, the war disclosed a division of feeling in Samos itself—between the democratic, and therefore Attic, party and the oligarchical party. The former joined the Milesians in inviting Athenian interference. Forty ships were sent from Athens, a democratical government was established in the island, a hundred hostages—men and boys—were taken and deposited in Lemnos, and an Athenian garrison was left in Samos. But the oligarchical party were not yet beaten, and had taken a step of evil omen to the peace and independence of Greece. A number of them had left the island before the arrival of Pericles and had gone to Sardis to ask help of Pissuthnes the Persian satrap. He was only too ready to seize the opportunity of interfering in Greek affairs. By his help a body of 700 men were collected, who crossed to Samos at night, overpowered the Attic ships still blockading the town, and the democratical government, recovered the hostages from Lemnos, and declared

the separation of the island from the league. The arrival of Pericles with a fresh fleet and his naval victory changed the face of affairs. But on his departure for Caria the Samians again overpowered the Athenian fleet, and for fourteen days seemed masters of the situation. On hearing of what had happened he hastily returned, and having beaten the ships of the Samians he renewed the blockade. Pericles was then reinforced by sixty fresh ships from Athens, with thirty from Chios and Lesbos. This large fleet enabled him to guard the various points along the coasts at which any Phoenician ships would touch, if they came to the relief of Samos. He was also able to maintain a strict blockade of the island town. It was not, however, till the ninth month that the Samians surrendered. They were obliged to give up all ships of war, pull down their fortifications, give hostages and pay the expenses of the war. They had induced the Byzantines, who were strong at sea, to join in the revolt; but the submission of Samos seems to have carried that of Byzantium without the necessity of striking a blow. Athens had fully asserted her authority, and two more States were added to those in the Confederacy which were entirely subject to her. Nor was the rest of Greece at present prepared to resent it. The question of supporting the Samians had been discussed by the Peloponnesian States, but, chiefly owing to the opposition of Corinth, the idea had been given up. But the danger had been great, and Athens had had to put out her full strength. Grievances against her were accumulating, and if another such opportunity occurred, it was becoming more and more probable that a great combination would be formed to crush her power.

For the next four years however a general peace was preserved, and the Athenians continued their policy of expansion. In B.C. 437, for instance, they successfully established a colony at Amphipolis, and in B.C. 433 negotiated alliances with Italian and Sicilian states. This quiet was

5. The quarrel of Corcyra, leading to the Peloponnesian war, B.C. 434—432.

disturbed in B.C. 434 by an outbreak in the west of Greece, which led to greater things. The island of Corcyra (*Corfu*) had been colonised from Corinth, and had in its turn sent a colony to Epidamnus (*Durazzo*). In B.C. 435-4 a revolution of the usual sort occurred in Epidamnus. The oligarchical nobles were expelled and a democracy established. The nobles driven from the town obtained the services of some of the neighbouring barbarians and endeavoured to secure their return, harassing the city and its territory by frequent raids. The Epidamnian government applied to the mother State of Corcyra for assistance; and, being refused, appealed to Corinth as the mother city of Corcyra itself. The Corcyreans had the strongest naval power of any State in the west¹, and were viewed with jealousy by Corinth. The Corinthians were therefore ready for a policy of self-assertion, and resolved to make Epidamnus a colony of their own, sending troops and a body of colonists to Apollonia (about fifty miles from Epidamnus), and ordering the Ambracians and Leucadians to send ships. These proceedings forced the Corcyreans to retaliate. They adopted the cause of the banished oligarchs and blockaded Epidamnus. The Corinthians on their part sent ships to relieve the town; but they were defeated by the Corcyreans and Epidamnus fell. Following up their advantage the Corcyreans proceeded to invade the Corinthian colony of Leucas, as well as other allies of Corinth, and to make themselves masters of the whole western sea. The Corinthians were compelled to send out another expedition of ships and soldiers, and the two opposing forces faced each other near Actium for the rest of the summer of B.C. 434 without striking a blow. Meanwhile the Corinthians at home were making vigorous preparations for prosecuting the war on a large scale, building and fitting out ships, and hiring rowers from all parts of Greece.

Alarmed at these preparations the Corcyreans sent ambassadors to Athens asking for help, contrary to their usual

¹ Thucydides (I. 25) says they had 120 triremes, i.e. war vessels.

policy of avoiding all alliances. The Corinthians sent ambassadors to counteract them, but the Athenians—who had their eyes fixed on the west, and wished to secure a ready approach to Italy—finally decided on a defensive alliance with the Corcyreans¹. As the Corcyreans were being attacked by the Corinthians, a squadron of ten ships in virtue of this compact was sent from Athens to support them in the spring of B.C. 432. The rival fleets of Corinth and Corcyra—numbering with allies 150 and 120 respectively—engaged near the Sybota islands. After a desperate struggle victory declared for the Corinthians. But towards the end of the day the Corcyreans were reinforced by a second squadron of twenty Athenian ships, which forced the Corinthians to retire. Though both sides thus claimed the victory and both erected trophies, the fact remained that the Corinthians could not renew the battle next day, but returned home with their prisoners.

6. Application by the Corcyreans for help from Athens, B.C. 433. The victory of the Corinthians neutralised by Athenian ships.

This was one grudge which the Corinthians had against Athens. A second was caused almost immediately by the affairs of Potidaea. This brings upon the scene another power destined in the not remote future to be supremely important—Macedonia. Since the expulsion of the Persians from Europe, King Alexander (whom we have heard of as reluctantly medising) and his son and successor Perdiccas had extended the kingdom—once an inland territory round Edessa—down to and along the Thracian coast as far as the Strymon. The Athenians, who highly valued their hold on the Thracian coast, because their corn ships from the Pontus had to skirt it, were made uneasy by this Macedonian extension, and accordingly intrigued with the brother of King

7. The revolt of Potidaea B.C. 432, instigated by the king of Macedonia.

¹ That is an alliance by which each was to help the other if attacked (*ἐπιμαχία*), not an agreement to share generally in any war undertaken by either (*συμμαχία*).

Perdiccas, who was trying to supplant him. Perdiccas retaliated by suggesting to the cities on the Chalcidic peninsula to abjure the Athenian alliance. He was believed to have been specially successful with Potidaea, a Corinthian colony on the narrow isthmus of Pallene. The Athenians therefore sent to Potidaea a fleet of 30 ships carrying a thousand hoplites, with orders to demand hostages, the dismissal of officials sent from Corinth, and the levelling of the city walls. They were also to place garrisons in the neighbouring towns. The Potidaeans sent an embassy to Athens disclaiming any disloyal intentions; but getting no concession from the Athenians, they went to their mother State of Corinth. The Corinthians were quite prepared to help them and conducted the ambassadors to Sparta, where they received a promise that, if the Athenians attacked them, the Spartans would create a diversion by invading Attica. Thus encouraged, and relying on the help of Perdiccas, the Potidaeans made a league with the neighbouring tribe of Bottiaei, and other Chalcidians, and openly renounced the Athenian alliance. The Athenian forces in the neighbourhood were too weak to act against all the revolted States on the Chalcidic peninsula, and before they could be strengthened the Corinthians sent a relieving force. But the Athenians were not much behind them. A fleet of forty ships with two thousand hoplites arrived on the coast of the Thermaic gulf. They found the force which had been previously despatched already in possession of Therma (Thessalonica) and engaged in besieging Pydna. A hasty peace was patched up with King Perdiccas (which he soon violated) and the entire force left Macedonia and proceeded to attack Potidaea. The Potidaeans and their allies were defeated in the isthmus and driven into the town, which the Athenians proceeded to blockade: at first from the north, and when reinforcements arrived, on both sides, as well as from the sea. The city held out until the winter of B.C. 430, and heavy losses were experienced on both sides.

But while the blockade was going on, the Corinthians—now twice thwarted by Athens—induced the States generally acting with the Spartans to send ambassadors along with their own to a conference at Sparta, at which after a long debate it was resolved that the Athenians had broken the peace and rightly deserved to have war proclaimed against them. In another larger conference of her allies summoned by Sparta (after consulting the oracle at Delphi) it was resolved to proclaim war at once.

8. Conferences of Peloponnesian States and proclamation of war, B.C. 432.

The real reason of the war was the fear entertained in the Peloponnese and Central Greece of the growing power of Athens, which relatively to that of any other Greek State was certainly very great. It is true that Athens had renounced in B.C. 445 any claim to supremacy over States on the continent; but if her empire was allowed to extend east and west over the islands, into Thrace and Asia, into Sicily and Italy in the west, and to control all the seas, the Spartans and their allies believed that her authority over the States of continental Greece would be again claimed, and that too when she had become too strong to be resisted. The struggle was therefore between the continental States south of Thessaly—with the exception of the Argives and most of the Achaeans—and a power scattered over the islands and the shores of Thrace and Asia, with a small central State controlling and inspiring the whole mass, but lying itself in the very midst of its enemies and easily exposed to attack. It was also a struggle—though with exceptions on both sides—between Dorians and Ionians: and lastly it was a struggle between two opposing political ideals—the oligarchic or aristocratic and the democratic.

9. Reasons for the war.

That it lasted so long is principally due to the fact that it was a war of a continental league against a sea league. The Spartans had ships of war, and some of her allies—the Corinthians, Megarians,

10. Causes of the long continuance of the war.

Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambracians and Leucadians—had a considerable number; but for a long time they were not even when combined able to furnish a fleet superior to that of the Athenians, without counting those supplied by Chios and Lesbos. Corcyra, though originally the cause of the Athenian difficulty, gave little or no help after B.C. 431. Therefore, though Attica might be invaded, and even Athens invested from the land, the sea was always open to her fleets. Corn ships brought supplies from the shores of the Black Sea in comparative safety, and her triremes could issue out to make descents upon the enemy's coast or to strike a revolted subject. Battles and defeats on land did little to bring the end of the war nearer. At the same time the people of Attica suffered more than any other people engaged. Attica was perpetually being invaded, her corn crops destroyed, her vines and olives cut down, and the rustics obliged to take refuge in the city, where they spent their time in poverty and idleness, unless they were drafted into the army or navy. Throughout the war therefore the farmers were anxious for peace, which was also desired by some of the upper class, whose sympathies were with a less democratic form of government, and whose tastes inclined them to friendly intercourse with Sparta. On the whole, however, there was a marked absence of treason within the walls of Athens. The citizens generally shewed a united front to the enemy; and the bulk of them being actively employed in the war quite obscured the minority in favour of peace.

II. Demands
made on
Athens by the
Peloponnesian
allies.

Though the allies in Sparta in B.C. 432 had unanimously decided on war, negotiations were not immediately broken off. The Spartans endeavoured to put the Athenians in the wrong by delivering certain definite demands, all more or less plausible. Three separate embassies were sent. The first assumed a care for religion by demanding that the Athenians should expel the Alcmaeonidae as being under a curse—among whom Pericles would have had to leave Athens.

The second demanded that the siege of Potidaea should be raised, and the decree revoked which—on the plea of encroachments upon consecrated land and the harbouring of runaway slaves—had some years previously forbidden the Megarians the use of the harbours and markets of Athens. The third embassy delivered the sort of ultimatum which is equivalent to a declaration of war; for it offered peace only on condition of Athens acknowledging the independence of all her allies. The people however remained firm in allegiance to Pericles, and on his advice accepted the war.

Still hostilities were not begun at once. Both sides spent the winter in preparations and in securing allies.

But early in the spring of B.C. 431 the Thebans precipitated matters by suddenly seizing Plataea, the one town in Boeotia that clung to the Athe-

12. The war begun by the Thebans, B.C. 431.

nian alliance. The attempt failed and the invading party were either killed in the fight or massacred in cold blood afterwards. But the Plataeans prepared to stand the siege which this made inevitable, and sought and obtained a reinforcement of their garrison from Athens. This affair was the signal for active operations on the part of the Peloponnesians. The allies mustered in the Isthmus under Archidamus king of Sparta, and, after one more fruitless attempt to negotiate, the invasion of Attica was begun.

The war thus begun lasted ten years. It is sometimes called the Archidamian war, from the policy of Sparta being directed till his death in B.C. 427 by King Archidamus. It had various phases. But the first two years it mainly consisted of two invasions of Attica by the Peloponnesian army, which contented itself with devastating the country without attempting to attack Athens itself. By the advice of Pericles no effort was made by the Athenians to repel the invasions or to offer battle in the open. The country folk from the invaded districts were called

13. Two invasions of Attica. Retaliations by Athenian fleet. Fall of Potidaea, B.C. 431—430.

into the city, and safe behind its fortifications, their communication with the sea secured by the long walls, they allowed the enemy to vent a comparatively harmless malice upon their vines and cornfields. The cavalry indeed issued out from time to time to harass the invaders and cut off their stragglers; but otherwise they were suffered to work their will on the Thriasian plain, and to advance within ten miles of Athens itself. Meanwhile a fleet of a hundred Athenian ships, reinforced by fifty sent from Corcyra, sailed round the coasts of the Peloponnese, making descents at various spots, and reducing the island of Cephallenia. It returned home early enough in the autumn to assist in a retaliatory inroad upon the territory of Megara, which was organised in this and the following year as soon as the Peloponnesian army of invasion had withdrawn. The only other point at which serious fighting was going on was at Potidaea, where the blockade was strenuously maintained. In the second year (B.C. 430) the main features of the war were the same—an invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians in the spring, followed by a counter invasion of the Megarid in the autumn, and accompanied by a naval expedition round the Peloponnese like that of the previous year, commanded by Pericles himself; while the blockade of Potidaea still occupied a considerable fleet and army. The Spartans had now seen the necessity of attempting to carry on the war at sea also, and sent out a hundred ships to seize Zacynthus, but without success.

14. The
plague at
Athens, B.C.
430.

The year however was rendered a terrible one to the Athenians by an outbreak of plague. The town was crowded with refugees from the country, bringing their goods and cattle. They were so numerous that they could not find enough houses in the city to shelter them, and had to live for the most part in huts hastily erected along the line of the long walls to the Piraeus. This no doubt contributed to spread the plague, which raged for two years, and, after a year's intermission, for another year.

As many as 4400 hoplites are said to have perished, besides uncounted thousands of other inhabitants. It presented all the usual features of what we know as the Asiatic plague, and its effect was to produce a dreadful depression, as well as a complete demoralisation. The constant prospect of a rapid and painful death dissolved the ties of kindred and affection and all moral restraints, and the city became a scene of misery mingled with desperate debauch. There were loud cries against the policy of Pericles, to which their misfortunes were attributed, and proposals were made to open negotiations with Sparta. Though Pericles had still sufficient influence left to stop this movement by an eloquent appeal to the patriotism of the people, they shewed their indignation by deposing him from the office of strategus and imposing a heavy fine upon him. The fall of Potidaea however in the winter, after its inhabitants had been reduced to the most terrible extremities of hunger, must have encouraged the people to persevere in the war policy of Pericles.

His death in the course of the next year made way for a new set of statesmen of various ability, who controlled the policy of the State for the next few years by demagogic acts to which he had never condescended. Not one of them had the skill or good fortune to retain his influence for any length of time and so to initiate and carry out a definite policy. Aristophanes comments on the vague optimism that had taken possession of men's minds at this period, which made them believe that, however ill their plans were laid, Providence somehow or other brought the State out of its difficulties. This trusting to its luck proved fatal to the power of Athens. Pericles on the other hand had conceived and steadily carried out a policy, and had been able to do so partly from superior ability, but mainly from character—his fellow-citizens believing that, whatever else might be said of him, he was incorruptible and honest. His plan of carrying on the war by keeping safe

15. Death
of Pericles,
B.C. 429.

within the walls of the city, by abandoning the country districts, and by retaliating upon the enemy by means of the navy, no doubt cost much immediate suffering, yet proved eminently successful. It was when the Athenians broke away from that policy, in B.C. 424, that they sustained at Delium the first serious disaster of the war. At the same time the losses from these almost annual and unresisted invasions caused a large class of the citizens—especially those engaged in farming or other country businesses—to be eager for peace almost at any price. And the existence of this *laconising* party encouraged the hope that the Athenians would be brought to surrender, if the pressure were continued, and therefore helped to prolong the war.



COIN OF DELPHI.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR TO THE PEACE OF
NICIAS, B.C. 431—421. THE UNAVOWED WAR,
B.C. 421—415.

We have seen that the operations of the first two years of the war (B.C. 431—430) consisted mainly of invasions of Attica during the early summer months by the Peloponnesians, avenged by descents upon the Peloponnesian coasts by the Athenian fleet: and that while these operations were going on the blockade of Potidaea continuously employed part of the Athenian forces. In the next years (B.C. 429—424) warlike operations were more widely spread, and though the Athenians had to endure two more invasions their successes elsewhere were almost unbroken. The confidence of the Spartans was so much shaken that they seemed likely to listen to honourable terms of peace. It was the events of the next three years (B.C. 424—421) which lowered the pride of Athens and caused her to accept a peace on far less favourable terms.

As in the first two years of the war, so now, while operations were going on in other places, a long and wearisome siege occupied a considerable force and was watched with interest by both sides.

This time it was the Spartans who were so engaged, and the object of their attack was Plataea. After vainly trying to

1. First
Period of the
war, B.C.
431—424.

2. Siege of
Plataea, B.C.
429—427.

persuade the Plataeans to desert the Athenian alliance, they laid siege to the town and used every possible expedient to take it. Attacking walled towns was always difficult with the means then at the command of armies, and the Spartans never shewed to advantage in such operations. They were compelled to turn the siege into a blockade. The defenders able to bear arms only numbered 480, all the other inhabitants (except about 110 women) had left the town already. For rather more than two years this blockade occupied a part of the Spartan forces. In the winter of B.C. 428 two hundred and twelve of the besieged garrison effected their escape to Athens through the Spartan lines during the night, with the loss of only one man. The remaining two hundred were forced to surrender early in the following year, and at the instigation of the Thebans were all put to the sword, nominally in retaliation for the treacherous killing of the Theban invaders, but at bottom for their persistent siding with Athens. Twenty-five Athenians were executed with them.

While Plataea was being blockaded the war was taking a wider sweep in Greece. In B.C. 429 Acarnania was unsuccessfully attacked by the Peloponnesians, and the Athenian fleet under Phormio won two victories over that of Sparta, though this campaign witnessed the appearance of the active and able Spartan general Brasidas. After his defeat in the west, Brasidas made a dash upon the Peiraeus, but failed to capture it owing to the timidity of the Peloponnesian allies. In the north also the Macedonians were invaded by Sitalces, king of Thrace, an ally of Athens; and though the Macedonian king contrived to induce him to withdraw without a battle, the events of this year were on the whole decidedly in favour of Athens. But in the next (B.C. 428) the first symptom of a wide defection in the Confederacy was shewn by the revolt of Lesbos. The Athenians, at first scarcely believing the news, seemed inclined to

3. Operations in the west and north, B.C. 429.

4. Revolt of Lesbos, B.C. 428—427.

do nothing. But presently, becoming awake to the danger, they dispatched a fleet under Paches to lay siege to the chief town of the island, Mitylene. The Mitylenians had already sent envoys to the Peloponnese, who pleaded their cause before the assembly at the Olympic festival. The usual spring invasion of Attica had already taken place; but the Spartans promised to make another, as well as to send a fleet to relieve Mitylene. The Athenians, however, acted with unexpected promptitude. A powerful fleet was sent round the coast of the Peloponnese, which diverted the proposed invasion of Attica: and a strong reinforcement was sent to the blockading fleet at Mitylene before the Spartan ships could arrive, though a Spartan agent named Salaethus managed to run the blockade and encouraged the people of Mitylene to hold out. But the usual party division now appeared in the town. The revolt had been the work of the oligarchical party. In the spring of B.C. 427 the democrats rose and compelled them to surrender the city to the Athenians. The treatment to be meted out to the revolted people was then discussed in the assembly at Athens. On the proposal of Cleon—who now first appears as taking an active part in politics—a decree was passed ordering them all to be put to death and a vessel was at once despatched with the decree. Such an atrocious decision naturally produced a reaction. In a second assembly the decree was reversed, and another trireme was sent hurriedly with the reprieve, and arrived only just in time to prevent the execution of the sentence. Nevertheless the punishment actually inflicted was sufficiently severe. About 1000 of the oligarchical party, as having been chiefly responsible for the revolt, had been sent to Athens by Paches along with the Spartan envoy. These were all put to death on the motion of Cleon, and the whole soil of Lesbos was divided among Athenian cleruchs, who generally left the native cultivators in possession on the payment of a rent.

In the west similar divisions between the oligarchic and

democratic parties — supported respectively by Sparta and Athens—gave rise to fighting and bloodshed.

5. Hostilities
in Corcyra.

In Corcyra especially there was an outburst of fierce party conflict. The democrats after three days of street fighting got the victory over their opponents. The Athenian commander Nicostratus arriving with a small fleet attempted to make terms; but the aristocrats looked for speedy help from Sparta and broke off all negotiations. The Spartan fleet arrived, but its commander Alcidas was dilatory or treasonable, and before anything was done a large Athenian fleet under Eurymedon drove him off and confirmed the supremacy of the democrats, who proceeded to massacre their opponents. The aristocrats who survived escaped to Epirus; but soon afterwards returned, and occupying some high ground in the island harassed the victorious democrats and raided their fields. They were however surrounded and put to the sword two years afterwards (B.C. 425). Though Corcyra with greatly diminished power was thus secured to Athens, it never rendered her substantial help. Farther west, a small Athenian fleet operated in support of Ionian States in Sicily—especially Leontini—against the Dorian states, headed by Syracuse, and established a precedent for interference in Sicily which was to have important effects at a later period.

In the next year events in the east were neither important nor decisive. The Athenians made a vain attack upon the island of Melos, and the Spartans an almost equally vain attempt to threaten Euboea and the Thraceward possessions of Athens by establishing a colony at Trachis near Thermopylae, called Heracleia, which for many years suffered so much from the attacks of the Thessalians as to be of little use to the Peloponnesian cause. In the west events were more interesting, though not much more decisive. Demosthenes was persuaded by the Messenians, whom the Athenians had placed in Naupactus, to invade their neighbours

6. Demos-
thenes in
Corcyra,
B.C. 426.

in Aetolia. The Aetolians were little known to the rest of Greece, and were regarded as scarcely Greeks at all. They lived in scattered and unfortified villages, but they shewed now that they could combine for defence, and Demosthenes had to retire with the loss of nearly all his army. This led to Aetolian attacks upon Naupactus, supported by aid from Sparta, which were however repelled by help from Acarnania. The Acarnanians in their turn were attacked by the Peloponnesians, but successfully defended by their allies under the command of Demosthenes.

The next year however (B.C. 425) gave the Athenians an advantage which might have been used to secure an honourable peace. Demosthenes, still in command of a fleet, was sent to Sicily with permission to operate upon the coasts of the Peloponnese on his way. Landing at Pylos on the south-west of Messenia, and being detained by bad weather, he employed his men in throwing up fortifications round the place where they were encamped. He remained there with five ships, while the rest of the fleet went on to Sicily. This lodgment in Spartan territory caused the Peloponnesian troops engaged on the usual invasion of Attica to return in all haste. A party of Lacedaemonian soldiers was placed on the island of Sphacteria, which lies across the bay of Pylos, and the Spartan ships were recalled from Corcyra in order to blockade the Athenian ships and men. But the main Athenian fleet promptly returned, for they had not gone farther than Zacynthus, and, having conquered the Spartan fleet, completely blockaded Sphacteria. The men on the island were thus caught between two hostile forces. The Spartan government, in great alarm, having obtained an armistice, sent ambassadors to Athens with proposals of peace. But the Athenians were instigated by Cleon to insist on impossibly hard conditions. They demanded not only that the troops on the island should surrender and be brought prisoners

7. The fortification of Pylos, and the capture of the Spartans on Sphacteria, B.C 425.

to Athens, but that Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen and Achaia should be given up to them. This was to replace Athens in the same commanding position which she had occupied before the thirty years' peace of B.C. 445, and to reduce the supremacy of Sparta even in the Peloponnese to the lowest pitch. The Spartan envoys therefore left Athens without making peace, and, the armistice being at an end, the Athenian ships blockaded the troops on the island more closely than ever. The Spartans however managed in various ways to throw in provisions. The summer was slipping away and the uneasiness of the Athenians at the continuance of the blockade gave Cleon the opportunity of attacking Nicias, who was strategus and at the head of the aristocratic party. He loudly accused him of playing into the hands of Sparta, and urged the people not to waste time in sending commissioners to see what was going on. It was easy, he declared, to capture the men if it were really desired by the generals. Nicias therefore offered to resign his command to Cleon. And when Cleon, who had had no experience of war, endeavoured to back out of it, he was forced by the people to undertake the work. Making the best of it, therefore, he promised to return with the prisoners in twenty days. He was prudent enough to join the experienced Demosthenes with himself, and to the surprise of everybody, including himself, he made good his boast. Favoured by an accidental fire in Sphacteria which laid bare the enemy's position he landed troops on the island, drove the Spartans to take refuge in the extreme point of it, and discovering a secret path by which he could get upon their rear, forced them to capitulate.

The number of prisoners was not very large, amounting only to 292, of whom 120 were Spartans, but the moral effect was great. During the remainder of this year and the next the Athenian fleet made one successful descent after another on the Corinthian territory, at Epidaurus and Troezen, and at Anactorium in Ambracia. In B.C. 424 Nicias seized the island

of Cythera, at the southern extremity of Laconia, from which to ravage the Laconian shores. Nisaea, the southern harbour of Megara, was again occupied, and Megara itself was only saved by the vigorous action of Brasidas. Everything seemed to be in favour of Athens and to discourage Sparta, when two disasters turned the tide and began a period of failure for the Athenians. The first was the revolt of most of the towns on the Chalcidic peninsula brought about by Brasidas. The second was the failure of an invasion of Boeotia. The plan was that Demosthenes should invade it from the side of Phocis, starting from Naupactus, while Hippocrates entered it by way of Oropus. But the two invading columns did not properly concert their movements. The Boeotians were therefore able to deal with them separately. Demosthenes was unable to land at Siphæ on the Boeotian coast, which he found strongly occupied, and had to retire. Accordingly, when a few days afterwards Hippocrates reached Delium, he found that he was threatened by the whole Boeotian army. He therefore began to retreat homewards, but was overtaken by the Boeotians between Delium and Oropus, and defeated with considerable loss. It was on this retreat that Socrates distinguished himself by his coolness and courage, and saved the life of Alcibiades.

Both Sparta and Athens had now motives for wishing to come to terms: the Athenians in order to stop the advance of Brasidas in Thrace; the Spartans in order to recover the prisoners taken on Sphacteria. Accordingly an armistice for a year was concluded in B.C. 423, on the condition that at the end of it both sides should retain what they possessed at the beginning of it. But though the terms were observed in the south, Brasidas refused to restore Scione (in Pallene), though its surrender had taken place a few days after the armistice was

8. Successful operations of the Athenian fleet in B.C. 425—424. Revolt of Chalcidice and Athenian defeat at Delium.

9. A year's truce between Sparta and Athens, B.C. 423. Death of Cleon and Brasidas, B.C. 422. Peace of Nicias, B.C. 421.

agreed upon. The war went on in the north, and Nicias and Nicostratus blockaded Scione, and recovered Mende, which had joined the revolt. In the next year (B.C. 422) Cleon was sent with a fleet and army to recover the revolted places in Macedonia and Thrace. He took Torone, and then proceeded to attack Amphipolis. But Brasidas threw himself into the town, and managed to surprise Cleon, who had advanced too near to its walls. In the battle that followed Brasidas was killed as well as Cleon; but the Athenians were defeated, and Amphipolis thus maintained its independence.

But the summer was now drawing to a close, and both sides were weary of the war. A Lacedaemonian force that was on its way to relieve Amphipolis heard at Heracleia, near Thermopylae, of the Athenian defeat and returned home. The peace party at Athens, headed by Nicias, and that at Sparta headed by King Pleistoanax, got the upper hand in their respective towns. In March B.C. 421 a peace for fifty years was concluded between Athens and Sparta, including most of the allies of both. The motives however which led to the acceptance of the peace were not such as to promise well for its continuance. The Athenians feared that after their two defeats at Delium and Amphipolis the revolt of their allies would spread. Their exchequer also was nearly exhausted, in spite of the *phoros* from the allies having been nearly doubled in B.C. 425, and they had become deeply indebted to the treasuries of various temples, while in B.C. 422 the Boeotians had seized a fort on the Attic frontier called Panactum, from which they could annoy the country. The Spartans wished to recover the prisoners taken on Sphacteria, and to get back Pylos and Cythera. Both had their selfish ends to gain, and little regard was paid to the interests of the allies who had assisted them in the war. Her allies in fact regarded Sparta as having betrayed them, as

10. Peace of
Nicias,
B.C. 421.

well as having been unsuccessful in the war itself. Their feelings may be compared with those of the Dutch and other allies of England, when she made the treaty with France at the end of the war of the Spanish succession.

The Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians therefore refused to join in the peace. The last had the special reason that their harbour town of Nisaea was to be left in the hands of Athens; and all objected to the clause that authorised the Spartans and Athenians to add new provisions to the treaty by mutual agreement; for this left the question of their status under it entirely uncertain. Accordingly a new combination of States was formed with Argos (whose treaty with Sparta was expiring) to which Corinth, Mantinea, Elis, and the Chalcidic towns adhered. For a time Megara and Thebes stood aloof from both sides. But Athens soon found that the hostility of the latter was as determined as ever. The Thebans did not restore Panactum according to the treaty, and when requested by the Spartans to do so, refused unless the Spartans made a separate treaty of alliance with themselves. This being done, they dismantled or demolished Panactum, instead of handing it back as it was to the Athenians: who thus found themselves isolated between two confederacies,—Sparta and Thebes on the one side, and Argos with her allies on the other, either of which might at any time find some pretext for hostilities. The policy of Athens was at this time much influenced by Alcibiades. He was a young man of one of the chief families at Athens, rich, handsome, and supremely able; but extravagant, wilful, and dissolute. His eccentricities provoked while they amused the people. But though many scandals already attached to his name, his eloquence, energy, and courage, joined to a charm of manner which always distinguished him, gave him for a time a great hold upon the assembly. By his persuasion an alliance was now made by Athens with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea; and

II. New
combination
of States with
Argos,
B.C. 421—415.

he proceeded himself to the Peloponnese to win over other towns to this league.

Sparta could not view the growth of a hostile confederacy in the Peloponnese with indifference: and the Argives soon gave her a good pretext for interference, by trying to compel Epidaurus by force of arms to join their league. The Spartans invaded Argolis in force with their allies in B.C. 419, but king Agis was induced to grant an armistice and retire. In the following year (B.C. 418), supported by an Athenian contingent, the Argives and their allies invaded Arcadia to compel the towns there to join the league. The Spartans under Agis called out their allies and went to the rescue. The Argive allies were decisively beaten at Mantinea, and Argos and Mantinea were compelled to make peace and alliance with Sparta.


The Athenians, though some of their troops shared in the defeat of Mantinea, had not been openly at war with Sparta: nor did the result of the battle break off their alliance with Argos, though a brief oligarchical revolution there interrupted it for a short time. To secure that Athens should be able to give Argos help in time of need, the latter town was now connected with the sea by long walls, which brought upon it an unsuccessful attack by the Spartans. Thus, in spite of the peace, a kind of veiled and unacknowledged war was still going on: and the fate of Melos, which at length surrendered in B.C. 416, must have been a farther provocation to Sparta. The Melians were a Lacedaemonian colony. At the beginning of the war they had remained neutral, but in B.C. 426 Nicias had unsuccessfully attempted to force them to join the Athenian alliance. Since that time they had shewn themselves openly hostile to Athens. In B.C. 416 an expedition was sent against Melos. After a vain attempt to obtain its submission by diplomacy, the Athenians regularly blockaded

12. War
between
Sparta and
Argos, in
which the
Athenians
eventually
join, B.C.
419-418.

13. The cap-
ture of Melos,
B.C. 416.



it, and in the following winter it surrendered. It was cruelly treated. The men of military age were put to death, the rest of the inhabitants sold into slavery. Still the Lacedaemonians did not disavow or openly break the alliance. It was a distant expedition presently undertaken by Athens that brought upon her again the open hostility of the Peloponnesian allies; and inflicted such grievous losses upon her that the dissolution of her empire became certain.



CORNER OF THE PARTHENON.
(From Waldstein's *Pheidias*.)

CHAPTER XVII.

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION AND THE FALL OF
ATHENS, B.C. 415—405.

1. Financial
recovery of
Athens after
the peace of
Nicias,
B.C. 421—415,
and reasons
for a renewal
of the war.

The five years that had passed since the peace of Nicias had been a period of financial recovery at Athens. In B.C. 416 not only had the loans been repaid to the temples, but there was again a surplus of 3000 talents in the treasury. The cessation of the frequent invasions, and the peace prevailing in the islands and other towns of the Athenian league, and the freedom of the corn trade from the north, had all contributed to this result. The long war however had left its traces on the character of the people. There was indeed a party at Athens which desired to maintain the peace with Sparta. But there was also a strong and active party which wished to seize every opportunity of extending the power of Athens, and for this purpose was willing to risk or even to court a rupture. The people were also encouraged by the signs of apathy or timidity on the part of the Spartans under various provocations. Pylos had not been restored to them, and in B.C. 419 the Athenians placed in it some of the banished Helots and Messenians. In B.C. 420 the Eleans on a flimsy pretext had excluded the Spartans from the Olympic festival. In B.C. 416 the Athenians had annexed the Lacedaemonian colony of Melos. And in the

same year (or later in the previous one) the Argives had overthrown the oligarchical government which Spartan influence had set up. All these provocations had been borne with strange patience by the Spartans, and they had shewn no inclination to formally break the alliance with Athens, though Lacedaemonian and Athenian troops had faced each other at Mantinea, and though the alliance of Athens with Argos was notoriously meant to check Spartan influence in the Peloponnese. The Athenians therefore were encouraged to enter upon larger schemes without fear of Sparta. Alcibiades, who had been active in promoting the Argive alliance, now conceived a great scheme for extending Athenian supremacy to Sicily and Magna Graecia, and thus threatening the Peloponnese—if necessary—on both sides.

Sicily was probably imperfectly known at Athens, in spite of the fact of its having been visited by small expeditions at frequent intervals during the war.

But the general fact was clear that Dorian influence was supreme there, owing to the preponderance of Syracuse. This preponderance had been gained partly by the success with which Syracusan sovereigns had championed Sicilian freedom against Carthage (p. 171), partly from the ambition and ability of those sovereigns themselves and the favourable position of the city. Between B.C. 480 and B.C. 465 this state of things had led to much fighting and suffering in the Greek towns of Sicily, especially in Syracuse, Himera and Agrigentum. But when Hiero died in B.C. 467 the tyranny of Thrasybulus led to a revolution which established a popular government in Syracuse. This movement was imitated in other Greek cities after many scenes of violence and bloodshed. By about B.C. 460 we find the theory of free government and local autonomy generally acknowledged in Sicily. This however did not prevent attempts being made from time to time by the stronger cities to extend their supremacy over weaker neighbours. In this policy as before

2. Previous
connexion of
Athens with
Sicily.

Syracuse was the most active and successful; and it was a quarrel caused by it, of which the Athenians took advantage, when they began to entertain the idea of western expansion.

The first plea was to support Ionian against Dorian colonies¹. Hence in B.C. 427-6 they aided Leontini against Syracuse, taking occasion to ally themselves with Rhegium in Italy, to attack the Liparean islands, and to force Messina to join their alliance. A two years' campaign produced no results of importance beyond shewing that the Athenians were ready to help any towns opposed to Syracuse. The Syracusans retaliated by besieging Rhegium. To relieve Rhegium a fresh Athenian fleet was despatched in B.C. 426, but was diverted by the affair at Pylos. The original fleet still remained in Sicilian waters, but was too weak to effect anything. In B.C. 424 a congress of Greek cities in Sicily resolved on a general peace. In urging this measure Hermocrates of Syracuse argued especially that their dissensions were opening the way to Athenian ambition. The presence of the Athenian fleet was rendered useless by this pacification. It accordingly returned home, but the disappointment of the people shewed itself by fining the three commanders for receiving bribes to abandon Sicily.

¹ The following is the list of great cities in Sicily of Ionian and Dorian origin :

- I. IONIAN: *Zankle* (Messana), *Naxos*, from Chalcis in Euboea.
Himera, *Thermae*, *Mylae*, from Zankle: *Catana* and *Leontini*, from Naxos.
- II. DORIAN: *Syracuse*, from Corinth.
Acrae, *Casmene*, *Camarina* (*Aetna*, *Tyndaris*), from Syracuse.
Gela and *Lipara*, from Rhodes and Crete.
Agrigentum, from Gela.
- III. Mixed DORIAN and IONIAN: *Thapsus* (Megara Hyblaea), from Megara.
Selinus, from Megara Hyblaea.
Heracleia Minoa, from Selinus.

Two years later a revolution in Leontini, during which the aristocratic party invoked the interference of Syracuse, gave the Athenians a fresh excuse for interfering in Sicilian politics. Phaeax and two other commissioners were sent in B.C. 422 to Sicily and Italy to promote a league against Syracuse. Phaeax had some success at Agrigentum and Camarina, and in Italy, but no immediate action was taken. The Athenian treasury was exhausted; the peace of the next year at first discouraged new undertakings. But with improved finances produced by peace, the old project of Sicilian conquest revived. The possession of Sicily, or a commanding influence in Sicily, would enable the Athenians to renew the struggle with Sparta—which many thought inevitable—with increased prestige, as well and with greater facilities for attacking the Peloponnese.

The opportunity came in B.C. 416. Besides the Greek colonies in Sicily there were certain towns of the native Sicels, and some of unknown origin. Among the latter was Egesta or Segesta, said to have been founded by Trojans, and at any rate having no tradition of a descent from any Greek town, though coins and inscriptions shew that it had been early hellenised. In the course of numerous quarrels with its neighbour Selinus, on questions of intermarriage or frontiers, it found itself threatened by a joint attack from Selinus and Syracuse, whose aid the Selinuntians had invoked. Envoys from Segesta arrived at Athens asking help. The Athenian commissioners, sent to see whether the wealth which it professed to have really existed, were deluded by a trick into making a favourable report. They were entertained by the chief inhabitants with a fine display of silver and gold plate. But they did not observe—it is said—that these rich articles were passed from house to house. The Segestans however sent a considerable sum of money and bullion, to be used in equipping ships: and encouraged by this, and full of the scheme of a western empire, the Athenian people voted the

3. The Athenians are induced to send a fleet to Sicily to aid Egesta.

desired aid. In vain Nicias warned them that they were embarking on a dangerous and almost impossible undertaking; and intreated them to use their recruited resources in securing themselves at home, where they still had many enemies. 'They had no interest'—he argued—'in lowering the power of Syracuse in Sicily; nor would they be able to keep so large an island if they conquered it. They should leave Sicilians to settle their own quarrels, and not make alliances in which the advantages were all with others and the dangers all their own.' But the ambition of the people was roused and they listened rather to Alcibiades, who urged that Sicily was so divided by factions that its conquest would be easy, and that a forward policy was the only safe one for the Athenians and the best suited to their character. The enthusiasm rose higher and higher. In spite of his protests Nicias was elected to share the command with Alcibiades and Lamachus, and in the summer of B.C. 415 a great fleet of 100 Athenian ships and 34 from the allies, carrying 5100 hoplites and over 1200 light-armed troops, left the Piræus amidst the prayers and hopes of the people.

Lamachus was an excellent soldier, but had less influence than the other two, because he was of humble birth and of narrow means. Nicias inspired confidence by his character and previous services: but in the existing excitement it was the bold language and self-confidence of Alcibiades which were most attractive. Still he had powerful enemies, who determined to prevent him from strengthening his position by success in this expedition. The Athenians were always sensitive to religious scruples, and would be specially so at the beginning of a great undertaking. Rumours therefore were industriously spread of his having been guilty of a sacrilege particularly shocking to Athenian feeling. He was said to have held a mock celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries—the secret rites of Demeter—in his own house with other reckless young men. To crown all, a few days before the expedition

4. The profanation of mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae.

started the busts of Hermes, which stood on square pillars along some of the streets, were found to have been mutilated in the night. This may have been the freak of idle or intoxicated youths; but the people were apt to attribute organised mischief to a revolutionary plot. Alcibiades and some of his friends were suspected; and notice of a public prosecution was given against them for impiety, including the profanation of the mysteries, as well as the mutilation of the Hermae. Alcibiades demanded that the trial should be at once held, and that he should not be sent out in command of an army with such a charge hanging over his head. But perhaps his enemies feared that they would be unable to establish their case in the popular excitement over the Sicilian expedition. It would be easier to do so while he was absent from home. They therefore induced the assembly to insist upon his proceeding to Sicily, and on the charge being postponed till his return. By the time however that the fleet had reached Rhegium the agitation as to the mutilation of the Hermae had been so skilfully fostered, that several men were executed for being concerned in it, and the assembly resolved to recall Alcibiades. The sacred Salaminian trireme was accordingly sent for Alcibiades, with orders to use no violence and to grant him every indulgence. It found him at Catana, but being allowed to return in his own private trireme he escaped to Argos.


His loss was a serious one for the expedition, which was being conducted according to his plan. Three courses had been suggested by the three generals. 5. The plan of the Sicilian campaign. Lamachus wished to attack Syracuse at once, while their strength was still undiminished, and the terror of their name great. Nicias wished to keep closer to the ostensible object of the expedition. He proposed to go to Selinus, and if the Segestans were able and willing to supply what they had promised, to settle the quarrel between Selinus and Segesta and then return home. The plan of Alcibiades,

like that of Lamachus, was to fulfil the real object of the expedition by attacking Syracuse: but he thought that they should first try to win over the Sicels and the Greek cities in Sicily. There was still much to be done in this direction. The Athenian fleet had been refused provisions by the Greek cities on the Italian coast, and as yet had no certain prospect of more friendly treatment from any Greek city in Sicily. They began with Messana and Catana. Neither was willing to join them. But when an accident gave them an entry into Catana, the Athenian headquarters were removed to that place. There the recall reached Alcibiades, and Nicias and Lamachus remained inactive till the approach of winter. Then by spreading false intelligence they induced the Syracusans to send out their full land force to attack Catana, and getting on board their ships they landed near Syracuse before the Syracusan army could return. The Syracusans hastily marched home and were defeated in a battle outside the town. But the Athenian generals would not begin the siege so late in the year, and retired for the winter to Catana.

Early in the next summer the Athenian army moved to Thapsus, where the force was landed. Thence
 6. B.C. 414. The siege of Syracuse. having succeeded in surprising Epipolæ, the high ground to the north of Syracuse, they began constructing lines to enclose the town by a complete cordon from sea to sea.

The besieged made several unsuccessful attempts to interrupt the construction of these lines; and, though Lamachus fell in one of these engagements, it seemed as if the town would inevitably be cut off, and—with the Athenian fleet blockading its harbour—must be starved out. But one of those sudden changes now occurred which affect the whole course of a campaign. The Spartans—though nominally still at peace with Athens—had resolved to espouse the cause of Syracuse, and the Athenians justified them by an open breach of the peace in landing a force on the coast of Laconia. The Syracusans, vexed

at their ill-success, had deposed their generals, and the Spartan Gylippus with a small force was sent out to take their place.



PLAN OF SYRACUSE.

Nicias, now in sole command of the Athenian expedition, did not think it worth while to oppose his arrival. Gylippus

touched at Tarentum, and sailing unhindered through the straits of Messina, landed at Himera. Thence, having collected a large force from the Greek and Sicel towns, he approached Syracuse by land, penetrated the Athenian lines where they were still incomplete, and entered Syracuse. The change thus created was immediate and complete. He surprised the Athenian fort of Labdulum, and after two not very decisive actions succeeded in completing the transverse wall which Hermocrates had failed to carry out previously. This forever prevented the completion of the sea-to-sea lines of the Athenians. A blockade of the town was thus rendered impossible, and for the rest of the summer Nicias remained on the defensive.

The inevitable result followed in the depression and demoralisation of the besieging force. The gallant fleet, which had sailed out in the previous year with such high hopes, was becoming less and less fit for service. Nicias was suffering from an incurable complaint and was unable to rouse the flagging spirits of his men. The one hope was to be reinforced from home. In answer to a despatch sent by him at the beginning of the winter the Athenians voted a large reinforcement, which was to sail under the command of Demosthenes and Eurymedon in the following spring. They refused to recall Nicias himself. By this time however the chief enemies of Athens—the Spartans and Corinthians—had also resolved to take up the defence of Syracuse in earnest, and to strike at Athens at home as well as abroad. By the advice of Alcibiades, who had come to Sparta from Argos, an invasion of Attica took place in the spring of B.C. 413, and a permanent occupation of Decelea was begun. This town, about 15 miles north of Athens, commanded the road over Parnes from Oropus by which corn was usually conveyed to Athens, when landed by the ships from Northern Greece and Thrace. Its occupation by the enemy therefore not only shut off many farmers from their

B.C. 413.
The occupa-
tion of
Decelea.

lands, but increased the time and expense in furnishing the city with provisions, as the ships were now obliged to sail round Sunium and land their cargoes in the Peiraeus. At the same time a strong force was despatched to Sicily from Sparta and Corinth.

Meanwhile the Athenian affairs in Sicily had been going from bad to worse. The Syracusans, encouraged by their successes, determined to launch their ships and try conclusions with the Athenian fleet, which up to this time they had not ventured to attack. At first they failed, but their failure was compensated by the capture of the Athenian forts and magazines on Plemmyrium, the southern headland forming the Great Harbour. When Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived, it was resolved first of all to make an attack on Epipolae ; and when that was repulsed with great loss Demosthenes wished at once to return home. But Nicias was unwilling to face his disappointed fellow-citizens, and induced the new generals to make another attempt at sea. But the forces against them were too formidable to be attacked, and it was resolved to escape with all on board. This might perhaps have been done, had not an eclipse of the moon occurred (27 August), after which the *manteis* declared that no movement must be made for a month. The superstition of Nicias overcame the counsels of prudence, and the fleet remained only to be again defeated with great loss, Eurymedon being among the slain. The only hope now was to escape by any means. But the Syracusans closed the mouth of the Great Harbour by chains and vessels lashed together across its entrance, and the only chance was to defeat their fleet. Every available man was put on board, while Nicias and the land forces remained watching the struggle. It raged with varying fortune for many hours, but in the end the Athenians were totally defeated. Such of the ships as escaped destruction were run aground as near the Athenian camp as was possible. Demosthenes wished

7. Destruction of the Athenian armament at Syracuse.

next day to renew the fighting at sea, but the men refused, and the only thing left was to retreat by land to some part of Sicily where they might hope for friendly aid. But the retreat was delayed for three days in consequence of the representations of pretended friends within the town, and meanwhile the Syracusans broke up the roads in their line of march and made every preparation to intercept them. Nicias in this supreme hour behaved with great heroism, sparing no pains to encourage and animate his men. The retreat was conducted in two columns, one commanded by Nicias, the other by Demosthenes. The latter was first overtaken by the Syracusan cavalry and light-armed troops; and after marching a whole day continually harassed by the enemy, Demosthenes and his whole division were compelled to surrender. The same fate befell the division of Nicias two days later, which after suffering great loss during a day's march was finally captured on the river Assinarus. Demosthenes and Nicias—in spite of the remonstrances of Gylippus—were put to death, and the bulk of the Athenian troops were confined in the quarries near Syracuse or sold as slaves. The whole of the remaining fleet fell into the hands of the Syracusans.

The dismay of the Athenians at this disaster did not induce them to make peace; and though the continued occupation of Decelea by the Spartans caused great annoyance, it did not prevent them from fitting out fleets to repress the rebellions among their allies which followed their defeat in Sicily. The Spartans were always ready to assist the rebels, and the decay of true Hellenic patriotism is shewn by the fact that both sides intrigued with the Persian satraps, who welcomed divisions in Greece which would enable them to recover the king's authority over Greek cities in Asia. Accordingly the last scenes of the war are almost confined to Asia and the islands. There were four points at which the aid of Sparta was invoked. First in Asia, where Erythrae, Teos, and Miletus with the island of Chios

8. Revolt of
Athenian
allies, B.C. 412.

revolted in B.C. 412; secondly, in Lesbos; thirdly, in the cities of the Hellespont and Thrace; lastly, in Euboea. By the advice of Alcibiades the Spartans gave the preference to the first of these groups and a fleet was mustered at Corinth to proceed to Asia. For a time the Athenian ships held it back; but Alcibiades with a small squadron made his way to Chios and supported by Tissaphernes, satrap of Lydia, encouraged the rebels. A treaty made with the Persians declared that the Asiatic cities were subject to the king and need no longer pay tribute to Athens. The revolt spread still farther, when the Peloponnesian fleet under the Spartan admiral Astyochus arrived, having broken through the cordon of Athenian ships.

But the energy of the Athenians was equal to the crisis. A popular revolution at Samos put that island securely at their disposal. They attacked and subdued the Lesbians; recovered Clazomenae; defeated the Chian ships and blockaded the island; made a descent upon the coast of Miletus, and, after defeating the Milesians and their allies, prepared to lay siege to the town. The arrival of another combined Peloponnesian and Sicilian fleet forced them indeed to abandon this siege and retire to Samos. But on the whole they had shewn an almost undiminished strength. The blockade of Chios was continued, the enemy vainly attempted to recover Clazomenae, and Astyochus did not venture to aid the Lesbians. On the other hand a defeat was inflicted upon an Athenian squadron off Cnidus, and Rhodes revolted and was occupied by the Peloponnesian fleet.

But a second treaty by which, in return for the support promised by the Spartans to the Persian king in Asia, he undertook to bear the expense of all armaments serving in his territory or at his request, led to frequent disputes between Tissaphernes and the Spartan commanders. Taking advantage of these, Alcibiades quitted his Peloponnesian friends and

9. Gallant struggle of Athenians to maintain the empire.

10. Alcibiades abandons the Peloponnesians.

joined himself closely with Tissaphernes. He was weary of his exile in Sparta. The habits of the Spartans were uncongenial to him, and his own misconduct involved him in quarrels with King Agis and made his position insecure. His object now was to pave the way for a return to Athens. Perhaps he had enough patriotism left to dislike witnessing her humiliation. At any rate he had no desire to see Sparta all-powerful in Greece. He suggested to Tissaphernes that it was not to the king's interest that any one State should have a decided supremacy, and that he had better be less liberal in subsidies to the Spartan army and fleet. Yet when an Athenian embassy—encouraged by Alcibiades—came to Tissaphernes, his demands were so outrageous that the negotiations were abruptly broken off. The Athenians attributed this to the treachery of Alcibiades himself; but it is probable that he found his influence with Tissaphernes less than he thought. The king's right to send a fleet into the Aegean was what Tissaphernes no doubt thought essential. It was the one thing that the Athenians could not concede and yet maintain the Confederacy of Delos and their right to tax the allies. For the avowed object of that tax was to maintain a fleet able to prevent the king's ships from sailing in Greek waters. At the end of the year the Athenian force remained at Samos, the Spartan at Miletus.

II. B.C. 411.
The revolution
of the Four
Hundred.

In the next year the Spartans began the second part of their programme by promoting a rebellion against Athens in the Hellespont, where Derkyllidas was sent to encourage the movement. Nothing however decisive occurred. Abydos and Lampsacus revolted, but the latter was speedily reduced by a detachment of the Athenian force which was blockading Chios. And though Abydos successfully resisted, the Athenians occupied the opposite town of Sestos which also commanded the entrance of the Hellespont. Yet later on in the year the revolt spread to Byzantium.

But the great event of the year was a revolution in Athens itself, where the long continuance of the war and its chequered fortunes naturally gave the oligarchical peace party an opportunity. The embassy to Tissaphernes of the previous year had been led by Peisander, who with his colleagues had wintered at Samos. Thence, after conference with certain of the same party in the Athenian fleet, he sailed to Athens with some of his colleagues intent on abolishing the democracy. When he arrived he found his work half done by the political clubs, which had established a kind of terror by secret assassinations of leading democrats. In their alarm the people consented to appoint a commission to draw up a new constitution. There were always some doctrinaire politicians to whom this was a congenial task. They produced a scheme which professed to confine power to the 'best men.' There was to be a nominated council of four hundred to conduct the government, and a sovereign assembly. But this assembly or *ecclesia* was to be confined to 5000 named by the council. The leading statesmen who devised this scheme were Antiphon, Phrynichus, and Theramenes, who perhaps sincerely believed it to be for the good of the State; the misfortunes of which were owing to the imprudence of a large and indiscriminate *ecclesia*. The scheme was put to the vote and carried. The old council of five hundred was forcibly abolished and the new council of four hundred was established in its place.

The experiment however did not last long. In the first place, it soon appeared that all power was to be in the hands of the Four Hundred. The assembly of five thousand was not summoned, or even nominated. In the next place, the army at Samos—under the guidance of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus—declined to recognise the new government. They elected their own generals and determined to carry on the war. They invited Alcibiades to Samos, whose influence with Tissaphernes was still believed to be great, and elected him

12. Opposition to the new constitution in the army at Samos.

one of their generals. He induced them to give the agents of the Four Hundred a hearing: but a peremptory message was sent to Athens that the old council of Five Hundred must be restored. Meanwhile the new government, after vainly attempting negotiations with King Agis at Decelea, had baffled his attempt to surprise the city and had sent ambassadors to negotiate with the Spartan government. But when the decision of the army at Samos was known at Athens, a certain number of the Four Hundred themselves—headed by Theramenes—ventured to shew their discontent at the failure of the council to carry out the full scheme, by summoning the ecclesia of Five Thousand. The more violent party, alarmed at this, sent hastily to Sparta offering peace on any terms. They also began building a fort at the entrance of the Peiræus, to secure command of the food supply as well as to protect themselves, should the fleet return from Samos. But these two measures proved their ruin. The people believed that they were being betrayed to Sparta and that this fort was to facilitate the entrance of Spartan ships into the harbour. This belief was intensified when a Spartan fleet was seen on its way to support the rebels in Euboea. There was a great popular rising countenanced by Theramenes. The new fort was demolished, and the restoration of the old council demanded, and at any rate the real establishment of the ecclesia of Five Thousand. It was at length agreed that the assembly of all the citizens should be summoned to decide. But before any conclusion could be reached the citizens had hastily to man all remaining ships and sail to Euboea, which was now in full revolt supported by the Spartan fleet. They were defeated, and all Euboea, except Oreus or Histiaea, was lost. The Spartans however did not follow up their victory by an attack upon Athens, and this calamity had the effect of restoring internal peace within the city. The revolutionary government had brought no success; and the people being again summoned put down the council of Four Hundred, and restored the old

ecclesia with some restrictions, as to which we are not informed. Whatever they were, they seem to have been very soon tacitly neglected¹.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians had not been successful in Asia. Whether it was from the influence of Alcibiades or from his own policy, Tissaphernes would not treat the Peloponnesian officers frankly, or fulfil his engagements as to supplying pay. The Peloponnesians seem also to have quarrelled among themselves, and in this summer Mindarus was sent to take the place of Astyochus who had become unpopular in the fleet. Weary of the duplicity of Tissaphernes, Mindarus resolved to transfer the fleet to the Hellespont and see whether the satrap Pharnabazus would treat them better. But this move was answered by a counter-movement of the Athenian squadron which was at Samos under Thrasyllus. It sailed to the Hellespont, and off Cynossema, a promontory on the east coast of the Thracian Chersonese, utterly defeated the Peloponnesians. The victory revived the spirits of the Athenians. They proceeded to recover Cyzicus and other revolted towns; and though they seem afterwards to have sustained a reverse, this was presently made up for when Alcibiades arrived to take command. He engaged the Spartans near Abydos, from which they had issued out to escort a fresh fleet into the Hellespont, and defeated them with the loss of 30 ships. Tissaphernes had now arrived at the Hellespont wishing to be reconciled to the Peloponnesians, and caused Alcibiades who visited him to be arrested and sent to Sardis. Alcibiades however managed to escape after about a month's detention, and rejoined the Athenian fleet. For the next two years he is the ruling spirit in the war. Whatever his faults there seems no doubt that

13. Battle of
Cynossema,
B.C. 411.

¹ Certain *Nomothetae* were appointed to revise the laws and suggest alterations required. But these men seem to have taken a long time, and perhaps never made their report. Consequently this new constitution, whatever it was, was never legally established.

he was an excellent general. Everywhere victory attended him. He surprised the Peloponnesian fleet as it was manœuvring outside the harbour of Cyzicus, captured the whole of it, and killed Mindarus. Having forced Cyzicus to surrender he proceeded to the Bosphorus, where he established a custom house to receive tolls from the corn ships. In the autumn, having been joined at Sestos by Thrasyllus—who had suffered a severe defeat at Ephesus—he won a brilliant victory over Pharnabazus at Abydos. In the following spring (B.C. 409) he proceeded once more to the Bosphorus and invested Chalcedon opposite Byzantium, and successfully repelled a sortie from within and the attempt of Pharnabazus to raise the siege from without. This induced Pharnabazus to come to terms, acknowledging Chalcedon as tributary to Athens, and arranging that Athenian envoys should visit the king, and that there should be no hostilities in Asia till their return. These envoys were on various pretexts retained for three years. But meanwhile Alcibiades pressed on the siege of Byzantium which presently surrendered.

These brilliant successes paved the way for the return of Alcibiades to Athens. He was elected general, B.C. 408, and when Thrasyllus took the main army and fleet home, Alcibiades accompanied him to Athens. Thus, in June B.C. 408, he once more entered the Peiræus after an exile of seven years. He was received with the utmost enthusiasm. The curse pronounced upon him for his profanation of the mysteries was revoked, and for the time there seemed nothing that the people, always as easily moved to remorse as to anger, were not prepared to do to shew their repentance and confidence. He was elected general with absolute powers to continue the war, and crowned his reconciliation by an act of reparation to the goddess of Eleusis, whose mysteries he had been condemned for profaning. The solemn procession along the

14. Battles
of Cyzicus
and Abydos,
B.C. 410; and
capture of
Chalcedon and
Byzantium,
B.C. 409.

15. Alci-
biades returns
to Athens,
B.C. 408.

sacred road to Eleusis had for several years been omitted for fear of the enemy, such worshippers as still went being conveyed by sea. But Alcibiades now escorted the procession with a guard and brought it safely home. He then caused 100 triremes to be equipped, and having raised large reinforcements of soldiers he sailed in October for Andros, and after inflicting a defeat upon the Lacedaemonian garrison there, proceeded to Samos.

The Lacedaemonians meanwhile had been strengthening their position in Asia. The capable Lysander superseded the feeble admiral who had been in command, and gained the warm friendship of Cyrus, the younger son of the Persian king, who

16. Battle of
Notium in
April, B.C.
407.

had come down to Sardis as governor-general of the king's dominions in Asia Minor. Cyrus promised the Peloponnesians vigorous support and increased pay, while he refused even to see Athenian envoys. Lysander had now 90 ships at Ephesus, and Alcibiades, who had wintered at Samos, would not attack him till he had collected an overpowering force. In the spring of B.C. 407 he left the fleet at Samos in charge of Antiochus, with strict orders not to engage the enemy, while he went to confer with Thrasybulus, who had arrived with his fleet at Phocaea on the coast of Lydia. But Antiochus allowed himself to be drawn into a general engagement with Lysander off Notium, and was defeated with the loss of 15 triremes. On his return Alcibiades vainly endeavoured to entice Lysander out, that he might renew the battle and avenge the defeat. It does not appear that the disaster was in any way the fault of Alcibiades, who had good reasons for visiting Thrasybulus and concerting measures with him; but the Athenians at home attributed it to his neglect, and superseded him by sending out a new board of ten generals. He thereupon retired to a castle of his own in the Thracian Chersonese. He was a great loss to the Athenian cause. The ten generals—among whom was Conon—were capable

men, but their period of command did little for the Athenian cause and ended in a way unfortunate to themselves.

For the rest of the season of B.C. 407, Conon, who was commanding at Samos, contented himself with
 17. B.C. 406. The battle of Arginusae. manning a part only of his fleet and making descents upon the coasts. In the spring of B.C. 406 the Spartan Lysander was succeeded by Callicratidas, who, though unable to obtain the same help from Cyrus as Lysander had done, managed to equip 140 ships with supplies from his other allies, and tried to tempt the Athenians to give him battle by making attacks on Chios and Lesbos. He even chased Conon into the harbour of Mitylene and blockaded him there, capturing 30 Athenian vessels. But Conon contrived to send word to Athens, and in thirty days a fresh fleet of 110 vessels was on its way to Samos. Callicratidas attempted to intercept it when it was at anchor off Lesbos, and while the crews were eating their dinner on some small islands called Arginusae, between Lesbos and the mainland. The Athenians however were able to put out to sea in time to meet him, and in the battle which followed inflicted a severe defeat upon the Peloponnesians. Callicratidas himself was killed, and 69 ships were lost against 25 of the Athenian, while the survivors of the Peloponnesian fleet fled to Chios and Phocaea. But the Athenian victory was marred by an unfortunate circumstance. After the battle 12 of the 15 disabled vessels were still afloat, and while some of their crews, as well as some from the other 13 vessels which were totally lost, managed to get to land, a considerable number were still clinging to the wrecks. The eight generals—Conon and one other were not at the battle—wished to attack the enemy's ships at Mytilene, and they ordered Thrasybulus and Theramenes to stay behind with 47 vessels to rescue these men. But a violent storm came on which prevented both the expedition and the rescue, and nearly all these unfortunate men perished.

As the year during which the ten generals normally held

office was now over (July), a new board was elected, and only Conon was continued in office. Of the eight engaged at Arginusae two did not go home, probably suspecting danger. The six who did return were promptly impeached before the assembly for treason. Among the loudest of their accusers was Theramenes himself, who with Thrasybulus had been ordered to rescue the drowning men. At the first hearing the generals seemed to have sufficiently defended themselves by alleging that the storm had made the rescue impossible, a statement supported by many pilots and sailors who were there. The proceedings however had taken so long that the final decision was deferred to the next meeting of the assembly. In the interval occurred the festival of the Apaturia (October), which was an occasion of family gatherings, enrolment on the register of their demes of children and adopted citizens, and other similar functions. The losses suffered by families in the war would then be specially noticed; and as the signs of mourning were everywhere visible—sometimes, it was afterwards said, falsely assumed to increase the impression—a strong feeling was aroused against the generals. This was faithfully reflected by the proposal which was now brought forward. An impeachment before the assembly was conducted like other business there. The Boulè drew up the proposal—called a *probouleuma*—and the prytaneis, that is, the fifty members of the Boulè whose turn it was to preside, put it as the resolution to be voted upon. In this case the *probouleuma* stated that evidence having been already fully heard, the people were simply to vote for or against all the generals at once, and that, in case of condemnation, the penalty was to be death. This was unconstitutional, because a law or decree carried by Cannonus had ordained that in case of several accused persons each was to be voted upon separately. The famous Socrates therefore, who was one of the prytaneis, refused to break the law by putting the motion to the people, and left the assembly rather

18. Execution of the six generals.

than do so, though assailed by loud cries and threats. It was however put by the other prytaneis and passed, and the six generals were executed.

Next year (B.C. 405) Lysander again directed the Lace-

19. Battle of
Aegospotami
and end of the
war, B.C.
405 (July
—August).

daemonian fleet at Ephesus, though nominally second in command as *epistoleus* or vice-admiral.

The early part of the summer was spent in some unimportant operations on the coast of Caria and Ionia. But presently Lysander sailed to the

Hellespont, where most damage could be done to Athens by stopping her supplies of corn. There he captured Lampsacus and occupied its harbour. The Athenian fleet of 180 sail followed close behind him and anchored at Aegospotami on the Thracian Chersonese, opposite Lampsacus. It was an open beach and an unsafe anchorage, as Alcibiades, who visited the Athenian head-quarters, pointed out. Lysander, after making several feints, seized an opportunity when the crews were mostly on shore for their dinner. Rowing rapidly across he possessed himself of the greater part of the Athenian ships with scarcely any resistance. The crews to the number of 3000, as well as the generals, were captured and put to the sword, and the whole force was annihilated, Conon with eight ships, and the sacred *Paralus* alone escaping.

This was the end of the war. The Athenians could not put another fleet to sea capable of preventing Lysander from occupying the Peiraeus. By land they soon found themselves closely invested, for before many days the Spartan king Pausanias with a large force joined King Agis at Decelea, and the two proceeded to occupy the academy, just outside the walls. When the *Paralus* had arrived with the fatal news, in spite of the consternation caused by it, there had been a feverish haste to put the town in a state of defence. 'That night no one slept.' But it was evident to all that, if Lysander chose to occupy the harbour while the Spartan kings occupied the country outside the walls, they must be starved out. So

sure was Lysander of his prey that he made no haste. He busied himself with confirming the complete separation of all her allies from Athens, sending home Athenian citizens to swell the numbers to be fed within the city. He waited also to perform a great act of justice. Not content with destroying the naval power of Aegina, the Athenians had resolved to get rid of its Dorian inhabitants altogether and thus remove what Pericles called the 'eyesore' of the Peiraeus. This people had accordingly been expelled in B.C. 431 and allowed by Sparta to settle in the coast district of Thyrea. In B.C. 424 the Athenians occupied Thyrea and killed many of the Aeginetan settlers. Their survivors were now restored to their homes in Aegina by Lysander, who thus occupied nearly two months before appearing in the Peiraeus. It was then only a question of months or even weeks before Athens must surrender. Her fall marks the beginning of a Spartan supremacy in Greece, of which we shall have to speak in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE SPARTAN AND THEBAN SUPREMACIES
(B.C. 404—362).

The result of the Peloponnesian war was to put the Spartans, in regard to the States that had formed the Confederacy of Delos, in the place of the Athenians. Professedly these peoples were freed from the control of an imperial State, practically they were subjected to Sparta. A Spartan *harmost* or a board of ten—a *decarchy*—took the place of the Athenian *episcopus*, and in some cases a Spartan garrison the place of Athenian *phylakes*. This also meant a considerable political change: for wherever there was a Spartan harmost, there was pressure put upon a State to abolish or modify democracy and to introduce a more oligarchical form of government. Nor were the States much relieved financially. They no longer, it is true, paid the *phoros* to Athens; but on one pretext or another they had to pay contributions to Sparta, which is said to have received from them a yearly revenue of 1000 talents. Spartan officers moreover were less sympathetic and conciliatory than Athenian, and speedily became unpopular. Nor when circumstances made it necessary for the Spartans to play the part once sustained by the Athenians, as champions of Hellenic cities against Persia, did they prove either so trustworthy or so successful as the Athenians.

Though a small Sicilian fleet had after B.C. 413 rendered aid to the Peloponnesians in the Aegean, yet the political troubles in Syracuse that followed the Athenian invasion, and the great struggle with the Carthaginians which came a few

I. Effect of
the Pelopon-
nesian war
and the nature
of Spartan
supremacy.

years later withdrew the Sicilian and Italian Greeks from the main stream of Greek History for some time to come. We have for the next forty years to trace the combinations and feuds of Central Greek States, and their effect upon the fortunes of their Asiatic brethren's freedom or submission to Persia. The great States which chiefly influence the course of events are Sparta, Athens, Corinth, Thebes. At first the supremacy is entirely in the hands of Sparta. She gained it by crushing the power of Athens, in which, as in other cases, she tried to maintain her power by promoting an oligarchical revolution within its walls. This is the most conspicuous instance of the policy of Sparta, its strength and weakness, and we will begin the narrative of her supremacy with an account of it.

2. Sicily and Magna Graecia withdrawn from Greek politics. The beginning of Spartan supremacy.

Athens held out till the spring of B.C. 404, though the citizens suffered much from confinement and want of food. After fruitless offers to Agis, to Lysander, and to the Ephors, the people were at length persuaded to commission Theramenes to go to Lysander with full powers to agree to any terms of surrender. He was over three months absent, and on his return could only report that he had been again referred to the Ephors. With nine others he was sent to Sparta, and presently returned with the final demands. The Athenians were to be free—though wholly deprived of their external empire—and the Spartan army of invasion was to be withdrawn, on condition that all ships of war except 12 were given up, the long walls and the walls of the Peiraeus demolished, and all oligarchical exiles recalled. The people were too much reduced by famine and misery to resist, and too much relieved by the promised withdrawal of the invading armies to feel the full humiliation when the destruction of the long walls was begun to the sound of music and rejoicing, as though it were the beginning of freedom for Greece.

3. The surrender of Athens and the establishment of the Thirty, B.C. 405–404.

But the party within the city which had welcomed the presence of the Spartans was not content with this. They desired a complete change of government. The oligarchical clubs had been strengthened by the return of exiles and by the presence of the Spartans, and at once began scheming for a change of government. Five leading men formed themselves into a committee to control the ecclesia, and invited Lysander's presence at a meeting of it. There it was proposed to appoint a commission of Thirty to revise the laws and, meanwhile, to conduct the government. The presence of Lysander overawed opposition, and they were appointed. Among those Thirty was Theramenes, who once more wished to try his hand at constructing a constitution, while the most influential and most violent was Critias. What form of constitution would have eventually resulted from their labours we cannot tell; for the Thirty made such ill use of their temporary authority, that they fell before that point was settled. Having secured that the Boulè and other offices should be filled by their own partisans, they proceeded on various pretexts to get rid of all whom they thought dangerous. At first their victims were informers and men of bad character, whose death or banishment was regarded with indifference by the people. But presently, as they needed money, rich men were marked down for death for no other reason but the profit to be got by the confiscation of their property. They especially attacked the class of men called *metics*, or resident aliens, who, though not full citizens, were useful members of the community carrying on various peaceful trades and professions without meddling with politics. Among the victims was the brother of the orator Lysias, who was arrested and put to death on the pretence of disaffection, Lysias himself only escaping by paying an enormous bribe to the members of the Thirty sent to arrest him. Socrates once more shewed his courage and integrity by refusing, at the risk of his life, to obey an order to arrest an innocent man.

But these acts of injustice produced a split in their own ranks. Theramenes once more declared for moderation, and insisted that the Thirty should proceed with their proper business of drawing up a constitution. As a compromise, Critias proposed to make a list of 3000 citizens who were alone to have full privileges and the right of possessing arms. Though Theramenes objected that the 'best' men could not be confined to a definite number, the proposal was carried; and Critias, having succeeded in getting the name of Theramenes himself erased from the list, arrested and put him to death. Theramenes was probably sincere, though his moderation always seemed like time-serving and gained him the nick-name of *Cothurnus*, the 'buskin' that would fit either foot. At any rate his death removed all restraint from the violent part of the Thirty, who now took still more sweeping measures. All not in the list of 3000 were forbidden to live in the upper city without leave, and many were deprived of their lands and goods. These people, if they could not find a home in the Peiraeus, sought refuge at Megara, Thebes, and Chalcis in Euboea. More than half the citizens were said to be in exile. But this conduct of the Thirty caused their ruin. The exiles were protected by these towns and their surrender was refused. In September of B.C. 404 Thrasybulus—who had stood by the democracy at the time of the Four Hundred also—left Thebes where he was living in exile and seized on Phyle, a strong castle on the pass over Mount Parnes about 10 miles from Athens, with some 70 followers. There he was joined by other exiles till he had nearly 700 men. After repulsing a force sent against him by the Thirty, about November he descended upon the Peiraeus and occupied the high ground of Munychia. Critias led an army against him but was defeated and killed. This brought a change of government. The 3000 citizens on the roll deposed the Thirty and elected a body of Ten. But the Ten were equally opposed to Thrasybulus, and asked help from


Death of
Theramenes
and counter-
revolution.

Sparta. In answer to this appeal Lysander himself was sent as harmost with a Spartan garrison, while a Spartan fleet blockaded the Peiræus. But Agis and Pausanias were jealous of Lysander, and after some little fighting, which was not meant to be serious, gave a hint that they were open to an offer of terms. In the end peace was made on condition that the Athenians should support Sparta in war and grant an amnesty to all except the actual members of the Thirty. By the spring of B.C. 403 Thrasybulus was in possession of the city; the Spartan garrison and harmost were withdrawn; and the old constitution restored. The Archon Eponymus of the year was Eucleides, and his archonship thus marks an epoch in Athenian history, and the final restoration of democracy.

But though the amnesty was well observed, and political passions seem to have died down at Athens for a time, a State could not go through so much suffering and humiliation without some lasting effects on public feeling. At Athens this seems to have taken the form of a desire to return to some imaginary standard of simplicity of life and religious piety, under which former generations had attained greatness. What had destroyed all this? The reactionary party answered by the word 'sophistry'—the teaching of the professional lecturers, who whether natives or foreigners constantly gave instructions to young men, after they had left school, in rhetoric or physics or other branches of learning and philosophy. Some of them—such as Anaxagoras and Protagoras—had been at various times forbidden to reside in Athens on account of the supposed irreligious or immoral tendency of their teaching. But the public feeling did not stop now to distinguish. The whole system was regarded as corrupting, and the Athenians had one man in their midst who seemed to embody all that was worst and most misleading in it.

This was Socrates. The son of a sculptor and a mid-wife Socrates was born in B.C. 469, and is one of the most remarkable

4. Reaction-
ary feelings at
Athens. The
Sophists.



To face p. 265

SOCRATES

characters in history. At first he followed his father's profession: but quickly finding that his calling was for speculation rather than art or any definite business, he devoted himself to the study of poetry and philosophy, and to listening to the conversations and speeches of all the great men to whom he could get access. In course of time he obtained an extraordinary influence, especially among rich and intelligent young men, in a most original manner. He had nothing in his person to recommend him. He had the flat nose and thick lips of a satyr, and, though possessed of great physical strength, was of a heavy ungainly figure, while his dress and manner of life betokened extreme poverty. With all these disadvantages, the charm of his conversation was so great, that rich men gathered round him continually and were glad to welcome him to their tables. He gave no formal instruction or lectures, and demanded no fees, but he was ready to discuss every kind of subject—especially such as concerned conduct and belief—with all comers. He regarded himself as a divinely appointed missionary to clear the minds of his countrymen from confused or false notions as to justice, righteousness, virtue, and religion. The Athenians—leaving mechanical arts mostly to their slaves—were now, as in St Paul's time, eager to hear some new thing; and Socrates was daily seen in the market-place, or wherever men congregated, discussing these high subjects with groups of earnest or amused listeners. The older and more conservative citizens, or those who here—as everywhere—suspected to be dangerous what they could not understand, looked upon this as demoralising to the young, undermining their notions of right and wrong, or at any rate withdrawing them from active life. This view had been formulated by Aristophanes, who in B.C. 423 selected Socrates, as the representative of the new culture, to be attacked in his play of the *Clouds*. But public feeling was not then sufficiently roused and the play did not get a prize. It was however brought out again some time after B.C. 411 with a new dénouement, in which the

5. Socrates.

young man who had been corrupted joins his old father, whom Socrates had persuaded him to ill-treat, in burning down the sophist's school. It did not much matter that Socrates could not fairly be looked upon as at the head of any particular school; or that he had in fact avoided discussion on certain physical theories. It could not be denied that his arguments tended to shake many current beliefs. It was this tendency that Aristophanes was attacking, and it was necessary for dramatic purposes to have a well-known figure as the prominent person in his play. Other comic poets attacked him in much the same way, and thus created the sort of popular feeling with which we are so well acquainted nowadays as a result of a newspaper campaign. This feeling was now intensified by the fact that among the youths known to have been much in the society of Socrates were Alcibiades and Critias. It was an easy step to call them his pupils, and to attribute the intemperance and treason of the former, and the excesses of the latter as leader of the Thirty, to the lessons learnt from his lips¹.

Some five years therefore after the restoration of the democracy three men, Meletus a poet, Lycon an orator, and Anytus a man of business, came forward to accuse him of atheism and corruption of the young. By *atheism* was meant a disbelief in the gods of the country. And the frequent assertion of Socrates, that a divine warning or *daemon* often prevented him from doing some particular thing, was enough to shew him to be a setter forth of strange gods: while Anytus believed his son to have been perverted by him. In defending himself Socrates repudiated the charge of atheism, denied that he undertook to teach anybody, and affirmed that so far from corrupting those who listened to his conversation—as all were at liberty to do without fee—he had cleared men's minds from confused and false ideas of justice and virtue, and led them to aim at

¹ Another of the partisans of the Thirty, Charmides (one of the 'Ten on the Peiræus') frequented the society of Socrates.

realities. When he was found guilty by a small majority of the dicasts, his accusers assessed the penalty at death. Called upon—according to Athenian custom—to give a counter-assessment, he at first asserted that he deserved public maintenance in the Prytaneium rather than punishment, but at length, owing to the urgent advice of his friends, fixed it at a fine of 30 minae (about £120). The jury regarded this as contumacy and voted for the sentence proposed by the accusers—death. He had still a month of life: the sacred trireme, the *Salaminia*, was conveying commissioners to attend the festival at Delos, and until it returned no capital sentence could be carried out. He was then obliged to drink the hemlock poison used at Athens for executions. Thus was the moral panic allayed. But this martyrdom was not the only sign that the old spirit of freedom—which had endured the outspoken ridicule of the comic stage—was gone. Just when Athens had ceased to be important politically, it became unsafe to speak about politics and politicians. The later plays of Aristophanes have scarcely any political allusions. The old *parabasis*, or speech delivered by the leader of the chorus as mouth-piece of the poet, was dropped, and a new kind of comedy—bearing on stories of private life and manners—was called for—more respectable, perhaps, but much less interesting. The death of one old man, chiefly noted for talk often found embarrassing by self-satisfied and dignified people, did not perhaps seem to ordinary citizens to be a matter of much importance. But it confirmed the influence which he had exercised over a few choice spirits: and the philosophy of Plato, which has so deeply influenced human thought, took its rise from the inspiration of his discourses.

The interest of Greek history after the fall of Athens shifts again to Asia. The support which Cyrus had given to Sparta was now to be paid for by services to Cyrus himself. He had no doubt the same policy as other Persian satraps in

7. The expedition of Cyrus and the retreat of the 10,000 Greeks, B.C. 402–401.

regard to the Ionian cities. They were one day to be annexed again to the dominions of the king. But Cyrus had at present a more important object in view—that of securing the succession to the kingdom at the death of his father Darius for himself, in place of his elder brother Artaxerxes. His designs being suspected, he had been summoned to visit his father at Susa. He went with Tissaphernes and a company of hired Greek guards. Before he arrived however his father died, and Artaxerxes had been proclaimed king. Tissaphernes, always jealous of Cyrus, denounced his intended treason to Artaxerxes, who wished to put him to death, but was persuaded by his mother to allow him to return to Sardis (B.C. 402).

Here Cyrus immediately began collecting an army under pretence of subduing the robber tribes of the Pisidians, but really to march up country against his brother: and he called upon the Spartans to send a fleet to Cilicia, which would prevent the prince of that country from interrupting his march. All went well with his great army, which included 11,000 Greeks, besides 2000 peltasts and 100,000 Asiatics, till he came in contact with his brother's army at Cunaxa (autumn of B.C. 401). There the Greek contingent defeated the forces opposed to them, but Cyrus himself was killed whilst making a furious attack upon his brother. The Greeks had then nothing left but to retreat. Their generals were treacherously decoyed and put to death by Tissaphernes; but the greater part of the 10,000 that still remained was safely led by the Athenian Xenophon to the shore of the Euxine at Trapezus, after the wonderful eight months' march described in his *Anabasis*; during which they had to contend with endless difficulties in crossing mountains and rivers in the depth of winter, harassed at first by Tissaphernes, and then by the hostility of native tribes. From Trapezus those that survived—over 6000—made their way partly by land and partly by sea to Byzantium.

8. Cyrus
starts to attack
his brother,
B.C. 401.

The most important results of the expedition however were that Tissaphernes was rewarded by being sent down to take the place of Cyrus, and that he came with the full understanding that he was to subdue the Greek cities, and that in doing so he would have to reckon with the hostility of the Spartans, who had been strong supporters of Cyrus. On the other hand the sympathies of the Athenians were generally with Artaxerxes; for Cyrus had been studiously unfriendly to them. Xenophon's having joined the army of Cyrus was regarded as an act of treason to his country. At any rate, shortly after his return to Greece he was banished from Athens and continued for many years to live under the protection of Sparta. Here then was a new turn of affairs. The Spartans could act as champions of Greek freedom against the Persians without being embarrassed by friendship for Cyrus. The Athenians, feeling that they were no longer the special object of hostility to the Persian satraps, could look on with some indifference, and not without a hope that something might occur to give them the chance of recovering their old place in Greece.

9. Political results of the expedition of Cyrus.

Not only did such an opportunity arise, but the result of the struggles of the next thirteen years was, that, though placed for a time in a position of great strength, Sparta lost her credit in the eyes of most Greeks. At first she responded to the appeal of the Greek cities of Asia with promptitude and some success. In B.C. 400—399 a campaign was conducted by Thimbron and a Spartan army, reinforced by the remnant of the ten thousand which had returned with Xenophon: the Athenians also furnishing some cavalry according to their agreement with Sparta. But Thimbron did little of permanent importance and alienated the Greek cities by his exactions and acts of pillage. In B.C. 399 he was superseded by Dercylidas, who in three campaigns (B.C. 399—397) subdued Aeolis and Bithynia,

10. Spartan wars in Asia and Greece, B.C. 400—387. The campaigns of Agesilaus.

crossed to the Chersonese, which he fortified by building a wall across the neck, and then returning to Asia and taking Atarneus in Mysia after a long siege, finally invaded Caria. He had thus harried the satrapies of both Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes—playing off one against the other with a cunning which gained him the name of ‘Sisyphus.’ The two satraps now combined to agree with him upon an armistice; and in the spring of B.C. 396 he was superseded by Agesilaus, who meantime had become one of the kings of Sparta. Tissaphernes offered a truce, swearing to employ the time in negotiating with the king of Persia to acknowledge the independence of the Greek cities. He however broke his oath, and instead of asking the king for this acknowledgement, asked and obtained large reinforcements, and then openly proclaimed war on Agesilaus. The Spartan king, thanking Tissaphernes for thus drawing upon himself the enmity of the gods, marched into Phrygia. But though he won a victory near Dascylium in that country, he perceived that he could not finally win against the Persians in a flat country without cavalry. He therefore spent the winter of 396–5 in collecting a body of horse. In B.C. 395 he invaded the district of Sardis with such success that the king, believing Tissaphernes to have played the traitor, sent Tithraustes to put him to death and succeed him in his satrapy. Tithraustes at once offered to acknowledge the autonomy of the Greek towns on condition of their paying tribute. He induced Agesilaus to withdraw to Cyme, which was in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, furnishing him with money to pay his troops. Here Agesilaus received authority from home to command the naval as well as the military forces, and accordingly began collecting a fleet from the allied cities, the command of which he gave to Peisander. To understand how this fleet came to be defeated off Cnidus by Conon in the following year (B.C. 394), and how Agesilaus came to be recalled without securing finally the freedom of the Greek cities in Asia, we must glance at what had meanwhile been going on in Greece.

If the Greek cities of Asia had found less internal freedom or security against Persia under the Spartan than under the Athenian supremacy, the cities in Central Greece were little better satisfied with the change. A war with Elis begun in consequence of a series of petty disputes—chiefly connected with the exclusion of Spartans from parts of the Olympic festival—had been at first unsuccessful. But in the second year (B.C. 398) King Agis and his allies had harried Elis with fire and sword. Though Sparta's allies were willing enough to share in the plunder, these proceedings shocked the general feeling and gave Sparta's enemies a handle against her. This was followed by a disputed succession. Agis died at the end of the campaign of B.C. 398, and Agesilaus—who was lame—on the plea that Leotyichides was not the real son of Agis, was made king in spite of an oracle bidding Sparta to beware of 'a lame reign.' This was followed in the next year by the conspiracy of Cinadon against the tyrannical oligarchy of the Spartans, whose numbers were rapidly declining. Though it was suppressed and punished with great severity, it threw a strong light on the internal weakness of Sparta, and encouraged her enemies to attack her. Accordingly, when in B.C. 395 the satrap Tithraustes—hoping to secure the recall of Agesilaus from Asia—sent Timocrates to offer money to certain cities to enable them to make war against Sparta, he was gladly received at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos. The Athenians do not seem to have been bribed, but they welcomed the opportunity of striking a blow for the recovery of their lost power. The first bloodshed was at Haliartus in Boeotia, where the Thebans, who were on their way to aid the Locrians against the Phocians in a dispute about territory, defeated and killed Lysander who was coming from Sparta to help the Phocians. Then the allies mustered at Corinth, near which in the spring of B.C. 394 they were

ii. Spartan invasion of Elis, B.C. 399
—8. Conspiracy of Cinadon in Sparta, B.C. 397. Combination of Thebes, Corinth, Argos and Athens against Sparta, B.C. 395. Battle of Corinth, B.C. 394.

decisively beaten by the Spartans. But this reverse was more than compensated by the victory of Conon at Cnidus.

Since the disaster at Aegospotami (B.C. 405) Conon had been residing with Evagoras king of Cyprus. In B.C. 397 Pharnabazus had consulted with Evagoras and Conon as to raising a fleet in Phoenicia and elsewhere, to protect Asia from the Spartan invasion. Conon was made commander of the Greek part of it. In B.C. 396-5 he induced the powerful island of Rhodes to establish a democracy and to abandon alliance with Sparta; and made himself master of the Southern Aegean. But it was not till more than a year afterwards (B.C. 394) that he was able to induce Peisander to come out and give him battle. This was at last accomplished off Cnidus. In this battle the Greek ships under Conon had the chief share of the fighting, though they were supported by Pharnabazus and his Phoenician fleet. Peisander was deserted by his allies and fell fighting gallantly. The Spartan fleet was entirely destroyed or dispersed; and Conon went on to visit the islands of the Aegean, expelling the Spartan governors, and promising the islanders autonomy and freedom from molestation. Pharnabazus, who had accompanied Conon on this voyage, then left him to carry on the same policy in his own satrapy in the north. He presented Conon with 40 ships, and agreed to winter with him at Sestos. In the spring of B.C. 393, after some further operations among the islands, Conon sailed to Athens, where by the help of money supplied by Pharnabazus he at once began the restoration of the long walls.

The supremacy of Sparta in the Aegean was at an end: but she was still strong in Central Greece, where she was facing gallantly a combination of Argos, Corinth, Athens, Boeotia, and other allies. Agesilaus was summoned home in B.C. 394, and in his march down the country he defeated the allied forces about the middle of August at

12. Conon
defeats the
Spartans off
Cnidus, end of
July B.C. 394.
Recall of
Agesilaus
from Asia.

13. The
combination
against
Sparta.
Battles of
Coroneia
(B.C. 394),
Lechaeum
(B.C. 392).

Coroneia. He then marched away and crossed the gulf of Corinth for home. Next year he led an army to Sicyon to watch the allied forces again mustered at Corinth. Nothing important took place in B.C. 393, but in the following year (B.C. 392) the Spartans defeated the allies between the long walls uniting Corinth with its harbour at Lechaëum, within which they had been admitted by treachery. For a year and a half afterwards the Spartans were supreme in the district along the Corinthian gulf, and threatened Argos with a serious invasion. The tide was turned in the next year (B.C. 390) by the Athenian Iphicrates, who cut to pieces a Spartan *mora* or company with a body of light-armed troops or peltasts, equipped and trained in a special manner which he was the first to introduce into the Athenian army. The loss of life does not seem to have been serious, but the moral effect was great. For the Spartan infantry had been looked upon as all but invincible.

But still more fatal to the prestige of the Spartans was the evident fact that they were ready to surrender Greek interests to Persia. In B.C. 387 their ambassador Antalcidas concluded a treaty with the king which practically gave up everything for which they had been fighting, and to secure which the Confederacy of Delos had once existed. It took the shape of a royal edict conveying certain orders to the Greeks: but, though offensive to Greek feeling, this was perhaps merely the form of all documents issuing from the Persian court. Its substance however was as offensive as its form was peremptory. All Greek cities in Asia were declared to belong to the king, all others to be autonomous, except Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, which were to belong to Athens. He would make war on any State refusing to accept the settlement.

In spite of the humiliating terms of this treaty or edict, Agesilaus obtained the oath of acquiescence from all the States. The Theban deputies at first refused, not from general dislike to the treaty, but because they claimed that Boeotia

14. The
peace of
Antalcidas,
B.C. 387.

should be regarded as a single State, for which Thebes was to be spokesman. A threat of Spartan invasion however soon

15. From the peace of Antalcidas to the battle of Leuctra, B.C. 387—371.

induced them to accept it and acknowledge the independence of the Boeotian towns. Thus the Spartans managed for some time to keep the Greek States isolated and too weak to resist their orders. But this surrender to Persia fatally

damaged their credit; and a number of tyrannical acts in the following three years increased their unpopularity. Mantinea, for instance, was ordered to pull down its walls.

On its refusal the town was besieged, the walls destroyed, and the inhabitants compelled to live in open hamlets (B.C. 385). Again in B.C. 382, in pursuance of the same separatist policy, the Spartans declared war against Olynthus which had formed a confederacy of neighbouring towns, including Pella in Macedonia. While Phoebidas was leading a body of Spartan troops to reinforce the army at Olynthus, he was admitted by treachery into Thebes, and occupied the citadel or Cadmeia. This aggression was maintained for nearly seven years, and caused deep resentment among patriotic Thebans. Again in B.C. 380 the little State of Phlius in the Peloponnesus was besieged by Agesilaus because certain exiles, whom the Spartans had forced the Phliasians to restore, had caused a serious civil strife. Phlius fell in B.C. 379, as at length did Olynthus also. But the war with Olynthus had lasted nearly four years, during which the Spartans had suffered more than one defeat; and on the whole had become less and less liked or respected in Greece.

The first actual blow to their supremacy was the expulsion of the Spartan garrison from the citadel of Thebes. This was effected by a number of young

16. Spartans driven from the Cadmeia. War between Sparta and Thebes, B.C. 378—371.

men—among whom was Pelopidas—who killed the heads of the treasonable party which had admitted the Spartans. They then gathered a large force of citizens and—assisted by some Athenians—took the place by assault. The Spartan

government, which had originally punished Phoebidas under pretence of disavowing his action, but had yet retained the Cadmeia, could not overlook this blow to their pride. In the next three years, B.C. 378—376, there were frequent Spartan invasions of Boeotia. At first the Thebans offered to acknowledge the hegemony of Sparta, if she would acquiesce in the expulsion of the garrison from the Cadmeia. But when the Spartans would not listen to this, the Thebans determined to resist. In this they were supported by the Athenians, who profited by the difficulties of Sparta to strike for a new supremacy at sea. The Thebans were nearly always successful in repulsing the Spartan invasions of Boeotia; and were able to restore the old league of Boeotian towns to repel the common danger. At length in B.C. 371, when Cleombrotus king of Sparta invaded Boeotia again, to compel Thebes to join the peace to which the other States had just agreed, he was defeated and killed by the great general Epameinondas at the battle of LEUCTRA. For ten years after that battle Thebes was the strongest city in Greece.

A striking consequence of these contests between Sparta and Thebes, was the revival of Athens as a naval power. In B.C. 378 she proposed a new naval confederacy, which was joined first by Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes and Mytilene, shortly afterwards by Euboea, and then by many of the islands and States which had once belonged to the Confederacy of Delos, to the number altogether of about seventy. The object of the confederacy, as stated on the still existing *stelè*, was to maintain the freedom of the States belonging to it against Sparta. The Athenians promise to help by every means any State, the freedom of which is threatened. They undertake moreover not to place a garrison or governor in any of the States, nor to exact tribute (*phoros*), nor to acquire land or houses in them. There is to be a commission of allies (*synedroî*) to consider and punish any breach of the treaty. The allies in return promise to assist

17. Renewed
Athenian
Confederacy,
B.C. 378.

Athens if attacked. It appears from other *stelae* that a certain sum of money was to be paid, but it was to be called a contribution (*σύνταξις*) not a tribute (*φóρος*). This new association lasted 23 years (till B.C. 355), when as a result of the 'Social war' the allies were all declared independent. But meanwhile it served to restore the prestige of Athens. In B.C. 375 Timotheus, son of Conon, defeated the Peloponnesian fleet and forced Corcyra, Acarnania, and other States in the west to join the alliance; and two years afterwards (B.C. 373) Iphicrates at the head of the Athenian fleet still farther established the supremacy of Athens in the Ionian sea. These operations were interrupted by a short peace or armistice between Athens and Sparta in B.C. 374, and suspended altogether by the general peace of B.C. 371, which the Thebans however refused to accept, and supported their refusal by their victory at Leuctra. After that time the State whose power was formidable was not Sparta but Thebes. And it was against Thebes that fresh combinations were now made.

The hero of the ten years of Theban supremacy is Epameinondas—one of the greatest and purest names in Greek History. Though of a good family he was poor, but his devoted friend Pelopidas was rich and could supply him with all that he needed. He was better educated than most of his countrymen, and his character gave him great influence. He had not actually joined in the measures taken to get rid of the Spartan garrison; but had approved of them and supported Pelopidas. In military matters he introduced the system of the phalanx, afterwards used so effectively by the Macedonians—that is, a body of men massed sixteen deep, armed with long spears (*sarissae*), which on favourable ground could disperse an enemy by the weight of its charge. He had been one of the Theban ambassadors at Sparta who claimed that in the peace of Antalcidas Thebes should take the oath for the whole of Boeotia; and he seems to have made it the object of his life to increase the power of Thebes. Under

18. Theban
supremacy,
B.C. 371–362.

his advice the Thebans now began active interference in the Peloponnese in order to encourage resistance to Sparta. Mantinea was restored, and all Arcadia was united in a confederacy, with a new capital called Megalopolis. Epameinondas also marched at the head of an army into Laconia itself, as far as the harbour town of Gythium, and returned safely in spite of large bodies of allies from Athens, among other places, arriving to defend the country. He then entered Messenia and encouraged the restoration of the old capital Messene round Mount Ithome, as a centre from which to uphold Messenian independence. It cannot be said that these measures added much to the peace and happiness of the Peloponnesians generally. Not only did the Arcadians sustain a severe defeat at the hands of the Spartans in B.C. 368, in revenge for several successful raids started on their own account, but they presently quarrelled with Elis also, with the result that there were several invasions on both sides (B.C. 365—364). Finally the Arcadians quarrelled with each other on the subject of the possession of Olympia, which they had wrested from the Eleans in B.C. 364, the two sides calling for help, the one from Sparta and Athens, the other from Thebes. Nor did the final settlement of all these squabbles give general satisfaction. The fourth invasion of the Peloponnese under Epameinondas was ended by the victory of MANTINEIA (B.C. 362), but it was a victory dearly purchased by the death of Epameinondas himself: and from the pacification that followed the Spartans held sullenly aloof, because they would not recognise the independence of Messenia; while some of the Arcadian cities had to be forced to remain members of the league of which the centre was Megalopolis. Everywhere the action of Thebes had tended to weaken and split up Greece into small leagues. Thus between B.C. 369—364 they made several attempts to destroy the unity of Thessaly, which had been partly secured by the cruel Jason of Pherae, who being elected *tagus* of Thessaly established a kind of dominion over the whole country. The first invasion

under Pelopidas (after Jason's murder) had the desired effect of establishing the independence of the Thessalian towns from Jason's successors: as also did another in B.C. 364 from Alexander of Pherae, undertaken after the death of Pelopidas. But it cannot be thought that the disunion and weakness of Thessaly was anything but a misfortune to Greece in view of the coming struggle with Macedonia. The policy of Epameinondas also thoroughly alienated Athens, by establishing a Theban supremacy in Euboea (B.C. 371) and occupying Oropus (B.C. 366), thus creating a bitterness of feeling between the two cities which was afterwards a source of much trouble. Epameinondas was reported to have said that he would remove the ornaments of the Acropolis to Thebes: and once at any rate by sailing with a fleet to Byzantium he attempted to extend the Theban hegemony to the sea—the greatest possible blow to Athenian interests as well as to Athenian pride (B.C. 364). Nor had Thebes, any more than Sparta, kept Greece free from Persian interference. The Asiatic Greek towns were left under the yoke without even a suggestion of help: and in B.C. 367 Pelopidas went to Susa to invoke the help of the Great King in establishing a peace on conditions which the Thebans approved. The ten years of Theban supremacy were fruitful in nothing but increased division and weakness. At the end of it there was no large and powerful State: though Athens had recovered something of her old maritime supremacy and vigour. But Sparta was permanently weakened, without any other Peloponnesian State being ready to take her place: Thessaly was split up into petty States; and even the Boeotian league, though still existing, had been disgraced and weakened by the unjust destruction of Orchomenus and of the lately restored city of Plataea.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE MACEDONIAN PERIOD. FROM B.C. 361 TO THE
BATTLE OF CHAERONEIA, B.C. 338.

The ten years of Theban supremacy had left Greece weak and divided, but during the latter part of them Athens had made considerable progress in the recovery of her naval supremacy. Opposition to Thebes was kept alive by the interference of the Thebans in Euboea and Oropus; but the chief interests of Athens were after all in the north. To recover her authority in the Thracian Chersonese and at Amphipolis was of the utmost importance in view of the corn trade of the Black Sea. Artaxerxes had been induced to declare Amphipolis to be Athenian territory. But it had to be won by arms in spite of the royal rescript. Timotheus (and afterwards Chares) was therefore sent out with a fleet and in the course of B.C. 365-4 recovered Samos and Sestos, and established Athenian authority in part of the Chersonese and Chalcidice. But he failed to take Amphipolis: and an intermittent war—varied by treaties of friendship—went on with the Thracian king Cotys and, after his murder in B.C. 358, with his successor Cersobleptes. The object was always the same—the possession of the Thracian Chersonese, commanding the Hellespont. It was these

1. The re-
establishment
of Athenian
power in the
Thracian
Chersonese
and Amphipo-
lis attempted,
B.C. 365-358.

interests in the north that brought Athens before long into collision with the rising power of Macedonia, and forced her to come forward as the champion of Greek freedom against the Macedonian king.

The name of Macedonia originally attached to a narrow district between the Haliacmon and Axios, with a capital at Pella, and with no access—or at any rate no good access—to the sea. But a dynasty of active and warlike sovereigns had gradually extended their dominions to the north as far as the Strymon. To the south it was always their object to get control of the coast of Pieria and the Chalcidic peninsula, as offering them the desired communication with the sea. Thus the town of Pydna had alternately been held by a Macedonian king and by the Athenians. The Macedonians, though never acknowledged as Hellenic, seem in many ways to have been nearer allied to the Thessalians and other Northern Greeks than to the barbarians that surrounded them. The kings who for many generations had governed them claimed to be descended from the Temenidae of Argos, from whom came Perdiccas the founder of the dynasty. They were little known in Greece till the reign of Amyntas I and his son Alexander, whom we heard of as unwillingly submitting to Persia in the invasion of B.C. 480 (p. 164). Between the death of this Alexander called the ‘Philhellene’ (about B.C. 454) and Philip II who succeeded in B.C. 359, there had been seven sovereigns. They were prevented from much extension of their dominions to the east, and from interference in Greek politics, by having constantly to struggle for existence with the Illyrians and other western barbarians. Philip’s brother and immediate predecessor Perdiccas III fell in a great battle with the Illyrians in B.C. 360, and Philip was at first nominally guardian to his infant nephews. But the dangers surrounding the country were too great to allow of the reign of an infant; and in B.C. 359—owing it is said to the urgent entreaties of the people—Philip assumed the crown.

2. The rise
of Macedonia.

He was in his 23rd year, and had during part of his boyhood lived at Thebes under the care of Epameinondas. The circumstances connected with his being at Thebes as a hostage are obscure, but it seems certain that he was there at least three years, and owed much to the instruction and example of Epameinondas both in general culture and in the knowledge of military affairs. He assumed the crown at a time of great danger. The Illyrians were attacking the country on the west, the Paeonians on the east. One pretender to the crown named Pausanias was being supported by the Thracians, and another called Argæus by an Athenian fleet under Mantias. But Philip shewed himself well able to grapple with these difficulties. By cunning diplomacy or bribes the barbarians were induced to refrain for a time from farther raids, or from attempting to support a pretender: while by a sudden march he caught up and defeated a band of mercenary soldiers who, with the connivance of the Athenian Mantias, had advanced to Aegæe in the interest of Argæus. Meanwhile he devoted himself to equipping and training his army, using the knowledge which he had attained under Epameinondas, especially in the formation and working of the phalanx.

3. Philip II
(B.C. 359—336)
succeeds to the
crown of
Macedonia
amidst many
dangers.

Philip temporarily disarmed the opposition of Athens by withdrawing all claim to Amphipolis. He declared it a free town, but with a secret promise to the Athenians that he would aid them to get possession of it. For a year and a half neither he nor the Athenians were inclined to take any farther step. He was engaged in subduing the Paeonians and Illyrians, while the attention of the Athenians was taken up with a successful struggle to drive the Thebans from Euboea and recover their control of the island. However, Philip's hands were free from his barbarous enemies before the Athenians had finished the

4. B.C. 359
—358. Peace
between
Philip and
Athens, B.C.
357. Philip's
first aggres-
sions at
Amphipolis,
Pydna and
Olynthus.

business of Euboea. Taking advantage of this he determined to secure the command of the coast. He seized Pydna on the Thermaic gulf, which was in alliance with Athens, and then proceeded to threaten Amphipolis. Now the possession of Amphipolis was desired by Olynthus, representing a powerful league of cities on the Chalcidic peninsula. The people of Amphipolis in terror sent to Athens for help, promising to join Athens if defended from Philip. But the king assured the Athenians that, if he took it, he would hand it over to them, and gave a similar secret assurance to the Olynthians. He farther conciliated the Olynthians by giving up to them the frontier town of Anthemus, which had always been a subject of dispute. He then took Amphipolis by storm—handed it over neither to Athens nor to Olynthus, but retained possession of it himself. At the same time he strengthened the anti-Attic interests of Olynthus by seizing Potidaea—where there were many Athenian cleruchs—and handing it over to the Olynthians (B.C. 356). He then went to Thrace, where he was busy for some time in enriching himself with the gold from the mines of Mount Pangaeus. The town of Crenides with its harbour of Datum—a proverb for wealth—was the centre of this mining district. Defeating the Thracians, who were attacking it, Philip possessed himself of Crenides, which he refounded under the name of Philippi, and filled his exchequer with the produce of the mines. He coined gold staters—called Philippei—which long formed the chief gold currency in Greece: and thus provided himself with what he knew to be the most potent means of penetrating the walls of fortified towns. He was quickly becoming the most formidable man of his day. In B.C. 356 three great pieces of good fortune befell him—a victory over the Illyrians and Paeonians by his general Parmenion, the birth of his son Alexander, and the victory of his horses at Olympia. Between that date and the end of B.C. 353 he was continually strengthening his position and his hold on the sea-board.

Meanwhile the distracted state of Greece had secured

Philip from any interference in these operations. Athens was involved in a war with the three sea-powers Byzantium, Chios and Rhodes, which in B.C. 356 renounced their membership of the league formed in B.C. 378. Their pretext for doing this was that Athens had broken the terms of the alliance in sending cleruchs to Samos and other places which she had conquered and compelled to join the league. They feared, or affected to fear, that Athens would destroy their independence also. They perhaps saw no danger threatening them sufficiently formidable to make them incur the expenses of the league, rendered the heavier by the fact that Athens now employed mercenary soldiers, who had to look for their pay chiefly in levying contributions from conquered countries or from allies. After three campaigns the war ended in B.C. 355 with an acknowledgment of their independence. Athens being thus weakened, Central Greece was rendered still more open to foreign interference by a war against Phocis proclaimed by the Amphictyonic Council, principally under the influence of Thebes, on the ground that the Phocians had cultivated some of the sacred territory of Delphi. The Phocians in self-defence seized the treasures of the Temple, and the war dragged on for ten years, with varying success (B.C. 356—346). The Phocians were supported—though with little vigour—by Athens and Sparta, while the confederacy against them was headed by Thebes. As usual, the continuance of a war involving a number of States on both sides produced struggles in other parts of Greece more or less connected with it. Thus the Spartans took advantage of Thebes being engaged in the Sacred war to try to recover their control over Messenia, and their supremacy in the Peloponnese generally, threatening the Arcadian league and its capital Megalopolis. Both the Messenians and the Arcadians appealed for help to Athens; and though this did not bring about an actual breach of the peace between Sparta and Athens, there seemed great danger of its

Athens was

5. The
Social war,
B.C. 357—355.
The Sacred
war, B.C. 356
—346.


doing so. In Thessaly also there was a rebellion of the cities against the supremacy of the tyrants of Pherae, who were actively supported by the Phocians. Everywhere there seemed unrest and division.

This was the very opportunity for Philip. He was appealed to for aid by the cities of Thessaly and resolved to give it. He first besieged and destroyed Methone on the Thermaic gulf, which the Athenian fleet arrived too late to save, and then marched into Thessaly. At first (B.C. 353) he was unsuccessful, being twice defeated by the Phocian general Onomarchus. But the next year (B.C. 352) he not only defeated and killed Onomarchus, but marched down as far as Thermopylae, as though with the intention of invading Phocis. He affected to consider his victory over Onomarchus as won in the cause of the Delphic Apollo, and ordered his soldiers to wear bay-leaves as champions of the god. He took Pherae and proclaimed it a free town; and laid siege to Pagasae. The people of Pagasae sent hastily to Athens for help, which however failed to arrive in time. Philip was now able to threaten Euboea and Attica itself, and certain ships in his pay did actually make some raids on the Attic coast. But the Athenians were now thoroughly alarmed, and though they had failed to relieve Pagasae, they did send a fleet in time to prevent Philip from passing Thermopylae.

6. Philip's interference in Greek politics begins in Thessaly.

7. Beginning of the opposition of Demosthenes to Philip, B.C. 352.

Up to this time there seems to have been little or no clear perception either of Philip's aims or of his abilities. In B.C. 354 Demosthenes—just beginning to be influential—when recommending a reform in the administration of the navy, assumed that the enemy to be resisted was still Persia. And as late as B.C. 352 he said in a speech (about Rhodes) that it was too much the fashion to disparage Philip and think little of him. But though he warns the people against that view, he had evidently only just become converted



To face p. 285

DEMOSTHENES

himself. In the autumn of the same year however Philip, having returned from Pagasae, began meddling with the Thracian Chersonese. That was always the one thing the Athenians would not endure; and Demosthenes now found it easier to rouse his countrymen to throw off their policy of indifference to Philip's proceedings: and to keep

1st Philippic,
B.C. 351.

an army and fleet ready to start at any moment if a fresh aggression were reported. From this time forward Demosthenes made it his chief business to watch and thwart Philip. And it was not long before he had good reason for calling upon the citizens to act. Philip by the possession of Amphipolis, Pydna, Methone and Pagasae, had gained the command of a great part of the eastern coast of Greece. But this coast-line was cut in two by the projecting Chalcidic peninsula, held by a league of cities, in which Athens had always claimed some authority. The Chalcidic league had been dissolved in B.C. 379 by Sparta, but had partially revived. Philip—as we have seen—had used the jealousy existing between its chief town Olynthus and Athens with advantage to himself in the matter of Amphipolis (B.C. 358), and had subsequently strengthened Olynthus at the expense of Athens by annexing Potidaea to the league. Now after two years of secret intrigues, of which we have little information, he determined to invade Chalcidice. The Olynthians sent hastily for help

The Olyn-
thiac Orations,
B.C. 349.

to Athens. In three stirring speeches Demosthenes tried to rouse his countrymen to move in time to save Olynthus, and thus keep from their own frontiers the attack which Philip would surely make. But his advice was not followed. The citizens preferred to waste their strength on an unsuccessful attempt to recover Euboea, which had again revolted, and when at length in B.C. 348 a force was sent to Olynthus, it arrived too late to save the town. Philip treated the towns confederate with Olynthus, as well as Olynthus itself, with great severity. They were all dismantled and a large number of their inhabitants

Fall of
Olynthus,
B.C. 348.

—it is said 10,000—were sold as slaves. This was sufficient to rouse the bitterest feelings against Philip at Athens. But the Athenians had found it impossible to organise a league in the Peloponnesus to resist him, and they knew that he had the support of Thebes and Thessaly. They had to choose therefore between opposing him almost single handed, or making peace with him.

The proposals for sending ambassadors to the king were for the most part made by Philocrates, after whom the subsequent peace is often called.

8. The peace of Philocrates, B.C. 346.

The objects at which the ambassadors—among whom were Demosthenes and his great rival Aeschines—had to aim were (1) to secure that they were not ousted from the Thracian Chersonese, (2) to induce Philip to withdraw from Amphipolis, (3) to prevent him from passing Thermopylae and attacking the Phocians. The embassy led to a famous controversy between Demosthenes and Aeschines, each accusing the other of treachery, and of having been bribed by Philip to give a too favourable report of his intentions. But whatever was the truth, it is certain that the terms which the envoys obtained did not fulfil the professed objects of the embassy. Philip consented to peace with Athens and her allies simply on the conditions that each was to keep whatever they had got. The Phocians were not included in it, nor Cersobleptes of Thrace. Philip was therefore still free to do what he pleased in Thrace, except with such towns as were actually in the Athenian alliance, and to act in any way he chose as to the Sacred war with the Phocians. Moreover, until the oaths were actually taken, he might continue to seize towns and then claim to retain them. It was therefore necessary that the ambassadors sent to announce the Athenian acceptance of the terms should visit the king as soon as possible. But whether from the deliberate treason of the ambassadors—as Demosthenes alleges—or because the king cunningly postponed the interview, the oaths were not taken

by him till late in June, when he had already possessed himself of several fresh strongholds in Thrace.

Thus relieved from the opposition of Athens Philip acted as the ruler of a Greek State possessed of a paramount authority. The pass of Thermopylae had been put into his hands by a private understanding with the Phocian leader Phalaecus.

9. Philip takes a leading part in Greek politics, B.C. 346—341.

He at once entered Phocis, summoned a meeting of the Amphictyonic Council, and obtained its decree for the dismemberment of Phocis, the dismantling of twenty-two of its towns, and an order that the Phocians were to possess neither horses nor arms till they had paid a fine of 10,000 talents. They and the Spartans were also to be expelled from the Council, and the two votes were to be transferred to Philip, who was also to preside at the Pythian games. Thus the Sacred war was at an end, leaving Philip an acknowledged Greek power, and the strongest in existence. The Athenians indeed saw when too late that they had been deceived. They had consented to Oropus remaining Theban; Amphipolis a possession of Philip; to Chios, Cos and Rhodes being members of a Carian confederacy independent of themselves; to Cardia their one colony in the Chersonese being separated from their alliance, and to Byzantium recovering its naval power—all for the sake of a peace which brought them nothing. But Demosthenes pointed out that, having yielded all these important points, it would be folly to go to war with Philip for 'a shadow at Delphi'—that is, because he was allowed to preside at the Pythian games. They therefore gave a somewhat sullen acquiescence, and contented themselves with refraining from sending representatives to the games.

But Philip, caring little for such marks of discontent, steadily worked to gain his object of being supreme in all Greece. He supported Thebes, as the best make-weight against Athens in Central Greece, and Messenia and Argos in the Peloponnese against Sparta; and established his creatures

in the Thessalian towns. He was not of course uniformly successful. He secured indeed an influence in Elis, and established tyrants subservient to himself in certain towns in Euboea; but in Aetolia and Ambracia he was checked by an Acarnanian league formed by the influence of Demosthenes, who never ceased urging the

10. Continued ag-
gressions of Philip.
The Second
Philippic of
Demosthenes,
B.C. 344.

Athenians to take every precaution against Philip: for, though not openly proclaiming war, he was constantly doing what amounted to acts of war. The strained feeling between Athens and Philip came to a crisis in B.C. 342, when the king again threatened the Thracian Chersonese. The ground for his action was the despatch of some Athenian cleruchs to the Chersonese, who though not refused admission by the other towns were rejected by Cardia (in the Isthmus), which had been left in Philip's hands by the peace of B.C. 346. The Athenian commander Diopceithes endeavoured to force the Cardians to admit them, and Philip remonstrated against this as a breach of the treaty. Demosthenes urged that, if Diopcei-

Speech on the
Chersonese
and the Third
Philippic,
B.C. 341.

thes had been guilty of a technical breach of the peace, it was amply justified by Philip's own acts of hostility; and that, instead of disavowing Diopceithes, they ought to send aid to the Chersonese and to Byzantium—both of which Philip intended to absorb. For a time the exhortations of Demosthenes had effect. By his exertions Philip's partisans were driven from Euboea, and agreements were come to with that island, and with Byzantium, Acarnania, Achaia, Corinth, Megara, Corcyra and Leucadia, to join in resisting the encroachments of the king.

Philip's answer to this was to lay siege to Perinthus and Byzantium in B.C. 340. The Athenians declared that Philip had thereby broken the treaty of peace, and sent an expedition under Chares to relieve Byzantium. But Chares had so bad a character for rapacity, that the Byzantians, who had already

received assistance from Rhodes, Chios, and Cos, refused to admit him into the city. He did no good therefore among alienated allies by his rapacious demands for money. The Athenians wished to give up the expedition altogether. But Phocion, who had already done good service in Euboea and Megara, and who was generally an opponent of Demosthenes, persuaded the people to recall Chares and send another expedition. He was sent himself, and as his character gained the confidence of the allies, he did some excellent service. Early in B.C. 339 Philip was compelled to raise the siege of both Perinthus and Byzantium.

11. Philip attacks Perinthus and Byzantium.

But in the summer of the same year another 'Sacred war,' proclaimed by the Amphictyons against Amphissa, some seven miles from Delphi, for the usual offence of cultivating part of the sacred plain, gave Philip an excuse for again interfering in Greece. He was invited by the Amphictyonic Council to coerce Amphissa, which had resisted the attack of their army and refused to pay its fine. He accepted the invitation and promptly marched south. One evening in the early part of B.C. 338 news reached Athens that he had occupied Elateia. This was a town on the frontier of Phocis and Boeotia, and its occupation shewed that Philip's object was not to go to Amphissa but to descend into the plain of Boeotia. The alarm in Southern Greece was great as it was sudden. An assembly at Athens was hastily summoned for next morning, and when no one ventured to come forward, Demosthenes rose to advocate the most energetic measures. Ambassadors—of whom he was one—were sent to Thebes, offering an oblivion of all former quarrels and the presence of a protecting army. The other allies of Athens were also summoned and a considerable force was collected. The war at first seems to have been somewhat in favour of the allies. At any rate Demosthenes speaks of two successful

12. The Amphissian war. Philip occupies Elateia, B.C. 339—338.

engagements, and certainly Philip did not advance against Thebes or Athens, but marched rather in the direction of Amphissa, as though to maintain the show of having come merely as the champion of the Amphictyonic Council.

But about the end of August the manœuvring of the two armies—of which we know nothing—brought them face to face near Chaeroneia. The Greeks sustained a crushing defeat. The ‘sacred band’ of the Thebans was annihilated, 1000 Athenians fell and 2000 were taken prisoners, besides large numbers of the allies and mercenaries. It was the end of all resistance. The Athenians had to surrender all their foreign dominions in return for being left unharmed, receiving back their prisoners without ransom, and being allowed to resume possession of Oropus. Thebes had to admit a Macedonian garrison; and when Philip continued his march into the Peloponnese, all the cities submitted except Sparta. From henceforth Philip acted as absolute master of Greece, giving and withdrawing territory and lands as he chose: while both in the Peloponnese and in Central Greece he punished by death or exile some of his most pronounced opponents, though Athens in this respect was left untouched. He did not however destroy local autonomy. The cities remained as they were, outwardly independent and enjoying their own laws. But all leagues or combinations naturally ceased to exist, and where it seemed necessary Macedonian garrisons were freely introduced. A congress of representatives was summoned at Corinth, the conditions to be accorded to each State were settled, and the number of troops which they were to furnish to the army defined.

13. Battle of
Chaeroneia,
August,
B.C. 338.

14. Philip's
rule over
Greece and its
effects.

It seems as though this might have been a happy thing for Greece on the whole; giving her peace and safety, and a respite from the eternal petty wars waged by small States with each other, as well as from the almost as constant party strife within each separate city. But something in the Greek nature

prevented its kindly development in such a combination under one head. Everything seemed to droop and languish—population, industry, patriotism, art, poetry and eloquence. Demosthenes had no successor, nor were the glories of the Attic stage ever renewed. Philosophy was still studied and developed, but to the men of the next century it seemed to have degenerated into endless quibbling or useless refinements. Greek literature did not die, but henceforth it was to flourish more vigorously in other places than in Greece itself.

Having secured control of Greece Philip turned his attention to what had been perhaps for some time his object—to free Greece in Asia from the Persians, and make Lower Asia once more a part of Hellas. For this purpose he caused himself to be elected by the assembly at Corinth ‘general with full powers’ (στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ) for all Greece. But he was not destined to carry out his design.

15. Philip
elected
general for
war against
Persia,
B.C. 337.
His death
and character,
B.C. 336.

Early the next year, at the marriage of his daughter to Alexander, king of Epirus, he was assassinated by a captain of his own body-guard named Pausanias. As usual it remains doubtful whether the crime was an act of private vengeance, or whether Pausanias was acting in the interests of others. A guilty knowledge has been attributed to Philip’s wife Olympias and to his son Alexander, and by some it was suggested that Pausanias was an agent of the Persian king. Philip had no doubt many vices. His court is said to have been scandalous; he was unscrupulous and perhaps cruel and false. But his life of ceaseless activity seems to make it unlikely that he could in fact have indulged freely in personal excess. That he was not without magnanimous feelings is shewn by his treatment of Athens. His military abilities were great, his courage unquestioned, and he drilled and disciplined a rough and independent people, not only into an irresistible fighting machine, but into some semblance of civilisation and order.

CHAPTER XX.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT

Alexander, the son of Philip, was only twenty years old at the time of his father's death; but he quickly shewed that he was worthy to be his son. He found himself menaced by dangers within and without his kingdom. The relations of his father's second wife were plotting against him at home, the barbarians in the north were threatening war, and a movement in Greece in favour of independence was believed to be fostered by gold from King Darius Codomannus, who hoped by giving Alexander employment there to prevent the expedition into Persia which his father had planned. This conspiracy was being promoted by Demosthenes, who was believed to have received a large part of the Persian gold, and seemed likely to be serious.

But the rapidity of Alexander's movements disconcerted all his enemies. The leaders of the intrigues at home were put to death. Soon after his father's murder in July he appeared in Greece at the head of an army. The cities hastened to give in their submission, and a congress at Corinth elected him 'general' of the Greeks, as Philip had been. Early the next year (B.C. 335) he invaded and crushed the Triballi, on the Danube, and reduced all the northern barbarian tribes to obedience. While he was thus engaged the movement was

1. Alexander II (the Great),
B.C. 336-323,
b. B.C. 356.

2. Alexander establishes his control over Greece.

renewed in Greece, headed by the Thebans, owing to a false report of his death. But Alexander, fresh from his victories in the north, marched quickly through the pass of Thermopylae and appeared before the walls of Thebes. His offer of freedom being declined he stormed the city, and by September had taken and razed all the buildings to the ground—sparing nothing, it is said, but the house of the poet Pindar. A large number of the inhabitants fell in battle, and most of the rest were sold into slavery. A certain remnant, consisting of those who had opposed the war, were spared, and, as it seems, continued to live in the town which they partially restored. But from henceforth Thebes ceased to be a power in Greece, in which for some time Alexander had no more difficulties. Other States had joined with Thebes. The Athenians had been about to send forces to its support, the Eleans and Arcadians were actually on their way, and the Aetolians were in arms. But the fall of Thebes reduced them all to submission; and during the remaining eleven years of Alexander's life, which were spent in his great expedition into Asia, there was no more resistance in Greece, except for the abortive movement of Agis king of Sparta (B.C. 333–331) which ended in his defeat by Antipater near Megalopolis, where the king himself fell. Alexander treated the other Greek States magnanimously. He at first demanded from Athens the surrender of Demosthenes and eight other orators, but eventually was satisfied with the banishment of one—Charidemus. In other respects Athens and the rest of the towns were left unharmed, though they had mostly to admit Macedonian garrisons.

Immediately after the fall of Thebes (September-October) Alexander began the preparations for his great expedition against Persia. It was meant to put an end for ever to the Persian control of Greek cities and Persian interference in Greek politics. Its result was something much more important—namely, to create a greater Greece spreading over most of the Eastern

3. Alexander's invasion of the Persian Empire, B.C. 334–323.

world, as it was then known, from Egypt to India. Large parts of Asia were completely hellenised, and in the rest Greek cities were established which kept alive for many generations Greek habits and thoughts amidst a barbarous and alien population. Asiatic Greece gradually grew and prospered, until in course of time it came to be the chief seat of Hellenism, to which the Greece of Europe was looked upon as almost an outlying province. These results however were not those at which he aimed, nor did they come about till long after his death. For the present he was going, as the acknowledged head of the Greek race, to avenge upon its traditional enemy a long series of encroachments.

4. Battle of the Granicus and the conquest of Asia Minor, B.C. 334.

In the beginning of the spring of B.C. 334 Alexander crossed the Hellespont with an army of 30,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry. Of the infantry 12,000 were Macedonians, the rest were allied troops, partly Greek, partly barbarian. The cavalry was also a mixed body of Macedonians, Greeks, and others.

Landing at Abydos, the king first visited the traditional scenes described in Homer (for he was well acquainted with the *Iliad*), and in particular poured a libation at the tomb of Achilles. But he did not waste much time on these visits. The enemy in numbers much superior to his own had been posted by the Persian satrap on the Granicus, a river of Phrygia flowing into the Propontis. This army also consisted partly of Greeks, some of them Asiatic Greeks, immediately under the control of the Persian king. But there were other Greeks also from Europe, serving for the sake of pay, or because they desired the defeat of Alexander as likely to give freedom to Greece. The battle of the Granicus was mainly a cavalry battle: Alexander led his horsemen across the river in person and fought with the utmost gallantry. His life in fact was almost lost, and he was only saved by the timely assistance of Cleitus. When the Macedonian phalanx got across the river it had little to do but to cut down an already disorganised, alarmed, and



unresisting enemy. The only serious stand was made by the Greek mercenaries : and they were at length almost annihilated. The victory was followed by the rapid conquest of all Asia Minor. Sardis, Ephesus, Magnesia, Tralles, and many other towns were successively captured, or submitted without resistance. The only two cities which gave him any difficulty were Miletus and Halicarnassus. The former was blockaded at sea by Alexander's fleet of 160 vessels, which was accompanying his movements, and after some weeks' resistance surrendered. The latter held out till the beginning of winter.

The fleet was then dismissed and the Macedonian advance was continued in two columns. Alexander led one along the coast of Lycia and Pamphylia ; while Parmenion led the other from Sardis to Gordium on the Sangarius on the borders of Bithynia. After some successful operations against the Pisidians, Alexander turned north and joined Parmenion at Gordium. From Gordium he went to Ancyra, where he received the submission of the Paphlagonians. He apparently did not begin his march to the south-east until he was assured that a danger threatening nearer home was over. Memnon, the admiral of the Persian fleet, was subduing islands in the Aegean and threatening Greece and Macedonia. He however died early in B.C. 333, and then Alexander resumed his advance. He overran Cappadocia south of the Halys, and continued his march into Cilicia. At Tarsus he fell ill, and the delay thus caused gave Darius time to arrive at the eastern side of Mount Amanus which divides Cilicia from Syria. Parmenion was sent in advance to guard the pass or 'Gates' over Amanus, while Alexander employed himself in taking over certain cities in Cilicia. He then returned to Tarsus and proceeded by the Cilician Gates into Syria. Darius, who had already crossed by another pass into Cilicia, hearing of this followed him. Alexander, finding that his enemy was on his rear, turned to meet him near the town of Issus. In the

5. Battle of
Issus and
defeat of
Darius,
B.C. 333.

battle Darius was entirely defeated, with the loss it is said of over a hundred thousand men. The king himself escaped capture, but his wife and family, his camp and stores, all fell into the hands of Alexander.

After this victory Alexander moved upon Damascus, and in the course of this and the following year took almost without resistance the rest of Syria, Phoenicia, Palestine, and Egypt. He undertook these conquests without stopping to pursue Darius, because it was necessary to secure the Phoenician fleet and thus destroy the power of Persia at sea. The only place which offered resistance was Tyre. But that too fell after a seven months' siege (July, B.C. 332), during which a huge mole, connecting the island on which Tyre stood with the mainland, had been twice constructed (the first being destroyed by the sea), a large fleet collected, and every engine of war known at the time used against the walls. With the exception of Tyre and Gaza—which also stood a six months' siege—the cities of Syria, Palestine, and Egypt were taken almost without opposition. Alexander kept to the same policy throughout. Towns that did not resist were allowed to retain internal freedom and the enjoyment of their own laws, the form of government favoured or insisted upon being usually democratic. In Egypt he founded a new town between the lake Mareotis and the sea, which under the name of Alexandria rose to be one of the greatest and richest cities of the ancient world.

In the spring of the next year (B.C. 331) Alexander once more started on the march. He crossed the Euphrates in July, at Thapsacus. Thence, still unopposed, he marched across Mesopotamia to the Upper Tigris, crossed it, and marched for four days down its left bank. Darius with an immense army was at Gangamela, about 75 miles from Arbela. Here Alexander, prudently refusing a night assault, attacked and

6. Conquest
of Syria,
Phoenicia,
Palestine and
Egypt,
B.C. 333–32.

7. Battle of
Arbela,
B.C. 331
(September).

completely routed him with immense slaughter. Darius fled eastwards into Media, where he was murdered by the direction of Bessus, the satrap of Bactria. Alexander had pursued him with the utmost eagerness, but only arrived in time to find his dead body, which he sent to Persia to be buried in the royal tomb (B.C. 330).

Alexander now openly assumed the position of the Great King. He had subdued the whole of Asia Minor and Egypt, and was now master of Persia and Media. He had followed up the victory of Arbela by occupying all the royal cities. Babylon, Susa and Persepolis one after the other fell into his hands. His great march into the interior was not interrupted by the death of Darius.

8. Alexander king of all Asia. His great march through Media, Parthia, Bactria, Sogdiana to India, B.C. 330—325.

During the next five years (B.C. 330—325) he traversed an almost incredible tract of country. First reaching the south of the Caspian in Hyrcania, he turned westward as far as the river Mazyris. Then returning eastward, he marched through Hyrcania again to the Oxus. This march was begun in pursuit of Bessus, who had assumed the title of King of Asia. But when Bessus had been captured and put to death in Bactria, it was still continued. Bactria had been subdued in B.C. 329; and in Sogdiana on the farther side of the Oxus, where Bessus was captured, he continued nearly three years (B.C. 329—327) engaged in a difficult war with the wild people of the steppes. In the next year (B.C. 326) he crossed the Paropamisus range (*Hindu-cush*) into the lowlands of the Indus and invaded the Punjaub. He conquered King Porus, who opposed his passage of the Hydaspes (the *Behut* or *Jelum*), but his army refused to proceed farther than the Hyphasis (*Sutlej*), and he was obliged to return to the Indus. From the mouths of that river (B.C. 325) he marched back to Persepolis, while the fleet—which had been built in the Indian rivers—sailed along the Persian gulf under Nearchus. In the next year (B.C. 324) he visited the capital cities Susa, Opis, and Ecbatana, finally taking

up his residence in Babylon (B.C. 324-3). Throughout these years of marching and fighting he had had to contend not only with extraordinary natural difficulties, but with constant hostility on the part of the warlike native tribes. Nearly everywhere he had triumphed, and in many places had founded towns, to maintain his authority and continue the Hellenisation which was one of the chief objects of his expedition.

But though his victories were all but unbroken, the victor did not remain the same man. He adopted the habits, dress, and exclusiveness of an Eastern monarch. His court and the royal table were maintained with ostentatious magnificence, and his courtiers were compelled to pay him almost divine honours. Having about B.C. 327 married the Bactrian Roxana, in B.C. 324 he married a daughter of Darius as a second wife, after the manner of the Persian monarchs. This however was a measure of policy. He wished the Macedonians and Persians to amalgamate, and encouraged or compelled many of his Macedonian soldiers and officers to marry Persian wives. It was not a policy, however, which pleased his Macedonian army, which saw itself supplanted and superseded by Eastern troops and guards; and a very serious mutiny accordingly took place at Opis, on the Tigris, which was only allayed with great difficulty, and 10,000 of his Macedonian soldiers were sent home. He was engaged in B.C. 324-3 in subduing various hostile tribes, and was meditating other expeditions of a still more adventurous

9. Alexan-
der an Asiatic
monarch.

nature, when death overtook him at Babylon from a fever brought on partly by the extraordinary fatigues of the last five years, partly by intemperance, to which after a youth of unusual strictness he had succumbed. At his death some of the provinces of his huge empire continued to be administered by rulers whom he had himself nominated. The greater ones were now assigned to his principal generals—Ptolemy took Egypt, Antigonos most of Asia Minor, Asander Caria, Lysimachus Thrace, and so

10. Death of
Alexander,
B.C. 323.

on. They were nominally still under Macedonia, where Antipater, who had been left in charge when Alexander started, continued to administer the government, though Perdiccas was appointed guardian of the king of Macedonia—first Philip Arrhidaeus, half-brother of Alexander, and then Alexander his posthumous son by Roxana. But after years of struggle and several rearrangements, in B.C. 301 four chief independent kingdoms were developed out of the empire of the great conqueror—Macedonia under Cassander, son of Perdiccas, Egypt under Ptolemy, Syria under Seleucus, Thrace with Asia Minor under Lysimachus. These great military monarchies made European Greece insignificant as a world power. It has still a history, but after one more struggle for freedom, which we must now narrate, it sank for a long time into a state of dependence, varied by only occasional exhibitions of its old spirit.



ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE GREEKS AFTER ALEXANDER'S DEATH.

Alexander's brilliant successes in Asia, and the strength of the Macedonian army left at home under Antipater, had prevented much serious trouble in Greece. But there had been one movement in the Peloponnese which for about two years threatened to be dangerous. Agis II, a king of Sparta since B.C. 338, had prevented Sparta from joining in the general submission after the fall of Thebes in B.C. 335, and had already accepted money from the Persian satraps to attack Crete and establish there a base of naval resistance to Alexander (B.C. 333). In B.C. 331 he induced Elis, Achaia, and parts of Arcadia to join in a revolt against Macedonia. The rising was also joined by the Aetolians; and the Arcadian Megalopolis, which refused to join, or was prevented by its Macedonian garrison, was besieged. But Antipater quickly marched south and defeated the combined forces near that town in B.C. 330. The Spartans suffered very heavily, and were obliged to give hostages for their good behaviour, while sending ambassadors to Alexander to plead their pardon.

This was the last resistance in Greece during Alexander's life. The Macedonian party was in the ascendant in all the States. At Athens the opportunity was taken to procure the repudiation of the anti-Macedonian policy of Demosthenes by the condemnation of Ctesiphon, who seven years before had proposed to present Demosthenes with 'a crown'

1. An unsuccessful rising in the Peloponnese, B.C. 331-330.

2. The great trial of strength between Aeschines and Demosthenes, B.C. 330.

in recognition of his services. His great rival Aeschines had at once given notice of an 'indictment for illegal proposals': but the trial had been postponed for various political reasons. Though the indictment was nominally of Ctesiphon and was based on technical grounds, it was regarded as virtually a trial of the whole career and policy of Demosthenes. The prosecutors now thought that the success of Alexander being secure, a favourable time had come for trying it. The greatest interest was excited throughout Greece as to the result. It was felt to be a national, not a local or personal question: for if Demosthenes won the day it would be a sign that the Athenians did not repent of having resisted Macedonia, though now obliged to submit. Demosthenes was triumphant. Aeschines did not obtain a fifth of the votes and had to retire to Asia (B.C. 330). But though this shewed that the feeling against the supremacy of Macedonia had not died out, there was no longer either courage or power to give it practical effect, and till Alexander's death, in B.C. 323, there seems to have been almost complete repose in Greece. Some trouble was caused at Athens in B.C. 325 by the arrival of Harpalus, a dishonest officer of Alexander's, who fearing punishment for his misdeeds fled from Asia with large sums of money, with which he bribed Demosthenes and other orators to persuade the Athenians to give him refuge. But the risk of thus defying Alexander was great, and the bribery having been discovered, Demosthenes was banished and Harpalus imprisoned.

No sooner however was the death of Alexander known than Demosthenes returned to Athens, and a revolt was organized throughout Greece. The pretext was an order sent shortly before Alexander's death that every Greek State was to recall its exiles. This would have meant a danger to the existing government in nearly every Greek city, for the exiles were in each case the party in opposition. The movement therefore was general, and a leader of some ability was found in Leosthenes, an Athenian

3. The
Lamian war,
B.C. 323—322.

whose previous career is unknown to us, but who evidently enjoyed a high reputation. A force of 6000 Greek mercenaries happened to have been recently sent home from Asia by Alexander's orders, in pursuance of his policy of employing Asiatic troops. These were at once secured by Leosthenes, who also visited Aetolia and other districts to collect aid in troops and money. The only country which did not join was Boeotia. The Boeotian towns feared that, if the Greeks were successful, they would restore Thebes and enable her to renew her pretensions to supremacy in Boeotia. But Leosthenes not only defeated the Boeotians, but also Antipater himself, who had marched down to Thermopylae. Antipater was obliged to retire to Lamia, a small town in Malis, and was there besieged by Leosthenes. But before the end of the year B.C. 323 Leosthenes was mortally wounded in a sally of the besieged garrison. His successor Antiphilus early the next year was obliged to raise the siege of Lamia in order to meet a relief column under Leonnatus. He defeated and killed Leonnatus; but meanwhile Antipater had left Lamia and joined another relief column under Craterus, who had just returned from Asia with Alexander's veterans. They were joined by the remains of the column of Leonnatus, and retired along the road to Larissa in Thessaly as far as CRANNON. There Antiphilus attacked them, but in the battle, which took place in August (B.C. 322), the Greeks were defeated; and, though the defeat was not very decisive, Antiphilus had to retreat to some high ground and there remain inactive and helpless. He attempted to make terms with Antipater, but the Macedonian commander declined to treat with the Greeks as a body. Each State was to be considered separately; and he proceeded to reduce the cities of Thessaly without Antiphilus being able to stir. The earlier Greek successes had inspired a belief that the Macedonian cause was hopeless, and many of the Greek contingents had gone home. Now all the States submitted. The only two which hesitated were Athens and Aetolia.

Accordingly Antipater threatened an invasion of Attica. Eventually however an embassy headed by Phocion and Demades—who had all along supported the Macedonians—effected a peace. It was only granted on very severe terms. Athens was to give up the anti-Macedonian orators, especially Demosthenes and Hypereides; to pay the expenses of the war; to evacuate Samos; to admit a Macedonian garrison into Heracleia; and to limit the citizenship to men owning property worth 2000 drachmae. The orators fled, but after being condemned to death some were captured and put to death at Aegina, while Demosthenes poisoned himself in the small island of Calaurëia.

Death of
Demosthenes,
B.C. 322.

Most of the citizens who did not possess the minimum of 2000 drachmae were deported to Thrace. Only 9000 are said to have remained at Athens.

All the other cities in Greece were forced to submit in a similar manner, though they received terms more or less favourable in accordance with the attitude which they had assumed towards the Macedonians. But all had to submit, if required, to receive a Macedonian garrison, and to furnish troops to the Macedonian army. Antipater and Craterus next invaded Aetolia. But the Aetolians abandoned their villages and took refuge in the mountains, and the Macedonian generals had to give up the invasion in order to defend themselves against Perdiccas, the guardian of the young king and the whole empire, who wished to take over the government of Macedonia also. The Aetolian highlanders therefore retained their liberty, and presently became an important factor in Greek politics. With this exception Greece was formally subjected to Macedonia. But in the various changes that took place in the next twenty years (B.C. 321—301), though Athens fell into the hands of one sovereign after another¹, the contests for the throne of

4. State of
Greece after
the Lamian
war.

¹ In B.C. 318 Cassander; in B.C. 307 and 295 Demetrius Poliorcetes.

Macedonia, and for the independence of the parts into which Alexander's empire had actually been split, resulted in Greece being left a good deal to itself. In B.C. 311 indeed, at the third rearrangement of the provinces of the empire among Alexander's generals, it was formally declared free. But that was never actually the fact: and in B.C. 295 Demetrius Poliorcetes, coming forward as the liberator of Greece from Cassander, who had obtained the government of Macedonia in B.C. 312, besieged and took Athens and thence spread his power over all Greece. In B.C. 294 he secured the throne of Macedonia and retained Greece as part of his kingdom. But in B.C. 287 Demetrius was overthrown by Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, and fled to Asia, where he was seized by Seleucus and died a prisoner in B.C. 283. His son Antigonus Gonatas remained in Greece, and kept part of it in obedience to Macedonia. Above all he maintained garrisons in the three places, which from their commanding position were called the 'three fetters' of Greece—Demetrias, Chalcis, and Acrocorinthus. But the Athenians had risen as soon as Demetrius was driven out of Macedonia in B.C. 287, and regained their freedom. The disputed succession to the crown for the next seven years again so much weakened Macedonia, that Greece was once more neglected. This weakness was increased by the invasion of the Celts in B.C. 280; for they defeated and killed Ptolemy Ceraunus, who had obtained the crown only the year before.

The period of political insignificance through which Greece had thus been passing does not seem to have been an altogether unhappy one. The constitutions in the several towns, arranged by Antipater in B.C. 322, appear to have generally worked well; and beyond the offensive presence of a Macedonian garrison the inhabitants had no great reason to complain of their treatment by the Macedonian kings. In B.C. 315 Thebes had been restored by Cassander, and though occupied from time to time by one or

5. Greece
under
Macedonian
supremacy.

other of the rival claimants to the throne of Macedonia, had been generally treated with indulgence. In the Peloponnese, Sparta, though steadily declining in numbers, still retained her old constitution, though her power was confined to her own territory. The other towns for the most part fell under the rule of some despot who relied upon the support of the Macedonian garrison. But about this time the germ of a new combination, which was destined for a time to unite the whole Peloponnese, was formed by a few Achaean cities which for the purpose of mutual protection agreed to unite their forces.

Nor was this period unproductive of men of genius, though it now took somewhat different directions. With the death of Aristophanes (B.C. 380?) the Old Comedy came to an end. With the loss of freedom and the death of Demosthenes (B.C. 322) political oratory was for a time in abeyance.

6. The intellectual movement in the Macedonian period.

With the death of Plato (B.C. 347) and of Aristotle (B.C. 322) one great chapter in the history of Greek philosophy closes. But in all these departments there were successors. A new comedy arose—of manners, rather than of politics or criticism. The authors of it came from all parts of Hellas, but Athens was still its chief home, and the Athenian Menander (B.C. 342–291) the most famous of the writers in it. He is known to us only by the Latin translations of his comedies by Plautus and Terence, no complete play in Greek having survived. Oratory also still formed a subject of study, but it was no longer a great public power, and in the hands of such a man as Demetrius of Phalerum (d. B.C. 283) was little more than essays in academic discussion and an exhibition of style. A whole school of poets also arose, chiefly in Alexandria, who have left charming hymns and pastoral poems, such as Callimachus, Philetas and Asclepiades, and above all Theocritus of Syracuse. Later on Apollonius of Rhodes (b. about B.C. 235) attempted to revive the Epic style of Homer in his *Argonautica*. The central home of these poets was not Athens

but Alexandria. Athens however still remained the headquarters of philosophy. Aristotle had spent much of his time there, and his school was named from the *peripatos* or covered walk in which he taught. He was succeeded by his pupil Theophrastus of Lesbos (b. about B.C. 372) who also taught at Athens.

But two other famous schools arose also in Athens about this time, the doctrines of which had more practical influence through the next centuries both in Greece and Rome than either Plato's Academy—even as modified by the later Academics—or Aristotle's Peripatetics. These were the schools founded by Epicurus and Zeno. 7. Epicure-
ans and
Stoics. EPICURUS was a native of Samos (b. B.C. 342) but came to Athens as a boy. After his education there he taught at various places—Mytilene, Colophon and Lamp-sacus, but returned to Athens in B.C. 307. There he taught numerous pupils in a retired garden. He followed earlier philosophers—especially Democritus—in giving a rationalistic account of the origin of the universe. But the doctrine by which he was most popularly known, or rather misunderstood, was that the 'end' of action—the *summum bonum*—was pleasure. The outside world interpreted this as a licence to excess, without caring to understand his definition of the highest pleasure—the intellectual pleasure of the purified soul. ZENO was a native of Cyprus (about B.C. 340–260) who also came to Athens early in life, and after studying with philosophers of all the schools there, taught large numbers of pupils at first walking in the *Stoa Poecile*, whence his followers came afterwards to be called Stoics. He taught a belief in a single, eternal God; and defined the end of action—the *summum bonum*—to be virtue, sought solely for itself. But either he or his followers made the definition of virtue—which the perfectly wise man alone could possess—so stringent, that it appeared out of the reach of mortal man. The doctrine also of the equality of all sins would seem to render all civil

institutions useless. Yet while the Epicureans advised abstention from politics and a life of retirement and contemplation, the Stoics advised their followers to take part in social and political activities of all kinds. These four schools then—the Academy, the Walk, the Porch and the Garden—had their headquarters at Athens, and attracted numerous students from all parts of Greece, teaching Metaphysics, Ethics, Physics, and Rhetoric. Athens thus started on a new career as a University town, enjoying a prosperity of a quiet kind as great perhaps in its way as that which she had formerly sought as a military and naval power.

The Greeks in Asia were meanwhile rising in importance and prosperity. Seleucus, who from B.C. 301 had included in his great kingdom of Syria nearly all Asia Minor, made it the chief aim of his policy to extend and strengthen Hellenism.

8. The
Greeks in
Asia, Egypt
and the
Islands.

He founded numerous cities in every part of his empire called either *Antiocheia* after his father, *Laodiceia* after his mother, or *Seleuceia* after himself. Many of these were destined to be important and populous towns; and at any rate their settlement offered constant chances of prosperity to his subjects of Greek and Macedonian origin. After his death in B.C. 280 his son Antiochus saved Asia for a time from the inroad of the Gauls, though he perished in a second battle with them (B.C. 261). These kings and their successors were indeed constantly at war. But they used to a great extent mercenary or eastern troops, and did not seriously interrupt the prosperity of the Greek cities, which seem steadily to have risen in wealth and importance, protected by the Seleucid sovereigns from inroads on the east and piracy on the west. One town, PERGAMUS, was maintained in quasi-independence under the rule of Philetaerus, an officer of Lysimachus, whose nephew and successor Attalus after defeating the Gallic invaders of Asia (B.C. 240) assumed the title of king, and for a time extended his power over all Asia Minor west of Mount Taurus. Some other

Greek States also rose to considerable naval and commercial importance in this period. The people of RHODES expelled their Macedonian garrison on the death of Alexander, and quickly obtained a predominant influence in the Aegean, having gained great reputation by their successful resistance to Demetrius Poliorcetes who besieged their capital for more than a year (B.C. 305-4). CHIOS appears also to have gained wealth and naval power: and though BYZANTIUM was hard pressed by neighbours on land, especially by the Celtic migrants, it supported a powerful navy. The chief seat of Hellenic life and energy however was ALEXANDRIA, where the ability of the early Ptolemies not only maintained them in power, but secured provinces in Caria, the Cyclades and the Thracian Chersonese, when the Thracian kingdom came to an end with the death of Lysimachus in B.C. 281. It was for many generations the real capital of the Hellenic race.

Another branch of the Hellenic family had during these events in Greece been passing through times of mingled trouble and success. The final result however was, like that in Central Greece, the loss of independence and submission to a superior power. The towns in Magna Graecia, after a period of prosperity—always however marred by mutual quarrels—were compelled for the most part about B.C. 280-270 to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. Those in Sicily maintained their independence between fifty and sixty years longer. It was in Sicily that the vigour of these Western Hellenes had been chiefly shewn. They had had to struggle for more than a century against an implacable and ever-encroaching enemy in Carthage. The reign of the elder Dionysius—who gained his power because of the dangers of his country—had witnessed four Carthaginian wars. In these wars Dionysius met with many disasters as well as some brilliant successes. The upshot of them all was that the Carthaginians were confined to the western corner of the

9. Sicily
and Magna
Graecia.

Dionysius I,
B.C. 404-368.

island, while the power of Syracuse was supreme in the rest. But Dionysius had not confined his energies to Sicily. He interfered with Central Greek politics, always on the side of Sparta, first against Athens and then against Thebes, and in every way claimed to be one of the great Hellenic family. He also pushed his power in the west. His attacks upon the Greek towns in Italy resulted in the ruin of most of those situated in Bruttium. The reign of his son and successor lasted from B.C. 368 to 344 with a ten years' interval of exile (B.C. 357-346).

Dionysius II,
B.C. 368-344.
Timoleon and
Agathocles.

During this time there was not much trouble with the Carthaginians. But his misrule—especially after his return from exile—weakened Syracuse and began a period of misery to all Sicily, caused by the pillage and violence of the mercenary soldiers hired by the tyrants of the various towns to protect themselves against each other. It was to put an end to this intolerable state of things that the Corinthian Timoleon was sent to Sicily in B.C. 343. His first task was to free Syracuse and other Greek towns from their tyrants. When that was done he had to meet a fresh invasion of Carthaginians, invited by the divided state of the country. His victory on the Crimisus (B.C. 339) put an end to that danger for the time. But the peace secured for Sicily by Timoleon did not last many years after his death in B.C. 336. We have no details of the troubles that followed that event, but in B.C. 317 they enabled Agathocles, a man of humble birth, to seize supreme power in Syracuse. He not only maintained the struggle against the Carthaginians in Sicily, but carried the war into Africa with such success as to induce nearly all the towns subject to Carthage to revolt. But though he championed the cause of the Siciliots against Carthage, he deprived the Sicilian towns of their independence and forced them to submit to his rule. At his death (B.C. 289) this combination melted away. The several towns again fell under the sway of incompetent tyrants. Some of his own mercenaries—the Mamertines—seized

Messana, killed the men, took possession of the women and children, and made the town thus occupied a starting place for plundering and harassing their neighbours. Sicily once more was a scene of disorder and suffering, and in self-defence many of the cities admitted Carthaginian garrisons. Others looked for help elsewhere. Thus Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, was invited to abandon his invasion of Italy and to come to the aid of Syracuse, with which he had been connected by his marriage with a daughter of Agathocles. Pyrrhus spent nearly three years in Sicily (B.C. 278–276) and was at first brilliantly successful against both the Carthaginians and the Mamertines. But the Sicilians were afraid that he meditated establishing a tyranny in Sicily as fatal to their liberty as the encroachments of the Carthaginians. At his first failure, that of the siege of Lilybaeum, he found his position unendurable, and in B.C. 276 he left Sicily to be contended for, as he saw plainly would be the case, by the Carthaginians and the Romans. In fact the independence both of Sicily and of Magna Graecia was on the eve of disappearing for ever. Within ten years of the defeat of Pyrrhus in Italy the cities of Magna Graecia were all subjects of Rome (B.C. 275–266). The result of the first Punic war (B.C. 264–241) was to reduce all Sicily except the kingdom of Syracuse to the Roman obedience. After the fall of Syracuse in the second Punic war (B.C. 212) the whole of the island became a Roman province: while what remained of prosperity, as well as of independence, to the Greek cities of Italy disappeared as a result of the Hannibalian invasion of Italy (B.C. 218–203). The Western Hellenes therefore within the century following the death of Alexander disappeared as a political force. Their civilisation and their spirit survived in the influence which they exercised on their conquerors, who were soon to be the conquerors of the world. The Italian cities indeed—except Naples and Rhegium—quickly lost their Hellenism: but Sicily, though a Roman province, retained its Hellenic aspect and peculiarities for many generations to come.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE AETOLIAN AND ACHAEAN LEAGUES.

After three years of anarchy, Antigonus Gonatas, son of Demetrius Poliorcetes, in B.C. 377 obtained the crown of Macedonia, which (with a short interruption by Pyrrhus in B.C. 274) he held till his death in B.C. 239. The separation of Macedonia from the other kingdoms formed out of Alexander's empire was now complete; but the connexion of Greece with the sovereign of Macedonia was ill-defined, and always a matter of dispute. The various pretenders to the Macedonian throne since B.C. 311 had frequently affected to attack each other in order to liberate Greece. But in fact they had all endeavoured to keep a hold on Greece, and had seized every opportunity afforded by quarrels between the States or parties within them to interfere in Greek politics, or to keep forcible control by introducing Macedonian garrisons. The extent of the control exercised by the Macedonian sovereign differed at different times and in different parts. Thus Thessaly seems by this time to have been practically incorporated in Macedonia; and Boeotia to have acquiesced in almost any order from the king, though left with more nominal freedom. Athens however became for a time really independent in B.C. 287, when after long struggles the Athenians expelled the garrisons placed by Demetrius in the city and the Peiraeus.

1. Greece in the early part of the third century B.C.

Ptolemy II, king of Egypt, B.C. 285—247.

Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia, B.C. 277—239.

2. The Aetolian League.

In the west the Aetolians had maintained their independence: and their vigour and warlike qualities did good service in repelling the invasion of the Celts at Thermopylae and Delphi (B.C. 279). By this time they had a federal government in a fairly advanced state of development. They did not usually fortify towns, but lived in open villages, each with a government of its own. The federation of these townships elected a yearly *Strategus* or general, with a secretary. There was also a general assembly called *Apocleti*, with a smaller body called *Synedri* for judicial, and another called *Nomographi* for legislative, purposes. They had been looked upon by the other Greeks as scarcely Hellenic, —a strange wild and predatory people, whose piracies along the west coast of the Peloponnese were a constant source of terror. They became better known after repelling the invasion of Demosthenes in B.C. 425. Philip of Macedonia had found it worth while to conciliate them by giving them Naupactus, and neither Alexander nor his generals after his death had effected their subjugation. In course of time they had extended their power in Greece by admitting or forcing towns in various parts of the country to join their league. Thus in B.C. 266 they negotiated with the king of Epirus a partition of Acarnania, and subsequently annexed certain portions of Epirus itself. In Thessaly we find Pharsalus, Echinus, Demetrias, Hypata and Heracleia also united with them; in the Peloponnese, Mantinea, Tegea, Orchomenus; in Thrace, Lysimacheia; in Asia Minor, Caria and Chalcedon; and among the islands, Ceos. It is not very clear what the exact nature of their relations with these distant towns was, but from the surviving treaty made with Ceos (about B.C. 240) it seems to have included a mutual engagement to abstain from pillage of each other's merchandize, and a promise on the part of the League to protect the State thus joining it from pillage by others. According to Polybius—who however as an Achæan was their enemy—they were dangerous alike to friend and foe,

and were steadily degenerating in the third century. Their constant warfare ruined their finances, their government was corrupt, and their strategus, who had the absolute power of proclaiming war, acted from selfish and unpatriotic motives. They certainly seem to have been a firebrand in Greece in the last century of her free existence, to have been continually at enmity with the Achaeans, to have intrigued for and against Sparta, for and against Macedonia and Rome, and finally to have been the authors of great misfortunes to the country by inviting the interference of the king of Syria.

In the Peloponnese, Sparta was almost the only one of the old strong States that had retained its independence, and refused to accept a Macedonian garrison. Its constitution had remained the same.

3. Sparta in the third century B.C.

It still had its two kings, five ephors, and gerusia. But in other respects it was much changed. The numbers of the true Spartans had greatly diminished, and the lands had got into the hands of a few families by passing to heiresses. Its old supremacy in the Peloponnese was gone; its territory was confined to Laconia, and even that had been curtailed in favour of the Messenians who acted usually with the Macedonians. It was however strong enough to repel with something like its old spirit the attack of Pyrrhus in B.C. 273-2. The other towns in the Peloponnese were mostly closely allied to Macedonia, and garrisoned by Macedonian soldiers or ruled by tyrants who looked to Macedonia to support their authority.

In this state of things the one hope for independence in the Peloponnese seemed to be a combination of States strong enough to hold its own against jealousy at home and hostility abroad. The nucleus of such a combination was formed about this time. A league of twelve Achaean towns had existed from ancient times. The twelve cities mentioned by Herodotus are Pellene, Aegira, Aegae, Bura, Helice, Aegium, Rhypes, Patrae, Pharac, Olenus, Dyme, Tritaea. Of these

4. Early history of the Achaean League to B.C. 280.

cities Rhypes and Aegae were in some way destroyed, and their places were taken by Leontium and Caryneia. Before B.C. 371 Olenus and Helice had also disappeared, partly owing to an earthquake and partly to the encroachments of the sea. The Achaeans had always enjoyed a good reputation for justice and peaceableness in Greece, and had been selected to arbitrate in the disputes which raged in Magna Graecia about B.C. 400, and between Sparta and Thebes after the battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371). They had also been in early times among the most prolific in colonisation. During the Peloponnesian war they had alternately submitted to Athens and Sparta, but appear to have regained independence at the end of it. During the Macedonian period the cities had declined in prosperity, had ceased to maintain the friendly connexion with each other, and had been forced either to admit Macedonian garrisons, or to be ruled by tyrants. This had been particularly the case while Antigonus Gonatas had been in the Peloponnese during his father's lifetime (B.C. 294-287).

But about B.C. 280, when Macedonia was disturbed by disputes about the throne, and Pyrrhus was starting on his invasion of Italy, four of the Achaean cities—Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea and Pharae—formed a new league to secure each other's independence. This proving after five years' trial to have some stability, it was joined by Aegium, Bura and Caryneia at short intervals; the first after expelling its Macedonian garrison, and the two latter after getting rid of their tyrants. These seven towns formed the whole league for twenty-five years (B.C. 279-255). The principle of the arrangement was that each city should be free, and have a democratic government; but that there should be among them a uniform coinage, and the same standard of weights and measures, and that the business affecting the League generally should be conducted by two *strategi* and a secretary, elected alternately by the

5. The
renewal of
the Achaean
League,
B.C. 280.

several cities. After B.C. 255, instead of two *strategi* one only was yearly elected with a second in command or *hypostrategus*. The assembly (σύνδοξ) of the League met once a year in May (at first always at Aegium) for the election of the officers, and a second time in the autumn for general business; but there was also a council (βουλή) consisting of the officers and certain elect members, numbering about 120, apparently for the management of foreign affairs. The strategus had a cabinet of ten *demiurgi*, in consultation with whom he summoned assemblies and prepared motions to be brought before them. There was also a *hipparch*, who commanded the League cavalry; and a *navarch* to command the squadron of ten ships which was regularly maintained, and *judges* (δίκασται) to administer cases under the federal law. Probably these institutions were gradually developed; but from B.C. 255 when Margos of Caryneia was first elected sole strategus, the League steadily grew to be the chief power in the Peloponnese.

The chief object of the League was to destroy Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese by driving out Macedonian garrisons and the tyrants who depended on them. It had therefore to reckon with the hostility of Antigonus Gonatas, backed up by the jealousy of the Aetolians, who had interests in the Peloponnese because the Arcadian towns of Mantinea, Tegea, and Orchomenus had been joined to the Aetolian League. The success of the Achaeans against this combination was due chiefly to Aratus of Sicyon—the real founder of their power—who in B.C. 251 returned from Argos, where he had been brought up in exile, surprised and expelled the tyrant of Sicyon, and being elected chief magistrate of the town caused it to join the Achaean League. Eight years afterwards—being himself strategus of the League—he drove the Macedonian garrison from Acrocorinthus, caused Corinth to join the League, and in the course of the same year annexed Megara also (B.C. 241).


6. Progress
of the League
under Aratus,
B.C. 251—239.

Aratus, though not a great soldier, was an adroit diplomatist. He not only maintained the struggle against Antigonus Gonatas during that monarch's life, but contrived during the reign of his son Demetrius II to secure the cooperation of the Aetolians in maintaining the opposition to Macedonia. They were so successful that at the death of Demetrius (B.C. 229) there was a general movement among the Peloponnesian towns to join the League. The tyrants of Argos, Hermione, and Phlius abdicated, and those towns joined the League, as Megalopolis had already done in the king's lifetime. In B.C. 229 therefore practically the whole Peloponnese except Laconia and Elis was combined in the Achaean League. It was just at this time that relations began with Rome. Both the Leagues had given aid to the Roman expedition against Teuta queen of the Illyrians, from whose piracies both continually suffered. On Teuta's submission to the Romans, and the agreement made with the Illyrians that they should not sail south of Issus with ships of war, the Roman consuls sent legates to both Leagues acquainting them with the terms of the treaty. They were received with great honour at Corinth and admitted to the Isthmian games, while the Athenians gave them the freedom of their city and allowed them to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries (B.C. 228).

But the success of the Achaean League was viewed with secret dread by its Aetolian allies, and with open hostility by Sparta. And when Antigonus Doson—nominally the guardian of the young king Philip—made himself king of Macedonia (B.C. 229–220), and among the first acts of his reign treacherously seized upon Acrocorinthus, the Aetolians began intriguing with him and with Cleomenes king of Sparta to thwart and weaken the Achaeans. Sparta—as we have said—had much declined

7. Demetrius II, king of Macedonia, B.C. 239–229. Continued rise of the Achaeans. First relations with Rome.

8. Philip V, king of Macedonia, B.C. 229–179 (Antigonus Doson, nominally his guardian, calls himself king, B.C. 229–220). Attempts to revive Sparta.



TEMPLE AT BASSAE (PHIGALIA IN ARCADIA, HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE AETOLIAN INVADERS)

from its ancient position of supremacy. The old discipline which had bred a race of soldiers had fallen into disuse, and the numbers of the true Spartans had been reduced to about 700, the ownership of the land having come into the hands of only 100 families. Agis III (B.C. 244-240) had attempted to reform this state of things by redistributing the land among the Spartans, including some of the perioeci, but had lost his life at the hands of the narrow oligarchy headed by the other king and the ephors. Cleomenes III (B.C. 240-222) married the widow of Agis, and was in full sympathy with his policy. He too wished to restore the old Spartan discipline, and the old equality between all true Spartans. But he could not get the influence necessary to carry out his reforms and to resist the oligarchical ephors, unless he made Sparta strong again, and recovered her old hegemony in the Peloponnese.

The greatest obstacle in the way of these schemes was the Achæan League, which not only aimed at combining all the Peloponnese, but made democratical government in each state—what it called *freedom*—a necessary condition. Cleomenes therefore looked to the jealousy of the Aetolian League as his best support against the Achæans. The Aetolians caught at the chance, and connived at the seizure by Cleomenes of Tegea, Mantinea and Orchomenus, which belonged to them, in order to give him posts of advantage against the Achæans. Encouraged by this Cleomenes proceeded to build a strong fort on the frontier of the territory of Megalopolis, as the Achæans alleged, to enable him to harry Achæan territory: as he alleged, to protect his own borders from their incursions (B.C. 229-227).

9. Enmity
between
Sparta and
the Achæans
leading to
interference of
Macedonia.

The usual result of the enmities of Greek States followed—an appeal for the intervention of a foreign State. Aratus, the chief aim of whose policy had been to exclude the Macedonians from the Peloponnese, and who had in B.C. 229 advanced

a great part of the money required to induce the Macedonian garrison to quit Athens, was eventually the man to invite the interference of Antigonus Doson. This however was not until the war with Cleomenes, upon which the League resolved in B.C. 227, had lasted more than four years and had proved almost everywhere disastrous to the Achaeans.

Cleomenes began the war by invading Arcadia and seizing Methydrium (B.C. 227). This invasion was repeated in each of the next three years. In B.C. 226 he won two considerable victories near Mount Lycaeus and at Ladocaea near Megalopolis, and the next year a third near Dyme. In the next (B.C. 224) he conquered Pellene and Argos. To set off against these feats the Achaeans had very little to shew, and it seemed likely that the other cities in the Peloponnese would declare on the side of Cleomenes. Corinth, Phlius, Cleonae and others did so at once; and in B.C. 223 Cleomenes laid siege to Sicyon—hoping to secure the control of the northern part of the Peloponnese, though Acrocorinthus still remained in the hands of the Achaeans. It was in these circumstances that Aratus, fearing a combination of Sparta and the Aetolians—supported by the king of Egypt, who desired to embarrass the Macedonian sovereign—carried out his long meditated design of inviting the assistance of Antigonus Doson. The king of Macedonia promptly sent an army, which, in spite of protests from the Aetolians, reached the entrance to the isthmus of Corinth. Cleomenes hurriedly abandoned the siege of Sicyon and brought his army to dispute the passage of the isthmus. But alarmed at hearing that Argos had been re-occupied by the Achaeans, he retired upon that town in the vain hope of recovering it. Antigonus therefore advanced unopposed to occupy Acrocorinthus, which the Achaeans handed over to him, and spent the rest of the summer in ejecting the Spartan garrisons which Cleomenes had posted in various strongholds on the borders of Achaia. While wintering at Sicyon and Corinth he was appointed

10. Cleo-
menic war,
B.C. 227—222.
The Achaeans
apply to the
king of
Macedonia.

commander-in-chief of the combined Achaean and Macedonian armies, and in the following year (B.C. 223) recovered Tegea, Orchomenus, Mantinea and other Arcadian towns. Antigonus thus assumed the position of an officer and champion of the Achaean League, and during the winter of B.C. 223–222 attended the league-meeting at Aegium. His Macedonian soldiers were sent home for the winter, and he relied for the time on the League forces and on his mercenary troops. Cleomenes took advantage of this to seize Megalopolis—always obstinately opposed to him—and to dismantle its fortifications and public buildings. In the spring of B.C. 222 he collected his army and advanced into Argolis, where Antigonus had wintered. He was obliged—it was said—to move early, because the king of Egypt, who had been supplying him with money, declined to do so any longer, and he therefore could not maintain a large army through the summer. He hoped either to tempt Antigonus to give him battle with inadequate forces, or to discredit him with the Argives when they found their territory devastated without receiving protection from him. Antigonus however, in spite of popular clamour, could not be drawn into the field, and Cleomenes had to return to Sparta, without any other satisfaction than that of having plundered a hostile territory.

As soon as Antigonus had been rejoined by his Macedonian soldiers, in the summer of B.C. 222, he retaliated on Cleomenes by invading Laconia with an army of twenty-eight thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry. Cleomenes had made preparations to resist the invasion by guarding passes, digging trenches, and felling trees. He himself took post where the roads from Tegea and Argos to Laconia unite, near the town of Sellasia in the valley of the river Oenus. On his right was a mountain called Olympus, on his left Mount Evas, between which was a small plain on which he placed his cavalry and mercenaries, protected by a trench. The position was so strong that at first Antigonus did not venture to attack him.

II. Battle
of Sellasia,
B.C. 222.

But after waiting some days both sides seem to have made up their minds to decide the question by battle. The king's brother Eucleidas occupied Evas, Cleomenes himself Olympus, the light armed troops and cavalry were in the low ground in the centre. The left wing under Eucleidas was the first to give way, for the cavalry and light armed who tried to get on the rear of the Macedonians, as they were advancing up Mount Evas, were prevented by a timely charge of the Achaean cavalry, led by a young officer named Philopoemen, of whom we shall hear much hereafter. The charge was made without orders, but did much to win the battle. His left and centre having been beaten, Cleomenes made a desperate effort to restore the battle on the right. But the enormous weight of the Macedonian phalanx proved irresistible, and when he saw that all was lost he escaped on horseback to Sellasia, and thence to Sparta, and Gythium. There he took ship for Egypt, and disappears from Greek History. Antigonus had little difficulty in occupying Sparta soon after the battle.

Shortly afterwards Antigonus was recalled to Macedonia by the news of an Illyrian invasion, and before many months he was dead. But the result of his victory was to free the Achaean League from all fear of Sparta, and to re-annex to it the towns taken by Cleomenes. Sparta itself was not injured nor forced to join the League. Nominally its freedom was respected and its old constitution restored. But the dual kingship was put an end to soon afterwards by Lycurgus, who though not of the royal blood contrived to be elected king after the death of Cleomenes in Egypt (B.C. 220) with Agesipolis III. In a short time Lycurgus deposed Agesipolis and made himself sole king, or tyrant, though the ephors still continued to be elected and to exercise some control over him. His policy and that of his successors in the tyranny was answerable for the renewal and continuation of the wars in Greece which made inevitable its subjection, first to Macedonia, and then to Rome.

12. Death of
Antigonus
Dosen, B.C.
220. Revolu-
tion in Sparta.

CHAPTER XXIII.

GROWTH OF ROMAN SUPREMACY IN GREECE.

On the death of Antigonos Doson the youthful Philip became real as well as nominal sovereign of Macedonia. The character of the Macedonian monarch was now of great importance to Greece, and it was soon known that, though only seventeen, Philip gave great promise as a ruler and a soldier. Events in Greece presently called for his interference. Just at this time the Aetolians made themselves particularly troublesome to the Peloponnesians. The depredations in Arcadia and Messenia, instigated or connived at by their agent Dorimachus, were so audacious that the Achæan League resolved to assist the Messenians in arms. Thus began another 'Social war,' in which the Achæans—allied with Macedonia, Boeotia, Phocis, Epirus, and Acarnania—contended against the Aetolians allied with Elis and Sparta.

1. Philip V
king of
Macedonia,
B.C. 220—179.

The three years of this war witnessed no great or decisive battle. It began with plundering expeditions on either side, and at first fortune was generally against the Achæans. The Achæan leader Aratus, though an able statesman, was timid and ineffective in the field, and allowed the Aetolians to score a number of petty successes before Philip's arrival towards the end of B.C. 220. It was too late for the king to take part in the campaign of this

2. Social
war, B.C. 220
—217.

year, but he met deputies from the allies at Corinth and agreed to declare war upon the Aetolians. After spending the winter at home in making preparations, in the spring of B.C. 219 he invaded Aetolia. His success was interrupted by the necessity of returning home to repel a threatened inroad of barbarians. But later in the year he made a descent upon Elis, the chief Peloponnesian ally of the Aetolians, and after overrunning the country and capturing the towns of its southern district called Triphylia, in spite of an Aetolian force sent to its aid, he wintered at Argos. Next year (B.C. 218) he prepared to carry on the war by sea, but was induced by the Acarnanians to invade Aetolia again. He captured and plundered Thermus, the capital of the Aetolian League, and many other towns in the valley of the Achelous. His fleet then took him on board at Limnaea on the Ambracian gulf and conveyed him to Corinth. Thence he advanced rapidly by way of Tegea into Laconia, to punish the Spartan king who had invaded Arcadia in his absence. He marched right up to the harbour town of Gythium, whence he laid waste the country. On his way back he baffled an attempt of Lycurgus to intercept him and returned safely to Tegea. Here he was visited by envoys from Rhodes and Chios offering intervention and begging him to end the war. No agreement however was arrived at; and, as the king was obliged to go home to Macedonia in the early part of the next year (B.C. 217), the petty raids began again, the Aetolians harassing Acarnania, and Lycurgus various places in the Peloponnese. About midsummer Philip arrived with his fleet at Cenchrea, the harbour of Corinth. Being there he attended the Nemean games, and while watching the contests received a despatch which altered all his plans and caused him to take a step which had grave consequences for Greece. This despatch announced the defeat of the Romans at Lake Trasimene and determined Philip to do what he had already meditated doing—throw in his lot with Hannibal.

Lycurgus
king of Sparta,
B.C. 220—210.

The first effects of this resolution seemed to be for the happiness of Greece. The king at once took measures for ending the Social war, and a general peace was arranged at Naupactus. The Achaeans and other Peloponnesian States set to work to repair the losses they had suffered, to renew the cultivation of their lands, and to restore the various religious festivals which still played so great a part in Greek life, but which war and its expenses had in many cases interrupted. North of the isthmus of Corinth there was peace indeed, but it was the peace of decay. Boeotia was in every way decadent; and Athens, though freed from the fear of Macedonia, abandoned all care for Panhellenic interests and endeavoured to secure her safety and repose by passing complimentary decrees in favour of the king of Egypt, and any other princes who seemed likely to be friendly or formidable. As far as the Peloponnese was concerned the quiet did not last long. Philip soon found that his schemes of Italian invasion were hopeless. After the peace negotiated with the Aetolians at Naupactus (B.C. 217) he spent a year in collecting a large fleet to dominate the coast of Illyria as a vantage ground for a descent upon Italy. But certain Illyrian princes warned the Roman government, and the appearance, or rather the mere report, of a Roman squadron drove him in headlong flight to Cephallenia. It was only after the Roman disaster at Cannae (August, B.C. 216) that he ventured to take the decisive step of making a treaty with Hannibal. Even then his first envoys were intercepted, and the treaty was not ratified till B.C. 215.

3. Peace of Naupactus. Philip V prepares a fleet to invade Italy, B.C. 217—215.

Meanwhile Philip returned to the Peloponnese, no longer as its defender against the Aetolians, but with the object of extending his own influence there. He already held Acrocorinthus, and he took the opportunity of a revolution in Messenia to seize Messene (Mount Ithome) the other 'horn of the ox.' This brought him into collision with

4. Renewed trouble in the Peloponnese. Philip quarrels with the Achaean League.

the patriotic party of the Achæan League. The Achæans had originally invited Macedonian interference in the Peloponnese: but they had fondly hoped that the Macedonian kings would retire when they had secured them their freedom. But what they meant by 'freeing the Peloponnese' was forcing all States to establish democracy and join their League. What Philip meant was to prevent the invasion of Aetolians and the encroachments of Spartans and Eleans. He always intended to be paramount himself: and in order to secure that object, he introduced Macedonian garrisons into as many towns as possible. Those of the Achæans who opposed this he regarded as enemies, and was believed (though probably without good grounds) to have got rid of Aratus by poison (B.C. 213). The general distrust of him roused in Greece by these proceedings gave the Romans a great handle against him when they proclaimed war in consequence of his treaty with Hannibal.

The war (B.C. 215-205) was not prosecuted with much
 5. The first vigour, but Roman policy aimed at forming a
 war between combination of Greek States against Philip in
 Philip and every direction. The Illyrian princes were sup-
 Rome, ported by Roman troops; a treaty was made
 B.C. 215-205. with the Aetolians; in the Peloponnese Sparta, Elis and Messe-
 nia were declared 'friends of Rome'; in Asia Attalus king of
 Pergamus sought the same protection against Philip and his
 ally Prusias, king of Bithynia. This combination was the
 growth of the first four years of the war (B.C. 215-211). Philip
 confronted the danger with spirit. Upon his side he could
 reckon on Epirus, Acarnania, Thessaly, Boeotia. The
 Achæan League was alternately distrustful of him and willing
 to seek his aid; but on the whole their fear of the Spartan
 tyrant Machanidas (B.C. 210-207) and his successor Nabis
 (B.C. 207-192) kept them loyal to Philip. But the result of
 nine years of warfare—during which the permanent occupation
 of Aegina by Attalus and a Roman fleet kept the opposition to
 Philip alive and active—was that Greece was divided into two

factions, some States looking for protection to Rome, others to Macedonia. It was clear that one or the other of these two powers would become supreme. The question was not settled by the peace of Phoenice (B.C. 205): the division was only emphasised. For in it Rome spoke for one section of Greek States, Philip for the other¹: and it was understood to be little more than a truce.

For a few years however there was comparative quiet in Greece. The great danger to the peace in the Peloponnese was the hostility between Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, and the Achaean League. He had managed to obtain the rule of Sparta, when Machanidas fell in a war with the Achaean Philopoemen, and his ambition was to extend the Spartan dominions. But for the first few years of his rule he confined himself to strengthening his position in Sparta and did not provoke hostility. Another danger was the jealousy of the Aetolian League, which owning certain outlying cities in the Peloponnese and elsewhere in Greece (see p. 312) was exceedingly sensitive to any movement likely to absorb these cities in other combinations. In the west independent Hellenism had disappeared. All the Greek cities in Sicily had fallen under the dominion of Rome after the capture of Syracuse (B.C. 212), while the Greek cities of Southern Italy which had found the same fate after the invasion of Pyrrhus (B.C. 282-275) had been ever since steadily declining, and had in most cases been finally ruined by the Hannibalian war. In Asia, New Ilium and Pergamus were enjoying a kind of independence, but the islands and the Greek cities of Asia were ruled either by the king of Egypt or

6. Between
the first and
second Mace-
donian wars,
B.C. 205-200.

¹ On the Roman side in the peace of Phoenice were Sparta, Athens, Elis, Messenia in Greece, Ilium and Pergamus in Asia; on Philip's side Achaia, Boeotia, Thessaly, Acarnania, and Epirus. The Aetolians were not included in this treaty, because they had made a separate treaty with the Romans in B.C. 211.

by Antiochus king of Syria. Like the few remaining independent States in Greece itself, they were all destined soon to pass under Roman sway.

This followed step by step from the policy of king Philip, which again brought upon him the hostility of the Romans, who gradually adopted the principle that Greek affairs were their immediate concern, and that no interference in Greece was to be permitted to any one except themselves. The first offence of Philip was conniving at a body of Macedonian troops being sent to help Hannibal in Africa, which fought in his ranks at Zama (B.C. 202). But it was his policy in Greece that was the immediate cause of war. Antiochus, king of Syria, returned in B.C. 205 from a seven years' campaign in Central Asia, in which he had won a high reputation and the title of 'the Great.' His ambition was to extend his dominions to Palestine and parts of Cyrene and Egypt. In order to do that he made a compact with Philip to divide the outlying dominions of the young king of Egypt between them. Philip's share was to consist of the islands of the Aegean and the Greek towns of the Thracian Chersonese and Ionia¹. He began at once to carry out his part of the compact by sending an expedition against the Cyclades. The powerful naval State of Rhodes was prevented from interfering for their protection by a war with Crete, in which Philip's agent supported the Cretans; while Philip himself marched to the Thracian Chersonese and seized Lysimacheia at the head of it. He then crossed to Asia and seized Chalcedon and Cius, which he handed over to his brother-in-law Prusias of Bithynia. Thence he invaded the dominions of the king of Pergamus and marched up to the walls of the town. Then going on board his fleet, he took Samos and besieged Chios, fought two battles with the fleets of Attalus and Rhodes at Chios and Lade (B.C. 201), in the

¹ These possessions had fallen to the king of Egypt at the breaking up of the kingdom of Thrace and Asia Minor, B.C. 281. See p. 308.

7. Plan for the partition of the dominions of Ptolemy V king of Egypt (B.C. 205—181).

former with doubtful result, but in the second with complete success. Having wintered in Caria—as he was prevented from returning by the enemy's fleet—in the spring of B.C. 200 he went back to Macedonia.

He had by these proceedings roused Greek feeling against him in every direction. The Aetolians were enraged at his capture of Lysimacheia, which, though once belonging to the king of Egypt, had for some years been a member of their

8. Provocations given by Philip to Rome and other States.


League. Attalus was alarmed by the invasion of his territory and the strengthening of his neighbour Prusias; the Rhodians feared for their supremacy in the Aegean; the Athenians embraced the cause of Attalus, whose friendship was important to them for their corn trade; the guardians of the young king of Egypt were indignant at his outlying possessions in Greece being attacked. From all these States complaints poured into Rome, now become the universal referee for all Greek troubles. Roman commissioners were sent in B.C. 204 to Egypt, and to Greece in B.C. 203: and though Philip endeavoured to counteract their report by sending ambassadors of his own to Rome in B.C. 201, the senators made up their minds that the king must be defeated, if they were to maintain their supremacy, or indeed any footing at all in Greece. Messengers were sent round to Greek States friendly to Rome—the Epirotes, Athamanians, Aetolians and Achaeans—assuring them that they would be protected. An invasion of Attica by Philip's general Philocles was averted; and while the king was engaged on the siege of Abydos, a Roman ambassador visited him with an ultimatum: 'he must abstain from attacking any Greek town, or any place under King Ptolemy, and submit to arbitration the claims for compensation made by Rhodes and King Attalus.' Philip treated this demand with disdain and completed the capture of Abydos. But he soon heard that a Roman army was in Epirus, that another invasion of Attica by his troops had been repelled, and the stores which he had collected at

Chalcis in Euboea burnt. He was obliged to return to Europe, and after a vain attempt to capture Athens, he went to Aegium in the Peloponnesus to meet the magistrates of the Achaean League. He wished them to supply him with garrisons for Corinth and towns in Euboea in return for his defence of them against Nabis of Sparta. His object was to weaken the Achaeans and to commit them to an attitude of hostility to Rome. But the Achaean magistrates were too prudent to be thus caught. Their object was to maintain their independence without provoking the Romans; and Philip went back in disgust to Attica, where, though he again failed to take Athens, he did much damage to the country. Towards the autumn he returned to Macedonia.

The war was thus begun by the Romans with the distinct object of destroying Macedonian supremacy in Greece. What the ultimate position of the Greek States was to be could not be foreseen, nor had the Roman Senate probably any definite plan. The one thing they were certain about was that Philip must withdraw from the country. He was not prepared to yield without a struggle, and in fact shewed great activity and skill in his preparations. For two years (B.C. 200–198) the Roman invasion from Epirus was kept back, and the operations of the Roman fleet in the Aegean were only partly successful. It was not till the advent of T. QUINCTIUS FLAMININUS, early in B.C. 198, that the tide turned. By his energy and good fortune the king's position on the Aous was turned, and a Roman army was in Macedonian territory. The king fled into Thessaly, now for all practical purposes his own dominion. It was there that the war was decided, and it was the Thessalians who suffered most in it, both from the ravages of Philip, intended to make the country unable to support the invading Roman force, and from the inroad on the south of the Roman allies the Aetolians and Athamanians. But Flamininus had made

9. Second
war between
Rome and
Philip V,
B.C. 200–195.

Arrival of
Flamininus,
B.C. 198.



skilful preparations for transport of provisions from his ships, first from a harbour in the Ambracian gulf, and then from Anticyra in the Corinthian gulf. He marched through Thessaly and Southern Greece, everywhere driving out the Macedonian garrisons, sometimes with ease, and sometimes after stout resistance.

Whilst he was besieging Elateia he received the formal adhesion of the Achaean League. This had been brought about directly by the action of the Roman fleet under his brother L. Flamininus. In conjunction with the fleets of Attalus and of Rhodes he had seized certain towns on the

10. The Achaean League adheres to Rome, B.C. 198 (autumn).

coast of Euboea and expelled the Macedonian garrisons, and had finally occupied Cenchrea the harbour of Corinth. The Achaeans felt that the time was come to choose definitely between Philip and Rome. Friendship with Macedonia, as a protection against the Spartan tyrants and the Aetolians, had been a policy of long standing with them. But Philip had forfeited their confidence by his recent conduct in the Peloponnese, and it now seemed that he was also likely to be crushed by the Roman power. After a remarkable debate in a meeting of the League at Sicyon, at which envoys from the allies, from Philip, and from the Romans were heard, the assembly decided by a large majority to follow the advice of the Achaean strategus Aristaenus, who pointed out that they had better accept a free alliance with the Romans, who, if they refused, might and would compel them to submit.

The adhesion of the Achaean League was very welcome to the Romans; but Philip was not conquered yet, nor was the hold of the Macedonians on Greece shaken off. The king still had garrisons in 'the fetters' of Greece, Demetrias, Chalcis and Acrocorinthus, as well as in Argos and a number of towns once in political union with the Aetolian League. He now suggested a conference of all States interested, that he might know

11. Terms demanded from Philip, B.C. 198-7.

exactly what was expected of him before the Romans would consent to withdraw from their attack. The conference was held at Nicaea in Locris, in the autumn or winter of B.C. 198-7, and the demands made will best show what the position of affairs in Greece was.

(1) The Roman general demanded that Philip should evacuate all Greek towns and restore all prisoners; surrender all places in Illyria taken since the peace of B.C. 205, and all that had been taken from the king of Egypt since the death of Ptolemy Philopator (B.C. 205).

(2) The envoys of Attalus demanded the restoration of ships taken at Chios, and the repair of temples near Pergamus.

(3) The Rhodians demanded the evacuation of their Peraea and some towns in Caria, the restoration of Perinthus to Byzantium, and the withdrawal of Macedonian garrisons from Sestos, Abydos, and other ports in Asia.

(4) The Achaeans demanded Argos and Corinth.

(5) The Aetolians demanded that Philip should quit Greece and restore to them the towns once in their League—Cius and Chalcedon in Asia; Lysimacheia in the Chersonese; Pharsalus, Larissa Cremasta, Echinus, and Phthiotid Thebes in Thessaly.

These demands will shew how widely Philip had spread his net over Greece and Hellenic Asia, and what it was from which the Romans now professed to be liberating the Greek States.

The king parried most of the demands, offering to satisfy some and then withdrawing, and finally proposed that the whole case should be referred to the Senate. A truce of three months was arranged for this purpose, and the king's envoys appeared before the Senate. But the answer was uncompromising—Philip must evacuate all Greece, and especially the three strongholds Demetrias, Chalcis and

12. The war continued, and ended by the battle of Cynoscephalae, B.C. 197.

Acrocorinthus. This he was not prepared to do, and the war was therefore renewed in B.C. 197. He tried to retain Nabis of Sparta on his side by giving up Argos to him. But though the treacherous tyrant occupied Argos and exacted money from the citizens, he immediately opened communications with Flamininus. The final battle of the war was fought near a low range of hills in Thessaly called the 'Dog's heads' (*Cynoscephalae*), in which the Romans and their allies utterly defeated Philip, who fled with a small guard of cavalry to Tempe, and there collected his scattered forces. This defeat was not the only blow to Philip's cause. About the same time the Achaeans had defeated his commander in Acrocorinthus; the Rhodians had reconquered their Peraea; and his allies the Acarnanians had been forced to give in to the Roman fleet under L. Flamininus.

Philip therefore made up his mind to submit to the Roman demand for the evacuation of Greece. But it must have been some consolation to him to observe that his doing so did not end all controversies. The Aetolians were profoundly dissatisfied. They expected to get back all their outlying towns, and Philip, as he could not keep them himself, was quite willing that they should do so. But Flamininus claimed most of them as having voluntarily surrendered to Rome. The arrogance of the Aetolians indeed was a bad omen of future harmony. They claimed the chief credit of the victory of Cynoscephalae; had been conspicuously selfish in appropriating plunder; and wanted to impose much harsher terms on Philip than Flamininus was inclined to demand.

The final arrangements for Greece were made by ten Roman commissioners acting in accordance with certain principles laid down by the Senate. These principles were mainly three :

13. The
settlement
of Greece,
B.C. 196.

(1) All existing free States were to be free and autonomous.

This covered the case of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues, of Athens, of Sparta, of the Boeotian and some other States.

(2) Such States as had been actually occupied by the king's garrisons were before the next Isthmian festival (July) to be handed over to the Roman commissioners, who were to decide as to their future status.

These were in all parts of Greece (especially Thessaly) and included the 'three fetters'—Demetrias, Chalcis, and Acrocorinthus.

(3) All Greek towns in Asia occupied by Philip were to be set free at once, and Cius was to be demanded from Prusias.

The States included in the first and third of these categories had therefore no farther cause for doubt or anxiety. They were to be exactly what they were before. No doubt they were fully aware that they owed this to the superior strength of Rome, which might be exerted to deprive them of what it had thus restored to them. But it would not seem a more formidable danger than had for long been threatening them from Macedonia. What public sentiment was excited about was the fate of the parts of Greece coming under the second category as having been in actual occupation of Philip. The task of the commissioners was not quite simple. There would be many claims and counter-claims as to territory to settle between the towns, even if enfranchised, and we find traces of such controversies going on for some years. But the general question—as to whether such States as a whole were to be free or were merely to be transferred from Philip to Rome—they had decided by the time of the Isthmian festival in July.

Many rumours of the usual contradictory kind had got abroad on this subject, and when the herald appeared in the stadium before the crowd of spectators, there was the most intense anxiety to hear him. He declared it to be the will of the Senate that the following peoples should 'be free, without garrisons, or tribute, in full enjoyment of the laws of their respective countries—Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Achaeans of Phthiotis, Magnesians, Thessalians,

14. Proclamation at the Isthmian games, B.C. 196.

Perrhaebians.' This included all districts in which Philip had occupied certain strong towns with Macedonian garrisons. That they were all to be free and not Roman dependencies was good news almost beyond hope, and the proclamation was received with the wildest enthusiasm, as the confirmation of 'the freedom of Greece.' The Aetolians were the only people dissatisfied, for they asserted that Greece could not be 'free' so long as Roman garrisons were in the 'fetters'—Demetrias, Chalcis and Acrocorinthus. This exception Flamininus and the commissioners had felt constrained to make, partly from the feeling that it would not be safe to withdraw entirely, till the new settlement had had time to take root, and partly because Antiochus king of Syria shewed an inclination to interfere in Europe. He had secured Ephesus and even crossed to the Thracian Chersonese, whence Greek discontent might induce him to come farther south. In fact he had only been prevented by the Rhodian fleet from giving active aid to Philip. The settlement however was not meant to break up existing confederacies. Phocis and Locris were allowed to be rejoined to the Aetolian League, and Corinth with some other towns to the Achaean League. The only substantial grievance that the Aetolians had was that the outlying towns once joined to their League (see p. 312) were now independent. On the whole it was a just award, adapted to Greek feeling, and to the importance which the Greeks always attached to local autonomy. Flamininus put a finishing stroke to the work in the following year (B.C. 195-4). After assisting the Achaean League to force Nabis to restore Argos to them and confine himself to the territory of Sparta, surrendering his fleet and withdrawing his garrisons from all towns outside that territory, he proclaimed the freedom of these towns at the next Nemean games; and withdrew the Roman garrisons from Demetrias, Chalcis and Acrocorinthus.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ROMAN CONQUEST OF GREECE, B.C. 193—146.

1. The Aetolians and King Antiochus, B.C. 193. The settlement of Greece made by Flamininus and the Roman commissioners was acceptable to a large part of the country, but there were two States in which deep dissatisfaction remained. Nabis of Sparta, cut off from the sea and surrounded by enemies, felt that his only chance of recovery was for the Achaeans to lose the support of Rome. The Aetolians were disgusted at not recovering their outlying States especially Pharsalus in Thessaly and Leucas (which had not like the others surrendered to Rome), and loudly asserted that the Greeks had not gained freedom but only a change of masters. They looked round therefore for means of resistance, and conceived the idea, which had so often proved fatal to Greece, of calling in a foreign power to their aid. They fixed on Antiochus of Syria.

Antiochus III had been king of Syria since B.C. 223, and had gained the title of 'the Great' from his success in a seven years' expedition in Upper Asia (B.C. 212—205). This had made him at least nominal master of an empire almost as great as that of the ancient Persians. He could command ships from Phoenicia, and he ruled over most of the Greek cities of Asia Minor. He had already come into collision with Rome: for in B.C. 205 he had agreed with Philip to

divide the external dominions of the king of Egypt (see p. 326), and the Romans had guaranteed the safety of Egypt. To secure some of the States once belonging to the Egyptian king and to support Philip he came to the Thracian Chersonese in B.C. 196 (p. 333), where Roman envoys had visited him, and whence he had himself sent ambassadors to Rome. But the latter were told by the Senate that, unless the king quitted Europe, they would free the Greek cities in Asia from him. Antiochus had had a long and on the whole glorious reign, and he was not inclined to accept such haughty commands. His flatterers told him that his wealth and power were equal to a struggle with the presumptuous Republic, and Rome's great enemy Hannibal had taken refuge in his court and urged him to resist. Therefore he was ready to listen to the invitation of the Aetolians.

The result of his arrival in Greece (autumn of B.C. 192) was a widespread and violent party division between those who favoured Roman supremacy, or thought it safer to seem to do so, and those who supported Antiochus and the Aetolians. This division was not only of States against States ;

2. Effects
of Antiochus
coming to
'liberate'
Greece,
B.C. 192.

in nearly every city partisans of both sides were to be found, and all the troubles of a divided Greece seemed likely to recur. It was in Thessaly, Boeotia, and Aetolia that the king looked for his chief support. The Peloponnese was now united and hostile. Earlier in the year Nabis of Sparta by attempting to regain Gythium and other seaports had found himself at war with the Achaean League. He asked for help from the Aetolians and obtained it. But the Aetolians when they arrived murdered Nabis and began to plunder Sparta. The Achaean strategus Philopoemen hastened to relieve it, and with the assent of the Romans, whose fleet was at Gythium, forcibly annexed it to the Achaean League. The Spartans never wished to belong to the League, and, as we shall see, proved very troublesome members of it. But for the moment

the Peloponnese was united; and as that union depended for its continuance on Roman favour or permission, it was hostile to Antiochus. King Philip of Macedonia also, who had accepted the title of friend and ally of Rome, and had no wish to see Antiochus at any rate supreme in Greece, was ready to oppose him. Towns which, like Chalcis and Demetrias, had gained by the Roman award, were not willing to listen to Aetolian suggestions for the recovery of their freedom, asserting that they were already free and had no knowledge of Roman garrisons being in any Greek cities. On his arrival therefore Antiochus did not find anything like the general welcome which the Aetolians had promised him. The next ten months (B.C. 192-191) were mostly spent by him in negotiations with various States: but he obtained little support except from the Aetolians themselves, the Athamanians, and the towns in Boeotia, and some few in Thessaly in which he placed garrisons. The only successful military action was his capture of Chalcis, where he made his headquarters.

But he gave the Romans a good ground for proclaiming war by cutting to pieces a small body of Roman troops near Delium, and next year (B.C. 191) had to face a regular army led by M'. Acilius Glabrio. Being signally defeated at the battle of Thermopylae he fled to Chalcis and thence to Ephesus, and in spite of grandiloquent promises never reappeared in Greece. Earlier in the year his garrisons in the Thessalian towns had been driven out by the advanced guard of the Roman army, assisted by Philip, and after the battle of Thermopylae the Boeotian towns also submitted. Greece was again pacified, but this time the Roman supremacy was not disguised, and the various States which had favoured Antiochus had to submit to whatever the Roman consul chose to award to them. Demetrias for instance lost its independence and, with some other towns, was handed over to Philip as a reward for his fidelity.

3. The
Romans make
war on
Antiochus,
and establish
their authority
in Greece,
B.C. 191.

The only people who stood out were again the Aetolians. After the fall of Heracleia indeed, which was heroically defended by a small Aetolian garrison, the League government did make overtures of submission, but they could not brook the terms insisted upon by Acilius, and it was not until B.C. 189, after standing a memorable siege in Ambracia, that they gave in, consenting to abandon all places occupied since B.C. 192, to annex no other States, and to bind themselves to follow the Romans in war and peace. They in fact ceased to be a sovereign State, and the country quickly deteriorated and became helpless and insignificant.

4. The Aetolians resist for a time, but at length submit, B.C. 189.

Meanwhile Roman vengeance followed Antiochus into Asia, and the threat of freeing the Asiatic Greek cities from him was carried out. They did not however become independent. After the Roman victory of MAGNESIA (December B.C. 190), which had been preceded by more than one defeat of the king's fleet, Antiochus was obliged to surrender all dominions west of Mount Taurus, and the various districts in Asia Minor were assigned to Eumenes of Pergamus (who had succeeded his father Attalus I in B.C. 197) or to Rhodes, while many towns on the coast were to be free and autonomous. Hellenism no doubt gained greatly by this award. The cities prospered under it, and again Hellenic life in Asia gradually became more vigorous than in Greece itself. The drawbacks were the presence of the Roman money-lender (*negotiator*), and the fact that no sufficient provision was made to control the piratical natives in the south, nor to guard against encroaching barbarians in the north-east. Antiochus had at least done this to some extent in his day of power, and the Hellenic cities were not strong or united enough to do it for themselves.

5. Antiochus driven from Asia Minor, B.C. 190.

But elsewhere the freedom which the Greek world seemed to have gained was to a still greater degree illusory. It held it only by the grace of the Roman Senate, and as in the frequently

recurring quarrels between the States reference was continually made to Rome, the fact that there was a superior power to

6. Subjec- whom they were all accountable could never
tion of be forgotten, while the Roman government was
Macedonia gradually led to the conclusion that it would
and Greece be impossible to allow much longer even this
to Rome. outward show of liberty. The country seemed to pine and

dwindle under this shadow. Population in European Greece declined rapidly, the cities were weak and decaying, and the old intellectual activity disappeared. Athens was still the home of philosophy, but even Attic philosophy was falling into disrepute, and was believed to have degenerated into a system of verbal quibbles and sophistries.

The one fairly strong State now existing in Greece was the Achaean League. The story of how it too provoked its fate, and was swept into the Roman net, forms the last chapter in the story of free Greece. The chief name in the history of the League since B.C. 222 is that of Philopoemen: and his great work had been to train and inspire his fellow citizens to resist the encroachment of the three successive tyrants of Sparta—Lycurgus, Machanidas, and Nabis. The crowning act of his life was, after the death of Nabis (B.C. 192), to compel Sparta to become a member of the League. In the next year Elis and Messenia were also added, and the Achaean League thus embraced the whole of the Peloponnesus. But these recent additions to the League did not really add to its strength. They were unwilling members, and always inclined to use any pretext to apply to Rome for remedies of alleged wrongs. In fact from henceforth we find two parties in the League: one was for entire submission to Rome and its policy; the other, while admitting Roman supremacy, was for maintaining their independence by a strict observance of the terms of the treaty of B.C. 198, and a firm resistance to all encroachments upon it by Roman officers.

7. Rome
and the
Achaean
League, B.C.
190—146.
Death of
Philopoemen,
B.C. 183.

But the Roman policy was secretly to support the former of these parties, and to regard the latter as enemies of Rome. The effect of this policy was shewn in B.C. 183. The leader of the romanising party was at this time Deinocrates, that of the moderate party Philopoemen, for the eighth time strategus. With—it was alleged—the secret support of Flamininus, Deinocrates induced Messene to break off from the League. Though old and sick Philopoemen at once marched into Messenia. But he was surprised, taken prisoner, and dragged in chains to Messene and there compelled to drink poison. This excited general indignation. The Achaean assembly elected Lycortas—father of the historian Polybius—strategus, who at once invaded Messenia and laid waste the country; and Deinocrates and his chief followers were forced to commit suicide.

From this time the affairs of the League were largely directed by Lycortas, Archon and Polybius, leaders of the moderate or federal party. But the leader of the opposite party Callicrates gave advice to the Roman Senate, when on an embassy in B.C. 180, which Polybius regards as the beginning of a new policy on the part of Rome towards the Achaean League, destined eventually to prove its ruin. Sparta—as has been said—was neither a willing nor a loyal member of the League, and from the very first there had been a dispute as to whether the exiled citizens, driven out by the tyrants and in subsequent revolutions, should be recalled now that the city was Achaean. The dispute as to this had in part caused the severe measures of Philopoemen in B.C. 188, when he seized Sparta, executed eighty of the anti-federal party, and forced into exile a number of citizens enrolled by the tyrants. These exiles were constantly sending embassies to Rome asking to be restored. In B.C. 180 Callicrates being in Rome on League business supported the prayer of the petitioners, and returned triumphantly to the Peloponnese armed with authority to restore the exiles. A *basis* of a statue still exists with an inscription stating that

8. Affairs of
the Achaean
League after
the death of
Philopoemen,
B.C. 182—179.

‘Callicrates recalled the men of Sparta exiled by the tyrants, reconciled them with the citizens, and restored the ancient concord.’ But he also advised the Senate to observe, both in the Achaean League and in other Greek States, who were for obeying Roman orders and who for opposing them, and systematically to exalt the former and suppress the latter. This Polybius regards as the beginning of the misfortunes of the League, which up till then had been growing in power and resources, and had attracted the alliance of various princes and States. From this time the partisans of Lycortas and Polybius found themselves the objects of suspicion to the Roman Senate: and the crisis was now near at hand at which that suspicion was to prove fatal to themselves and ruinous to the League.

This crisis was brought on by the policy of the kings of Macedonia. Philip V lived nearly eleven years after the defeat of Antiochus at Magnesia (B.C. 190–179): but though he had been rewarded for his loyalty to Rome during the struggle with Antiochus by considerable restorations of territory in Thessaly and elsewhere, he had chafed at his subordination, and had aroused jealousy at Rome by encroachments, especially in the Chersonese. Things had gone so far that, when he died, he was actually making preparations for renewing the war with Rome, and was working to secure the support of those Greek States in which he knew that an anti-Roman feeling existed, or in which he was able to create one. His policy was continued by his son Perseus (B.C. 179–168), especially in regard to promoting and extending his influence in Greece. Perseus even tried to renew the old friendship between Macedonia and the Achaean League, which had been broken when the League formally adopted the alliance of Rome in B.C. 198, the two countries being thenceforward mutually closed to each other. This was sufficient to rouse the jealousy of the Roman government. Frequent commissions of enquiry were sent into Greece and Macedonia, which

g. Tension
between
Philip V and
Rome at his
death, B.C.
179, and policy
of Perseus,
B.C. 179–168.

reported on the preparations of Perseus and the state of unrest in Greece, where many States began again to look to Macedonia, and to speculate as to whether it would not be more prudent to attach themselves to the fortunes of Perseus. The uneasiness in Greece was increased by a severe commercial crisis affecting Aetolia and Thessaly especially. Altogether the Romans made up their minds that Perseus must be deposed; and, though he had not really committed any act of hostility, a Roman army landed at Apollonia in the spring of B.C. 171. The war lasted till B.C. 168, and was ended by the defeat and flight of Perseus at PYDNA, and his subsequent capture.

But the Romans were not content with crushing the Macedonian dynasty. They were resolved to punish all who had supported the king in Greece; for some successes of Perseus in B.C. 171 had roused considerable enthusiasm, and had induced many of the Greeks to shew what their real wishes were. In B.C. 169 two commissioners visited the Peloponnese and gave out that the Senate would hold all who abstained from assisting the Roman cause to be as much guilty of disloyalty as those who worked against it. They even wished the three leaders of the moderates—Lycortas, Archon and Polybius—to be impeached for treason and condemned by the League assembly. There was still enough spirit of independence left in the assembly to refuse to do this, and even to elect Archon and Polybius strategus and hipparch for the next year (B.C. 169–168). But no sooner had Perseus been crushed than the vengeance of the Senate fell upon all real or supposed opponents of Rome in Greece, whose names had been furnished by officious traitors. The commissioners sent to arrange for the dismemberment of Macedonia (B.C. 168–7) were instructed to carry out this measure also. In every city they summoned the avowed partisans of Rome and used their information in detecting the leaders of the opposite party. Polybius gives the black list of these traitors, whom he regards as the most

10. Opponents of Rome removed from Greece, B.C. 168.

worthless men of the day. They vied with each other in filling the lists of the proscribed. Other names were revealed to the commissioners by letters found in the Macedonian archives, while some few had committed overt acts sufficiently notorious to leave no doubt. The decision was the same in all cases: the men were to go to Italy, and there await trial or whatever decree the Senate might pronounce. The case of the Achaeans was rather more difficult. No incriminating letters had been found in the Macedonian archives concerning them. The information before the commissioners rested entirely upon the statements of Callicrates and other informers, and the spirit of the assembly in refusing to condemn men unheard had been shewn before. Special commissioners were sent to the Achaean assembly who demanded that it should pass a vote condemning to death 'all who had helped Perseus,' and said that, when that was done, they would publish the names. The assembly refused to commit such an injustice: whereupon the commissioners named to begin with all who had been in office as strategus since the beginning of the controversy with Perseus. One of these men demanded to be tried openly, whereupon the commissioners drew out a list of about a thousand persons, all of whom were ordered to proceed to Italy to stand their trial. They were quartered in various cities of Etruria, and with the exception of a few who managed to escape, were detained there without trial till in B.C. 151 the survivors, amounting to about three hundred, were contemptuously allowed to return. Though the Achaean League was not now dissolved, it was very much weakened, and Sparta and other unwilling members encouraged to break off. The same was the effect in other parts of Greece. The disloyalty of Boeotia had been more marked than that of other districts; and though no special severities were used except in the case of three cities—Coroneia, Thisbe and Haliartus—which had openly joined Perseus, its impotence was secured by the prohibition of any union between the towns. Cities

on the coast had also suffered much from the Roman fleets commanded unfortunately by men of unscrupulous and rapacious character, who began that practice of wholesale robbery of works of art, which afterwards went to so great a length. The city of Chalcis in Euboea, for instance, though it had been friendly to the Romans, was thoroughly stripped. In all directions the same policy of weakening existing States was followed. The Rhodians had hesitated as to supporting Rome, and they were accordingly ordered to give up the territories which they held in Caria and Lycia and were obliged to obey. Their trade too was partially ruined by Delos being declared a free port, which diverted a large part of the traffic between Greece and Asia from them. Epirus, which contained many Hellenic cities, was treated with still greater harshness, the country being stripped of all its gold and treasures, and an immense number of its inhabitants being sold into slavery. Eumenes of Pergamus had also been suspected of sympathy with Perseus: accordingly his brother Attalus was ostentatiously patronised, while he himself was forbidden to visit Italy, and the Greek cities in his dominions were encouraged to lay complaints against him. Everywhere the Greek world was to be taught that its safety and prosperity depended on submission to Rome.

The complete destruction of Greek independence was still postponed for a few years. But how entirely the Greek cities were in fact subject to Rome is well illustrated by the affair of Athens and Oropus. In B.C. 157-6 the Athenians had a quarrel with Oropus and made a raid upon its territory. At once the Oropians appealed to the Roman Senate, and the Senate authorised the people of Sicyon to appoint a board of arbitrators. They imposed a fine of 500 talents upon Athens. In its then impoverished state Athens was unable to pay, and sent a deputation to Rome of three of its leading philosophers—Carneades, founder

II. The dependence of Greece upon Rome.
Embassy of the three philosophers.

of the new Academy, Critolaus the Peripatetic, and Diogenes the Stoic—to plead with the Senate for a mitigation. Now Athens was and continued to be ‘a free State,’ which had remained firm in its friendship to Rome, and had never therefore suffered any diminution of its sovereign rights, but on the contrary had been specially favoured. Yet there is no question, in case of a controversy with another State, of the final decision being with the Roman government. If this was the case with Athens, much more would it be so with those States which were under the frown of the Republic. The Achæan League was no exception to the rule. The deportation of its leading men to Italy for trial—a trial which never took place—was in itself a sufficient sign of the dependence of the Achæans upon Rome; and it is not wonderful that they should have watched for any opportunity which Roman difficulties or embarrassments might give them of securing a more real freedom.

This seemed to have come when Rome was involved almost simultaneously in an insurrection in Macedonia and a quarrel with Carthage. On the defeat of Perseus Macedonia had been divided into four distinct regions, each with its own capital and government, and each forbidden the rights of intermarriage and ownership of land within the other. This of course destroyed national life and was also a very expensive form of government. Patriotic Macedonians therefore were still found glad to welcome the claims of Andriscus, who pretended to be a son of Perseus and managed, between B.C. 152 and B.C. 149, to collect an army to enforce his claim to the sovereignty of the whole country. He had some success at first, but was finally defeated in B.C. 148 by the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus. It was then resolved to do away with the empty form of freedom hitherto granted to Macedonia. The fourfold division was abolished, and the whole country was to be reduced to the form of a Roman province. Whilst engaged in carrying this

12. Macedonia made a Roman province, B.C. 148.

out Metellus was directed to look into the state of affairs in Greece, where trouble had also been brewing, chiefly owing to the dislike with which the Spartans regarded their position as members of the Achaean League.

Among those Achaeans who returned from Italy embittered by their sixteen years' detention was a certain Diaeus. He was elected strategus for B.C. 149-8 and almost immediately became involved in a quarrel with Sparta on some questions of boundaries. Sparta appealed to the Senate.

13. Quarrel
between
Sparta and
the Achaean
League, B.C.
149-7.

Now by the treaty with Rome individual States in the League had no right to do this. The Senate was only to be applied to by the central body of the League. Nevertheless such separate appeals were covertly encouraged. In this case Diaeus went to Rome in person to state the case of the League government against Sparta. He received an answer in his favour, but with the qualification 'that nothing was to be done affecting life.' He suppressed this qualification, and induced the League assembly to vote for coercing Sparta in arms. The Spartan envoy on the other hand told his countrymen that the Senate authorised them to break off from the League. They accordingly did so, and elected a strategus of their own. They were however beaten in the field by the Achaeans, who elated by this success were particularly annoyed at a commission from Rome arriving at Corinth in B.C. 147 to investigate the matter. They considered that they had settled it already, as they had a right to do, by force of arms. Still greater was the indignation when the commissioners announced that it was the will of the Senate that Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Orchomenus in Arcadia, and Heracleïa in Trachis should be separated from the League. A furious riot arose in Corinth, houses inhabited by Spartans were plundered, and the Roman commissioners themselves were roughly handled when they tried to interfere.

At a meeting of the League assembly, held at Aegium later

in the same year, a fresh commission headed by Sext. Iulius Caesar appeared and warned the Achaeans that, if they did not obey the award of the late commission, war would be proclaimed against them. But Critolaus the strategus of B.C. 147-6, acting in combination with Diaeus, resolved to resist. They put off giving Sext. Caesar a definite answer on various pretexts, and when he returned home with his report the Senate declared war. Critolaus exerted himself to get support from all the Peloponnesian cities, and seems to have succeeded except with those near the coasts of Elis and Messenia, which were overawed by the presence of a Roman fleet.

Caecilius Metellus sent officers from Macedonia to persuade the Achaeans to avoid committing themselves, but they were somewhat roughly treated, and Critolaus prevailed on the League assembly to compel Sparta by force to remain in the League. As the Spartans had acted under the authority of the Senate this was regarded as an act of war.

Metellus was anxious to have the credit of settling the affair before being superseded by his successor in the consulship. Early in B.C. 146, therefore, he marched south through Thessaly by the coast road which would bring him through the pass of Thermopylae. Critolaus had raised the armed levy of the League and was besieging Heracleia, a few miles north of Thermopylae. Hearing of the approach of Metellus, he raised the siege of Heracleia and retired through the pass towards a place called Scarpheia. But he was overtaken by Metellus and defeated. What became of him was never known: some said that he lost his life in attempting to escape over the salt marshes, others that he poisoned himself.

By the law of the League his predecessor Diaeus now became strategus till the following midsummer. He was then re-elected, and with about 10,000 troops which he had managed to raise threw

14. Rome declares war against the Achaean League, B.C. 147-6.

Death of Critolaus, spring of B.C. 146.

15. The fall of Corinth, B.C. 146 (July).

himself into Corinth, to which flocked also many fugitives from Boeotia alarmed by the Roman advance. Metellus, anxious to finish the war, offered favourable terms to the army in Corinth which many of the Achaean officers wished to accept. But Diaeus felt sure that he at any rate would not be pardoned, and determined at all costs to hold out. He arrested and put to death some of those who advocated surrender, and Metellus was obliged to lay regular siege to Corinth. He did not take it however, for early in July the consul of B.C. 146, L. Mummius, arrived with a fresh levy and, sending Metellus back to Macedonia, undertook the siege himself. It did not last long. A slight success on the part of Diaeus encouraged him to sally out and offer battle, in which he was so disastrously defeated that he fled to Megalopolis and there poisoned himself. Three days afterwards Mummius entered Corinth. The town was stripped of everything of value. Countless works of art were shipped home to Italy, and many also perished in the fire which destroyed the city or were ignorantly injured and cast aside by the soldiers. Polybius tells us that he saw some of the most valuable pictures being used as dice boards by the soldiers. The smelting of the statues of bronze and precious metals produced a particular composition which was afterwards much prized by Roman collectors and known as *aes Corinthiacum*. The city was utterly destroyed and remained a mere hamlet till it was restored as a colony by Iulius Caesar.

The fall of Corinth involved the submission of all the cities of the Achaean League and in fact of all Greece, which now became a Roman possession, though not an organized province. The political status of the various towns and districts differed considerably. Ten commissioners were sent out from Rome to assist Mummius in settling the position of the several States, and their award marks the end of free Greece.

I. In the Peloponnese the Achaean League was dissolved, the meeting of its assembly was prohibited, and the members of one State forbidden to own land in another. To each

particular State was assigned a form of local government modified in each case by its special circumstances. The ten commissioners were assisted by Polybius, who was also employed by them to explain the new constitution to the several States, and the numerous statues set up in his honour seem to shew that he was thought to have done his work well. The prohibition as to owning land in another State was it seems soon withdrawn, and even a kind of meeting of the Achaean assembly for religious purposes was allowed. But for purposes of local government each city was separate and paid a fixed sum to the Roman Exchequer, and had no 'foreign policy.' Rome guaranteed its defence, and it had no need of troops, though in certain circumstances it could be called upon to furnish auxiliaries to the Roman army.


II. In the rest of Greece the same policy was followed of dissolving all leagues and confederacies. Thus the Boeotian towns and those in Euboea and elsewhere became separate communities: they had a local government, but were answerable to the Senate. Thessaly was united bodily to the province of Macedonia and its towns were treated as other towns in a Roman province, that is, with a certain local independence, they were all subject to *tributum*, military service, and the authority of the proconsul.

III. Certain towns enjoyed exceptional privileges—such as Athens, Sparta and Sicyon. They were not subject to *tributum* or military service. They had no Roman governor or garrison. They were *liberae civitates*, and a Roman magistrate entered them without his lictors. They made their own laws and appointed their own magistrates, but they too practically, if not technically, lost the sovereign right of making treaties and waging war. They were liable also in certain cases to contribute to the expenses of provincial governors or other Roman officials travelling through their borders.

IV. A large amount of land became *ager publicus* and

16. The
award of the
ten Roman
commissioners
in Greece,
B.C. 146–5.





was the absolute property of the Roman people, the rent of it being paid to the Roman Exchequer. This was the case with the whole territory of Corinth, all Euboea and Boeotia, and the territory of all cities which had resisted the Roman arms and had been taken by force. No doubt the former owners were generally allowed to remain on the soil, and their rent would come to be regarded as a kind of tax; but they lost the right of sale, and were liable at any time to be turned out, or to have the ownership transferred to some one else. Provision however was made for the festivals. A part of the Corinthian territory, for instance, was granted to Sicyon on condition of their keeping up the Isthmian games.

Thus though Greece was not yet organised as a province, its several cities and districts were in a sense provinces of Rome, and had to look to her in many ways for direction, as well as for protection to the Roman governor of Macedonia. The commissioners were thought to have shewn great skill in their constitution-making, and long afterwards Cicero thought of adopting their session at Olympia as a text for a dialogue on 'constitutions.' The general effect however on the national life was disastrous, though perhaps private life may have been rendered somewhat happier by the cessation of the constant petty wars which had agitated Greece. But there was no vitality left in it. The population continued to fall, populous cities dwindled to villages, art and literature steadily declined, and whole districts—as in Aetolia—became almost deserted, or only frequented by pirates. A few towns maintained a kind of prosperity from being in the line of traffic—as Dyrrhachium and Apollonia in the north, Patrae in the Peloponnese, Athens with its dependency Delos, and Rhodes whose trade and carrying business it seemed impossible quite to destroy.

There was one revenge which Greece could and did take upon her conqueror. She conquered his tastes, she dictated the form of his literature, she taught him all the arts and graces

17. Effect of
the Roman
policy on
Greece.

of life, directed his thoughts and his beliefs, and ministered to his bodily and spiritual needs. When Roman literature began it was mostly written in Greek, and even when Latin became the chief medium, its history, poetry and drama were all modelled, in metre, form, and spirit, on Greek writers. Nor was this influence confined to literature: in Rome nearly all teachers, physicians, architects, sculptors, painters, librarians and copyists were Greeks, who had either migrated to Italy to exercise their professions, or had been brought there as slaves and restored to semi-independence as freedmen. Rome had no philosophy except that which was taken wholesale from the Greeks, and the most cultivated of the Roman nobles found it their chief solace to have learned men of Greece living with them as members of their household.

18. The influence of Greece on her conqueror.

It is not growing like a tree
In bulk, doth make men better be.

The practical hard conqueror of the world despised his more subtle and ingenious subject, but he did his best—often clumsily and stupidly—to imitate his graces and appropriate the fruits of his genius.



PHILIP V.



PERSEUS.

CHAPTER XXV.

GREEK LITERATURE FROM THE BEGINNING OF
THE FIFTH CENTURY.

Much that made the glory of Greece has perished for ever. Of its skill in the use of colours in the earlier period we have necessarily only the less perfect kind to be found on pottery; the treasures of its art in marble, bronze, and clay which we possess are after all but a poor remnant of its incomparable store. So too in literature, though many of its masterpieces have survived, the amount is small indeed compared with what once filled the great libraries of Pergamus and Alexandria, or made the glory of the Palatine Apollo or the New Rome on the Bosphorus. But even of what remains it would be impossible in a few pages to do more than mention the writers and their works with a word of appreciation.

1. Surviving
Greek Literature of the
Attic and
Alexandrian
periods, B.C.
500—146.

Some reference has already been made to the early Epic (pp. 13—17, 25—6), to the Lyric, Choric and Elegiac poets (pp. 27—8), and the earliest writers on philosophy and physics (pp. 209—212). We shall here only speak of those writers of what may be called the Attic and Alexandrian periods (from about B.C. 500), a substantial amount of whose works has survived in history, drama and poetry, oratory and philosophy. They were not all Attics, nor did they all use the Attic dialect. But a large number of them were Athenians, and their writings set a standard both of style and form. Athens (and later on Alexandria) was the metropolis of letters and philosophy, to which all eyes turned, and to which most successful men of letters sooner or later found their way. The Attic dialect,

with modifications, remained the accepted literary language, the *κοινὴ διάλεκτος* of literature and science.

I. HISTORY.

Of historians the first of those whose work has survived is HERODOTUS, a native of Halicarnassus in Caria. His city, a Dorian colony, had broken off from the Doric hexapolis and had become ionicised. Moreover Herodotus early in life retired from it because of the tyranny of Lygdamis and resided at Samos. This may account for his use of the Ionic dialect: or it may be that, coming before much Attic prose had been written, he still felt himself bound by the traditions of Hecataeus and the Milesian school. Like Hecataeus he was a traveller as well as a writer; and his travels—which extended from Egypt eastward to the border of the Persian empire, and westward to Sicily and Magna Graecia—were probably undertaken for the most part as a preparation for the work to which he dedicated his life. This was to write the history of the conflict between the East and the West. There is a mixture of the epic and the tragic spirit in his history. It is Homeric in the numerous episodes and digressions which interrupt its continuity, as well as in its language and some of its descriptions. It is tragic in the convergence of all such episodes upon its dramatic catastrophe—the victory of a small and homogeneous nation over a vast empire composed of various and often discordant elements. The last chapter points the moral of the whole: luxury and wealth do not make heroes; victory is to the hardy and temperate. The charms of Herodotus are his insatiable curiosity, his clear and melodious language, his love for a good story and his supreme skill in telling it, and his transparent honesty. When he tells us things of his own knowledge we may nearly always trust him. He was no doubt sometimes deceived; but modern investigations have more

2. HIS-
TORIANS.
Herodotus
of Halicar-
nassus, b. B.C.
484, d. about
B.C. 425.

often than not confirmed his statements. His history in nine books begins with the career of Cyrus, founder of the Medo-Persian empire, and ends with the siege of Sestos following the battle of Mycale (B.C. 479-8). His life from about B.C. 440 was spent at the new colony of Thurii in Magna Graecia. But he had often visited Athens, where he was intimate with Pericles and some of the Alcmaeonidae, and according to one tradition he died there. We do not know, however, for certain either the place or time of his death, but as he alludes to events at least as late as B.C. 430 it cannot have been before that date. Some other passages in his history *may* have been written as late as B.C. 424; and it is most probable that he died about that time at Thurii.

Of THUCYDIDES, son of Olorus and Hegesipyle, little that is certain has been preserved. His father was said to have been descended from Thracian kings, and his mother to have been a relation of Miltiades.

Thucydides
of Athens,
b. about B.C.
471, d. about
B.C. 401.

But the chief fact we know of him is that in B.C. 424 he was in command of some ships off the coast of Thrace and failed to save Amphipolis from Brasidas. He was accordingly banished, and he says himself that he lived 20 years in exile, part of which at any rate he seems to have spent in Magna Graecia. He undertook to tell the story of the Peloponnesian war (B.C. 432-405), but the eight books of his history only take in twenty years of it. The last book seems unfinished, and the tradition is that he died in some way by violence, perhaps at Scaptesyle in an attack by the barbarians, for his marriage with an heiress had brought him estates in Thrace. Another tradition represents him as having been incited to write history by hearing Herodotus read his book at Olympia or during the Panathenaea at Athens. Beginning with a sketch of early Greek history and an account of the origin of the Peloponnesian war, he divides the years of the war itself into two seasons, summer and winter, and relates all the events, military or political, in them which

he could ascertain without much regard to their relative importance. He was not a constant traveller like Herodotus, but he had probably seen the greater part of the localities to which he refers, and had personal knowledge, or information at first hand, of many of the events. When he has striking incidents to narrate he writes with a terseness and concentrated force that leave an extraordinarily vivid impression on the mind. But these qualities are often accompanied by considerable obscurity. This may arise from the rapidity of his own thoughts or from the novelty of his task. Long and continuous narratives were as yet rare in Greek, especially in Attic, and he had no tradition or example of style. His conception of the form which history should take was original and differed considerably from that of Herodotus, and still more from that of the predecessors of Herodotus. For the sake, it would seem, of dramatic vividness, he introduced many speeches into his narrative. These he confesses not to be authentic, but to have been made up by himself, partly from what he had been told, and partly from what he conceived would be said in view of the characters of the speakers and of the circumstances. Such rhetorical exercises were a still greater novelty, and it is in them that his obscurity is most conspicuous and certainly gives the impression of an imperfect mastery over the use of a literary language. These speeches set a fashion in history which was followed by most writers after him, whether Greek or Latin. To compose them became a kind of necessary convention for historians. The most elaborate and in some respects the finest is the 'Epitaphios,' or speech over the fallen, put into the mouth of Pericles in the Second Book. Of the many pieces of brilliant narrative the most famous are the account of the plague at Athens in the Second Book, and the wonderful story of the Sicilian expedition in the Sixth and Seventh Books.

XENOPHON the Athenian, without being a great or brilliant

writer, was a man of wide interests and attractive character. He had enthusiasm ready for everything great and noble, and possessed a clear and easy style; never strong or at white heat, yet never seriously inadequate to his subject. Grammarians find him guilty of deviations from the Attic canon both in construction and word-forms, but this is of little consequence to most of us in view of the simplicity of his narrative, and the obviousness of his meaning. From him we have (1) the *Hellenica* in seven books; of which the first two, professing to be a continuation of Thucydides, were written many years before the last five. They bring down the history of the Peloponnesian war to the restoration of the democracy at Athens after the usurpation of the Thirty (B.C. 405-4). The last five end with the battle of Mantinea and the death of Epameinondas (B.C. 362). (2) We have also the story of the expedition of Cyrus and the retreat of the 10,000 Greek mercenaries, conducted by Xenophon himself after the death of the generals. The frankness, simplicity, and curiosity of this narrative have made it one of the most popular books in the world. (3) His admiration for Socrates, whose company he had frequented as a young man, caused him to compose an interesting memorial of him in four Books of *Memorabilia*—probably the most genuinely historical account of Socrates which we possess—as well as to introduce more of his conversation in his *Symposium*, and to make him the chief speaker in a dialogue on the management of a household, *Oeconomicus*. (4) He wrote also two political and philosophical romances in the guise of histories of Hieron I of Syracuse and Cyrus the Great. Lastly, he composed numerous tracts and dissertations—on Agesilaus, on the constitution of Sparta, on hunting, on horse-keeping, and others. The treatise on the Athenian constitution is probably by some earlier and unknown writer. Soon after his return from the expedition of Cyrus he was banished from Athens, perhaps because it was the Athenian policy just

Xenophon,
b. about
B.C. 431,
d. about
B.C. 354.


then to stand well with the king of Persia, whereas Cyrus had always been a partisan of Sparta. He afterwards accompanied Agesilaus in his campaigns in Asia (B.C. 397-394) and is said to have fought against his own countrymen at the battle of Coroneia (B.C. 394). Some time after this he settled at Scillus, about 30 miles south of Olympia, where for about twenty years he lived the quiet life of a country gentleman. After the battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371) he removed to Corinth, where he died about B.C. 354.

After the death of Xenophon two of his younger contemporaries, Theopompus of Chios and Ephorus of Cyme, wrote histories of Greek and Macedonian affairs. In Sicily, Timaeus of Tauromenium composed a history of his native island.

Polybius of
Megalopolis,
about B.C.
203-121.

In Achaia Aratus left memoirs of his own life, and Phylarchus a history of the League in the time of Philopoemen. But the works of these and of others have perished with the exception of fragments preserved by other writers. The next important historian, of whose writing we have substantial remains, is POLYBIUS of Megalopolis. He wrote a 'general history' of the Graeco-Roman world beginning with the 140th Olympiad (B.C. 220-217) and ending in B.C. 146. It was intended to shew how in this short period nearly all the known world was absorbed by the Roman empire. To make his narrative intelligible, however, he has to go back many years in the history of the several countries. Thus we have from him our best account of the first Punic war, of the early history of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues, of the kingdom of Antiochus in Syria, and of the Ptolemies in Egypt, as well as of the constitutions of Rome and Carthage. He had great opportunities of collecting information, for he and his father Lycortas were prominent politicians in the Achaean League. He was one of the *détenu*s in Italy between B.C. 167 and B.C. 152, and there knew most of the leading men of Rome, and acted as tutor to the younger Scipio Africanus. He was present





at the burning of Carthage and of Corinth ; had himself gone over the route of Hannibal across the Alps, and had visited many other localities connected with the war, as well as more distant countries. His style shews many divergencies from the Attic standard, and probably represents the Greek spoken in his day in the Peloponnese. Though neither graceful nor animated, it is direct and forcible. In form his work is more like Thucydides than Herodotus, though it resembles the latter in the plan of making its various episodes lead up to one great catastrophe. Its originality consists in the severer view taken of the function of history. He is more sparing in speeches, and those that he does give seem more strictly founded on trustworthy information. Five of the Books have survived entire, and considerable fragments of most of the others. His history of the siege of Numantia is lost.

II. THE DRAMA.

In no department of literature did the Greeks shew more originality or exercise more abiding influence than in the Drama. They loved shows and festivals and early learnt to make them cheerful with song and dance. The song and dance still went on, but from them was developed also the Drama. First one actor (or 'answerer') kept up a dialogue with the leader of the chorus, then a second, and finally even a third were added to maintain a dialogue independent of the chorus and to develop a plot, while the chorus remained to sing the interludes, draw the moral of the fable, or at times to intervene in its entanglements. The plots were mostly founded on well-known myths or legends. There were no surprises for the audience, and the masks worn by the actors prevented any aid to dramatic effect from play of features. But the subtle Greek intellect revelled in the art with which a familiar story was unfolded and in the rhetorical excellence of the speeches. The demand

3. The Greek
Dramatists.
TRAGEDY.

for plays was richly answered in every part of Hellas. Scarcely any considerable city was without its theatre, hewn out when possible of some hill side, and few that did not produce poets to compose tragedies which enjoyed more or less of popular favour.

The number of dramas once existing must have been very great. But in this as in other things Athens kept the lead though not the monopoly, and of all this mass of dramatic literature we have surviving only part of the work of three Athenian tragedians—seven plays of Aeschylus, seven of Sophocles, and eighteen of Euripides.

AESCHYLUS, son of Euphorion, born at Eleusis in B.C.


525, began to exhibit plays about B.C. 499.

Aeschylus,
B.C. 525—456.

He fought at Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea (B.C. 480—479), visited the court of Hieron I at

Syracuse more than once, and died at Gela in Sicily in B.C. 456. He was the first to introduce a second actor on the stage, instead of the single actor brought in by Thespis (about B.C. 535), thus making the dialogue the important part of the play instead of the chorus; though in the trilogy—*Agamemnon*, *Choephoroe* and *Eumenides*—it still fills a large and more important place than in his own *Prometheus*, or in any of the plays of Sophocles and Euripides. The principal features to be noted in his work are the lofty and religious tone of the plays, the grandeur of their language (sometimes amounting to inflation) and the neglect of mere stage effects. The *Agamemnon* is perhaps the greatest and most impressive drama in the world. Yet it depends on one situation only, and that an impossible one. But it fills the mind with suspense and terror by the tragic irony of its language, the awfulness of the foreseen catastrophe, and a kind of splendid audacity in its disregard of the limits of time and space. The two companion plays dwell on the inevitable retribution for crime and the expiation for sin demanded by religion. Three of the plays bear on questions of the day, but from a lofty or religious point of view. The *Persae* celebrates the defeat of Xerxes





To face p. 359

SOPHOCLES

and like Herodotus draws the moral that pride and luxury will bring ruin. The *Supplikes* refers to the quarrel with Egypt of B.C. 461, and the *Eumenides* to the attacks on the sacred character and rights of the Areopagus; and the *Seven against Thebes* contains a eulogy of Aristides. Aeschylus is patriotic, but his patriotism rests on tradition and ancient faith. The *Prometheus*, though in language and incident the most simple of all, is perhaps the hardest to interpret. It seems to turn upon a mystic view of the struggle between human aspirations and the destiny which overrules and defeats them, a struggle only to be consoled and relieved by the kindly influence of the powers of nature. But we are left uncertain whether the promised relief is to come from the decay of the old religion or the victorious development of the human faculties.

SOPHOCLES was born in the Attic deme Colonus in B.C. 495. He gained his first tragic prize in B.C. 468. He was distinguished for beauty, good birth and culture. He served as a colleague of Pericles in the Samian war in B.C. 439, and held other offices afterwards without much distinction. In his extreme old age he still continued to write, and according to the common story was engaged in the composition of the *Oedipus Coloneus*, when his sons attempted to deprive him of the management of his property on the ground of the failure of his intellect. The seven plays which we possess, out of a large number, are distinguished by extraordinary grace and beauty of style. He is the most Attic of the dramatists in the severity of his taste and the moderation of his view of men and of art. It is not so much the doom overhanging mankind that interests him as the play of human passions under it. Ajax suffers the unendurable reaction from over-confidence and excessive self-esteem, while the politic moderation of Odysseus—untouched by passion, and neither relenting nor revenging—sways with unerring dexterity the stormier and less refined natures round him. In the *King Oedipus* we have again the rebound from over-confidence and

Sophocles,
B.C. 495—405.

the collapse of reason under the horror of involuntary crime. In the *Electra*—as in *Hamlet*—there is presented the picture of a noble soul oppressed by a task for which it is unequal, though constrained to its performance by love and duty. In the *Trachiniae* love is maddened though not destroyed by jealousy. In the *Philoctetes* just resentment is intensified beyond bearing by solitude and pain, while the honesty and generous impulses of youth are contrasted with Machiavellian cunning. In all of them misery and injustice are relieved by the contrast of true affection or lofty virtue. The heroic courage of Antigone, who will die rather than omit a sister's sacred duty; the devotion and fidelity of the daughters of Oedipus at Colonus; the enduring love of Tecmessa for Ajax and of Electra for Orestes—are altogether noble and cheering. Life with Sophocles is not all miserable or a hopeless struggle against destiny, but a field for the highest virtues to flower amidst the errors and vices of lower natures—'he saw life steadily and saw it whole.'

EURIPIDES, son of Mnesarchus, was born in Salamis on the day of the great battle (B.C. 480). He was therefore fifteen years younger than Sophocles who yet survived him by a year. His early manhood fell at a time when the lectures of such sophists as Anaxagoras, Prodicus and Protagoras were being given at Athens, to the detriment—as old-fashioned citizens thought—of the faith and morals of the rising generation. He first brought out a tragedy in B.C. 455, and continued doing so at frequent intervals for many years. He does not appear to have taken any active part in politics or war, and late in life he left Athens and spent some years at the court of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, where he wrote the two plays on Iphigenia and the *Bacchae*. We know little of his life beyond the fact that he was twice married and that both his wives proved unfaithful. Euripides was the most popular of the dramatists. Distant Greeks were eager to hear his choric odes and dramatic

Euripides,
B.C. 480—406.

speeches. The tale is told of some of the unfortunate Athenian captives in Syracuse having gained the kindness of their masters, and even their own release, by being able to recite passages from the plays of Euripides. Aristotle thought him the 'most tragic' of the poets. On the other hand, Aristophanes made himself the mouthpiece of the most violent and persistent attacks upon him both as an artist and as a moralist; and these severe judgments—founded for the most part on political and social prejudices—have been too often adopted as a basis of modern criticism. The charges against him were chiefly (1) that he altered, generally for the worse and to suit his own purposes, the heroic traditions and legends on which most of the dramas were founded; (2) that he made heroic characters contemptible by their dress and by the use of homely and even paltry language; (3) that his choric songs had little or no connexion with the subject of the play; (4) that he made his tragedies end happily, frequently by the stale device of divine interposition—the *deus ex machina*; (5) that he went out of his way to put into the mouths of his characters sceptical sentiments, opposed to the religion of the country, and derogatory to the wisdom and goodness of the gods; (6) and lastly that he perpetually spoke ill of women. His alteration of the legends, his simplicity of language, and his use of choric songs as mere interludes instead of bearing directly on the subject of the play—a charge much exaggerated—would not have seemed grave faults to a modern critic, had he not learnt to think them so from the violence of contemporary attack, founded on a somewhat futile clinging to a literary tradition. If Euripides, again, doubted the morality of the received theology and the truth of existing theories of the universe, one would think the time come to acquit him of presumption or want of foresight. To doubt what is false is at least a step towards the discovery of what is true. And if it is the fact that his domestic misfortunes made him take a cynical view of women, the noble and pathetic figures of Alcestis and Iphigenia may perhaps

shew that he appreciated what was excellent as well as what was base in them. That the rhetorical and sophistic element is prominent in dialogue and speech is true. But he understood at least a part of his audience, and there is room for all kinds of excellence in the world; and besides these characteristics he has a power of description almost unrivalled. Of the eighteen plays which survive a much larger number the merit is not equal, and there are in them faults of construction and perhaps of taste patent to all, but there is one thing they never fail to be—interesting.

COMEDY had almost the same origin as Tragedy—the *Comos* or revel at the great feasts. But while

4. COMEDY. the latter developed into sombre scenes of heroic struggle and suffering, the former ran wanton in every kind of mirth, frolic, and satire. In form it was not much unlike Tragedy. There were the actors on the stage developing by speech and dialogue the fable conceived by the poet, and there was the chorus in the orchestra dancing to the pipe and chanting his songs. But it was a travesty of its serious cousin. The *fabula*, if it touched on ancient myths and legends, set them forth in a ludicrous light, and the chorus sang parodies of diviner strains. The longest recitation by the chorus was called the *parabasis*, when it turned from the stage and addressed the audience in the name of the poet and commented upon all kinds of local topics and political and social questions. The privilege of the festival seemed to cover any amount of personality, indecency of gesture, allusion, and description, as well as the utmost freedom of ridicule even of the gods themselves. If acted with complete *abandon* it must have been the most astonishing carnival of mad mirth and revelry ever presented to an audience. It is a proof of the versatility of Greek genius that the same people enjoyed it who so keenly appreciated the artistic perfection of tragedy. It seems as though in this one instance they abandoned that ‘moderation’ which is one of the most striking notes of Greek art.

Eleven of the plays of ARISTOPHANES—alone of all the comic poets—have come down to us in their original shape, and they enable us to see something of what Greek comedy was at the period of its most complete licence, and how that licence was gradually curtailed. The earliest of the extant comedies—the *Acharnians* (B.C. 425), the *Knights* (B.C. 424), the *Clouds* (B.C. 423 and 411), the *Wasps* (B.C. 422), the *Peace* (B.C. 419), the *Birds* (B.C. 413)—are all more or less political. The two first are direct manifestoes in favour of peace with Sparta, and bitter attacks upon the character and policy of Cleon. The *Clouds*, though chiefly social and directed against sophistic teaching and its ill effects upon character, yet implies a general attack on the party which supported the war. The *Peace* returns to the same theme without disguise, while the *Wasps* satirizes the effect of Cleon's increase of pay to the jurors in making a constant attendance at the law courts, with a peevish desire for pronouncing sentences of condemnation, the favourite employment of elderly citizens: while the *Birds*, though still in favour of peace, is much more purely poetical and imaginative and much less outspoken in politics.

Aristophanes,
about B.C. 444
to about B.C.
380.

A fresh departure begins with the *Thesmophoriazusae* and *Lysistrata* in B.C. 411. The plea for peace is still the motive of the latter, but the political element is less prominent, and the former is almost entirely devoted to satire on women and ridicule of Euripides. The functions of the chorus are curtailed and there is no *parabasis*. This may have been partly to avoid expense at a time when there was much distress, especially among the land-owners, but it is also because the freedom of speech, easily allowed when the democracy was secure, was dangerous at a time when revolution was in the air. In the *Frogs* (B.C. 405) however he reverts to the old form. The chorus is again prominent, and there is a long *parabasis* more outspoken in recommending amnesty and reconciliation. The main object

Middle
Comedy.

of the play however is not politics but literary criticism, a comparison between the antique grandeur of Aeschylus and the modern cleverness of Euripides.

The *Ecclesiazusae* (B.C. 392) and the *Plutus* (B.C. 392) again belong to the middle comedy. The former is a satire on fanciful constitution-mongering and communism, directed, it is believed, against Plato's *Republic*, part of which had recently appeared, while in the *Plutus* there is little trace of the old comedy. There is no criticism of political personages. It is purely a comedy of manners. The theme is the effect of wealth. The chorus of old farmers or farm labourers is little more important than 'First and Second Citizen' in a play of Shakespeare, and there is no *parabasis*.

It is in fact the beginning of the 'New Comedy,' in which the leading names are Menander of Athens (B.C. 342—291), Diphilus of Sinope (about B.C. 340), and Apollodorus of Gela (about B.C. 300—260), some of whose plays survive in the Latin versions of Plautus and Terence.

III. ALEXANDRIAN POETRY.

As national life became weaker in Greece during the troublous times after the death of Alexander, literature was involved in the general decline. Athens retained to some degree her prestige as the home of Philosophy, but the poetical tradition was for the most part kept up by writers who, though born and living part of their lives in Sicily or other places, yet regarded Alexandria as their intellectual centre, and resided there for instruction or learned society during many years of their life¹. The chief names of this school are Callimachus (ob. circ. B.C. 240), from whom we have some pretty hymns

5. Poets of
the Alexan-
drian School,
about B.C.
320—200.

¹ Other cities in which poets and men of learning found congenial society and protection were Syracuse, Pergamus, Pella and Antioch. The kings of these countries were fond of patronizing poets, and at Pergamus as at Alexandria there was a great library.

and epigrams, and Apollonius Rhodius¹ (b. about B.C. 235), who has left an epic poem in four Books on the expedition of the Argonauts, which, though deliberately an imitation, has yet many beauties. But the most original writers of this school were the pastoral poets—Bion, Moschus, and Theocritus. BION (fl. circ. B.C. 280) came from the neighbourhood of Smyrna. MOSCHUS (fl. B.C. 250—200) was born at Syracuse, was educated at Alexandria and was a pupil of Bion. We have four pastorals of his surviving.

THEOCRITUS was also born at or near Syracuse and also spent many years at Alexandria. His *Idylls* (εἰδύλλιον ‘a little picture’) have set the fashion which pastoral poets from Vergil downwards have followed. The essence of a pastoral is that the action of the poem should have a background of shepherd or country life. The art consists in representing universal passions or historical events without violating the *vraisemblance* of their surroundings. The idylls of Theocritus are not all strictly pastoral. There are town scenes and court poems among them. But the prevailing tone is pastoral and the dialect is Sicilian Doric. They are among the most popular of all Greek poems, partly for the freshness of the country air which breathes through them, partly from the universality of their theme, love and sorrow, and partly again from their literary grace and charm. There are thirty-one idylls extant, though of course the genuineness of some has been impugned.

Theocritus,
about B.C.
300—250.

IV. ORATORY.

A popular assembly involves the cultivation of oratory, for it is by eloquence alone for the most part that it can be influenced and controlled. Everywhere in Greece therefore we find rhetoric cultivated and taught as an art, and regular systems constructed with a view to the object of all oratory—persuasion. But besides popular assemblies,

6. ORATORY.

¹ So called because he left Alexandria and settled in Rhodes.

in which those alone who had this faculty in some degree would be likely to come forward, there were the law-courts which, at any rate at Athens, were popular assemblies on a smaller scale. They too had to be persuaded, and as any man might find himself before a court from no choice of his own, and without being equipped with the necessary skill, he had to look elsewhere for the means of persuading the jury. Hence arose the class of professional speech-writers, ready to put the skill which they had acquired at the service of others. It was again at Athens that this art was practised to its highest technical perfection, though the professional teachers often came from distant cities. At any rate it is only the ten Attic orators of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. whose speeches have been preserved.

From ANTIPHON, one of the supporters of the Four Hundred (B.C. 411), we have three speeches in murder cases, with some skeleton or model speeches for the prosecution and defence. From ANDOCIDES, son of Leogoras, there remain also three speeches, one on the violation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae, a second on his return from exile, and a third on making peace with Sparta (B.C. 390).

LYSIAS was the most eminent of the professional speech-writers. He was born at Syracuse, but his father migrated to Athens when he was a boy. In B.C. 404 he was one of the *metics* selected for death and confiscation by the Thirty; but he escaped by bribing the men sent to arrest him, and survived till about B.C. 375. Two of the speeches attributed to him contain a lively account of this incident in his life. He wrote some hundreds of speeches for clients (of which thirty-four are extant), famous for their business-like style, simple and lucid language, and their success in winning cases.

From ISAEUS we have left eleven speeches out of fifty anciently recognised as his, all in cases of disputed property under wills. He was a pupil of Lysias, and imitates the

Antiphon,
B.C. 480—411.

Andocides,
about B.C.
435—385.

Lysias, about
B.C. 450—375.





To face p. 367

DEMOSTHENES

directness and simplicity of his style. ISOCRATES was a professor of rhetoric rather than an orator, and his surviving writings, though mostly cast in the shape of speeches, are rather political pamphlets. Sometimes they take the form of letters, as those addressed to Philip. Sometimes, as the *Panegyricus*, they are meant to be recited or read at an assembly at Olympia or elsewhere. The *Panegyricus* (B.C. 380) aimed at establishing the claim of Athens to the gratitude of Greece. He was an Athenian by birth, and with the exception of some years passed at Chios, lived mostly at Athens. He died some nine days after the battle of Chaeroneia, it is generally said by his own hand.

Isaeus,
between B.C.
420 and 348.
Isocrates,
B.C. 436—338.

The greatest of all was DEMOSTHENES, born about B.C. 384, the son of a well-to-do manufacturer of the deme Paeania. At twenty years of age he brought an action against his guardians for mismanagement and embezzling of his property. Between that time and B.C. 345 we have 29 speeches in private causes attributed to him, of which 16 have been suspected on various grounds to be spurious. They are however sufficiently above the average of excellence to have been regarded as possibly his. The main features in this branch of the oratory of Demosthenes are the masculine vigour of the style and the technical skill displayed in marshalling facts, stating proofs, and finally winning the feelings of his hearers for his client's cause by the torrent of his eloquence. But the fame of Demosthenes rests more securely on his speeches delivered in his own name in public causes, and the deliberative speeches delivered before the assembly on political questions of the day. Of the former kind we have seven, three of which—*against Leptines*, *on the Embassy*, *on the Crown*—though delivered at public trials, are practically political speeches. Of the latter we have eleven (besides five believed to be spurious) devoted almost exclusively to the policy that he desired Athens to pursue towards Philip, which

Demosthenes,
B.C. 384—322.

has already been discussed (pp. 285—289). Their characteristics are fervour and passionate conviction. He has however the defects as well as the merits of the professional orator. He practises every rhetorical artifice calculated to sway a popular audience, and the special pleading of the counsel is mixed with the fervour of the statesman. There is always a danger of a reaction of feeling after reading one of his vehement denunciations. But for the purpose of the moment they were irresistible, backed by his inspiring presence and his perfectly studied action. As specimens of the artistic use of language they reach the highest point. As contributions to our knowledge of the political situation the *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics*, the speeches *on the Peace* and *on the Symmories*, are of the utmost value. Like Cicero—and at about the same age—his death followed on the final crash of all that he had wished and promoted. He poisoned himself in B.C. 322 after the Lamian war to prevent his surrender to the Macedonian rulers.

From his chief rival and opponent AESCHINES we have only three speeches. One *against Timarchus* on a charge of immorality, in which he took occasion to attack the character of Demosthenes. The second a defence of his own conduct *on the Embassy* to Philip in B.C. 346: and a third on the prosecution of *Ctesiphon*, for proposing a vote of a 'crown' to Demosthenes, which is almost entirely devoted to a furious attack on Demosthenes himself and his whole public career. Aeschines suffers by being continually compared with one greater than himself. He was equal to Demosthenes neither in vigour nor professional skill. His great speech against Ctesiphon—clever and even brilliant as it is—fails continually when it seems on the point of a striking success, and was quite unable to shake the conviction of the people that the cause of Demosthenes was the cause of their own honour and safety. He took an active and not dishonourable part in more than one military expedition between B.C. 371 and B.C. 349. Up to the time of the embassy of

Aeschines,
B.C. 387—314.

B.C. 346 he had been forward in opposing Philip's policy. From that time he was a consistent supporter of Philip and then of Alexander. Having failed to get a fifth of the votes in his prosecution of Ctesiphon he retired from Athens and died in Samos B.C. 314.

Several of the Orations of *HYPEREIDES* have been in part recovered in recent years from MSS in Egypt. He was closely connected with Demosthenes in opposition to the Macedonian government, but he turned upon him at the time of the affair of Harpalus, (p. 301), and one of the recovered Orations is against him.

Hyperides,
about B.C.
396—322.

From *DEINARCHUS* we have three orations all of them connected with the affair of Harpalus, one of them against Demosthenes himself. Being born at Corinth he was not an Athenian citizen and could not deliver these speeches himself. They were written for others, and are somewhat inferior imitations of the greater orators.

Deinarchus,
about B.C.
361—285.

V. PHILOSOPHY.

The two greatest names in the history of philosophy are Plato and Aristotle: and it is from them almost alone that we have an amount of work surviving sufficient to give them a place in an account of Greek literature of this period. Of their supreme position as philosophers no account can be even attempted here. All allusion to their work must be confined entirely to a view of it as literature.

7. PHILO-
SOPHY.
Plato,
B.C. 427—347.

PLATO was born at Athens, where he also died. In the course of his life he travelled in Egypt, Italy and Sicily, where he visited the courts of the elder and the younger Dionysius, the latter of whom he seems to have hoped to win over to philosophy. On one of his voyages from Sicily he is said to have been captured by pirates, sold as a slave, and ransomed by a disciple

and admirer. He had been one of the most constant hearers of Socrates, and in all his dialogues Socrates bears the chief part. How much of them really represents the views of Socrates we cannot be sure, and it is not to our present purpose to enquire. Three of the 'Dialogues'—the *Apology*¹, *Phaedo*, and *Crito*—are directly connected with the trial, imprisonment and death of Socrates, and the *Euthyphro* and *Gorgias* are more or less inspired by it, and these are of all his works (with one exception) the most attractive from a purely literary point of view. The one exception is the *Republic*. It begins with an attempt to define righteousness and the reasons for preferring it to unrighteousness: and then goes on to examine the question on a large scale by constructing a model State and discussing rules for the education of the ruling class in it. Whether this great work is the most complete summing up of Plato's philosophy as applied to practical life or not, the charm of its style, the vivacity of its dramatic setting, the dignity and aloofness of its moral tone constitute—in spite of occasional lapses into sophistic subtleties—one of the greatest pieces of literature in the world. Plato died at Athens in his 80th year while still actively employed in writing if not in teaching. His followers were called Academics, from the *Academeia*, a gymnasium outside Athens in which he taught.

ARISTOTLE was born at Stageira in Chalcidice. His father was physician to Amyntas II, king of Macedonia. From B.C. 367 to 347 he resided for the most part at Athens for study, principally under Plato. On the death of Plato he left Athens, and after living in different places till B.C. 343 was invited to Pella and became the tutor of Alexander. In B.C. 335 he returned to Athens where he lived and taught for thirteen years. He met his disciples in the Lyceum, a gymnasium which had shady walks (*περίπατοι*), from which it

Aristotle,
B.C. 384—322.

¹ The *Apology* is not a dialogue, but purports to be three speeches delivered by Socrates (a) for his defence, (b) on the assessment of his penalty, (c) after his condemnation to death.

seems that his followers derived their name of *Peripatetics*. His writings—even those that survive—embrace nearly every branch of learning and science known in his day. His *Ethics* are perhaps the most familiar of all, but he wrote also on rhetoric, politics, poetry, metaphysics, constitutional history, physics. These encyclopaedic writings have been the starting-point of almost all modern science. Merely as literature his work possesses neither the charm nor the poetical fancy of that of Plato. It is however something greater than literature. The difficulty that meets us in it does not lie in the language, which is simple almost to baldness, but in the connexion of thought and the logical sequence of ideas, in fact from our own inferiority and inability to measure his greatness. From Aristotle's pupil THEOPHRASTUS (ob. B.C. 287), besides a great work on botany, we possess a short book on 'Characters,' which contains some amusing information as to the social life of the time.

It does not belong to a history of literature to follow the developement of philosophy. But it is right to point out that the four schools—the Academy (Plato), the Walk (Aristotle), the Garden (Epicurus), the Porch (Zeno)—have profoundly affected the thought and conduct of mankind in every relation of life; that they modified the early teaching of Christianity itself; and that they all had their origin at Athens. It is this literature and philosophy which constitute the chief service that Greece has done to the world. Though its political history possesses many points of interest and is full of instruction, it would hardly have attracted so much attention but for the consciousness that in every domain of thought, feeling, and taste the Hellenic spirit still survives, permeates the language of our poetry, dominates our art, literature, and drama, and has always been most felt by those nations which have done most for civilisation and liberty.



MASKS OF COMEDY AND TRAGEDY.

I.

KINGS OF SPARTA OF THE TWO ROYAL FAMILIES
FROM B.C. 500.

AGIDAE	B.C.	EURYPONTIDAE	B.C.
Cleomenes I	520-491	Demaratus	abt. 510-492
Leonidas I	491-480	Leotychides	492-469
Pleistarchus	480-458	Archidamus II	469-427
Pleistoanax	458-408	Agis I	427-397
Pausanias	408-394	Agesilaus	397-361
Agessipolis I	394-380	Archidamus III	361-338
Cleombrotus I	380-371	Agis II	338-330
Agessipolis II	371-370	Eudamidas I	330-300
Cleomenes II	370-309	Archidamus IV	300
Areus I	309-265	Eudamidas II	300-243
Acrotatus	265-264	Agis III	243-239
Areus II	264-257	Eurydamidas	239-226
Leonidas II	257-242	Archidamus V	226-220
Cleombrotus II	242-236		
Cleomenes III	236-224		
Agessipolis III	220		

In B.C. 220 Lycurgus, though not of the royal family, was elected king with Agesipolis III. Lycurgus soon got rid of Agesipolis and remained sole king, or tyrant, till B.C. 210. He was followed in the tyranny by Machanidas (B.C. 210-207) and Nabis (B.C. 207-192). On the death of Nabis Sparta was joined to the Achaean League till B.C. 147.

II.

THE KINGDOM OF PERGAMUS.

Philetaerus holds Pergamus for King Lysimachus but declares himself independent	B.C.	283
Eumenes, nephew of Philetaerus, succeeds to the principality		263-241
Attalus (cousin of Eumenes) after a victory over Gauls takes the title of king as Attalus I		241-197
Eumenes II, son of Attalus I		197-159
<i>(who was rewarded by the Romans with most of the dominions of Antiochus in Asia Minor)</i>						
Attalus II, Philadelphus (brother of Eumenes II)		159-138
Attalus III, Philometor (son of Eumenes II)		138-133
<i>(who left the Romans his heirs)</i>						

III.

THE KINGS OF EGYPT, SYRIA, AND MACEDONIA, BETWEEN B.C. 306 AND B.C. 146.

B.C.	EGYPT	B.C.	SYRIA	B.C.	MACEDONIA
306-285	Ptolemy, s. of Lagus	306-301	Antigonos the One-eyed	323-311	{ Alexander IV
285-247	Ptolemy II, Philadelphus	301-280	Seleucus I, Nicator	323-317	{ Philip III (Arrhidaeus)
247-222	Ptolemy III, Evergetes	280-261	Antiochus I, Soter, s. of Antigonos the One-eyed	311-306	Regency of Cassander
222-205	Ptolemy IV, Philopator	261-246	Antiochus II, Theos	306-296	Cassander
205-181	Ptolemy V, Epiphanes	246-226	Antiochus III, Calinicus	296	Philip IV s. of Cassander
181-146	{ Ptolemy VI, Philometor	226-223	Seleucus III, Alexander	296-294	Antipater
170-154	{ Ptolemy VII, Physcon,		or Ceraunus	294-287	Alexander
	joint king with his brother, Ptolemy VI	223-187	Antiochus III, the Great	287-281	{ Demetrius I, Poliorcetes (s. of Antigonos
146-117	Ptolemy VII, sole king	187-175	Seleucus IV, Philopator	281-280	the One-eyed), ob. 283
		175-164	Antiochus IV, Epiphanes		Divided between Lysimachus and
		164-162	Antiochus V, Eupator		Pyrhus
		162-150	Demetrius I, Soter		Ptolemy Ceraunus, s. of Ptolemy I of
		150-147	Alexander Balas		Egypt
		147-125	Demetrius II, Nicator	280-277	[Various claimants]
				277-239	Antigonos Gonatas, s. of Demetrius I
				239-229	Demetrius II, s. of Gonatas
				229-179	Philip V, s. of Demetrius II
					[Antigonos Doson, nominally his
					guardian, assumes the crown
					B.C. 229-220]
				179-168	Perseus [Macedonia a Roman province]

Observe that on the death of Lysimachus, king of Thrace (B.C. 281), his dominions, which included most of Asia Minor, many Islands of the Aegan, and the Thracian Chersonese, were divided between the kings of Egypt and Syria, the king of Syria taking or eventually acquiring most of Asia Minor, while the king of Egypt obtained control over the Islands, the cities on the Thracian Chersonese, and some in Asia. It was these outlying possessions which Philip V (by his bargain with Antiochus III) proposed to appropriate in B.C. 205 (see p. 326).

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
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
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
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